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Abstract of the Dissertation 
 
The Role of Battle Narrative in the Bellum Gallicum 
 
By David Jonathon Nolan 
 
Supervisor Dr. Geoffrey Adams 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of battle narrative in the Bellum Gallicum, to show that these 
passages, including contextual information, are fundamentally persuasive in nature as they are 
integrated into Caesarʼs various self-promotional aims. To date a comprehensive analysis has 
not been undertaken of battle, and where it has been examined by military historians, 
investigations have often relied on the idea that these passages are primarily designed to 
reconstruct the details of the historical event. The thesis instead uses case studies to show 
these passages are not merely an attempt to describe historical events, but are fundamentally 
influenced by the desire to influence the audience. This can be a simple matter of reception, 
whether through the building of tension in the narrative, or the creation of a compelling 
account of a particular battle. More often however battle is used in conjunction with the 
campaign narrative to create an impression, or support an argument regarding Caesarʼs 
interpretation of the episode, as battles are part of the interpretive structure of the text, where 
information conveys his self-promotional objectives. Furthermore, a major objective of these 
accounts is to support Caesarʼs view of the various characters portrayed, and the narrative is 
used to create or encourage views of the individuals and peoples involved. Unsurprisingly, the 
most important figure represented in battle is Caesar, and self-aggrandisement or the 
deflection of criticism shapes the structure and content of these narratives at a fundamental 
level. A detailed analysis of these passages, and their relationship to the book in which they 
appear shows how Caesar structures battle narrative for self-promotion in various ways. Not 
only does such an examination reflect on the way that battle and other military information is 
presented, but it enables insight into the purposes that he had while writing these passages, 
and the extent to which he was willing to utilise battle narrative in the pursuit of the self-
promotional objectives of the work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The intention of this thesis is to demonstrate the role that battle plays in the Bellum 
Gallicum, in particular that the details of battle narrative are consistently used 
persuasively throughout the work. Such an investigation addresses an element missing 
in existing analyses of the military aspects of the work; as military scholarship has 
sometimes underestimated the effect of Caesarʼs various self-promotional objectives 
on the narration of combat and its campaign context. This thesis illustrates that battle 
narratives, and content relevant to an understanding of military affairs such as 
numeric and other contextual information, are utilised for much more than a 
reconstruction of historical events and are fundamentally persuasive in nature. As this 
study illustrates, these passages have implicit messages or arguments embedded in 
their structure and content, often closely related to the relevant campaign or book, and 
are designed to convey very specific information about Caesar, his enemies and the 
campaigns in Gaul.  
 
It may seem self-evident that Caesar would have developed his battle narratives as 
part of his promotional arsenal; however military enquiry has often taken the battle 
narratives as only superficially influenced by persuasive motives. John Keegan states 
the problem clearly:  
 
We now know that Caesar composed his commentaries for a carefully calculated 
political end. And intelligent readers, whether so aware or not, have probably 
always guessed that he overdid the descriptions of his own exploits. Yet surprisingly 
and exceptionally, military historians have never seriously questioned the realism of 
his battle-scenes, viewed as reportage, have indeed generally used his depiction of 
how his legionaries fought as a truth to which they adapt whatever facts they could 
glean of the battles of their own times.
1
 
 
Keegan identified this issue in 1976, however his concern appears to have been 
overlooked by some military historians, who continue to analyse battle in the Bellum 
                                                 
1
 Keegan (1976) p. 64. 
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Gallicum based on the idea that it is primarily reconstructive.
2
 This thesis addresses 
the problem of using battle as it is written, by illustrating that the creation of the 
narrative is not simply based on clarification of source events.
3
 The thesis illustrates 
that battle has an important role in promoting Caesar, not just as a record of his 
victories, but through the persuasive use of content. An example is the presentation of 
events in battle and characters that support his interpretation of each episode, and 
most importantly, support the favourable representation of himself. As this thesis 
illustrates Caesar uses the medium of battle narrative to promote himself throughout 
the Bellum Gallicum far more extensively than is often credited in analysis of the 
military dimension of the work.  
 
This use of battle is illustrated in the description of the massacre of the Usipetes and 
Tencteri in Book Four. Caesar reduces the account down to those elements essential 
to capture the basic sequence of events and the success of the encounter, so that the 
battle itself is described in less than two chapters. He only gives a basic array of 
battle, and a very brief account of what must have been a horrific sight, as the Romans 
cut down fleeing women and children, massacring two entire tribes in the ensuing 
rout.
4
 Nevertheless, the selection of content, in particular the blunt description of the 
slaughter of fleeing non-combatants, supports his justification for the massacre. This 
is apparent as he contextualises the slaughter of women and young boys as the 
elimination of a threat to Gaul, and supports his argument with the description of the 
Roman soldiers who are enraged by the enemyʼs supposed duplicity. The result is that 
the battle narrative supports an overall argument that the Usipetes and Tencteri are a 
threat that simply had to be destroyed.
5
 The battle and the campaign that precede it 
have the same fundamental purpose in establishing the necessity of Caesarʼs actions, 
something he is able to communicate in a very short account of combat. This 
approach is evident throughout the Bellum Gallicum, and a detailed examination 
reveals that battle is most often constructed with an embedded message that can be 
                                                 
2
 See pp. 22-25 below.  
3
 Lendon (1999) p. 275 states that battle descriptions have very rarely been studied as a group within 
the work of an author or as a group compared to other authors, suggesting the need for more 
examination of battle narrative and its place in the text. Kagan (2006) has addressed the major battle 
narratives of the Bellum Gallicum, and this study implicitly responds to Kagan‟s approach and the 
idea that the Bellum Gallicum battle narratives are primarily attempting to explain the source events.  
4
 Bellum Gallicum 4.14-4.15. 
5
 See pp. 297-319 below where the perfidy of the enemy, the threat they pose to Gaul, and fear of 
returning cavalry are all provided as justification for the massacre.  
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determined by looking at structure and content of the battle within the associated 
campaign. 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
This introduction to the thesis discusses the methodology by which battle narratives 
are examined, and addresses the relationship of Caesarʼs battles to historiography on 
battle. The literary study is, due to the extent of the scholarship on the Bellum 
Gallicum, very specific, and largely confined to works that address battle narrative 
and military matters. The body of the thesis shows that Caesar creates persuasive 
narratives using military content, whether this relates to the representation of the 
enemy, subordinates, or Caesar himself. Each chapter of the thesis provides case 
studies that include all the major narratives and most of the minor accounts. As the 
studies illustrate, the objective of battle narrative is fundamentally persuasive, and the 
content of each narrative appears to be determined by how Caesar wishes each 
passage to be interpreted.  
 
This thesis shows that there is a need to recognise the significant difference between a 
report or dispatch and Caesarʼs battle narratives. Specifically, Chapter One examines 
reconstructive elements of battle, to demonstrate that information is not solely 
determined by the need for clarity regarding the historical events. Caesar often 
simplifies or omits the complexities of battle, including contextual information, 
suggesting he is not limited by a need to communicate a full account of combat or its 
context. As the defence of the Rhone in Book One illustrates, even military details 
such as the scale, scope and numbers involved in a battle are not necessarily the 
criteria by which Caesar selects his content.
6
  
 
The remainder of Chapter One gives examples of how Caesar creates a narrative of 
battle that is structured to address reception rather than to clarify the original event. 
While Caesar is often our only record of the events described, it is nevertheless 
possible to see the author developing his narrative even at the expense of coherency 
regarding the course of the historical battle. For example, there is a concern with 
audience reception evident in the Helvetian campaign, in which Caesar varies his 
                                                 
6
 1.8. 
10 
 
level of authorial knowledge to capture the dangers and uncertainty of fighting this 
new enemy.
7
 A similar objective is evident in the Sabis River narrative, where 
contextual information is used to build tension in the passage.
8
 The divergence of 
Caesarʼs battles from a simple dispatch or reconstructive commentary is particularly 
evident the account of the Belgic confederation in Book Two. There he does much 
more than simply report the enemy numbers and constructs his narrative in order to 
develop the topos of the Gallic multitude, a powerful theme that determines the 
content of the passage.
9
 Furthermore, the manner in which Caesar digresses from 
simply reporting events is apparent in the battle of Octodurus, a battle where he is not 
present as character.
10
 Free from the need to directly self-aggrandise his personal role, 
he frames the account in terms of the perception of the protagonists, presenting 
information to vividly illustrate their thoughts, reactions and frustrations. The creation 
of a narrative designed to capture the impressions of the protagonists determines the 
type of content, and the level of detail provided, demonstrating that Caesarʼs battles 
are much more developed than just a report of historical events, as they place style 
and reception prominently in the choice of content and nature of the narrative.  
 
While Chapter One illustrates the manner in which Caesar develops a narrative of 
battle for reception, Chapter Two shows that battle is used to persuasive effect 
regarding the episodes described. Content can support a stated interpretation of an 
episode, as is the case in the destruction of the Tigurini, where it is clearly stated that 
the battle is the implementation of vengeance for past wrongs.
11
 Caesar also utilises 
battle in a more subtle manner, such as in the account of Gergovia, where exempla 
and other combat anecdotes are included specifically to support his stated 
interpretation that the soldiers were at fault for the defeat.
12
 This implicit use of 
military information to create a message is an important aspect of battle narrative. For 
example a study of the second invasion of Britain shows that contextual information 
such as numbers and tribal details are used to argue the level of threat that the enemy 
posed, and later to support the idea that the campaign was resolved successfully. 
Another important aspect of Caesarʼs technique is the use of battle to support and 
                                                 
7
 1.11-1.29. 
8
 2.15-2.29. 
9
 2.1-2.12. 
10
 3.1-3.6 
11
 1.12. 
12
 7.36-7.52. 
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resolve issues raised in each campaign narrative. In the Venetii account the medium 
of battle is used to address the issues he describes that he faced in prosecuting the 
historical campaign.
13
 Similarly, the battle against Ariovistus and the Germani in 
Book One is examined for its relationship to the proposition, raised in the preceding 
chapters, that the Germanic reputation for war was unfounded, and that the claims of 
the enemy leader were empty boasts.
14
 While the methods vary, it is apparent that the 
role of battle in these accounts is to persuade the audience to accept Caesarʼs 
interpretation of the content through the choice of information and the manner of 
presentation.  
 
Chapter Three shows that battle serves a persuasive role in the depiction of the 
participants, beyond that of a simple description of battlefield protagonists. Caesar 
uses the details of battle to create impressions and to interpret the behaviour of groups 
for his audience. An account can simply assign characteristics, as is the case in the 
Bibracte narrative, which is designed to define Gallic character and the manner of 
warfare against the Gauls.
15
 It can also be used to assign negative characteristics such 
as barbarism, or the arrogance and perfidy of the enemy. This is evident in the siege 
of Aduatuca, where Caesar uses topography to capture the arrogance of the enemy, 
and also in the topos of the Belgic multitude, which is used to capture its martial 
inadequacies and opposition to order.
16
 By contrast, the details of battle can be used to 
create a worthy enemy, as is the case with the Nervii in the Sabis River narrative. The 
Nervii are ascribed with virtus, a quality that is only indirectly evident in combat, but 
that creates a foe worthy of the commander.
17
 Individual participants are also subject 
to interpretation through battle, and this chapter examines some of Caesarʼs 
subordinates to illustrate that battle is used to define and encourage an interpretation 
of their behaviour. This is most evident in the representation of the defeated 
commander Titurius Sabinus, around whom the battle narrative is structured so that 
his behaviour is vilified and his agency in the defeat communicated.
18
 Battle is a 
                                                 
13
 3.7-3.16. 
14
 1.31-53.  
15
 1.23-1.26. 
16
 2.29-2.33, 2.1-2.12. 
17
 2.15-2.28. 
18
 For the subordinates see 3.20-3.22, 5.57-5.58, 6.7-6.8, 5.26-5.37. The representation of enemy 
leaders is examined where it affects the construction of a battle narrative. The most notable examples 
are Ariovistus at 1.31-53, and Vercingetorix in Book Seven. These are addressed at pp. 146-161 and 
pp. 260-276.  
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critical component in creating characters that support Caesarʼs interpretation of the 
text, and information is selected in order to persuade the audience as to how these 
characters should be understood.  
 
Chapter Four demonstrates that the narrative of battle serves to generate a positive 
portrayal of Caesar, and case studies show how fundamentally his self-representation 
determines structure and content. Battle is part of an overall scheme of self-promotion 
evident in the third person style of narration and the favourable representation of the 
commander through combat.
19
 However it is used to promote Caesar in other ways, 
through the portrayal of his character, which is sometimes placed at a point of 
thematic resolution, so that his own contribution is consistent with the general 
message of the battle.
20
 The use of Caesarʼs physical presence is most evident in the 
battle of the Sabis River, where the account is constructed to draw attention to the 
impact of his arrival, and to place him at a literary crisis point.
21
 Similarly, battle 
narrative is used to make the most of his instrumentality, such as in the siege of 
Quintus Ciceroʼs camp, where the passage creates a stalemate that maximises the 
impact of his arrival.
22
 The person of Caesar is therefore a critical element addressed 
in the construction of battle, and the narrative is constructed with the specific purpose 
of communicating his importance.  
 
While Caesarʼs person is important, Chapter Four also illustrates that battle plays a 
critical role in capturing his command qualities. Battle narrative can be used to show 
an aspect of his character, as is evident in the siege of Aduatuca where he describes 
events in terms of his own clementia.
23
 In the account of the first invasion of Britain 
Caesar draws attention to his role as commander of this unprecedented deed, and the 
battle narrative is constructed to address how he overcomes the obstacles in the way 
of Roman victory.
24
 Furthermore, in Book Seven, Caesar portrays an ongoing contrast 
of behaviour between himself and the Gallic leader Vercingetorix that influences the 
details of the siege of Alesia.
25
 Throughout the book, the pairing of the two is 
                                                 
19
 See Welch (1998) p. 85. 
20
 See 1.52, 3.14. 
21
 See specifically 2.25.  
22
 5.38-5.51. 
23
 2.29-2.33. 
24
 4.20-4.26. 
25
 See specifically 7.69-89. 
13 
 
designed to show his superiority to his Gallic opposite, a representation that 
culminates in Caesarʼs intervention at the crisis of the battle. These narratives are 
fundamentally influenced by the role set for himself as commander and participant in 
the Bellum Gallicum, thereby demonstrating their part in supporting the self-
promotional objective of the work.  
 
Chapter Five illustrates that battle narrative serves a supportive role in protecting 
Caesar from potential criticism. This is most evident in confrontations during the first 
invasion of Britain, where the narrative establishes his prudence in retiring from the 
island in the face of the unique and difficult circumstances encountered.
26
 Similarly, 
the reporting of the massacre at Avaricum in Book Seven uses implicit arguments to 
justify the treatment of this city, and the slaughter of the Usipetes and Tencteri in 
Book Four appears to address criticism he received at Rome by emphasising the sheer 
necessity of eliminating these tribes.
27
 The importance of explaining Caesarʼs conduct 
is also an ongoing feature of Book Five, and he utilises the second invasion of Britain 
to address the problematic circumstances of the first expedition.
28
 This account is also 
constructed to exonerate him from blame for the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta that 
occurs in the same book. The extent to which the massacre has affected the narrative 
is evident in the attention to affairs in Gaul during the preparations, and Caesarʼs 
general care as commander. Furthermore, the effect of the massacre is also evident in 
the siege of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp, where specific contrasts in behaviour are drawn 
in order to establish that the behaviour of the defeated commanders was entirely 
unsanctioned.
29
 The interrelationship of these episodes supports the case studies of 
each chapter that show how battle is fundamentally constructed to create or support 
the impressions of Caesar's choosing. 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis is a study of battle narrative and its place in the text of the Bellum 
Gallicum, in particular the role that such content plays in self-promotion over any 
                                                 
26
 4.27-4.37. 
27
 7.17-7.28, 4.1-4.15. 
28
 5.1-5.23. 
29
 5.38-5.51. 
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reconstructive historical framework. The study is particularly concerned with a trend 
among some military historians to take the battles as being primarily driven by the 
desire to reconstruct the course of events and the result.
30
 Caesarʼs battles are far from 
what Barthes calls the “vacuousness” of a simple series of events, and there is almost 
always a deeper meaning behind the content and its presentation.
31
 The thesis 
therefore examines the place of battle within the campaign narrative, or addresses the 
immediate aims of the text, with case studies utilised to show direct correlation 
between the content of battle, the campaign description and general self-promotional 
objectives. 
 
Caesar was under no compulsion to comprehensively report the course and result of 
the historical battles described in the text, and in the absence of supporting evidence 
from outside the work, the text itself is the best source for why the battles appear as 
they do.
32
 This thesis makes particular use of any judgement statements made by 
Caesar, such as praise of the enemy in the Sabis River narrative, the blame attached to 
Sabinus for a massacre in Book Five, or the stated reason for the defeat at Gergovia.
33
 
Other narrative clues are also utilised to determine the objective of a particular 
passage, such as combat vignettes, the placement of Caesar on the battlefield, or 
catalogues and speeches.
34
 Caesarʼs own introduction is the key to his style, in which 
                                                 
30
 See pp. 22-25 below. While Caesar does provide reasons for victory, elements of battle support the 
role of the passage in the text, which is not necessarily concerned with the victory or a 
comprehensive reconstruction of the historical event.  
31
 See Barthes (1970) p. 153.  
32
 The text of the Bellum Gallicum poses few problems, which are addressed as required. However as 
Edwards (1917) p. xvii notes, the text as a whole does not present any major manuscript issues. This 
thesis follows the text adopted by Edwards, unless otherwise noted, which is based on the MSS 
group A, B, M and R edited by Nipperdey and R. du Pontet, and includes some corrections by T. 
Rice Holmes. The study also uses the texts available on Diogenes, from the Thesaurus Linguae 
Graecae and the Packard Humanities Institute, with notes on any inconsistencies where required, 
however there are no major issues in terms of the scope of this study. Any translations are the 
author‟s own. Note that the issue of interpolation does not generally affect this study, as two of the 
major episodes in regards to the topic are the customs of the Germani, 6.25-6.28, and the description 
of Britain at 5.12-5.14, both of which are not in themselves battle narratives. See Riggsby (2006) pp. 
1, 11, 133, 196. Riggsby provides an overview of other sources of self-representation in war, none of 
which have the detail of Caesar. See Riggsby (2006) p. 202 for a summary of the paucity of 
evidence. As Riggsby (2006) p. 1 notes there is more evidence for the text than the wars themselves.  
33
 See 2.27.3-2.27.5 for the Sabis River narrative. See 5.52.6 for the massacre. See 7.52.1-7.52.4 for 
Gergovia. Note that sieges are included in this analysis as they often serve similar objectives to field 
battles, skirmishes or other confrontations. 
34
 The focus on implicit arguments is largely due to the general lack of non-narrative comments by 
Caesar, as Riggsby (2006) p. 7 notes. See Kraus (2010) p. 48. Kraus notes that the ethnographic 
passage of Book Six and the description of Gallic bravery are denoted by “flags” such as Caesar‟s 
use of the first person. Rasmussen (1963) pp. 21-27 shows that all 17 occurrences of direct speech in 
the commentaries serve sound literary purposes. See Mannetter (1995) pp. 138-175 on catalogues. 
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no overt purpose is stated for the work; rather implicit arguments are implanted in the 
narrative itself.
35
 As with the introduction, Caesarʼs self-promotion is often implicit 
and embedded in the content of battle. In these cases the text is the best source for 
Caesarʼs persuasive aims and techniques. 
 
This is primarily an analysis of military information, and the investigation focuses on 
the representation of combat and related military data. This involves an examination 
of the criteria by which Caesar selects the information, and his methods of conveying 
such data. From a military perspective disjunctive aspects are examined, such as the 
disappearance of units from the account, the selective record of contextual details and 
attention to particular sections of combat.
36
 Of equal importance is an examination of 
the contextual information necessary for a full understanding of battle, such as 
numeric factors, fighting techniques, topographical data and the delegation of 
command, which are often included outside of the battle narrative.
37
 The relationship 
between battle and the campaign narrative is critical, as the interdependence of the 
two means that battle often serves a complementary purpose in supporting the aims of 
the overall episode.  
 
The approach to understanding the role of these passages is to make comprehensive 
use of case studies. Military analysis tends to examine battle narratives as self-
contained reconstructive entities, so the thesis uses a similar approach to establish the 
persuasive objectives that form the foundation of each account. This is important as 
some passages, particularly the shorter accounts, have not been given much attention 
by military scholars, so these accounts have been included in this study in order to 
fully recognise the role of battle.
38
 These shorter battle narratives can be as important 
as the longer accounts, as they often achieve their objective in a much clearer manner 
and with less extraneous detail. It should also be noted that there is considerable 
linkage between chapters, as the battle narratives often contain multiple methods of 
self-promotion. This means that some passages, such as the Sabis River account, are 
                                                 
35
 See p. 41 below on the introduction to the work. 
36
 See pp. 40-59 below for the issues. 
37
 Kraus (2010) pp. 41-42 notes the general divisions of the work into episodes. This thesis associates 
information generally by campaign, noting that Caesar may describe activity in several locations in 
the one campaign. 
38
 For example, see pp. 113-116 on the defeat of the Tigurini, in which a short account is followed by 
the context in which Caesar interprets the encounter. 
16 
 
addressed in more than one chapter.
39
 It is not possible in this thesis to address every 
aim, nor to analyse in detail every objective, nonetheless the analysis is 
comprehensive enough in its illustration of the various self-promotional roles of battle 
narrative throughout the work.
40
 
 
This study also follows the work of post-Rambaud scholarship that understands the 
text to be essentially self-promotional in nature, but with this self-promotion evident 
in various ways.
41
 Rambaud's seminal work addresses the extent to which the work as 
a whole is a form of propaganda and the misrepresentation of events.
42
 This study 
agrees with Rambaud only in so far as Caesarʼs task appears to take over the 
understanding of events as they appear in the text, and does not presume that the 
objective is always to misinform. Instead, instances where the representation is 
problematic in terms of reconstruction are noted, as narrative selectivity and 
omissions are the often the key to understanding the use of battle. This is a textual 
analysis, and while it has implications for the historical context, it is directed at 
establishing the role of battle narrative within the work.  
 
In particular, the study draws on the work of Kraus, who analyses the use of 
individual elements of battle in accounts such as the Gergovia narrative.
43
 As Kraus 
states:  
 
                                                 
39
 As one of the longest battle narratives of the Bellum Gallicum, the battle of the Sabis River in Book 
Two is not addressed in a single examination, as it encompasses several authorial objectives. See pp. 
66-71, 192-204, 222-238 below. 
40
 The major narrative that does not receive full attention is the siege of Quintus Cicero‟s camp at 6.36-
6.41 which has been noted at pp. 164-165 below. This requires separate examination due to the 
unusual nature of Book Six, as it includes an extended section on the customs of the Gauls. It is 
intended that this be the subject of a further study.  
41
 Kraus (2009) pp. 102, 165. This study follows Kraus in that it regards the narrative technique as not 
essentially designed to “tendentiously” deform the underlying events. Kraus (2005a) p. 103 notes 
how Rambaud‟s approach, based on the idea of propaganda, has been refined, however the essential 
issue of veracity vs. propaganda is still major influence on scholarship. See also Riggsby (2006) pp. 
190, 207-214 on the idea of propaganda as having fallen into disfavour. Wells (2001) at p. 115 states 
that it is generally agreed that the purpose of the commentaries is to inform elites at home of Caesarʼs 
accomplishments, and to facilitate his accession to greater power. 
42
 Rambaud (1966) p. 111 states Ces disjonctions des faits et des liens logiques révèlent l’attitude 
intellectuelle de César. En écrivant les Commentaires, il a voulu prendre en main la compréhension 
de ses lecteurs et, à ce que les modernes appellent synthése historique opposer l’escamotage 
historique. Kraus (2009) p. 165 notes the essential lack of a systemised alteration of events in the 
Bellum Gallicum. 
43
 See Kraus (2010). 
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Caesarʼs decision to reduce the potentially infinite confusion and multiplied 
engagements of war to a few highlighted episodes harnesses a pre-existing grammar 
of military narrative to create a coherent, plausible literary representation of 
experience.
44
  
 
As these are literary representations of combat, this thesis adopts many of the 
observations of Kraus and scholars such as Brown, who address objectives implicit in 
the choice of content and structure.
45
 Narratological studies such as those of Kraus 
have been considered with the knowledge that the text is based on historical events 
such as manoeuvre, combat and a result that are derived from the original event.
46
 
While battle narrative also conforms to “dramatic unities” such as time, place and 
action, the study is primarily concerned with the use of military information in battle 
narrative, and therefore only refers to narratological studies when they impact on this 
data.
47
 Furthermore Latin passages are cited as part of the case studies, and some uses 
of Latin are examined; however Caesarʼs Latinitas is only indirectly addressed.48 
Narratological studies and the examination of Latin are used when they are relevant to 
military information, as the level of textual analysis adopted is designed to illustrate 
the overall role of battle in the work. 
 
Caesar and Battle in Ancient History 
 
Caesar was certainly not the only ancient writer to record a conflict, and there is a 
wealth of sources that include battle. While the records of commentarii are few, other 
historical sources are full of battles with various levels of detail.
49
 Herodotus and 
                                                 
44
 Kraus (2009) p. 165.  
45
 Kraus (2009) pp. 173-174 notes some important sources, including some recent dissertations which 
have been drawn on. These are listed separately in the literature review. See Brown (1999) and 
(2004) who provides analysis of the Sabis River account in Book Two, and the defence of Quintus 
Cicero‟s camp in Book Five. See also Powell (1998) and Grillo (2011) who makes some relevant 
observations on Caesar‟s role as narrator in the Bellum Civile. 
46
 Kraus (2005b) p. 243. Kraus‟ narratological approach provides useful observations on the text. For 
example, Caesar relies on the topos of the besieged city i.e. at 7.47-7.51 and the „topos-code‟ of the 
„decadent Asian East‟. On narratological terms and approaches see de Jong, Nünlist, Bowie, (2007a) 
(2007b). 
47
 Kraus (2009) p. 173 notes this and refers to Keegan (1976) p. 16 for the three elements.  
48
 See Cicero Brut 262 for praise of Caesar‟s style. 
49
 On commentarii see Bömer (1953). See also Cicero ad Attic 2.1.1-2.1.2 on his own commentarius. 
Riggsby (2006) p. 146 lists those works that are known to exist. 
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Thucydides both claimed that war was central to their reasons for writing, and both 
include numerous battles in their works.
50
 Extant Latin sources written before the 
Bellum Gallicum are rare; however it is likely that lost sources such as Catoʼs 
Origines included battle given the prevalence of warfare throughout the republican 
period.
51
 One of Caesarʼs contemporaries, Sallust, also included what he believed 
were noteworthy battles in the war against Jugurtha.
52
 Livy, writing in the early 
imperial period also includes numerous battles, for example major accounts of the 
battles of the Second Punic war.
53
 Similarly Cassius Dio, Arrian, Appian and Tacitus 
all include battle in their works due to the environment of martial endeavour in which 
their works are set.
54
 Even a biographer like Plutarch could record battle in some 
detail, as evidenced by his account of the battle of Marius against the Teutones and 
Cimbri.
55
 Other sources such as manuals on warfare also existed, and while many of 
these do not survive, Frontinus provides an almost encyclopaedic list of battles and 
the basic principles involved, and the fragment of Arrianʼs array against the Alans 
gives a clue to the level of detail that could have been provided in other works.
56
 The 
later work of Vegetius, with its recollection to the earlier periods of Roman warfare, is 
indicative of the pervasiveness of the martial ethos and military concepts.
57
 This small 
selection of the surviving works illustrates that Caesar wrote within a long tradition of 
literary representations of battle, which continued to be a major feature of ancient 
writing after the events described in the Bellum Gallicum. 
 
Caesar was also not the only eyewitness to the battles he recorded. Several of the 
extant sources on ancient battle were written by participants to the events they 
recorded and provide personal eyewitness accounts of battle, or may have come from 
witnesses to the confrontations described. An early participant who wrote on battle is 
                                                 
50
 See Herodotus 1.1 on conflict and for examples see Marathon 6.103-115; Thermopylae 7.206-239; 
Salamis 8.84-96; Plataea 9.17-89. See also Thucydides 1.1 on war, and for examples see Delium 
4.93-97, Amphipolis 4.102-108, and Mantinaea 5.66-5.74.  
51
 See Grant (1970) pp. 169-170 and Krebs (2014) p. 207 on the fragmentary nature of early republican 
historiography. 
52
 See Sallust Bell Jug 5.1-5.3 on his reasons for war being chosen as a topic. See also Bell Cat 1.5-1.7 
for martial endeavour. See also Bell Jug 48-53 and Bell Cat 57-61 for examples of battle.  
53
 See for example Livy 21.55.2-21.55.4 for Trebia, 22.46 for Cannae.  
54
 See for example Dio on Actium 50.15-50.35, on the Teutoberg Forest 56.18-56.24, Arrian Anabasis 
on the Granicus 1.13-1.16; Issus 2.6-2.13; Gaugamela 3.7-3.15. See Appian Bellum Civile on 
Pharsalus 2.70-2.82 and Phillipi 4.105-4.138. See Tacitus Annales 14.32-14.37 on Watling St, 
Agricola 29-37 on Mons Graupius. 
55
 Plutarch Marius 13-27. 
56
 Frontinus Strategmata, Arrian Ἔκταξις κατὰ Ἀλανῶν. 
57
 See Vegetius, Epitome Rei Militaris, and Milner (2011) pp. xxvii-xxix.  
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Thucydides, who not only recorded the siege of Amphipolis at which he commanded, 
but claims to have interviewed other participants in the Peloponnesian war, and 
presumably drew on their experiences for his account of battles he did not witness 
personally.
58
 One of the most immediate eyewitness accounts of battle is given by 
Xenophon, who was present at the battle of Cunaxa described in the Anabasis, and 
who probably included information provided by other participants, such as the death 
of Cyrus at which he was not personally present.
59
 Polybius also personally witnessed 
the fall of Carthage in 149 BCE, and may have extended his history to cover this 
particular battle.
60
 Another direct record of battle comes from the period of civil war 
that followed the death of Caesar as Galbaʼs letter to Cicero provides a first-hand 
account of the battle of Mutina.
61
 Another notable eyewitness account appears in 
Ammianus Marcellinus, who recalls the siege of Amida in considerable detail.
62
 Of 
course many of the surviving sources do not share this proximity to the original event. 
Livy in particular wrote on battles from the early history of Rome in which he was 
highly dependent on a variety of sources, including Polybius.
63
 Most surviving 
sources for the battles of the late republican period, such as Dio, Appian and Plutarch 
were all reliant on other sources due to their distance from the original events.
64
 
Caesar therefore occupies a privileged place of proximity to battle, alongside other 
military writers who were witnesses to the battles they recorded, or who were in a 
position to receive first-hand accounts of the events they recorded. 
 
Whether the narrator was close to the original events or not, writing on battle does not 
automatically equate to an impartial desire to reconstruct the historical events, and 
Caesar is not alone in utilising the martial environment of his work to address self-
promotional or other objectives. In spite of a declaration of truthfulness, Thucydides 
not only simplifies his history, but displays his dislike for figures such as Cleon 
through the narrative, and even admits that his speeches may not be exact 
                                                 
58
 See Thucydides 4.102-108 on Amphipolis. See 1.22 on his investigations. 
59
 Xenophon Anab 1.8.6-1.8.11. See also Grant (1970) p. 127 on Cunaxa. 
60
 See Polybius 3.4 on the scope of the work and 38.21.2 on the fall of Carthage. See Grant (1970) p. 
148. 
61
 Cicero ad Fam 30.1-3.5. Note that this is the same Servius Sulpicus Galba who served under Caesar 
and is described at pp. 88-111 below. 
62
 Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae 18.8-19.8. 
63
 See Oakley (1997) pp. 13ff on Livyʼs sources.  
64
 All wrote in the 1st-3rd century AD, and were therefore none were likely to have access to persons 
who were first hand witnesses. 
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reconstructions of the original words.
65
 Similarly, Xenophon allows self-
aggrandisement to determine his choice of content, particularly in the description of 
his own leadership qualities.
66
 Polybius was influenced in his choice of content by his 
motive in writing, and includes extensive information on Roman political and military 
institutions to illustrate the reasons for Romeʼs rise to dominance.67 Livy in particular 
allows his motive in writing to affect his battle narratives, as his focus on moral 
exempla is apparent in the story of Horatius holding the bridge.
68
 He even includes the 
possibly fictitious meeting of Hannibal and Scipio Africanus before the battle of 
Zama, presumably in order to show contrasts of character.
69
 Even Vegetius, writing 
an ostensible manual on military matters, carefully selected historical content in order 
to convey a political message.
70
 Caesar therefore writes in a literary environment 
where there is a precedent for using the martial material, particularly historical 
material related to battle, for persuasive ends.  
 
While not purporting to write history, it is likely that Caesar had access to and may 
have read some of these other sources, and it is even possible that some of these had 
influence on his style of writing. However the direct influences are not easily 
discernable and the text is somewhat isolated in the corpus as a result. The lack of 
commentarii to compare Caesar with is particularly problematic, as it means Caesarʼs 
use of battle cannot be compared to any obvious genre standards.
71
 Krebs also notes 
that the fragmentary nature of early republican historiography is particularly 
problematic as it limits the sources with which to compare Caesar.
72
 However Krebs 
suggests Caesar may have been familiar with and even drawn on the Historiae of 
Lucius Cornelius Sisenna, in particular noting the similar terminology for descriptions 
of flight.
73
 There is also some evidence that in the Bellum Civile Caesar may have 
owed a debt to Greek historians such as Thucydides, particularly in his treatment of 
                                                 
65
 See Thucydides 1.22 on speeches. See 2.97-99 for an example of what Grant calls the removal of 
“irrelevancies”. See Grant (1970) p. 115-117 on Thucydidesʼ dislike of Cleon. 
66
 Xenophon Anab 4.3.10 for an example. See also Grant (1970) p. 127. 
67
 See Polybius 1.1 for his purpose in writing. See 1.14 for his declaration of impartiality. See also 
6.19-6.42 on the military system, 6.2-6.18 on the political system. 
68
 Livy Praef 1 on his purpose in writing. See 2.10 for the Horatius episode.  
69
 See Livy 30.29-30.33 on Zama. See 30.30 for the speech, and Grant (1970) p. 227. 
70
 See Milner, Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science (2011) pp. xxviii. 
71
 See p. 17 fn. 49 above. 
72
 See Krebs (2014) p. 207, Riggsby (2006) pp. 133-156. Cato‟s Origines does not survive, and due to 
the relative paucity of sources we cannot be sure of the influence of early Latin history on Caesar.  
73
 See Krebs (2014) pp. 208-211. On flight see Sisenna Hist 28 [P34] and BG 1.12.3, 2.24.2, 5.18.5, 
7.67.6. 
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the siege of Massilia and in the description of the camp of Pompey.
74
 There is 
similarly evidence that Caesar may have been influenced by Thucydides in the Bellum 
Gallicum, as noted by Krebs and Kraus.
75
 In particular, Kraus suggests that Bellum 
Gallicum 1.1.1 may be modelled on Thucydides 3.92.2.
76
 Kraus also notes some 
similarities to Ciceroʼs letters from Cilicia; however the third person narrative is 
exceptional to Caesar.
77
 In spite of these possible influences, overall there are few 
sources prior to Caesar with which to compare or contrast the battles of the Bellum 
Gallicum, and available influences limited in terms of the construction of battle 
narrative. 
 
Caesar is also the major source on the wars in Gaul, as there is a relative paucity of 
information following the Bellum Gallicum with which to contrast his account. 
Riggsby notes that sources on the wars in Gaul seem to substantially follow Caesar, or 
are problematic in their own right as sources for comparison, as is the case with 
Cassius Dio who is highly hostile to Caesar.
78
 Other major sources include Suetonius, 
who briefly mentions the wars, Plutarch, and fragments of Appianʼs Gallic History, 
which give various levels of attention to the battles, none in the detail Caesar 
describes.
79
 Even Frontinusʼ Strategmata has only general information on the 
battles.
80
 As Kraus notes, Livy may have modelled his battles directly on Caesarʼs 
style, suggesting that it may be easier to see how he affected the battle narratives of 
others, than to locate his own sources of influence.
81
 Considering Caesarʼs 
exceptional status as a detailed personal account of war in the late Republic, with a 
relative scarcity of historical works with which to compare his style, the text of the 
Bellum Gallicum itself remains the most comprehensive source for analysis of his 
treatment of battle narrative.  
                                                 
74
 For a full list of sources, see Krebs (2014) p. 1.  
75
 See Krebs (2006) pp. 111-136 and Kraus (2009) pp. 159-174. 
76
 See Kraus (2009) p. 164. 
77
 See Kraus (2009) p. 161. See also Cicero ad Att 5.20, ad Fam 15.4. 
78
 See Dio Roman History Books 38-40. For examples of Dioʼs hostility see 38.31, 38.34, 38.35, 39.47-
39.48, 39.48.4-39.48.5, 39.53. 
79
 See Plutarch, Caesar 15, 18-20, 22-26, Suetonius Div Jul 25, 47, 55, 58, 69, Appian Celt 3-5, 15-18. 
80
 See for example Frontinus Strategmata 2.1.16, 2.3.18, 2.5.20, 2.6.3, 3.17.6-7, 4.5.11, 4.7.1. 
81
 Kraus (2009) p. 160. 
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The Bellum Gallicum in Modern Military History 
 
The approach of modern military historians to Caesar has often been to examine the 
Bellum Gallicum as primarily the record of the historical campaigns contained therein. 
Such an approach is evident in the 19th Century, when one of the more high profile 
instances was Stoffelʼs investigations into the topography and location of battles.82 
This work was continued by other scholars such as Rice Holmes, who in his analyses 
of the Bellum Gallicum examined the accuracy and military context of the battles, and 
what the work could provide from a historical perspective.
83
 Keppieʼs more recent 
examination of the battles is particularly representative of the reconstructive 
objective.
84
 So too is Pellingʼs, who attempts to locate possible sites for some of 
Caesarʼs battles, in particular against Ariovistus in Book One.85 Furthermore, the 
Bellum Gallicum has been used as a source of evidence for structural and social 
elements of the Roman army, as is apparent in the work of Goldsworthy.
86
 The 
importance of the Bellum Gallicum to such historians is its value as a primary source, 
in particular the historical veracity of the information provided, in order to understand 
the actual wars fought in Gaul and the nature of the forces involved. 
 
Some recent scholarship of battle, particularly as applied to the Bellum Gallicum, 
relies on the idea that the text is primarily reconstructive in its approach. While there 
is recognition that Caesar may have manipulated his recollection of events to achieve 
a measure of self-promotion, there is a fundamental assumption that he is attempting 
to reconstruct the battle and more importantly, explain the result.
87
 This is evident in 
Goldsworthyʼs Instinctive Genius, The Depiction of Caesar as General, which regards 
                                                 
82
 See Edwards (1917) introduction and pp. 623-631. Edward‟s notes to the Loeb translation of the 
Bellum Gallicum include Stoffel‟s maps and diagrams in order to explain the historical context.  
83
 See Rice Holmes (1911). More recently see Keppie (1984) pp. 80-102, Gilliver (2007) pp. 122-123, 
and most notably Goldsworthy (2010). 
84
 Keppie (1984) pp. 80-102. 
85
 See Pelling (1981). For the inclusion of geographic details and the objective of such information, see 
pp. 245-260 for the first British invasion. 
86
 See the use of the commentaries in Goldsworthy (1996) pp. 171-282 in particular see p. 269. 
87
 See Lendon (1999) p. 277 and Kagan (2006), p. 114. Culham (1989) p. 202 encapsulates the 
problematic attitude towards Caesar based stating “It is simply impossible to imagine Caesar…” 
“Caesar would not have….” “Caesar could not have….” “It is difficult to imagine Caesar…” Such a 
view also appears evident in Gelzer, in regards to the work overall (1968) pp. 171-172.  
23 
 
self-promotion to be primarily based on the record of battle activity.
88
 The approach 
of Goldsworthy is that Caesar recorded the battle narratives as the record of victory, 
and this was in itself sufficient for his self-promotional purposes, with him simply 
accentuating his own role.
89
 This implicit acceptance of the objective is problematic 
as it does not account for other motives, the plethora of reasons that information 
might be absent or present in a battle narrative and the full range of reasons that 
information may have been omitted.
90
 The primary determinant for such scholarship 
is in effect retrospective, looking back to the battle itself as the main source of self-
promotion, rather than the presentation of the text and the recollection that Caesar 
wishes to be the record of events.  
 
One of the most important influences on the military debate is John Keeganʼs Face of 
Battle, which has been highly influential with regard to the nature of battle narrative.
91
 
As noted above, Keegan is highly dismissive of Caesarʼs accounts, due to their 
emphasis on self-promotion.
92
 Caesarʼs emphasis on self-aggrandisement is 
problematic as it marginalises the soldierʼs experience that is, for Keegan, essential in 
understanding the nature of battle.
93
 Nevertheless, even where disputed, Keeganʼs 
approach to battle has set terms among historians such as J. E. Lendon and K. Kagan, 
who address Keeganʼs work in their own analyses of the Bellum Gallicum.94 Lendon 
and Kagan both regard the battle narratives as motivated by a desire to explain the 
                                                 
88
 Goldsworthy (2010) p. 212 acknowledges the existence of promotional objectives in the Bellum 
Gallicum, while using the text for a high level view of Caesar‟s military activity. The relationship of 
military historians to the literary dimension is complicated however, as Goldsworthy (1998) p. 193 
states that Caesar appears in the right place doing the right thing, stating that the commentarii are 
packed with military information, marred by excessive glorification of Caesar. Sabin (2000) p. 3 also 
notes the risks of literary distortion in the sources. 
89
 See Goldsworthy (2006) p. 280. On the uncritical use of sources see Wheeler (2001) p. 171 who 
cites Goldsworthy (1996) pp. 117-118. Wheeler (1998) p. 649 is highly critical of Goldsworthy. See 
also Gerlinger (2008) p. 17 for criticism of Goldsworthy‟s use of battle scenes. 
90
 For example, Goldsworthy (2010) p. 214 states that the tribes in Gaul were treated better than those 
outside, and uses Ariovistus an example of brutality against the Germani. However, this statement 
may rely on the text itself which is highly selective on the treatment of prisoners and captives taken 
in arms. For example the text is silent on the fate of any Viromandui and Atrebates combatants after 
the Sabis River at 2.18-2.28. 
91
 See Keegan (1976) pp. 74-75. See also Wheeler (2001) p. 170. Note Daly (2002), Lee (1996) and 
Sabin (2000) recall Keegan‟s studies in the titles of their own works on the topic.  
92
 See above p. 7. 
93
 See Keegan (1976) pp. 61-65. He regards the problems of Caesar as “discontinuous rhythm, 
conventional imagery, selective incident, high focus on leadership”. Keegan prefers Thucydides for 
his purposes, see pp. 66-67. For the automata approach see Wheeler (1998) pp. 648-650. 
94
 For references to Keegan, see Kagan (2006) pp. 180-192 and Lendon (1999) p. 273. Lendon is 
critical of Keegan‟s statement of the superiority of Thucydides and states this is part of the “easy 
assumption that there is a timeless ideal towards which military history tends”.  
24 
 
result, Lendon comparing Caesarʼs style with that of Greek historians, and Kagan 
explaining the narrative as driven by his perspective at the time of the battle.
95
 As 
Lendon states “Caesarʼs battle narratives are not works of fiction, but attempts to 
reduce the chaos of reality to understandable narrative, perhaps favorable to himself 
and his men” and explains the presence or absence of information in reference to this 
objective.
96
 While both scholars recognise that literary conventions are present, 
Lendon regards these as primarily those of the language of recording battle, and both 
scholars omit discussion of certain aspects of the passages, such as the use of 
exempla.
97
 In particular Lendon bases his understanding on selective battles, such as 
the Sabis River narrative, rather than analysing the approach to battle across the entire 
work.  
 
This selectivity regarding the purpose of battle narrative is also evident in V. D. 
Hansonʼs comments on the state of military history, where he states that a major 
unfulfilled task in the field is to identify how the ancients envisaged war. While his 
objective is an understanding of battle itself, he omits the importance of identifying 
the full range of literary objectives that may shape the source material, and which are 
fundamental to this understanding.
98
 Wheeler by contrast is much more cognizant of 
the literary dimension to ancient battle narratives, and highly critical of attempts to 
apply theories to the information in ancient texts, providing some valuable warnings 
about purely reconstructive approaches.
99
 In these cases however, the objective has 
still been to study the historical battle, and this aim has shaped the nature of 
discussion and the use of sources such as Caesar.  
 
In some cases the scholarly analysis is openly dismissive of the idea that the battles 
contain literary influences. Gilliver illustrates this attitude when stating that Caesar 
                                                 
95
 See Lendon (1999) p. 275. At p. 276 he states narrative conventions are based in literature and the 
realities of war. While Lendon recognises the artificialities of narrative, stating at p. 274 that there 
are many “arbitrary and fanciful” elements, at p. 229, Lendon explains the narrative structure as a 
development from Greek military narration, influenced by Caesar‟s personal understanding of battle.  
96
 Lendon (1999) p. 277. 
97
 See pp. 106-113 for exempla in use. Kagan (2006) p. 119 states that Caesar‟s perspective was only 
that of general in his narratives.  
98
 Hanson (1999) p. 384, states “What is needed is a true balance in form and ideology – a more 
realistic appraisal of how the ancients envisioned war, presented in a comprehensive, single-author, 
format that is nevertheless not just part of a summary of equipment, tactics and strategy”. While 
recognising a deficiency Hanson is primarily concerned with the study of historical warfare, which 
shapes his view of the sources. 
99
 See Wheeler (1998) p. 645.  
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avoids the literary formulas common to histories, and Kagan too is highly critical of 
the idea that there are literary conventions influencing the battle narratives.
100
 Kagan 
states openly an objective that is not to fit the narratives within the rhetorical 
conventions of the day, and in particular makes the statement that “Caesar was first an 
eyewitness to battle, and a commander in battle, and only then an author”.101 Kaganʼs 
statement illustrates the extreme point of view when she continues “The variety and 
distinctiveness of Caesarʼs tactics suggest that real circumstances, rather than literary 
paradigms, govern the structure of many of his battle descriptions”.102 For Kagan, 
highly critical of any attempt to account for authorial flexibility and creativity, 
Caesarʼs narratives are based on how he perceived causality and the original event.103 
Such a view is an extreme case, but representative of a dismissive attitude to the 
literary criteria of battle narrative. Within this area of military history, there has not 
been a comprehensive attempt to understand the motives of the narrator except as an 
implicit desire to reconstruct the historical event in textual form.  
 
Battle and the Scholarship on Caesar  
 
Beyond the purely military focus on battle, scholarship on Caesar has several broad 
streams that address battle narrative to varying degrees. The major conclusion to be 
drawn from these studies is that the text itself appears the best source for studying 
battle as there is a lack of external evidence with which to contextualise its historical 
context. This is evident in topics that only marginally address battle, such as 
investigations of the audience, publication and nature of the commentaries. The 
search for the audience of the Bellum Gallicum has been difficult in the absence of 
                                                 
100
 Gilliver (2007) pp. 122-123 also states that “othersˮ are more interested in entertaining their 
audience than the accurate reporting of events. See also Kagan (2006) p. 115. Lendon (1999) p. 275 
regards harangues as a convention to be followed to “adorn” an essentially reconstructive narrative. 
101
 Kagan (2006) pp. 201-202 fn. 4.  
102
 Kagan (2006) p. 121. 
103
 Kagan (2006) p. 149. Kagan states “Literary models may have affected Caesar‟s narrative 
presentation of battles more than his conduct of them, but so too did the diverse, real circumstances 
in which he actually fought”. See Kagan p. 111 on the idea of res gestae, and p. 112 where it is stated 
that “others” argue that literary conventions shape narratives. This leads to largely military 
explanations for some passages, such as at p. 119 where Kagan states that Caesar does not mention 
giving orders to the third line against the Helvetii for four possible reasons, one of which is to 
“smooth” the narrative. Such an approach marginalises any authorial intent beyond the transmission 
of the historical battle. 
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contemporary references to the work.
104
 In particular, the military reception of the 
work by contemporaries of Caesar is hard to determine, and who among his 
contemporaries actually read the Commentarii is unclear.
105
 The unresolved issues are 
indicative of the absence of evidence regarding the military context in which the 
Bellum Gallicum was received, and while it is possible to state that the audience was 
probably an aristocratic Roman one based on Ciceroʼs reception of the text, the 
reception of the military information contained therein, at least among Caesarʼs 
contemporaries, is less clear.
106
 
 
The lack of evidence regarding the audience is compounded by uncertainty over the 
date of publication, and the problem in determining whether the commentarii were 
written as a single work after the campaigns, or published periodically and closer to 
the occurrence of each campaign.
107
 Publication and composition dates are important 
as the time of composition may have affected Caesarʼs memory of events, and what 
sources he used. They may also have influenced how Caesar presented affairs, as any 
foreknowledge of future events could influence the content of a particular account.
108
 
Furthermore, a single publication after the events of 52 BCE might lend itself to a 
more structured approach and the integration of the battles into an overarching theme 
or motif.
109
 With composition and publication so important, several approaches to this 
issue have been attempted using the text itself. Earlier literary examination of the 
Bellum Gallicum by scholars such as Schlicher regarded an apparent shift in 
complexity as evidence of periodic publication, however more recent work by the 
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 There are of course references to the war; most notably Cicero Prov Cons 32-33. Cicero also refers 
to his brother‟s experience at ad Fam 7.10.1-7.10.3. 
105
 See Wiseman, (1998) pp. 1-9 who examines the idea of an internal, soldierly audience in opposition 
to Gelzer, (1968) p. 171, Meier (1995) p. 253, and Rambaud (1966) p. 365, who all argue for an 
aristocratic audience. As Riggsby (2006) p. 13 states, Wiseman has not proven his case yet.  
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 See below pp. 41-43 on reception. Where this study discusses an audience, it is in relation to 
Caesar‟s objectives regarding the narratee and only general references are made, with the assumption 
of a primarily Roman aristocratic audience per Riggsby (2006) p. 13.  
107
 Kraus (2005a) p. 102, and (2009) p. 164 notes the unresolved issue, and its importance for 
scholarship. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 9. 
108
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 193 on foresight. See Welch (1998) pp. 93-94, 106. fn. 55. Welch discusses 
publication and the representation of subordinates. The structure of Book Five illustrates a strong 
interconnectivity within that book that could suggest the primary objective at the time of writing was 
the events of that year. Within Book Five foreknowledge shapes the construction of the passages on 
Britain, the defence of a camp under Quintus Cicero, and the massacre of a legion. See Chapter Five 
pp. 319-339 for a full discussion. 
109
 See Wiseman (1998) pp. 1-9, cf. fn. 1, who discusses the concept. Rambaud (1966) and Gelzer 
(1968) are among the scholars who propose singular composition. Note that Riggsby (2006) pp. 1, 9 
tends to agree with the idea of serial composition, in spite of noting an overarching objective to the 
work.  
27 
 
likes of Gotoff and Williams state that this is not the case, suggesting that stylistic 
analysis has not answered the question of composition date.
110
 Furthermore Wiseman 
attempts to show that the work was published periodically, by citing inconsistencies 
regarding the fate of the Nervii, and a changing style which he attributes to higher 
stakes as Caesar wrote the latter books. However this has also proven inconclusive.
111
 
Attempts to demonstrate a single composition date have a similar issue due to a lack 
of evidence, Riggsby noting some of the issues in determining the manner the work 
was written.
112
 Attempts to date the work are inconclusive, and the exact date of 
authorship for the battles is similarly unclear.  
 
Several studies have examined the genre of the commentaries; however these also are 
unable to fully explain the role of battle, due to the lack of corroborating evidence.
113
 
Commentarii were an established form of reporting in Rome, and at least in the 
records that survive they appeared to provide the basic outline of events; however no 
records survive of works as comprehensive as Caesarʼs.114 His commentarii are 
clearly more than simple battle reports, as the extensive excursus of Book Six 
suggests, but their objective is not clearly stated.
115
 In spite of this lack of context, the 
issue of genre has been addressed by Cleary, who regards Caesar as attempting a 
synthesis of commentarii, res gestae and history.
116
 Bömer similarly examines the 
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 See Schlicher (1936) pp. 216-217, 223. Schlicher argues that the work changes from defending and 
justifying Caesar to a more complex style as it progresses. Such a pattern to the work has been 
disputed by Williams (1985) pp. 216, 226. Williams argues that the early books are not Caesar 
testing out his methodology but are well thought out and staged. See also Gotoff (1984) p. 15 who 
regards the Sabis River narrative as a particular departure from the commentarius style.  
111
 Wiseman (1998) p. 2, argues against the unity of writing, citing Book Two where the Nervii are 
wiped out, and in Book Five where there are 60,000 Nervii. At p. 6 he regards the commentaries as 
broken down broadly into two sections 58-57 BCE (Book 1-4) and 53-52 BCE (Book 5-7) For 
further discussion see Riggsby (2006) p. 13. 
112
 See Berard (1985), Riggsby (2006) pp. 10-11, and Nordling (1991), p. 60. Torigian (1998) p. 45 
analyses the work in terms of stylistic criteria and argues for a unified approach to writing, noting a 
ring composition, with Vercingetorix as a “reverse image of the scheming Orgetorix”. Nousek (2004) 
p. 63, agrees that the first chapter on geography and the Orgetorix episode contain signs of a “larger 
rhetorical design of the Bellum Gallicum”. See also Kraus (2009) p. 160. 
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 Kraus (2009) pp. 160-161. See also Riggsby (2006) pp. 133-150.  
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 Kraus (2005a) p. 97. See also Adcock (1956) pp. 6-18, Görler (1976) pp. 96-97, and Bömer (1953) 
who provides the best history of commentaries. See also Cicero‟s proposed commentary on his own 
consulship, which does not survive, discussed at ad Attic 2.1.1-2.1.2. Riggsby (2006) p. 146 lists 
those works that are known to exist.  
115
 See Kraus (2005a) pp. 98-99. See also Cleary (1985) p. 345 who notes this regarding the customs of 
the Britons in Book Five and the Gauls in Book Six. Nousek (2004) at p. 3 states that few have tried 
to put the commentarii into a genre. 
116
 See Cleary (1985) pp. 346-347, who notes the similarities with Xenophon‟s Anabasis. See also 
Cicero Brut 262 where they are called commentarii. Suetonius Div Iul 56.1-56.2, Hirtius 8 pr 2. 
Nordling (1991) p. 33, states that Caesar is providing an interpretation of events for “those who 
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idea that the work is an attempt at a unique format.
117
 Recently, Nousekʼs dissertation 
on the Bellum Gallicum extensively analyses the content of the work, including some 
battle analysis, to argue that he was engaging with a debate on the nature of history.
118
 
While useful in terms of history and genre, such works do not comprehensively 
conclude how far battle balances authorial objectives against the purely descriptive, in 
the absence of other extended commentarii with which to contrast the work. 
Nevertheless some useful analysis of battle has been performed, such as by Ash, who 
investigates the association of epic with the Bellum Gallicum.
119
 Ash examines how 
the commentarii and epic, in particular the Aeneid, have a top heavy emphasis in that 
they examine the actions from the perspective of the aristocratic leaders. Ashʼs work, 
like others, provides some useful insights into the manner in which Caesar constructs 
particular battles, even if the question of genre remains elusive. 
 
Studies in Style  
 
In spite of a lack of resolution regarding genre and the purpose of the work, there is 
still evidence to suggest that battle narratives were constructed according to 
aristocratic presentation criteria. Caesarʼs reputation as an accomplished orator 
formed the background to his career, and there has been considerable research on the 
style and language used in the commentaries.
120
 Quintilian provides early evidence on 
style stating that due to Caesarʼs skill as an orator he would have made an excellent 
                                                                                                                                            
would write history” later. Nordling p. 32 also notes that Cicero and Hirtius refer to commentarii as 
having a “literary parentage” in the war diaries of Alexander the Great. 
117
 Bömer (1953) p. 250. See also Rüpke (1992) pp. 210-216; Berard (1985) pp. 94-95. 
118
 Nousek, (2004) p. 2 regards the commentarii as historical, however noting that Kraus and 
Woodman (1997) pp. 1-9 do not include Caesar in their discussion of Latin historians. See also 
Nousek (2004) p. ii as Nousek states that as much as the Bellum Gallicum is a record of deeds, it is 
also a means of Caesar answering a contemporary debate about language, history and writing of 
history. Nousek p. 20 regards it as a work of literature leaving aside the political aspects and that 
Caesar was interested in linguistic and grammatical concerns. Nousek regards the work as a response 
to de Oratore and historiographical ideals in ad Fam 5.12. Schlicher (1936) p. 224 also argues for a 
development towards Cicero‟s historiographical ideal. As Nousek notes however at p. 22, ancient 
conventions for genre were “ill-defined” “fluid and less restrictive” than modern classifications 
suggest. Melchior (2004) p. 18 notes that the narrative is a “natural fit” for events but using a 
framework, and is therefore not unhistorical. Kraus (2005b) pp. 246-247 analyses 5.44, and the Pullo, 
Vorenus story and how it advertises Caesar‟s ʻaffiliation with mainstream historiography‟ i.e. the use 
or virtus, vir, and ver words. 
119
 See Ash (2002) p. 261. As Ash notes, in his account of Pharsalus in the Bellum Civile Caesar gives 
the location of subordinate leaders, but no contribution by them as the battle focuses on the action of 
the armies and the supreme commanders. 
120
 See Eden (1962); Gotoff (1984); Williams (1985); Kraus (2005a). See also Oppermann (1933); 
Schlicher (1936). 
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career on the rostrum if he had not taken up war.
121
 Cicero also appears to have 
admired his facility with language, noting that the commentaries are more than just 
material for historians, presumably due to the skill with which they were written.
122
 
As Fantham notes, there is evidence that Caesar had an extensive literary background, 
with Suetonius even mentioning that he had a background in writing tragedy.
123
 While 
these sources often do not directly address battle, they provide evidence that he had 
the literary background to develop his battles to more sophisticated standards than 
simple battle reports. 
 
With regard to the literary dimension of battle, the nature of the presentation has been 
addressed by several scholars. Moles and Wiseman noted in general that 
embellishment was criticised both by Thucydides and Livy.
124
 The recognition of 
embellishment has even led to neglect of more important objectives, as indicated by 
Collins who views as “mere literary flourish” the preliminaries of battle against 
Ariovistus.
125
 Nevertheless literary development of the text has been accepted with 
Welch noting that Caesar selected his material for “focus with a sophistication and 
rigueur recalling the cinematic”.126 As Collins states the text is “rich in literary 
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 See Quintilian 10.1.114.  
122
 See Cicero Brut 262. Cicero states that Caesar was unsurpassed as an orator, as cited in Suetonius 
Div Iul 55.1-55.2. Note that there is always the risk that Cicero was just being diplomatic or even 
ironic, as noted by Powell (1998) p. 114 or even critical, as note by Kraus (2005a) p. 111. See also 
Tacitus Dial. 21.5, Plutarch Caesar 3.3. See also Adcock (1956) p. 13, Nordling (1991) pp. 31-32.  
123
 Fantham (1996) p. 47. See Suet Div Iul 56.7 for Caesar‟s background in tragedy. Caesar also 
supposedly dictated a treatise on word formations and regularity in syntax to secretaries while 
crossing the Alps. He dedicated it to Cicero with the claim that extending intellectual frontiers was a 
greater triumph than any military victory. Caesar per Aulus Gellius NA 1.10.4 was also supposed to 
have said to steer away from an unfamiliar word as if it were a reef, as by implication the reader is 
shocked by a new word and the text “shipwrecked”. See Yavetz, (1983) p. 211 and Spaeth (1936/7) 
p. 541. 
124
 See Moles (1993) p. 101. Thucydides at 1.21.1 criticized embellishment i.e. in Homer, Herodotus. 
See also pp. 93, 95 where Moles notes this same motivation as early as Herodotus, who wanted to 
record marvelous things and was selective in his choices of what to narrate. See also Wiseman (1993) 
p. 134 who notes how Polybius 2.56.10-12 criticized Phylarchus, stating tragedy was to “thrill and 
charm” but a historian‟s task was “to instruct and persuade”. Livy also said some things he read were 
more suited to the stage than factual at 5.21.8-9. However, Arrian, a military man reported both what 
is worth believing and what is worth telling Anab pref 1.3. See also Gabba (1981) on the idea of 
“true” and “false” history. See Wiseman (1979) p. 30-31, who notes rhetorical training encouraged a 
“cavalier” attitude to historical fact i.e. Atticus in Brut 42. At pp. 5-6 he notes that in Cicero Att 
2.1.1-2.1.2 Cicero admits to ornamenting his own consulship‟s commentarii. 
125
 Collins (1972) pp. 927, 930. He states of apparent embellishments before the Ariovistus battle that 
these are “not seriously representing the facts” and that what others call propaganda is “high literary 
art”.  
126
 Welch and Powell (1998) preface p. viii. See Kraus (2005a) p. 113, fn. 58. Rowe (1967) p. 399 
notes of the Bellum Civile, that sententiae grow as the work progresses. Rowe analyses four episodes 
in the Bellum Civile to show success/hybris/catastrophe dramatic structure. 
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drama”.127 In spite of the dismissals this focus on the artistic dimension opens up 
possibilities for battle, as Harris notes that embellishments in combat, such as 
descriptions of fear, allow Caesar to promote his own abilities as commander.
128
 
Whether they address battle directly or the work in general, scholars have addressed 
some aspects of battle in their examination of the level of presentation applied to the 
work, which can have value in understanding the purpose of these passages. 
  
These general observations have been more directly addressed by scholars who 
support the idea that battle appears with the framework of a developed literary 
structure.
129
 Collins in particular notes the Bellum Gallicumʼs superiority to the 
Bellum Civile in terms of “coherence, proportion, smoothness of transitions, variety of 
sentence, and the marshaling and ordering of ideas”.130 As Eden notes, Caesar seems 
“incapable of wasting words or of becoming obscure” due to his apparent brevity and 
clarity.
131
 Damon makes similar observations on how the author persuades through 
simple language, although Damonʼs study is almost exclusively of the Bellum 
Civile.
132
 Schlicher also contends that there is a pattern to the Bellum Gallicum, noting 
that passages such as the ethnographic excursus of Book Six fall into an increasingly 
complex style.
133
 Such studies have focused on the skill with which the commentaries 
were constructed, and while the scholars often see an economy of language, they 
nevertheless recognise a level of literary complexity and design to the overall work.  
 
In particular, there is a substantial body of work on the more complex attributes of the 
work, including useful examinations of battle and the style of these narratives. As 
Richter notes: als kritischen Beobachter eines kampfverlaufes...die Kunst des 
Dartstellers spiegelt den Meister der Befehlstechnik.
134
 Gotoff also provides some 
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 Collins (1972) p. 27.  
128
 Harris, (2006) p. 311. As Harris states, fear allows Caesar to restore morale or show that by 
following orders certain situations would never have happened. 
129
 See Adcock, (1956), Rambaud (1966) Riggsby (2006) p. 10.  
130
 Collins (1972) p. 164.  
131
 Eden (1962) pp. 95, 101 states that Caesar is making himself intelligible to all Romans by using the 
“basic essentials of what was recognisably Latin”. 
132
 Damon (1994) pp. 184-195.  
133
 Schlicher (1936) pp. 216-217, 222-223. For instance Schlicher notes that heroism in the lower ranks 
is not introduced until Book Four. This discounts Baculus in Book Two at 2.25, discussed below at 
pp. 117-119. In response to those who see development as the work progresses, Gotoff (1984) p. 8 
notes that they have to come to terms with the Sabis River account at 2.16-27 and “a substantial 
section of highly ornamental and contrived prose coming so early in the corpus”.  
134
 Richter (1977) p. 149. See also Pascucci (1973).  
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extensive analysis of battle, including how the battle of the Sabis River uses language 
to enhance the sense of randomness regarding the Roman formations.
135
 As he further 
notes, the “encomium” to those who fought at Sambre is “so obviously ornamental” 
that the passage has been held in suspicion and even rejected by some editors.
136
 
Nevertheless, Gotoffʼs analysis provides some useful information regarding the 
structure of this particular battle.
137
 Similarly, Williams examines the Bibracte 
narrative and notes some important ways in which language and syntax convey the 
essential characteristics of the battle.
138
 Such analyses illustrate that the battle 
narratives of the Bellum Gallicum display a complexity of structure and style that 
needs to be accounted for in understanding their role. 
 
Furthermore scholars have noted the influence of rhetoric on the content of the work. 
Kraus analyses the content of the Bellum Gallicum for its use of historical and 
rhetorical techniques to persuasive effect, a study that has bearing on the manner that 
battle, in particular siege, is presented.
139
 The main area in which rhetorical studies 
have been applied to the Bellum Gallicum is with regard to the speeches, and some of 
the observations made have relevance to the battle narratives. Rambaud devotes an 
extensive section to the speeches, in order to demonstrate that Caesar uses them for 
propagandistic purposes, and Rasmussen also examines speeches and their persuasive 
role.
140
 More recently the discussion over rhetorical techniques and the construction 
of the commentarii is addressed by Wiseman, who provides a useful summary of 
Ciceroʼs attitude towards ornamentation, and an examination of the way speeches 
could be adorned or use “colour” in order to support the overall objective of the piece 
of work.
141
 While Wiseman does not specifically examine the Bellum Gallicum, the 
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 Gotoff (1984) p. 8. See also 2.21. 
136
 Gotoff (1984) p. 15. See also Pascucci (1956) p. 134. See also 2.27. 
137
 Gotoff (1984) pp. 12-15 notes that Caesar shares some “essential literary techniques” with the 
“orator and essayist”.  
138
 Williams (1985) pp. 222-223. Williams illustrates how language reflects both the ease with which 
the Romans break the Helvetian phalanx, and then, through syntax, the confusion caused. Williams 
regards Caesar‟s syntax as reflecting the ebb and flow of battle.  
139
 Kraus (2005b) pp. 242-243. See also Cape, Jr, R. W (1997) p. 213. As Cape notes, Cicero 
understood the facts of history to be a part of the “rhetorical superstructure” as much as their stylistic 
treatment. At pp. 217-218, Cape notes that the Romans regarded history as having to have a didactic 
purpose. See also Mannetter (1995) p. 98 for a discussion of rhetoric and the Bellum Gallicum. 
140
 See Nordling (1991) pp. 50-71 for a summary of this topic. Nordling in particular discusses the 
contrasting views of Rambaud (1966) and Rasmussen (1963) 
141
 See Wiseman (1979) p. 29. At p. 28, Wiseman notes how Thucydides 1.22.1 said in regards to 
speeches that he would say what was called for on each occasion. Note that at p. 8 “colour” is to put 
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observations regarding Cicero and his expectations regarding his own commentaries 
provide useful context in which to view the level of complexity that could be 
expected.
142
 More directly, Nordlingʼs thesis has addressed the speech of the Bellum 
Gallicum and the strategies employed in the work.
143
 Nordlingʼs work is valuable for 
an understanding of battle as speeches such as that of Critognatus in Book Seven 
occur within or in relation to a battle, and therefore can directly inform the 
interpretation of the narrative.
144
 Jamesʼ analysis of Caesarʼs speech in the near 
mutiny at Vesontio is particularly relevant, and it informs the presentation of the 
battle against Ariovistus.
145
 While studies in rhetoric do not always address battle 
narrative directly, they provide significant insight into how these passages are 
constructed. 
 
Narratological studies also address to varying levels the content of battle narrative. 
The complexity of the information presented in the Bellum Gallicum is important for 
Riggsby, who states that there can be a form of “covert argumentation” which is 
based on a readerʼs pre-existing knowledge.146 Mannetter has also examined the 
Bellum Gallicum from a narratological perspective, although as Nousek notes, 
Mannetter does not use narratological techniques.
147
 While actual combat receives 
less attention than other parts of the work, Mannetter makes some observations about 
the manner in which Caesar constructs battle, particularly contextual catalogues.
148
 
Most importantly, Kraus has specifically applied narratological techniques to Book 
Seven of the Bellum Gallicum, to demonstrate the presentation techniques involved.
149
 
On Caesar as narrator, Grilloʼs recent article makes observations regarding the Bellum 
                                                                                                                                            
a slant on what is said, and a pupil of rhetoric saw this as painting its face with “convincing colours”. 
See also Diodorus Siculus 20.2.1. 
142
 Cicero ad Att 2.1.1-2.1.2. 
143
 See Nordling (1991) pp. 2-.8. At p. 7 Nordling notes that Caesar‟s early training in rhetoric 
“reinforced stylistic propensities toward grammatical correctness and restraint”.  
144
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 107-118. On the speech see also Richter (1977) pp. 76-78. 
145
 James (2000) pp. 54-65. See also pp. 146-161 below which examines the relationship of the near 
mutiny to the battle.  
146
 Riggsby (2006) p. 7.  
147
 See Nousek (2004) p. 15. See also Mannetter (1995) p. vi. Mannetter argues that stylistic standards, 
not standards of truth apply to the work. 
148
 Mannetter pp. 138-175 on catalogues.  
149
 Kraus (2010) at pp. 46-48, Kraus notes how the Avaricum defences are stylised so they are typical 
characteristics not particular. At p. 56, Kraus notes the centurions seem as stylised representatives of 
the legions. 
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Civile that are also relevant to the Bellum Gallicum.
150
 The idea that battle exists as 
part of a construction, not only designed to capture an event persuasively but 
aesthetically, as befits a work in an age where the activity of writing was itself an 
artistic aim, is supported by these studies.  
 
A recent work by Gerlinger addresses the topic of battle rhetoric directly, including 
Caesar in a study of Tacitus and Sallust.
151
 Gerlinger groups battle scenes according 
to audience interest, such as the virtues on display, in order to determine the level of 
realism in the scenes.
152
 Gerlinger notes the presence of certain common elements to 
battle narrative, such as dispositions, the speech and a crisis.
153
 However these include 
scenes that seem “unrealistic” such as troops fighting over the bodies of their fallen 
comrades.
154
 While Gerlinger views such scenes as common in Roman 
historiography, the observations sometimes impact an understanding of why Caesar 
constructed his battle narratives.
155
 Gerlingerʼs work focuses on realism; however it 
informs some aspects of the current study when the historicity of a passage is 
problematic. 
 
Studies of the Narrative 
 
Academic inquiries address the text as a whole, along with elements of battle, to 
examine Caesarʼs purposes in writing, his style and methodology, or to determine the 
underlying paradigms that form the basis of the commentaries. These analyses tend to 
look at patterns of argument that include the battles, but can span the entire work. An 
aspect of battle important to such study is whether the narrative is primarily 
descriptive, or a carefully constructed argument, and a major field of research tends to 
view the work on the basis of structure and lines of argumentation. As Martin Jr. 
states, the purpose of commentarii are to establish gloria in posterity, but it is possible 
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 Grillo (2012) pp. 244, 250, 253, 256. See Görler (1976) on the flexibility of Caesar‟s narration. 
Görler at p. 118 notes a shift to an “Olympianˮ style as the work progresses. See also Görler (1980) 
on the Sabis River account and Caesar‟s role as narrator. 
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 Gerlinger (2008). At p. 24 Gerlinger notes that these are sources chosen due to their military 
experience.  
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 Gerlinger (2008) p. 27. 
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 Gerlinger (2008) p. 18. At p. 24 Gerlinger notes a general lack of study in the field of battle 
rhetoric. 
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 See Gerlinger (2008) p. 24 on the commonality of certain scenes. 
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to do this by a simple record of events or a more structured narrative designed to 
encourage a particular interpretation.
156
 By contrast Gardner states in The Gallic 
Menace in Caesarʼs Propaganda, the idea that “Caesar is having to argue his case all 
the way”.157 Murphy looks at such ideas broadly in determining themes applicable to 
each book, and while these take a very simple view of the overall work, they raise the 
possibility that there might be specific objectives at various points in the work.
158
 
Ramage also examines how self-presentation is paramount throughout the work and 
forms a background to activity, as the narrative focuses on the personal attributes that 
he wants to display.
159
 While other approaches to argument are examined in the 
relevant chapters, it is important to note that there is for some scholars a consistent 
line of argumentation evident throughout the work. 
 
One of the major streams of academic study that has influenced analysis of the battle 
narratives has been interested in the propagandistic aspect of the work. Asinius Pollio 
is attributed with an early remark about this aspect, noting that Caesar was careless 
with the truth.
160
 Most notably, Rambaudʼs work on Tendenz regards the entire work 
as heavily manipulated in the interests of self-promotion, and calls Caesarʼs ability 
lʼart de la déformation historique.161 This is a view qualified by Collins, who notes 
how modern ideas of propaganda are not applicable to studies of the commentarii.
162
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 Martin Jr. (1965) p. 67.  
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 Gardner (1983) pp. 184, 188. Gardner notes that the Ariovistus threat, like the Helvetii is weak, so 
Caesar has to stress the Germanic menace and arrogance of Ariovistus. On Ariovistus see also Christ 
(1974). 
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 Murphy (1977) p. 234. 
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 Ramage (2003) at p. 364 notes some thirty attributes and virtues that are attributed to Caesar in the 
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Pompey‟s reputation.  
160
 See Nordling p. 44. According to Suetonius, Pollio stated that Caesar‟s commentaries were parum 
diligenter parumque integra viritate compositos. Suetonius Div Iul 56.4. Nordling notes however this 
may be in reference to the Bellum Civile.  
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 Rambaud (1966) pp. 363-364. As he states Outre les falsifications proprement dites, décelables par 
la méthode historique, il faut reconnaître dans ces mémoires des convergences de procédés 
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de son récit suscitent chez le lecteur une impression fausse: c’est ce que nous appelons l’art de la 
déformation historique. On the topic see also Gerlinger (2008) p. 23; Heubner (1974) p. 104; Klaus 
(1974) p. 149; Walser (1995). Rowe (1967) at p. 403 notes that a lack of Tendenz in the narrative 
ignores the Tendenz in the “unified conception of the forces at work behind events”.  
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 See Collins (1972) p. 939. Nousek (2004) p. 8 discusses the arguments on mendacity. For Kagan 
(2006), the issue is critical to establishing the “Eye of Command” approach, and so discusses it at p. 
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This issue of Tendenz has been critical for an analysis of the essential truth of what 
Caesar states, and various reasons are presented as to how far he would manipulate or 
outright misrepresent affairs.
163
 In opposition to this view, other scholars such as 
Balsden have directly challenged the idea that he had to justify his campaigns, even 
while recognising the self-promotional nature of the work.
164
 Stevens even states that 
Caesar could not “garble the facts” due to their being on public record.165 However 
the demarcation between truth and falsehood is not regarded as consistent by Seager 
who sees varying levels of distortion occurring through the work, arguing that it was 
only the early books that required any form of justification.
166
 This issue of Tendenz is 
important to the historical context of the work, but also extends to battle narrative in 
the explanation for the content and structure of the individual accounts. 
 
Lines of argumentation extend to the presentation of military affairs; and can have a 
significant effect on the understanding of battle. Conley argues that Caesar is not 
simply centring each battle on his own contribution, and the manner in which he 
shares gloria in the Sabis River account is evidence that there is more to the work 
than self-promotion through a focus on his personal contribution.
167
 In Julius Caesar 
as Artful Reporter, Welch explains that the relationship of Caesar to Pompey was 
important for his self-representation in the Bellum Gallicum, and notes that Caesarʼs 
inability to falsify records led to him focusing on the army, officers and himself, and a 
general interest in Gauls and Germans.
168
 Wells notes with regard to the 
representation of the enemy that Gauls are differentiated from Germani, in order to 
                                                                                                                                            
109, deciding in favour of the work as essentially a reconstruction of Caesar‟s perspective. By 
contrast, see Wiseman (1993) pp. 126-132 on the need for truth in history. 
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 Seager (2003) p. 19 argues that Caesar only justifies his campaigns for the first year. As it 
progressed the war justified itself. Even at outset Seager states the explanation is only “perfunctory” 
and “never in the least apologetic” nor is there any hint he anticipated criticism or the need to defend 
his actions. See Chapter Five for qualification of Seagerʼs idea, and for justification in general. 
167
 Conley (1983) p. 173. Conley states that the Bellum Gallicum is fashioned around causas for the 
outcomes of battles and campaigns.  
168
 Welch (1998) p. 87. See also p. 85 where Welch notes the work as a response to Pompey‟s 
reputation. 
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present the campaigns as a completed accomplishment.
169
 Recently, Jervis has 
examined closely the presentation of the enemy, in particular how their characteristics 
protect the author from ideas of the effeminising influences of conquest.
170
 Jervisʼ 
research provides some valuable insights into the disparity between comments on the 
virtus of the enemy and actual performance in battle, which are important when 
considering issues of morale and its effects.
171
 Other articles on the work address 
similar issues, and for Rawlings, the general issue of the enemy representation is 
important, arguing that the enemy are a product of specific modes of portrayal.
172
 
Krebs even performs an examination of the representation of geography, to show that 
Caesar masters such features, an argument that can have reference to topography in 
the campaign narratives.
173
  
 
While the level of investigation varies, battle generally falls within the scope of 
general studies even when the focus is on broader patterns. For example Torigian 
examines the λόγος of the Bellum Gallicum, and Hall also examines how issues of 
ratio and romanitas are portrayed, both of which provide potential interpretive 
frameworks for battle narrative.
174
 Alternatively Dodingtonʼs dissertation addresses 
the function of engineering references, to demonstrate that Caesar was promoting 
aspects of his own character, and while this is not directly in relation to battle 
narrative, descriptions such as the fortifications at Alesia occur within passages that 
describe a siege, and therefore have relevance to the narration of battle.
175
 
Furthermore, there has been a recent attempt by Riggsby to construct an overarching 
purpose to the work to demonstrate that Caesar foreshadowed and prepared for his 
                                                 
169
 Wells (2001) pp. 112-113.  
170
 Jervis (2001) p. 141 states that Caesar stresses the primitiveness of Gauls to remove himself from 
dangers of contact with effeminising people and being like a Pompey, Sulla or Marius. 
171
 See Jervis (2001) p. 52. Jervis notes that Caesar‟s emphasis on virtus is not related to the difficulties 
he faced in battle.  
172
 Rawlings (1998) p. 179. Both sides claim they have courage, and that the other relies on stratagems 
i.e. at Avaricum. See pp. 261-264 below for the representation of Vercingetorix. 
173
 Krebs (2006) p. 117. Krebs notes the idea of the use of precise distances i.e. in the Helvetii account 
at 1.2.3 and the idea of “intellectual mastery”. 1.8.1, 1.21,1, 1.23.1 all give the impression of 
“control” of knowledge. See also Bertrand (1997) p. 108; however note that Bertrand accepts that the 
text is representative of an attempt to communicate intelligence accurately.  
174
 See Torigian, (1998) p. 45, who examines a rhetorical design to the work. See also Hall (1998) 
p.11, who notes that Caesar is “vigilant” to insults against the state and threats i.e. 5.7.1-5.7.2 and see 
fn. 6. At p. 28 Hall regards Caesar attempting to be the voice of Rome, imposing linguistic and 
political order. 
175
 Dodington (1980) pp. 50-51 argues that those who are given credit for works are those Caesar 
defeated, in order to show Caesars industry and intelligence. See p. 55 regarding Alesia. 
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own political ambitions.
176
 According to Riggsby, this underlying purpose is evident 
throughout the work, such as in the manner the Gallic threat builds.
177
 Riggsbyʼs 
analysis of battle examines themes such as just war, and Gaulʼs potential for 
subjugation, that rely on a particular presentation of battle, such as the way that Gallic 
siege techniques and warfare develop, in order to demonstrate the danger to Rome.
178
 
Such research must balance literary reasons for the inclusion of information against 
more direct self-promotion through the record of achievements and Nousekʼs 
identification of a meta-literary function to the bridge in Book Six, while possible, 
should also recognise that the passage is also purporting to describe Caesarʼs actual 
activity, and may therefore have a more direct promotional purpose of recording his 
deeds.
179
 The necessity of balancing the nature of self-promotion, whether through 
literary skill or the actions described, ensures that as battle falls within the scope of 
such studies, they can significantly inform the presentation of particular passages in 
the narrative. 
 
There are some important studies on individual battles that directly affect an 
understanding of these passages. In Powellʼs Julius Caesar and the Presentation of 
Massacre and Levickʼs The Venetii Revisited, the reasons behind specific campaign 
passages are investigated.
180
 Melchior addresses battle narratives specifically in 
Compositions with Blood: Violence in Late Republican Prose and regards them as 
adhering to a pattern in which the enemy threat is eventually dispersed though a focus 
on wounds and killing.
181
 Erickson in particular examines the naval battle against the 
                                                 
176
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 205-214 for a summary. At p. 121 Riggsby regards Caesar as setting up 
imperial authority in the Bellum Gallicum. At pp. 82-83, he states that Caesar builds up the Gaulish 
threat to legitimise war and increase Roman prowess. In particular at p. 45 he argues that the 
representation of land is to show land is available. In addition, Riggsby examines ideas of “just war” 
at pp. 157-189 and other themes. See in particular Chapter Three pp. 73-105 “Technology, Virtue, 
Victory”. 
177
 Riggsby (2006) pp. 101-105. 
178
 Riggsby (2006) pp. 73-105, 157.  
179
 See Nousek (2004) p. 122 and the presentation of the Rhine Bridge built at 6.9. There is an 
argument that the bridge in Book Six “operates as a meta-literary level, functioning more as a 
narratological bridge from one level of discourse to another, and back again”. Such analysis may 
attribute too literary an objective to Caesar.  
180
 Levick (1998) p. 71, Caesar must be a great leader and show he is versed in military affairs and has 
auctoritas with troops. See also Powell (1998) p. 111. As Powell states “For Caesar, to distort 
unobtrusively was not a simple matter”. 
181
 Melchior (2004) p. 38. At p. 18. Melchior notes how Caesar uses a revenge cycle. At p. 179, 
Caesar‟s “reassuring framework” is noted and that this idea imposes a level of unity to battle 
narration. As Melchior notes, at p. 19, the idea of reciprocal action as a structure fits actual 
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Venetii to demonstrate how Caesar portrays Roman and Gallic virtus.
182
 Görler 
examines the role of the narrator in the Sabis River account, and Brown examines 
narrative contrasts between the same account, and the battle of Pharsalus in the 
Bellum Civile, providing some useful observations on the construction of these 
passages.
183
 In the process of following these lines of argument, such investigations 
provide context to battle and the purpose of the information supplied.  
 
In spite of the large body of scholarship that includes battle, analysis of battle across 
the work, involving a full examination of Caesarʼs persuasive techniques using 
military data, has not yet been fully undertaken. Therefore an examination of battle, 
most importantly in the context of the campaign narratives in which they appear is 
required. The following case studies illustrate the various ways that Caesar uses battle 
to meet his objectives, and while each chapter examines an aspect of the relationship, 
the common feature is that the battles all have a purpose that extends beyond the 
purely descriptive. The analysis of battle enables an understanding of how he 
structured the narrative for self-promotion, and the place of the battles in the work. 
Not only does such an examination reflect on the role that battle and other military 
information plays, but it allows a deeper understanding of the concerns that Caesar 
had while writing these passages, and the manner in which he was willing to utilise 
such material in the pursuit of his reputation and career. 
                                                                                                                                            
recipocracy as a motive in battle. Melchior does not devote the whole thesis to the Bellum Gallicum 
and is not able to address the varying objectives evident from a study of all the battle narratives. 
182
 Erickson (2002) p. 602. Note that Erickson draws an unusual conclusion at p. 616, in the idea that 
the falling masts are symbolic of castration. 
183
 See Brown (1999) p. 333. Brown states that the clash of foreign armies and cultures lends itself to 
“heroic literary interpretation”. At pp. 333-334, 336, Brown examines the manner of portraying the 
enemy, issues of virtus in the Bellum Gallicum and Caesar‟s use of evocative language to describe 
the attack of the Nervii. Görler (1980) p. 31 examines the varying role of the narrator and contrasts 
the needs of the narrative with the question of Tendenz.  
 CHAPTER 1: THE CREATION OF CAESARʼS BATTLE 
NARRATIVES  
 
 
This chapter illustrates that Caesar develops the source material of his battles into 
narratives that place style and reception over the details of the historical victory. 
While Caesar holds himself forth as a source on the battles in the Bellum Gallicum, it 
is important to note that this does not translate to any requirement for a full and 
accurate description of battle. Caesar is highly selective regarding his choice of 
information included, and does not seem to be confined by any requirement to relate 
consistent and comprehensive battle reports, or to provide a manual on combat. As 
White notes “Every narrative, however seemingly „full‟ is constructed on the basis of 
a set of events that might have been included but were left out.”1 For Caesar, the set 
of events chosen, including contextual information and the content of the combat 
narratives are not simply records of events nor just an attempt to clarify the historical 
victories. They even exclude information that would be relevant to an understanding 
of the historical battle, as they are not an elaborate combat report, but a fully 
developed narrative more concerned with literary criteria than clarity regarding the 
original event.
2
 
  
The extent to which Caesarʼs narratives digress from a reconstruction of battle is 
evident in the information provided to create or develop impressions for the audience. 
For example, Caesar shows varying levels of narrator omniscience prior to the battle 
against the Helvetii, and there is a measured inclusion of contextual information in the 
Sabis River account, both techniques used to create tension in the narrative.
3
 The 
confrontation with a Belgic confederation in Book Two also illustrates the 
pervasiveness of style as the narrative is fundamentally determined by the topos of the 
                                                 
1
 White (1987) p. 10. See also Weinryb (1988) p. 269 who notes that while text is linear in nature and 
can only recall one event at a time, the crucial aspect is how those are narrated if not in chronological 
order. See also p. 270 where it is noted that historical text no less than the literary deviates from 
chronological order and “plays with time”. 
2
 See Kraus (2009) p. 173 for options for battle reporting and Keegan (1976) p. 16. See also Campbell 
(1987) on some of the problems of military manuals. While Campbell‟s focus is on the imperial 
period, there are useful observations on the problematic status of manuals overall. See also generally 
Richter (1977). 
3
 1.11-1.29, 2.15-2.29. 
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enemy horde.
4
 The influence of narrative style is also evident when Caesarʼs character 
is absent from the events described, and his opportunity for self-promotion of his own 
achievements limited. This is the case in the account of the battle of Octodurus, 
fought by the subordinate Servius Galba, an episode in which Caesar uses a style of 
narration that captures the perspective not only of the Roman commander, but the 
enemy and their plans.
5
 In contrast to a clear or consistent military methodology, 
stylistic determinants of battle are highly visible in the work, even where these 
conflict with a clear account of historical circumstances. The extent to which they 
determine the nature of the battle narrative and the level of military information 
presented is indicative of how far Caesarʼs narratives are from a battle report or a 
simple record of the victories.  
 
Battle Narrative vs. Battle Report 
 
Writing on war does not necessarily indicate a desire to accurately and 
comprehensively reconstruct the conditions of battle, and Caesar is not confined by 
the requirement for a full or accurate account of historical events. Virgil can appeal to 
the muses for his epic on warfare, and the context in which his battles are written, as 
his martial topic is not designed to be a historical reconstruction of battle.
6
 Similarly 
in epic, Naevius may state his military experience in the Bellum Punicum precisely to 
add authority to his narrative voice, rather than as recognition of any reconstructive 
motive.
7
 Even in history, Livyʼs preface establishes that his authority is inexorably 
tied with a moral agenda, rather than a descriptive methodology regarding battle.
8
 
Livyʼs presentation of historical events, even the battle of Cannae, includes 
information designed to examine personal characteristics, such as those of Roman 
commanders present.
9
 As Oakley states, several episodes are shaped so as to reveal 
particular moral qualities, for instance to show the pietas, clementia and disciplina of 
                                                 
4
 2.1-2.12. 
5
 3.1-3.6. 
6
 See Aeneid 1.1-4.  
7
 Ash (2002) p. 254. Naevius, according to Aulus Gellius NA 17.21.45.  
8
 See Livy Praef 10. See also Moles (1993) for an overall examination of Livy‟s preface. See Oakley 
(1997) pp. 114-117 on the moralising element. 
9
 See Livy 7.9.6-7.10.14. Walsh (1963) at pp. 98-99 notes how Livy applies moral criteria to Scipio‟s 
generalship, i.e. energy and hard work. See Livy 26.51, 22.22. On Cannae see Chaplin pp. 53-54.  
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Manlius Torquatus.
10
 It is therefore important to note that martial subjects do not 
necessarily indicate a desire to reconstruct the minutiae of historical battle.  
 
Similarly, a description of battle in the Bellum Gallicum does not automatically mean 
a prima facie desire to comprehensively describe or reconstruct the historical event. 
Historical recollection is the presumed motive in early 20th Century scholarship and 
even some recent work on battle.
11
 Lendon and Kagan in particular regard the battles 
as an attempt to record the historical victory, Lendon stating “Caesarʼs descriptions 
attempt to reduce the chaos of reality to understandable narratives” and Kagan 
arguing that “The commander-narratorʼs perception of battle….rather than 
historiographical conventions shape Caesarʼs accounts of his own activities.”12 In 
both cases, the assumption is that the objective of the narrative is primarily to record 
the course of the battle or its result. However Caesar does not explicitly state whether 
his primary purpose is a full and accurate reconstruction of battle in his introduction, 
which concentrates on Gaul overall rather than the military preparations for the first 
campaign, and even the information he provides relates only generally to the peoples 
who will be faced and the location of the campaigns.
13
 While this ostensibly describes 
the theatre of operations, it still does not take into account any variations in objectives 
regarding individual campaigns, and in fact makes no mention of battle.
14
 The 
objective of reconstructing battle should not be automatically assumed, as the focus of 
the introduction is only on the general context of Gaul as a whole. 
 
Caesarʼs relationship to Roman military reporting also makes the assumption that he 
is providing a complete reconstructive account problematic. Military manuals, while 
in use during the late republican period, do not seem to have had the popular appeal of 
                                                 
10
 See Oakley (1997) pp. 115-116. 
11
 Bishop and Coulston (1993) p. 42 state that works like Frontinusʼ and Caesarʼs are primarily 
intended as literature. See also Hall (1998) p. 31. fn. 46, who notes the views of early 20th Century 
scholars such as Klotz (1910) and Norden (1923) on the commentarii as reports. 
12
 Lendon (1999) p. 277, Kagan (2006) p. 114. 
13
 1.1. Note how the level of information provided is very general, such as the relative martial strength 
of the Belgae compared to other Gauls. Even this could indicate a moral purpose; something noted by 
Jervis (2001) pp. 61-75. See Kraus (2009) pp. 160-163 on the idea that there is not even a title to the 
work. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 59 on the ethnographic and geographic scope of the introduction. 
Schadee (2008) p. 160 notes the vagueness of the introduction.  
14
 Note how at 1.2-1.4 the text describes Orgetorix and the background to the Helvetian migration, and 
does not provide any Gallic fighting techniques or other information that might indicate an objective 
of contextualising battle narrative in the forthcoming books.  
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actual battle experience.
15
 Campbell notes that where military manuals are mentioned 
in the sources they tend to viewed as of less value than practical experience, and it is 
unclear where Caesar stood on such issues with regard to military writing.
16
 This is 
apparent in Sallust, who states that Marius learned from battle not reading, and in 
Cicero who makes a similar observation about Pompey.
17
 Furthermore, the detail that 
might be included in a military manual does not suggest they would be similar to 
Caesarʼs accounts of battle, as illustrated by Frontinusʼ short sections that indicate 
various principles at play in the battles he examines.
18
 Frontinusʼ account of Caesarʼs 
stratagem at the siege of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp is illustrative of the contrast between 
narrative and military summary: 
  
C. Caesar in Gallia, deletis ab Ambiorige Titurii Sabini et Cottae legatorum copiis, 
cum a Q. Cicerone, qui et ipse oppugnabatur, certior factus cum duabus legionibus 
adventaret, conversis hostibus metum simulavit militesque in castris, quae artiora 
solito industria fecerat, tenuit. Galli praesumpta iam victoria velut ad praedam 
castrorum tendentes fossas implere et vallum detrahere coeperunt: qua re proelio 
non aptatos Caesar emisso repente undique milite trucidavit.
19
 
 
This account provides the essential details to understand the military victory. The 
location and temporal context are provided, along with the exemplary deed that 
illustrates Caesarʼs stratagem. This is substantially shorter than Caesarʼs account of 
the whole affair, which extends for over twelve chapters.
20
 While the objectives of 
Caesarʼs version is discussed in Chapters Four and Five, it is sufficient to note at this 
point that the difference in length illustrates the substantial divide between Caesarʼs 
                                                 
15
 Rambaud (1966) pp. 19-23 nevertheless notes that Caesar may have made use of military reporting 
styles for persuasive effect.  
16
 See Campbell (1987) p. 21. While Cicero pro Balbo 47 cf. Sallust Bell Iug 85 12-14 states the idea 
that someone reading Marius‟ actual campaigns could obtain a detailed knowledge of the rules of 
war, Cicero may not be the best source on military matters due to his own lack of an exemplary 
military background. Also Cicero in pro M Fonteio 42-3 complains about the lack of practical 
experience. Such flexibility by Cicero compounds the problematic status of manuals. See also Cicero 
Prov Cons where he does not discuss battle. 
17
 Jug 85.7-14. See also Cicero De Imp Cn Pomp 27-28 on the importance of military experience and 
the idea that Pompey was concerned with practical experience not book learning. See Kraus (2009) p. 
161. 
18
 See for example Frontinus Strategmata 2.1.16, 2.3.18, 2.5.20, 2.6.3, 3.17.6-7, 4.5.11, 4.7.1. 
19
 Frontinus 3.17.6. 
20
 This includes the siege itself which is described at 5.38-5.51. 
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account of the historical event, and at least one surviving source on military 
principles. 
 
Even the evidence for commentarii, with which Caesarʼs works are generally 
associated, suggests that they were not constructed as comprehensively as the Bellum 
Gallicum.
21
 The possible exception, Ciceroʼs purported commentary on his own 
campaign, was clearly not designed to be a military report, as suggested by his desire 
to celebrate his victories through the proposed work.
22
 What evidence survives does 
not suggest that the battle narratives of Caesar can, or should be easily matched to 
ideas of military reporting, and there is a lack of evidence to suggest they should be 
viewed as an ostensibly simple record of historical events.  
 
In addition, the extent to which the audience would have read the works as a military 
manual is also unclear, due to uncertainty over whether they were concerned with 
such matters. Rosenstein in particular notes that men of Ciceroʼs generation often had 
little experience of war.
23
 Even though Lendon recognises martial psychological 
factors in the narrative that informs Caesarʼs understanding of battle, this does not 
necessarily imply that there is a reconstructive motive to a passage or that he intended 
his audience to focus on issues of causality.
24
 There is not enough evidence of how far 
Caesar is addressing military reporting criteria in the commentarii; even if it was 
likely he had read reports or treatises himself.
25
 Therefore the status of these 
commentarii as military manuals must be viewed with suspicion, in the absence of 
                                                 
21
 See pp. 27-28 above. 
22
 See Cicero ad Attic 1.19.10, 2.1.1-2.1.2, ad Fam 5.12.10 on his own commentarius. Those memoirs 
that might have shed some more light on Caesarʼs work have not survived, such as the lost 
commentary of Sulla.  
23
 See Rosenstein, (2006) p. 378. The requirement for ten years public service for office had been 
abandoned by this point. Wiseman (1998) pp. 1-9 postulates a primarily military audience. Even if 
so, how far they read the work as a military manual is unclear.  
24
 Lendon (1999). At p. 296 Lendon (1999) praises Caesar‟s attention to psychology and at p. 301 notes 
that some landscape is included for psychological effects on morale i.e. 7.19, 7.29. Lendon (1999) p. 
274 examines “the mechanics of battle description” and at p. 277 states how a classical historian must 
choose information, however this seems to rely on an implicit assumption that the objective is the 
description of the original event. Lendon (1999) p. 284 also notes of Polybius 5.21.3, 12.25.3 that the 
duty of a historian is to report topography, the physical deployments, formations and evolutions, all 
features of battle that this thesis illustrates are used to meet authorial objectives. 
25
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 133, 202 on the lack of other commentarii or reports to compare with. While 
Caesar at Bellum Civile 1.72 notes that the role of a general is to conquer by consilia no less than by 
sword, this does not necessarily imply the use of manuals. See also Bömer (1953) p. 250 on the 
unprecedented nature of Caesar‟s commentarii and p. 210 on the use of a military reporting format. 
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contemporary information to suggest they are designed or desired to be viewed as 
such.  
 
More importantly, the full and accurate description of battle was not necessarily the 
means by which Caesar intended to promote himself in the commentaries. As Riggsby 
notes, much of Roman expectation was in regards to the generalʼs conduct, not the 
minutiae of battle.
26
 In Caesarʼs case his rival was Pompey, whose reputation was 
founded on actual victories, and as Welch notes, the Bellum Gallicum was most likely 
an answer to such a reputation.
27
 While winning a battle was critical to many 
campaigns, the purpose of such accounts in the Bellum Gallicum is more likely to be 
predicated on the implications behind victory, such as the reputation that Caesar 
sought as great commander.
28
 Therefore, while the victories are an implicit 
affirmation of his overall military expertise, his reputation, as enunciated in the work 
also depends on the presentation of himself, whether that is attributes as identified by 
Ramage, or other objectives such as an identification with Rome.
29
 Any analysis 
should consider that the accounts are based on the overall impression Caesar is 
attempting to transmit, and this could take precedence over the details of the battles 
themselves, which by the time of writing had already been won. 
 
Caesar promotes himself through the content of his work, but care is also required 
when associating this purely with the representation of battle, as he establishes his 
knowledge of matters through various methods that are not battle. This is evident in 
the details of bridge building, or the ethnographic excursus of Book Six, in which he 
provides an extensive detail of Gallic customs.
30
 He makes direct statements on 
various topics, such as the garrulous or fickle nature of the Gauls, and includes 
                                                 
26
 Riggsby (2006) pp. 203-204. 
27
 Welch (1998) pp. 85-86. See Ciceroʼs speech De Imperio Cn Pompei 10-17. See also Ramage 
(2003) p. 376, Riggsby (2006) p. 205. Note also that Theophanes of Mytiliene is known to have been 
preparing a res gestae of Pompey in 62 BCE. See Cicero Arch 24 cited in Hall (1998) p. 40. fn. 180. 
Hall at p. 29 notes that Pompey in turn was influenced by the representation of Alexander. 
28
 See Ramage (2003) pp. 364, 367. See also Riggsby (2006) pp. 134-135 who notes the wide range of 
author types for commentarii, suggesting the description of battle and commentarii were not 
automatically equated with each other. See also Hall (1998) pp. 26-27 on the political implications of 
the Bellum Gallicum based on the use of Latin. 
29
 See Ramage (2002) pp. 132-138. See Mannetter (1995) p.196. On the narrator as military expert see 
Grillo (2011) pp. 253-259. 
30
 4.17-4.18, 6.11-6.28. Goldsworthy (2007) p. 101 notes regarding the information on the Rhine 
bridge, that the expedition did not involve serious fighting, but Caesar includes it apparently to 
“interest and impress his audience”. In regards to the customs of the Gauls see in general Riggsby 
(2006) pp. 47-72, Jervis (2001). 
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incidental details such as the manner in which they accost travellers for news, 
information that has only a marginal relationship to battle.
31
 In addition, Ciceroʼs 
criteria for judging the work do not seem to be based on the comprehensiveness of the 
military detail, and in fact may only be in praise of the stylistic aspects of the work.
32
 
As Whitby notes, even if Caesarʼs audience were interested in the reasons for victory, 
he may have decided at particular times that other matters were of greater interest to 
them.
33
 As a result, the narratorʼs place as a source on the activity of the Bellum 
Gallicum does not necessarily imply that he would be obliged to provide a full 
account of battle, as conflict is only one of the tools available in the body of the work. 
It is highly probable that the work is not designed simply as a record of military 
achievement through the reconstruction of historical battle in the text. 
 
Selection of Contextual Information 
 
Battles have a decisive quality and the confrontations are therefore important for the 
resolution of particular campaigns, but this is not necessarily the reason that Caesar 
includes his content.
34
 Goldsworthy regards victory as a criterion for inclusion in the 
narrative, stating that Caesar wrote to promote his own career and gain more 
opportunities for glory, and that he brushed over actions that “achieved littleˮ.35 This 
assumes that the criteria for narration are largely based on the significance of the 
event, rather than any authorial objective or interpretation. Certainly, the idea that 
victory could be a determinant is supported by the Alesia narrative, which is one of 
the longest passages in the work and as shown brings about a resolution to the war.
36
 
Even the battle of the Sabis River involves a resolution, as Caesar claims it brought 
                                                 
31
 See 4.5. 
32
 See Suetonius Div Iul 55, Cicero Brut 262. Such a reputation may of course have been Caesar‟s 
objective when writing and his reputation as commander probably only a part of what he wanted to 
achieve. 
33
 Whitby (2007) p. 81. Mannetter (1995) p. 194 states that for ancient historians the fight itself was the 
“most dispensable part of the narrative”.  
34
 Many narratives are based on historical events that resolved the campaigns, at least according to 
Caesar. However Caesar selects particular events for extended narratives based on literary 
interpretation of the historical victory. For example, see Melchior (2004) p. 18 on resolution as part 
of a revenge cycle. 
35
 See Goldsworthy (2006) pp. 187, 190, 280. On the uncritical use of sources see Wheeler (2001) p. 
171 who cites Goldsworthy (1996) pp. 117-118.  
36
 See 7.69-7.88. Note that the continuing warfare of Book Eight suggests that the Alesia campaign 
was not as decisive as portrayed by Caesar. 
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about the destruction of the Nervii.
37
 Nevertheless, victory is not always the criterion 
for an extended narrative, and the battle of Gergovia represents a major defeat in 
which the length of the passage demonstrates that not all battles are chosen for their 
successful resolution.
38
 A minor encounter in Britain against chariots is similarly 
given significant detail, in order to support Caesarʼs failure to prosecute the overall 
campaign.
39
 Other battles that involve success, such as the defeat of the Tigurini are 
only allocated a small section of text, showing that Caesar does not simply use victory 
to determine length and detail of battle.
40
 Such choices regarding the details of a 
passage are illustrative of the idea that Caesarʼs narratives are not only providing an 
account of events significant for their military success. 
 
The idea that the battles are more than just a record of favourable historical events is 
also evident as Caesar appears highly selective in his choice of battles and the 
contextual information provided, particularly in the Rhone confrontation.
41
 Gilliver 
makes a statement about ancient battle that is contradicted by this account: 
 
The big set piece description seems to have been almost a requirement for any 
writer of Roman history…and certain information was expected. The size of the 
armies, the dispositions, the speeches of the generals, the engagement, flight and 
casualty figures were all part of the description, though length and emphasis might 
vary considerably.
42
  
 
In contrast to Gilliverʼs assertion, Caesar does not appear to confine himself by the 
need to create large set piece battle narratives based on their historical importance, nor 
does he always include information that would clarify the historical context, such as 
the scope, size and historical importance of a battle.
43
 The defence of the Rhone in 
particular indicates that narrative length is not dependent on the size, scope or number 
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of combatants in a confrontation.
44
 The encounter at the Rhone is described in Book 
One, and is given little detail in spite of the importance of the undertaking and its 
overall success, nor the effort involved and the strength of the enemy forces.
45
 Caesar 
describes how his army constructed a sixteen foot high wall that was nineteen miles 
long, and included a ditch, an overall impressive structure, and larger than the eleven 
mile circumference of fortifications that he states surrounded Alesia.
46
 Similarly the 
number of Helvetians involved may have been substantial, as in the account the 
migrating people attempt to cross the river as a single entity.
47
 Importantly, Caesarʼs 
defence forces the Helvetii to change their course, thereby preventing them from their 
original objective of entering the Roman province.
48
 The narratorʼs brevity in this 
regard indicates that he does not consider the matter worthy of an extended battle 
narrative in spite of the size and importance of the defensive endeavour. 
 
In addition, Caesar does not appear to be influenced by the complexity of the Rhone 
crossing, and the opportunity to describe an interesting or technical narrative is absent 
from this and other potentially complex battles.
49
 The extent to which he abbreviates 
combat is evident in the description: ...nonnumquam interdiu, saepius noctu si 
perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi hoc 
conatu destiterunt.
50
 The raw material of a complex battle narrative is apparent here 
as the statement indicates the fighting went on for some time, and includes details of 
the defence that could have been developed significantly further.
51
 Such selectivity is 
also apparent in the Arar River account, which includes many elements that could be 
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made into an extended narrative, with a river crossing, and an unusual time for the 
Roman advance, however Caesar only devotes a single chapter to that battle.
52
 As 
Mannetter notes, “Caesar is not attempting to set down details of battle exactly as 
happened nor is he writing a technical manual for later generals”.53 The brevity of 
these accounts in spite of the source material supports the idea that battle narratives 
are not necessarily selected for the complexity and detail of the original event. 
 
Within other battle narratives Caesar is similarly selective, and in particular does not 
appear to show a concern to clarify numbers for his audience, suggesting battle is not 
structured in terms of its complete historical context.
54
 The reason for Caesarʼs 
numeric selectivity is examined further in Chapter Two, but it is important to note that 
his style is in marked contrast to historical sources like Livy and Polybius, who in 
spite of not being witnesses to earlier battles make an attempt to give numbers before 
some major narratives.
55
 While Caesar recognises the importance of numeric 
superiority in battle, in the description of the campaign against the Helvetii, important 
information is held in abeyance, and he only reveals pertinent details after the account 
of the fighting itself.
56
 In the early discussions of the Helvetian campaign he uses non-
numeric details to describe the enemy, simply describing them as a multitude too big 
                                                 
52
 See 1.12. Note also how this confrontation eliminates a quarter of Helvetii, according to Caesar, 
illustrating how the scope of victory claimed is not necessarily a prerequisite for an extended 
narrative. See also Kraus (2010) p. 44. Kraus notes Caesar‟s selectivity in Book Seven where there is 
an emphasis on three sieges that minimise the importance of a cavalry battle that forces 
Vercingetorix to Alesia. 
53
 Mannetter (1995) p. 196. 
54
 Richter (1977) pp. 156-158. See also Scheidel (1996) for a general discussion of conventions in 
numbering. While Scheidel examines economic numbers, it is important to note that numbers in 
sources are not necessarily included for purely empirical purposes.  
55
 On the importance of the size of forces see Polybius 3.33.17. This is certainly not the case in every 
account, particularly Livy‟s early books. However, the major battles of the Second Punic War afford 
an opportunity to examine what these historians are capable of. See Polybius 3.35, 3.60 for 
clarification of Hannibal‟s forces, 3.72 for Trebia, 3.113-114 for Cannae. See Livy 21.55.2-21.55.4 
for Trebia, 22.46 for Cannae, noting that his numbers for Cannae are less clear for the Roman side, 
even though he attempts to define the array. The use of numbers by Caesar is addressed in the 
individual case studies, but even this level of clarity regarding numbers and dispositions is rarely 
present, even in the catalogues which are discussed in their relevant narratives.  
56
 See 1.29. See also 1.52.6-1.52.7 and 2.8.1-2.8.3 for Caesar‟s recognition of numerical superiority as 
important. See also the naval battle against the Venetii at 3.14.2-3.14.3. In this account, only the 
numbers of enemy ships are given, as the objective is to reiterate enemy naval strength. See pp. 126-
145 below. Where Caesar does provide numeric factors, they are often delivered in a different part of 
the narrative, for example a figure for the Nervii is given at 2.4, and it must be assumed that this is 
the number fielded at the Sabis River at 2.19-2.29. See also 7.67-7.38 where Caesar does not state 
numbers, and only clarifies afterwards that 3,000 enemy were killed in retreat, probably to show the 
success of the pursuit.  
49 
 
for their lands.
57
 As he knew the numbers in this campaign at the time of writing, his 
silence before the battle is not through a lack of source information. Furthermore, 
when Caesar describes the Tigurini, he indicates that they represent a quarter of the 
total numbers of Helvetii, even though such figures have no original reference to be 
compared to.
58
 The absence of numeric context in the introduction of these tribes 
suggests that he is disinterested in clarification of empirical odds for his audience, and 
that a full descriptive report is not his aim. 
 
The figures revealed in the Helvetii account provide an example of the approach to 
numbers, and its problematic nature in terms of clarification. As Caesar states of the 
Helvetii after the battle: 
 
In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad 
Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus 
domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim pueri, senes 
mulieresque. quarum omnium rerum summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milia 
ducenta sexaginta tria, Tulingorum milia XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIIII, Rauracorum 
XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo. 
summa omnium fuerunt ad milia trecenta sexaginta octo. eorum qui domum 
redierunt, censu habito ut Caesar imperaverat, repertus est numerus milium centum 
et decem.
59
 
 
As the discovery of the census illustrates, the information is revealed according to the 
internal flow of the narrative, so that the audience has no idea of the actual numbers 
involved until the end when the camp is taken.
60
 Just as important to note is that even 
within the census, the numbers of fighting men are not clarified, the only number 
mentioned throughout the account being the 15,000 Boii who turned up part way 
through the battle, and a mention of the surviving forces afterwards.
61
 There is a lack 
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of clarity regarding combatant numbers that illustrates that Caesar does not appear 
constrained to provide a full account of the numeric strength of forces for his 
audience. 
 
In the first battle against the Germani, it is also apparent that the narrative is not 
driven by the need to establish clear numerical odds. Prior to and during the battle 
Caesar does not describe the numbers of Germani.
62
 If the audience requires 
numerical context, they must recall an earlier passage in which the numbers are 
reported by Gallic allies:  
 
Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; posteaquam agros et cultum et 
copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in 
Gallia ad centum et viginti milium numerum.
63
 
 
While Caesar states numbers, he later reports that 24,000 of the Harudes have recently 
joined Ariovistus, with no indication if these are additional, or included in the original 
figure.
64
 It is not even clear if the 120,000 are a fighting force or the entire population. 
While it might be assumed to be a whole population as they appear to be settled, the 
lack of clarity suggests Caesar is not concerned to contextualise the fighting strength 
for the upcoming battle narrative. There is no assessment of the fighting strength of 
these forces on the day of battle, particularly numbers of combatants.
65
 By not 
clarifying the numerical data, Caesar demonstrates that he does not wish to 
communicate empirical information critical to understanding the odds.
66
 In this 
regard, information is not provided in proximity or with reference to the battle as the 
purpose is not to clarify the circumstances of the confrontation.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Roman forces, and both lists are only of those promised to the battle. See pp. 71-88 and pp. 260-276 
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Such inconsistency regarding enemy forces is most evident in the description of the 
Nervii, and their problematic presence in Book Five after the defeat of Book Two.
67
 
The casualties of the Nervii are described as horrendous, and it is hard to imagine how 
they could recover when almost all the men were said to be killed.
68
 Caesar states: 
prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto.
69
 Nevertheless in Book 
Five the Nervii return as protagonists, and he describes that they and their allies 
launch an attack on Ciceroʼs camp.70 While this problem could be due to several 
reasons, the absence of an explanation for this apparent inconsistency suggests he 
may not feel bound by exactitude regarding the protagonists.
71
 
 
One striking feature in the narratives is that topography and the location of battle are 
not always contextualised in order to assist audience understanding. Pelling notes the 
paucity of information in Caesar in regards to locations and distances, suggesting a 
lack of concern with geographic precision overall.
72
 This is particularly true of battle 
as in the account of Ariovistus and the Germani in Book One; Caesar provides no 
consistent references to distance or geography even when these may be relevant.
73
 
Similarly with regard to locations, several towns in Book Two are named, even where 
no battle occurs, such as the town of Noviodunum, and Bratuspantium, both of which 
fall without combat.
74
 By contrast the town of the Aduatuci, where combat does 
occur, is not named at the start of the account.
75
 For Kagan terrain is “written to 
convey only the salient features of terrain that a reader would need to understand the 
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battle”.76 Nevertheless, the vague nature of Caesar‟s terrain descriptions can create 
confusion regarding the battlefield circumstances. This is evident in the Belgae 
confrontation in Book Two, as Caesar withholds mention of the marsh that lies 
between the armies, reserving the detail until later in the passage.
77
 These omissions 
indicate an inconsistency between topography, location and battle narrative, which 
suggests that contextualising the location is not the primary objective.  
 
Furthermore Caesar is inconsistent regarding the verification of information, 
indicating that there is no rigid standard regarding the reporting of military activity. 
As narrator of the work, Caesar is the main source of much information regarding his 
own activity.
78
 However when he reports activity that happened outside his personal 
presence, he sometimes explains his sources, such as in the massacre of Titurius 
Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, which appears pieced together from the story of 
survivors or prisoners, and elsewhere he similarly states his interrogation of prisoners 
or intelligence gathering.
79
 In the introduction to the Nervii, in which Caesar asks a 
question and receives an answer in indirect speech, he ensures through 
contextualisation that the information appears specific and logical according to the 
nature of the conversation, and what would be expected of the participants at this 
point.
80
 This adds veracity to the information given and imbues his representation 
with this authenticity.
81
 However, such information is not always forthcoming, and 
the inconsistency regarding sources is apparent in the battle against the Belgae in 
Book Two.
82
 While sources of knowledge appear before the battle, whether it is the 
letters of Labienus, conversations with the Remi or the various messengers and letters 
that travel back and forth, such detail is less evident for parts of the battle.
83
 The 
source of knowledge for the Belgic plans, such as the abandonment of the siege of 
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Bibrax, is not stated; it is simply related that they lost hope of taking the town.
84
 Their 
reason for taking on the greater task of facing the main Roman army is not even 
given.
85
 Even when Caesar describes complex motives, such as the reason that the 
Belgae decided to cross a river, or the meeting held after the failure of that plan, he 
does not mention whether he found this out through spies, prisoners or in later 
negotiations.
86
 Considering how complex the motives of the Belgae are for turning 
home, with reasons stacked up in sequence, and with reference to activities elsewhere 
in the region, his silence on the sources shows the inconsistency of his narrative 
approach.
87
 This methodology illustrates that he is only intermittently interested in 
establishing the veracity of his sources for battle and the context in which they appear 
in the work. 
 
The Selective Reconstruction of Combat 
 
It is not just in contextual elucidation that Caesar is selective, but in the details of 
combat itself. This lack of reconstructive clarity supports the idea that the narratorʼs 
objective is not just a reconstruction of the historical circumstances.
88
 By showing 
that Caesarʼs accounts are not concerned to comprehensively reconstruct the 
circumstances of battle, this section further demonstrates that Caesar is not simply 
creating context and understanding of the historical event for his audience. 
 
Caesarʼs narrative form appears limited in its ability to record battle in part be due to 
its complexity, where simplification is unsurprisingly a feature of the account.
89
 This 
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is evident in the siege of Aduatuca, in which the description of the town includes 
details of the one approach, a narrow slope that is heavily defended, however it is not 
stated that this is where a Roman tower advances, nor is there mention of the defences 
that are prepared against it, such information only being implied.
90
 Furthermore the 
sacking of the town is omitted once the Aduatuci are driven back from their sally.
91
 
Such details are critical to an understanding of the physical movement of men on the 
battlefield, and their absence suggests that Caesar is required by the constraints of a 
linear narrative to simplify details in the reconstruction of battle. 
 
Even within the narrative Caesar appears to deliberately simplify activity on the 
battlefield, using generic terms or broad descriptions to capture general concepts that 
suggest he does not desire a fully reconstructive account. While Kagan states that 
Caesarʼs narratives are trying to identify each battleʼs major events and the 
relationships among them, Kaganʼs investigations assume the narrative is an attempt 
at historical or military clarity, something that is not always apparent.
92
 For example 
in the Octodurus narrative, Caesar is non-specific regarding units involved, and 
identifying nomenclature is often vague regarding the action.
93
 When describing the 
combat itself, the use of words such as nostri, quaeque and alii are all indicative of 
the generic nature of identification, and replace any attempt to actually identify 
cohorts, or places on the battlefield.
94
 The summary nature of activity is illustrated as 
the enemy often act as a single unit, all of them attacking with missiles, or moving 
according to a single motive.
95
 Caesar relies on indefinite terms to describe units, 
indicating that this type of detail is not essential in the style of narrative he has 
constructed. 
 
Such an objective is also evident in the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri in Book 
Four, where the narrative is stripped of many militarily pertinent details and the 
encounter is reduced to its most simple terms. This is evident in the topography of the 
battlefield, which omits the complexities of actual combat to create a simplified 
environment. While Walker believes the terrain is flat and featureless in the region 
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and that is why Caesar gives no topographical details, flat and featureless is a detail 
that is in itself important for battle.
96
 No topography is mentioned within the battle 
that would help an audience to understand the locations of the forces, or the type of 
terrain where it was fought, except the basic concept that the enemy had a camp.
97
 
While Caesar mentions wagons and baggage, these are not given any sort of 
positional reference, and no other location information is forthcoming regarding their 
placement or location.
98
 This absence of detailed information is evidence that the 
battle is not to be regarded as a full reconstruction of the event, as situational 
information has been summarised in a highly simplified form.  
 
Similarly, Caesar omits much detail regarding the preparation and dispositions for 
fighting the Usipetes and Tencteri, suggesting that he does not wish to convey the 
physical circumstances involved in engaging with the enemy. All he states regarding 
the dispositions on the day is: acie triplici instituta et celeriter octo milium itinere 
confecto prius ad hostium castra pervenit.
99
 This basic description of his advance and 
manoeuvre into array suggests that the journey and the preparation for battle have 
been conflated for simplicity.
100
 The omission of any dispositions apart from the triple 
line illustrates that the conditions of combat are described in their most fundamental 
form.  
 
Furthermore when information is provided, it can disappear from the account once it 
has served its narrative purpose, even when it was likely important to the course of 
events. This is evident in the Arar River narrative, where in spite of the river location 
the river does not feature in the battle itself.
101
 As Caesar states: Flumen est Arar, 
quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, 
ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit.
102
 The sluggishness of the river 
and its appearance is only included to explain why the Helvetians cross at this 
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location.
103
 When he attacks the Tigurini, the river is not mentioned; its value only 
evident as it separated this tribe from the main host and presented an opportunity for 
attack.
104
 This abandonment of a battlefield feature furthers Krausʼ argument that 
Caesarʼs use of flumen is an example of how “superficially precise text” is useless for 
actual details.
105
 The feature is only described to show his decision making, and 
Caesar instead describes the flight of the Tigurini to the woods, so that the river does 
not even figure in the rout.
106
 While the river may play a part in explaining his 
decision to fight the Tigurini, the detail does not appear to be included to help in 
explaining the battle itself.  
 
Details of battle can be entirely missing from an account. In the confrontation with the 
Belgae in Book Two, Caesar describes his battlefield fortifications only after the 
cavalry have engaged in skirmishing, raising the question of what the Belgae are 
doing while this is going on.
107
 The lack of detail is also evident as the number of 
days over which activity occurs is summarised as cotidie, so that the temporal 
contribution of the cavalry battle and the length of the standoff itself is unclear.
108
 
More importantly, in the Battle of the Sabis River, whole units disappear from the 
account. Caesar omits to describe the results of combat fought by the Eighth and 
Eleventh Legions, which disappear entirely in the closing stages of the battle.
109
 
While Lendon attributes this to a style of reporting that varies as the account 
progresses, the omission of their final fate is important as they were engaged in 
ongoing combat when last described.
110
 This omission illustrates the selectivity of 
combat, and while Lendon regards it as driven by a historical aim, it is nonetheless 
indicative of a selection process with regard to the reconstruction of combat.  
 
The extent and importance of such selectivity is evident in a study of the first major 
battle narrative of the Bellum Gallicum, fought against the Helvetii near Bibracte, 
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where the techniques and narrative sacrifices are apparent. One major observation of 
the account is that Caesar reduces missile fire to its simplest terms, so that the 
narrative only mentions it occurring in one direction. This is evident in both major 
instances of missile fire in the battle.
111
 When he describes in detail a Roman pila 
volley, he makes no mention of return fire and the impact, if any, of Helvetian missile 
weapons is omitted.
112
 This is in spite of the array of tela, matarae and tragulae that 
he states the Helvetian army carried in its train, with which they are later able to hold 
off his entire army for an extended period.
113
 In this later confrontation, no Roman 
missile fire is mentioned either, illustrating the singular direction of missile fire.
114
 
There may be several reasons for this omission, such as the nature of the initial 
Helvetian attack, or the ineffectiveness of missiles at various times.
115
 However the 
absence of any mention is an example of how the narrator sacrifices particular 
elements of the battle and a full explanation for the event can only be inferred. 
 
Similarly Caesar omits a large amount of content that could be much more important 
for the result of battle, illustrating his selective attention to battlefield circumstances. 
After the initial pila volley, the account does not include any missile fire that might 
have been going on, an omission that has left it to modern historians to surmise the 
nature of combat in these engagements.
116
 Caesar states that after the volley, the 
milites make an attack with drawn swords, forcing the Helvetii from their position and 
into retreat.
117
 He then proceeds to an account of the manoeuvres that both armies 
undertake, as the Romans follow up the retreating enemy.
118
 In all this action no 
mention is made of any missile fire, or even if the soldiers continue to use swords; 
whether they fight with swords for the entire seven hour engagement or resort back to 
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a mix of missile fire after the first attack is not apparent.
119
 The change from the 
details of the pila volley and sword use at the start, to a summary of combat is an 
omission that is the result of Caesarʼs selective representation of combat. 
 
Caesar only marginally addresses other important aspects of the Helvetian battle, 
which indicates that he openly sacrifices important descriptive elements in his 
account. This is apparent as he scarcely mentions the use of cavalry, even when they 
appear important for the course of affairs.
120
 This is evident in the description of the 
opening of the battle:  
 
Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subducit 
equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit. ipse interim in colle medio 
triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas 
legiones, quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat, et omnia auxilia collocari, 
ac totum montem hominibus compleri et interea sarcinas in unum locum conferri et 
eum ab his, qui in superiore acie constiterant, muniri iussit. Helvetii cum omnibus 
suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie 
reiecto nostro equitatu phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.
121
 
 
In this opening passage of the battle, the cavalry are not the subject and are 
subordinated to the movement of the army onto the hill, even though the sequence of 
historical action would probably have been the other way around as they were sent to 
give the army time to form an array. The next and final appearance of the cavalry is 
equally short, and like the initial description, the sentence construction draws away 
from an examination of their contribution.
122
 In doing this Caesar brushes over an 
entire section of the battle, at odds with the importance of the cavalry, as through their 
contribution, he is able to draw up six full legions, the auxiliaries and the baggage. He 
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 The issue is that Caesar provides no details at all, his emphasis on swords in the initial attack not 
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is even able to begin fortifying the top of the hill and fight on better terms.
123
 This 
must have taken some time, suggesting that the cavalry contribution was significant, 
but their role is marginalised within the account. 
 
It is clear that Caesar is not motivated by a concern to describe important military 
stages in the battle, since the critical point in the battle is only briefly mentioned and 
many details of combat omitted at this point. The most dangerous point of the battle is 
when the Boii and Tulingi appear on the Roman flank, as the countermeasures 
indicate that he may not have expected this beforehand.
124
 Nevertheless, in the 
narrative this crisis is not elaborated on, nor given any detail except that Romans shift 
their dispositions to meet the threat.
125
 In spite of the long duration of the battle, there 
is no anecdotal information or details to describe how the Romans drive the Helvetii 
back.
126
 Even praise of enemy courage is positioned as an introduction to the final 
battle around the baggage and not part of this stage.
127
 The selectivity in content does 
not correspond with important stages of combat, indicating that elaboration and the 
important aspects of battle are not completely synchronous.  
 
As these accounts illustrate battle narrative does not seem governed by the purpose of 
explaining circumstances surrounding battle or the details of combat itself. The 
selectivity regarding the context in which the campaigns and their battles appear 
suggests that Caesar is not just providing details of his historical victories, nor 
assisting his audience to understand these details. While the victories themselves are 
apparent through the narrative, the inconsistent attention to clarification of the 
circumstances suggests only intermittent interest in full elucidation of the source 
events. Criteria other than self-aggrandisement through a record of success must 
therefore be considered as the determinant for the battles and their contextual details. 
The next section therefore examines the creation of the narrative to show that details 
are instead often provided to address the reception of these passages and Caesarʼs 
relationship as author to the audience of the Bellum Gallicum. 
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Caesar the Narrator and Battle 
 
In contrast to the inconsistent approach to reporting the details, there are clear 
indicators of Caesarʼs use of the medium of battle in order to create a narrative 
suitable for conveying his achievements. Kagan dismisses the idea that literary factors 
are a determinant in Caesarʼs accounts, stating that “scholars fail to recognize that 
Caesar conducted his military affairs in the realm of reality and not in that of fiction 
or rhetoric” further stating that Caesar was not relying on literary models to describe 
battles but on personal experience.
128
 However there is significant evidence to oppose 
this view, as Hirtius intimates that the commentaries are written to higher literary 
standards than a simple record of combat when he states: constat enim inter omnes 
nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum 
superetur.
129
 Cicero also read the commentarii from a literary perspective, as part of 
the aristocratic preoccupation with style and quality.
130
 While the persuasive effect of 
this is examined in Chapter Two, it is important for this chapter to understand that 
information on battle is selected and conveyed in order to address this stylistic 
dimension of the work.  
 
The idea that Caesar would have an interest in the audience reception of battle is also 
suggested as Cicero recommended narrating “changes of circumstance and 
vicissitudes of fortune” which will delight the reader giving rise to “surprise, 
suspense, joy, pain, hope and fear”.131 Kraus, as noted above, recognises this concern 
with audience reaction in Caesar, stating that he reduces the complexities of war to 
create a plausible, literary representation of the experience, thereby indicating that the 
relationship of author and audience has a fundamental impact on the manner that 
battle narrative is constructed.
132
 This motive is not exceptional, and Syme notes that 
Sallustʼs choice of content is sometimes developed at length, such as the Muthul 
account, and at other times left vague, in part due to the sources, but also to Sallustʼs 
technique of “selection and emphasis…omission, abbreviation, or the artistic 
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arrangement of events”.133 It is therefore also possible that Caesar would have been 
concerned with the presentation of the work enough to significantly affect his 
accounts of battle, and that this could be an important determinant of the narrative.  
 
There is an apparent concern with presentation evident in the provision of details used 
to evoke a reaction from the audience.
134
 Caesar uses methods like repetition or 
selective use of his own recollection, so that contextual information appears in order 
to further these stylistic aims.
135
 This is evident for instance in Book One and Two 
where the Helvetian campaign, the battle against Ariovistus and the Belgae account 
all use details to build tension in the narrative.
136
 In these instances, information is 
fundamentally determined by objectives related to Caesarʼs creation of the narrative 
to address his relationship with the audience as examined below. 
 
The evocation of a reaction in the audience is an apparent objective in the battle 
fought against the Helvetii, in which Caesar selectively recalls affairs in order to show 
the uncertainty and vulnerability of the Romans to this new enemy. Pitcher notes that 
this “building up” of an individual or group before they appear is a “recurring and 
effective tactic” in ancient historiography.137 Caesar reveals this tactic prior to the 
battle with the Helvetii, where he is careful to explain the reasons for the enemy 
offering battle or taking aggressive action, in a manner that appears designed to 
generate tension: 
 
Helvetii seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis 
quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re 
frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso 
nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacessere coeperunt.
138
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As indicated by the use of seu and sive, Caesar states he is not sure of their motives. 
This is in spite of his capture of the Helvetian camp and later negotiations with the 
same Helvetian leaders.
139
 While the uncertainty may have been real at the time of the 
event, it was probably resolved by the time of writing which must have been after the 
battle.
140
 In contrast to Caesarʼs lack of knowledge the enemy are placed in a position 
of strength and know of his own plans, as he states that a deserter provided them with 
the details, even though he may not have been aware of this at the time.
141
 By 
presenting the possible explanations, and selectively recalling details, information 
appears so that the uncertainty and tension of the situation is best communicated to 
the audience. 
 
Incidental details are used to support this impression, showing that information is 
included in the account when it supports the aim of building tension in the 
narrative.
142
 Caesar evokes an atmosphere of fear, through the examination of the 
motives of particular participants.
143
 This is not only evident when the Helvetians 
describe the Romans as timore perterritos, but it is also addressed through the failure 
of Considius, who is similarly described as timore territum.
144
 While some of this 
portrayal could be due to Considius having a possible connection to Sulla, it is also 
possible that he is included to invite the audience to consider what caused such 
fear.
145
 While criticised for his action, the shaken character of Considius, and the 
Helvetian perception of Roman fear illustrates that information reinforces the idea of 
suspense in the passage.  
 
In the campaign against the Germani in Book One, Caesar also generates such tension 
through the repetition of empirical data, illustrating that such information may be 
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duplicated to achieve an impression in the narrative.
146
 In describing the preliminary 
moves before battle he states how he has a small camp constructed: 
 
Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra 
eum locum quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus sescentos ab his, 
castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit. primam 
et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit. hic locus ab hoste 
circiter passus sescentos, uti dictum est, aberat.
147
 
 
Caesar repeats the distance, and coming so close after the first iteration, seems to 
stress how close this camp is to the enemy, even though he admits that he is repeating 
the information when he states uti dictum est.
148
 Nor does the repetition indicate a 
desire to map the battlefield for the audience, as he actually provides more 
information in the first statement, where he states that the small camp is beyond the 
enemy.
149
 The use of repetition highlights proximity and danger for the audience, in 
order to build towards the main battle narrative.
150
 Such apparently superfluous 
writing serves a purpose in terms of reception, and defines a relationship between 
Caesar and his audience that is primarily concerned with the reception of the passage.  
 
The motivation and objectives of the enemy are also described with certainty where 
they place the Germani in a position of apparent superiority.
151
 This approach is 
apparent when Caesar states that the Germani move camp: 
 
Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum 
duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque, qui ex 
Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur, Caesarem intercluderet.
152
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He shows no doubt here in explaining the motives of Ariovistus, in spite of the 
likelihood that at the time of the event he did not know the exact reasons.
153
 Such 
activity by Ariovistus might be motivated by a desire to cut supply, but the matter is 
reported in this case without qualification, as the objective appears to highlight the 
vulnerability of the Romans. 
 
A different technique appears in the Belgae campaign; however information is still 
presented selectively so that it builds tension in the narrative. Caesar describes a vast 
enemy host that is gathering against him, and structures the account to slowly provide 
more detail and an increasing level of tension as the narrative progresses, through the 
limitations he imposes on his own knowledge.
154
 At the start of Book Two he states 
conclusively that a conspiracy of the Belgae existed, however he later describes that 
he confirmed the rumours through the Senones and other tribes who were close to the 
Belgae, illustrating that he desires this account to be revelatory even though he has 
confirmed the plotʼs existence at the start.155 Furthermore, as the passage progresses, 
numbers appear through the indirect speech of the Remi, rather than when Caesar 
actually meets the enemy in battle, so that the initial rumours develop into a full 
account of the extensive numbers involved.
156
 In doing so an impression of 
apprehension builds, through the lack of certainty among the characters.
157
 The 
structuring of the narrative is designed to evoke the desired response in the audience, 
and to build tension in the passages before battle through the measured presentation of 
details.  
 
Similarly Caesar appears to use varying levels of omniscience in order to create 
tension, such as an account in Britain where he only gradually reveals the 
circumstances of an attack against the Seventh Legion, adopting a style that reflects 
his evolving perception at the time. As he states: 
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…ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant, Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem 
maiorem, quam consuetudo ferret, in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter 
fecisset. Caesar id quod erat suspicatus, aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, 
cohortes, quae in stationibus erant, secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas 
in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim se subsequi iussit. cum paulo 
longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et 
conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela conici animadvertit.
158
 
 
The passage establishes Caesarʼs limited perspective, as he only states that the guards 
reported dust clouds, rather than recording objective information regarding the enemy 
attack.
159
 He also records that he only suspected something was wrong, rather than 
state clearly what was happening. Even the actual battlefield is described in this 
manner, as he uses animadvertit to limit his perspective to that at the time of the 
battle.
160
 This style supports the impression of vulnerability, and as with the other 
passages examined in this section, indicates that selectivity is based on the effect of 
the information on the audience, even where this places clarity of the historical event 
or consistency regarding the narrator‟s knowledge in a subordinate position. 
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The Structure of the Sabis River Account 
 
The desire to evoke a reaction from the audience is particularly evident in the Sabis 
River narrative, which is structured to create elements of suspense and surprise.
161
 
The self-promotional aspects of Caesarʼs presentation of himself and his enemy in this 
passage are further examined in Chapters Three and Four.
162
 In this section, the 
passage is examined to show that Caesar captures the elements of suspense and 
surprise, and how information that describes the circumstances is carefully presented 
prior to battle itself to establish tension by focussing on the relative superiority of the 
enemy to Caesarʼs forces.163 While the enemy probably enjoyed some advantages in 
the historical battle, this feature in the account is a stylistic concern that determines 
the order and nature of the information related, and illustrates that Caesar is 
particularly concerned to do more than record events, as he appears to use military 
detail to engage his audience.  
 
In the passage preceding the battle narrative, suspense is built through the 
presentation of the intelligence gathering process, and by balancing the knowledge of 
characters.
164
 Caesar describes his own activity prior to the battle, making enquiries 
and finding out about the Nervii from the Remi, captives and other sources in the 
lands of the Ambiani, so he appears knowledgeable of affairs through the progression 
of the narrative.
165
 However he also ensures that the Nervii are equally 
knowledgeable, as they are not only informed of the states that had capitulated to him, 
but await him at the river, prepared and in the clear expectation he will arrive.
166
 In 
spite of the inquiries, the Nervii are clearly described as equal in intelligence 
gathering. The choice of narrative style ensures parity with regard to knowledge, so 
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that the text does not afford any particular superiority to the character of Caesar in 
terms of awareness of the attack. 
 
As the episode progresses Caesar includes the intelligence that the Nervii have 
gathered regarding his own forces. This appears to ensure that in the contrast of 
intelligence gathering, the Nervii are superior.
167
 Having found out the location of the 
Nervii, he then states that he sends out scouts to locate a site for the camp. As he 
states: 
 
His rebus cognitis exploratores centurionesque praemittit, qui locum castris 
idoneum deligant. cum ex dediticiis Belgis reliquisque Gallis complures Caesarem 
secuti una iter facerent, quidam ex his, ut postea ex captivis cognitum est, eorum 
dierum consuetudine itineris nostri exercitus perspecta nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt 
atque his demonstrarunt inter singulas legiones impedimentorum magnum numerum 
intercedere neque esse quicquam negotii, cum prima legio in castra venisset 
reliquaeque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub sarcinis adoriri; qua pulsa 
impedimentisque direptis futurum ut reliquae contra consistere non auderent.
168
 
 
While Caesar states that he has scouts at work, the knowledge gained through spies 
places the Nervii in a superior position as they are privy to information that the 
Romans are not. He even foreshadows Nervian victory by describing how they intend 
to win.
169
 There is a marked contrast between the start of the passage on Roman 
intelligence and the content, so that while Caesar knows this due to information from 
captives taken later, he is ensuring that the audience is aware of the information 
leaked to the enemy and the vulnerability of the Romans at the time.
170
 The passage 
illustrates that information is conveyed so that the position as narrator does not endow 
Caesar with overt superiority, and actually illustrates the enemy advantage at the time.  
 
                                                 
167
 See Grillo (2011) p. 252 on the technique.  
168
 2.17.1-2.17.4. 
169
 Mannetter (1995) pp. 101, 112-113 has a different view, believing that this serves to foreshadow the 
result. However while the statement ut postea ex captivis cognitum est may have this effect, the 
content of the information gathered serves to build tension by placing the enemy in a position of 
strength. The audience may reflect that the Romans eventually won, but at this stage of the narrative 
the obstacles facing the Romans are formidable, providing the necessary tension. 
170
 Caesar‟s knowledge allows for the enemy to be portrayed in a position of strength. See de Jong, 
Nünlist, Bowie, (2007a) p. xvii, for the definition of paralepsis. 
68 
 
This pattern exists throughout the preliminary stages of the account, as Caesar 
constructs the intelligence gathering and sequence of events before the battle to 
further build tension.
171
 The three passages prior to the battle follow a similar pattern, 
with two chapters starting with action by the Romans, but developing into extended 
passages concerning the activity, knowledge and resources available to the enemy. 
For example Caesar makes a three-day journey, and then has the location of the 
enemy described to him, only to then describe enemy activity and preparation.
172
 
Then he sends out scouts, only to redirect the narrative into a passage about the 
information brought to the Nervii and the advantages of terrain that they possess.
173
 
Finally, he briefly mentions the fact that the scouts select ground for camp, but uses 
the passage to describe the topography on both sides of the river and the advantageous 
location of the enemy.
174
 In each case, the Romans engage in brief activity, but the 
emphasis is on the relative strength and knowledge of the enemy, so that suspense is 
built prior to the battle itself. 
 
The final introductory passage, the description of topography, blends various aspects 
of both the descriptive background and intelligence gathering to enhance the 
impression of danger.
175
 One method is to present the intelligence that the Nervii 
gather and to develop it into an explanation of how the terrain works against the 
Romans, so that Caesar condenses two concepts within a passage to present obstacles 
to Roman victory.
176
 As he states of the terrain: 
 
Adiuvabat etiam eorum consilium, qui rem deferebant, quod Nervii antiquitus, cum 
equitatu nihil possent, neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid 
possunt, pedestribus valent copiis , quo facilius finitimorum equitatum, si praedandi 
causa ad eos venissent, impedirent, teneris arboribus incisis atque inflexis 
crebrisque in latitudinem ramis enatis et rubis sentibusque interietis effecerant, ut 
instar muri hae saepes munimentum praeberent, quo non modo non intrari, sed ne 
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perspici quidem posset. his rebus cum iter agminis nostri impediretur, non 
omittedendum sibi consilium Nervii existimaverunt.
177
 
 
This description of hedges that favour the Nervii follows on directly from the 
information that the spies brought to them, and comes before the description of the 
actual topography of the battlefield. In using this sequence, one topographical feature 
of the battle, the hedges, is separated from a later description of the field itself.
178
 The 
effect appears deliberate, as it condenses the dangers to the Romans, and the Nervii 
appear to control both knowledge of the Roman activities and the terrain itself.
179
 By 
following the spiesʼ narration with the description of this piece of terrain, descriptive 
details of topography are used to maximise suspense in the lead up to battle. 
 
Caesar also combines other topographical and perceptive information, demonstrating 
that the descriptive and subjective aspects of the account interact for the effect of 
surprise. He never explicitly states that the Romans are unaware of the location of the 
enemy, and according to the text he is actually expecting the Nervii to be here, as he 
found out their location from captives.
180
 Nevertheless, the narrative at this point is 
constructed to enhance this idea of an ambush; the structuring of surprise apparent in 
the manner the topography is described: 
 
Loci natura erat haec, quem locum nostri castris delegerant: collis ab summo 
aequaliter declivis ad flumen Sabim, quod supra nominavimus, vergebat. ab eo 
flumine pari acclivitate collis nascebatur adversus huic et contrarius, passus circiter 
ducentos, infimus apertus, ab superiore parte silvestris, ut non facile introrsus 
perspici posset. intra eas silvas hostes in occulto sese continebant. in aperto loco 
secundum flumen paucae stationes equitum videbantur. fluminis erat altitudo pedum 
circiter trium.
181
 
 
The passage opens with an explanation of why the camp site is selected, integrating 
terrain features into the site selection. However, not only the terrain is included in this 
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passage but also the location and disposition of the enemy. Furthermore, the woods 
where the enemy are hiding are described as impenetrable to sight, so that centurions 
and scouts seem to act without this knowledge, and whether they know the enemy are 
there is unclear.
182
 In describing the terrain thus, Caesar conflates three concepts in 
one passage: the disposition for battle of the enemy, the actual topography, and most 
importantly the limited knowledge of the Romans, all through an initial description of 
the camp site selection. The passage may be introduced as a description of terrain 
choice, but in this ostensibly descriptive passage, the impression of the threat is 
clearly developed.  
 
This description of terrain serves the dual purpose of presenting the topography for 
the audience, while at the same time anticipating the movement of the enemy attack, 
illustrating the objective of building suspense. The way that the passage describes the 
terrain is critical, as the perspective initially seems to follow the movement of the 
scouts, but then develops into a foreshadowing of the attack itself.
183
 The narrative 
follows the slope of the hill from the camp down to and across the river, then up to the 
woods. Importantly, Caesar then brings the narrative back to the river, following the 
advance that the Nervii will take, and ending with the information that the river is 
three feet deep. In doing so, he ends the passage with the most important piece of 
information, as at three feet deep, it is clear it can be crossed.
184
 By bringing the 
perspective back to this point, he demonstrates the subtlety of his technique as he 
saves the most ominous information for the end. A simple description of terrain has 
been structured to foreshadow the movement to follow, and to linger on the most 
pertinent aspect of the attack.  
 
In comparing the narrative and descriptive designs of this passage, it is worth noting 
where the impact falls most on the audience. An array of battle is omitted, and neither 
the locations of the various enemy tribes nor any other information regarding their 
dispositions are given. The effect is that the progression of the narrative is not forced 
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to dwell in one place, an effect that might otherwise undermine the foreshadowed 
movement of the enemy.
185
 In this case, the sacrifice of an array of battle seems to be 
clearly related to the needs of the narrative, as the objective is to create a stylistic 
image that supports the impression of surprise, to build tension, and to stress the 
vulnerability of the Romans.  
 
In constructing this particular passage, Caesar appears to be motivated by a desire to 
create a reaction in his audience, and this objective guides the presentation of the 
military circumstances. The relationship of narrator and audience and the desire to 
evoke a reaction appears to be a fundamental determinant in the construction of battle, 
illustrating the extent to which Caesarʼs battle diverges from a simple record of 
victory, as the narrative is governed by factors related to his relationship with his 
audience and the desire to create a compelling account from the historical event.  
 
Creating a Topos and the Belgic Multitude 
 
The battle against the Belgae in Book Two is further evidence of the difference 
between a reconstruction of details and the creation of a self-promotional narrative, as 
Caesar develops the historical victory into the narrative form. Kraus notes that “...any 
literary rendition of the past will inevitably move into the realm of the figurative, 
indeed, of the poetic” and states this is particularly true of ancient artistic prose due to 
sense of “literary history and rhetorical conventions”.186 Caesarʼs record of the battle 
against the Belgae in Book Two illustrates this to be correct in his case, as the account 
uses the numeric aspect of battle in order to create the impression of a vast host 
against which he ultimately prevails. The persuasive use of these numbers is 
examined further in Chapter Two.
187
 It is important for the current section to note that 
Caesar does more than simply report numbers, and promotes his victory by creating 
the topos of a multitude.
188
 This topos is not unique to Caesar, Riggsby noting the 
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presence of “raw numbers” as one of the “traditional themes” in discussion of 
Gauls.
189
 It is an interpretation of the enemy force that is not simply a retelling of the 
numeric odds faced, but a literary artifice that determines the structure of the account 
and the depiction of events described therein.  
 
The objective of addressing the topos of enemy numbers is achieved through several 
methods. Most evident is the repetition of the word multitudo, which is used 
frequently throughout the account, and while this might seem applicable due to the 
size of the enemy force described, it is specifically designed to create an impression in 
the audience and is not simply a description of enemy forces.
190
 In addition, the 
passages prior to the confrontation draw attention to size as the primary feature of 
their confederation, such as through a reference to the opening of the Bellum Gallicum 
in order to establish the scope of the confrontation. Furthermore Caesar uses a 
catalogue to build the impression of size, even where the details contained therein are 
not relevant to the course of the battle narrative. The careful construction of the text 
illustrates that the objective of addressing the topos determines the construction of the 
battle, and that this account is far from just a description of the Belgic force 
encountered.  
 
Caesar makes frequent use of multitudo, a reductive term that communicates the sheer 
size of the enemy force. While the word is applicable elsewhere in defining the 
enemy, it is particularly evident in this account.
191
 Caesar uses this word ten times in 
this passage, from a total of eighty one throughout the work, indicating that the size of 
the host is emphasised through choice of wording.
192
 Importantly, he condenses the 
usage, employing it nine times in twelve chapters, a much more concentrated use than 
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at Alesia, a narrative where the term appears nine times over twenty seven chapters.
193
 
More importantly, it is used in a number of contexts, not just in a description of the 
enemy force, but in descriptions of combat, or ethnic fighting techniques, or even the 
use of missiles.
194
 The intensity and range of usage indicates that there is a particular 
effort to evoke an established topos regarding the numbers of the enemy. 
 
The use of the word is not merely descriptive, and it is part of a larger scheme of 
representation that is the foundation of the entire account. This is evident as Caesar 
uses implicit assumptions without any form of objective verification. He opens Book 
Two by describing the plot by the Belgae against Rome, and states that all of the 
Belgae are involved in the conspiracy, even though one tribe, the Remi are actually 
not involved.
195
 This information comes to him through the letters of Labienus, and 
his implicit acceptance establishes early on that Labienus is correct about the scope of 
the threat.
196
 Importantly, the reasons for the revolt immediately follow this statement, 
and lend legitimacy to the rumours, as narrator omniscience applies to all the 
information in the statement coniurandi has esse causas.
197
 There is no doubt about 
the existence of a conspiracy and the extent of a revolt, which are conflated so that 
both are verified to create the impression of a great force gathering. 
 
Caesar enhances the scope of the forces involved by placing the enemy within their 
strategic context. It is particularly clear how large the Belgae are as a proportion of 
Gaul when he states: crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur, litterisque item Labieni 
certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra 
populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare.
198
 This statement refers back 
to the opening of Book One, so that the audience is aware of the significance of the 
event in terms of the size of the conspiracy and the numbers involved.
199
 Therefore 
the use of omnes Belgas is not, at this stage to establish a numeric figure, but to 
contextualise the people and location in geographic terms, to establish the scope of the 
                                                 
193
 While Alesia also features a huge number of enemy forces, Caesar is also concerned there with the 
contrast of leadership between himself and Vercingetorix. See pp. 260-276 below.  
194
 See a discussion of the traits assigned to the multitude below at pp. 177-184. 
195
 2.1.1. 
196
 2.1.1. 
197
 2.1.2. 
198
 2.1.1-2.1.2. 
199
 The numbers of Belgae are not actually being assessed at this point, as at 1.1.1-1.1.3 he does not 
state numbers either.  
74 
 
problem. The plot of the Belgae is placed within a broader schema, enhancing the 
impression of size.  
 
Caesar also uses anecdotal evidence to support the impression of size. He states when 
the Belgae arrive for battle: quae castra, ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur, 
amplius milibus passuum octo in latitudinem patebant.
200
 This piece of information 
supports the topos, as there is no need to elaborate on the size of the camp which 
plays no part in the battle. The information is purely to aid visualisation of the host 
and give a reference for the audience, demonstrating that it is designed to support the 
impression of the multitude. 
 
The most important way in which Caesar encourages the impression of size is through 
the use of a catalogue, which is a highly effective and direct description of the 
numbers, however the manner of reporting demonstrates the development of the 
topos.
201
 Caesar chooses to deliver the account of Belgic numbers in indirect speech, 
stating of his query that: cum ab his quaereret, quae civitates quantaeque in armis 
essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat.
202
 He has the Remi answer as follows:  
 
...plerosque Belgas esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter 
loci fertilitatem ibi consedisse Gallosque, qui ea loca incolerent, expulisse solosque 
esse qui patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata Teutonos Cimbrosque intra 
suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam 
sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. de numero eorum 
omnia se habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus 
affinitatibusque coniuncti, quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum 
concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint. plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et 
virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia 
centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia sexaginta totiusque belli imperium sibi 
postulare. Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros 
possidere. apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae 
                                                 
200
 2.7.4. 
201
 Mannetter (2004) p. 140 notes how complex catalogues are designed to manipulate the audience. 
The number is very large, and impossible to verify in the absence of supporting information. The 
catalogue however may be analysed to determine the objectives in its construction. 
202
 2.4.1.  
75 
 
potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae 
imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam; ad hunc propter iustitiam 
prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere 
numero XII, polliceri milia armata quinquaginta; totidem Nervios, qui maxime feri 
inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint; quindecim milia Atrebates, Ambianos 
decem milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios VIIII milia, Caletos X milia, 
Veliocasses et Viromanduos totidem, Atuatucos decem et novem milia; Condrusos, 
Eburones, Caerosos, Caemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad 
XL milia.
203
 
 
This catalogue is an unusual way for the Remi to respond to an assessment of Belgic 
strength if Caesar is only reporting what they said in response to his question, since 
the Remi are Belgae themselves, and are thus describing their own arrogance when 
they state: qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem 
magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent.
204
 Nevertheless the passage allows the 
Remi to become the spokespersons for Belgic character and history in a manner that 
suits the aim of addressing the size of the enemy force.
205
 It may therefore be an 
unusual statement for the Remi to make in answer to the question, but it allows 
considerable flexibility in the type of information included.  
 
The Remi specifically contextualise the catalogue in a manner that allows Caesar to 
develop the concept of the multitude, and thereby establish the topos. The Remi 
establish that the size of the Belgic army is great even before narrating the catalogue 
when they state: quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id 
bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint.
206
 The list that follows is therefore contextualised as 
the details of this great number, and provides the evidence to support the introduction 
by the Remi. It is not merely a list of contingents, as the speech of the Remi allows 
Caesar to clarify and enforce the image of an unusually large host through the 
secondary narrator. 
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Caesar also uses the introduction of the catalogue to achieve the impression of size 
and scope, through associations with the broader context of hostile activity against 
Rome. He commences the description by describing the Belgae as a people, but 
associates them with Germanic threats, as they are the only Gauls to stop the Teutones 
and Cimbri, an apparent indicator of their strength.
207
 When contextualised with the 
difficulties Rome faced in stopping those Germani in the previous century, the Belgae 
are thus presented as a powerful force.
208
 This passage describes the threat of the 
Belgae in terms of other migratory attacks, thus creating an impression of scope 
greater than any specific short term grievances with Rome.
209
 The introduction to the 
catalogue provides a thematic context in which to view their society, one that 
functions to increase the impression of scope.  
 
Where Caesar describes the actual strength of the Belgic tribes, the catalogue serves a 
similar function that broadens their contribution and establishes the expansive nature 
of the confederation. He provides a description of the previous ruler of the Suessones, 
Diviciacus, whose inclusion is unusual as he is no longer leader of the people.
210
 
While Diviciacus has little relevance in the current conflict, the description of his 
relationship to the Britons allows for an exotic anecdote that expands the context of 
the confederation, as his prior position, and the extent of his power extends even into 
Britain. The catalogue therefore illustrates the expanded scope of Belgic influence and 
power, in order to reinforce the topos with greater associations. 
 
While providing a list of various tribal names, the catalogue enhances the idea of a 
mass of men, as nowhere in the catalogue are the Belgae assessed in terms of the 
types of troops, and the impression is one of raw numbers rather than an accurate 
assessment of enemy strength.
211
 Caesar does not give a description of Belgic arms, 
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armour or fighting styles, or even a custom with which to associate them.
212
 He does 
not even specify if they have unusual weaponry, or clothing that would be of military 
interest to his audience, a marked difference to Livyʼs attempt to do so in his 
description of Cannae.
213
 Most importantly there is no information on what type of 
troops the Belgae have, so the numbers of cavalry, infantry and missile users are 
completely absent. The only details provided are that the Bellovaci are strongest in 
virtus, and the Nervii are ferus, or wild.
214
 The lack of elaboration on important issues 
like troop types demonstrates that the catalogue is designed to support the idea of a 
sheer mass of manpower, rather than a full and accurate assessment of combat 
strength. 
 
The impression of the multitude replaces any objective assessment of the actual 
numbers faced. The catalogue is highly subjective and of limited contextual value for 
battle, as the numbers given are only the men promised, and Caesar does not assess 
these against what he actually faces later, in spite of his overall attitude that Gauls are 
unreliable reporters and the information of the Remi should, by his own assessments, 
not be trusted.
215
 He instead states that the Belgae came against him omnibus copiis, 
and that he advanced postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se 
venire vidit.
216
 Consequently, the word of the Remi stands as the only record of how 
many men actually fought, and the impression of great odds is implicitly accepted.
217
 
While it is probable that the actual numbers of such a host could not be accurately 
confirmed, the presentation ensures that the figures of the Remi are not specifically 
disputed within the narrative.
218
 The development of the topos is given prominence 
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over a confirmation of the actual numbers of protagonists, as the impression is more 
important than clarification.  
 
There is a disparity between the impression of numbers and the way Caesar describes 
his own actions that demonstrates that the objective of creating an image of the enemy 
is paramount, even where it creates difficulties in understanding the course of the 
conflict. He specifically mentions in indirect speech that such a multitude is a 
strategic threat, stating:  
 
Ipse Diviciacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet, quanto opere rei publicae 
communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine 
uno tempore confligendum sit. id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines 
Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint. his mandatis eum 
ab se dimittit.
219
 
 
The threat of Belgic unity is very clear through the reference to communal safety and 
the use of magnopere. Yet Caesar waits until the Belgae are united before advancing, 
so that there is a discrepancy between the threat as it is raised and the actions he takes 
in response, and he does not explain why he waits in this situation.
220
 The narrative 
threat of the multitude is created, but the strategy for dealing with this is problematic 
as he does not describe or fully explain his own responses to that threat. 
 
Importantly, prior to the battle Caesar does not detract from the impression and avoids 
elaborating on the Roman forces that he has to deal with this threat. He does not 
provide the details of his own forces that oppose the catalogue, and it is left to the 
audience to gather this information from various points in the text.
221
 He has not 
specifically mentioned at this point that he had eight legions with him in total, and the 
only mention of Roman numbers so far is the two new legions recruited and led by 
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Quintus Pedius.
222
 There is no mention yet of the six legions already with him, even 
when he sets out with the army, so that while the force is dwarfed by the numbers of 
Belgae, he still avoids drawing attention to the massive Roman force with him, even 
though it is unprecedented so far in the Bellum Gallicum.
223
 By not raising its unusual 
size Caesar does not detract from the image he is evoking, and may even enhance it, 
as the only figure to directly contrast with the vast host is the two untested legions.
224
 
The narrative is constructed so that details that might detract from the image are 
marginalised until the battle itself, by which time the impression of massed odds is 
firmly established. 
 
The method of describing the contingents also aids the impression of size. Caesar uses 
asyndeton to describe the numbers of each minor tribe, building up the impetus of the 
passage as it approaches the end, the numbers coming faster to enhance the idea of a 
mass building momentum.
225
 He ends the passage with a grouping of tribes, in effect 
summarising the idea that he is conveying. The Germanic contingent, just like the 
Belgae as a whole, is a major threat due to the conglomeration of individual numbers 
into a mass. Even the length of the passage achieves this, as it is one of only two long 
catalogues in the work.
226
 It achieves the objective of impressing on the audience the 
sheer size of the Belgic force not only through the numerical data, but the manner of 
presentation, and the structure of the catalogue itself supports the objective of creating 
the topos. 
 
The Multitude and the Battle 
 
The creation of the topos and the impression of the multitude are not consistent with a 
clear explanation of the battle. In particular Caesarʼs actions seem unusual unless the 
Belgic host had separated, an action he makes no mention of in his account. Initially, 
Caesar states that the Belgae turned from their march to attack the town of Bibrax, 
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and then gives an explanation of siege tactics that suggests that a large number of 
Belgae, if not all of them, are involved in the assault.
227
 His response and the result 
are as follows:  
 
Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus, qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, 
Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares subsidio oppidanis mittit. 
Quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit et 
hostibus eadem de causa spes potiundi oppidi discessit. itaque paulisper apud 
oppidum morati agrosque Remorum depopulati omnibus vicis aedificiisque, quo 
adire potuerant...
228
 
 
In response to an assault by a force that is recorded as over 300,000 men, Caesar 
separates his forces and sends only the light-armed troops and cavalry. If the whole 
force of the Belgae is there and is as strong as he suggests, this is an unusual decision 
to make, and he does not provide the reasoning for it.
229
 Furthermore, based on the 
narrative, the implication is that because the town is surrounded, the auxiliaries would 
be unable to join the town, and thus would be largely alone against the Belgae.
230
 
Considering how careful Caesar is later to build defences against this enemy, the 
decision seems almost reckless.
231
 Caesarʼs action could be explained if the Belgae 
had subdivided their forces, but he makes no mention of this, presumably in order to 
maintain the impression of a massed host. Based purely on the narrative, the decision 
is unusual with regard to the impression given of the hostʼs size. However the 
problem is explained by the need to present the Belgae as a massive single entity.  
 
The effect of the topos is also evident in the problems of motivation ascribed to the 
Belgic host, who act in accordance with the idea of a multitude, but without a full 
account of the reasoning for their decisions. The arrival of light armed auxiliary forces 
brings hope to the Remi, and the Belgae give up the siege and turn aside from Bibrax 
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because of their arrival, as indicated by the phrase eadem de causa.
232
 The host of the 
Belgae retreat from a small light armed force, only to advance against a more 
powerful threat, a decision that seems odd considering their numbers.
233
 Nevertheless, 
the response of the Belgae to then devastate the fields and move onto the main Roman 
army is consistent with the ravaging effect of such a huge host on the landscape.
234
 
The actions of the Belgae seem problematic from the perspective of decision making, 
but nevertheless are presented are consistent with those of a single great host.  
 
The most striking effect of the objective is that in spite of the detailed catalogue, 
Caesar omits any separation of the forces and they act as a single unit, not even 
differentiated by tribe. The host of the Belgae engage in only one action at a time in 
spite of their vast size, whether that is assaulting the town, ravaging the fields or 
advancing against the Romans.
235
 The effect of this simplification is most evident in 
the standoff that develops between the two armies prior to combat. As Caesar states: 
 
Palus erat non magna inter nostrum atque hostium exercitum. hanc si nostri 
transirent, hostes exspectabant; nostri autem, si ab illis initium transeundi fieret, ut 
impeditos adgrederentur, parati in armis erant. interim proelio equestri inter duas 
acies contendebatur. ubi neutri transeundi initium faciunt, secundiore equitum 
proelio nostris Caesar suos in castra reduxit. Hostes protinus ex eo loco ad flumen 
Axonam contenderunt, quod esse post nostra castra demonstratum est.
236
 
 
In this passage, the enemy are not differentiated by tribe, appearing as a single unit. 
This is in spite of the various tribes who make up the host, and it is different to the 
specification used when describing the array of the Germani in Book One, or the 
actions of enemy tribal elements in the battle against the Nervii.
237
 The lack of detail 
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is a simplification that is in marked contrast to the knowledge that this enemy is 
comprised of a large number of different tribes, some with substantial forces 
compared to the others.
238
 Such a unitary approach to the numbers described is 
problematic even considering the need to simplify the account into a manageable 
form. It is indicative of how the objective of communicating the massed nature of the 
enemy determines the presentation. 
 
The unity of action ascribed to the host also does not allow for the complexities of 
maintaining such a large army in the field. The size of the Belgic army is massive, yet 
Caesar underplays the logistical element of war until the very end of the account.
239
 
While he is very careful to describe his own precautions against being cut off from 
supply, similar considerations do not plague the Belgae in the early stages of the 
narrative.
240
 The host lays waste to the fields of the Remi as an apparent act of 
frustration rather than to forage.
241
 Similarly, when it tries to cross the river and get 
behind the Romans, it does so to cut them off from supply.
242
 In neither case is the 
host pressed by its own supply needs, a distinct absence considering that Caesar is 
particularly aware of the logistical requirements of his own army.
243
 The absence of 
logistics in a narrative where these would have been critical concerns suggests that the 
account is simplified in favour of the impression created regarding the enemy army.  
 
In the battle Caesar also presents his own forces in a manner that highlights contrasts 
with the multitude. He mentions that Sabinus is placed in charge of a reserve, but is 
particular to state that this is made up of only six cohorts.
244
 This is the first mention 
of the forces with him in the battle, and they are puny in comparison to the vast size 
of the enemy. This approach is also evident in the manner the dispositions of the 
legions in battle are stated: 
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Hoc facto duabus legionibus, quas proxime conscripserat, in castris relictis, ut, si 
quo opus esset subsidio, duci possent, reliquas sex legiones pro castris in acie 
constituit. hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerant.
245
 
 
This statement gives prominence to the smaller amount, which is mentioned first, and 
the larger amount is described as the remainder. The effect is to make the forces seem 
less imposing than they are, with emphasis on the weaker elements. The presentation 
gives precedence to his weakest elements in order to enhance the impression of the 
odds that the vast numbers of Belgae represent.  
 
Such disparity in the forces is evident elsewhere in the account, and the treatment of 
the auxiliaries seems included to emphasise the difference in forces available to each 
side. Caesar specifically describes the use he puts the auxiliaries to when he states of 
their initial role:  
 
Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus, qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, 
Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares subsidio oppidanis mittit.
246
 
 
He then states in the battle:  
 
Certior factus ab Titurio omnem equitatum et levis armaturae Numidas, funditores 
sagittariosque pontem traducit atque ad eos contendit.
247
 
 
While these two passages describe the commanderʼs orders, such detail regarding 
auxiliaries is rare, and Book Two is the only book to feature specific mention of these 
units.
248
 It is therefore notable that he also individually describes his weaker units, and 
that very elaboration supports the scheme by opposing the mass of the Belgae with his 
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weakest troops.
249
 The specific description of auxiliaries highlights the impression of 
enemy strength by contrasting it against Caesarʼs own light troops. 
 
Similarly, the recognition of individuals on the Roman side is in marked contrast to 
the lack of names among the Belgae once the armies are in proximity. When the Remi 
send for help, Caesar is particular to identify the leader Iccius as the one who asks for 
help, thus personalising the response of sending the auxiliaries as an act between two 
individuals, rather than as a strategic concern of supply, and personal relationships are 
present in contrast to the masses of enemy.
250
 He even provides the detail of Iccius as 
a man of summa nobilitate, drawing attention to the individual.
251
 In addition, Caesar 
repeats the name of Sabinus when describing the Belgic attempt to cross the river, 
drawing attention to the individual and the paltry force he has to face the enemy 
host.
252
 Within the narrative the effect is to contrast the masses of the enemy with 
details regarding individuals.
253
 The specific mention of these individuals has a 
narrative purpose in developing the thematic idea of the passage, the contrast of a 
powerful singular mass against a vulnerable Roman protagonist identified by its 
individuals.  
 
The description of fortifications also draws attention to the size of the enemy force, 
even where this has little reference to the course of combat. Caesar describes defences 
that are not actually used and are not relevant to the course of combat, such as the 
earthworks in the smaller camp, a fortification that plays no role at all in the battle.
254
 
Similarly, the tormenta that he places on the walls achieve the effect of emphasising 
his own precautions in the face of such odds, being the first mention of these weapons 
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in any of the battles.
255
 Most importantly, it is the only description of the weapons 
when they are not actually in use, suggesting that the inclusion is purely to aid the 
image he is creating.
256
 The effect of such an incidental detail is to give prominence to 
the issue of fortification and an implicit reminder of the level of caution required in 
the face of the forces that are described.  
 
Even the resolution of the battle reveals the prominence of the thematic issue. When 
the Belgae attempt to cross the river they are defeated in a thematically appropriate 
manner when Caesar states:  
 
Acriter in eo loco pugnatum est. hostes impeditos nostri in flumine adgressi 
magnum eorum numerum occiderunt; per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime 
transire conantes multitudine telorum reppulerunt, primos qui transierant equitatu 
circumventos interfecerunt.
257
 
 
The multitude of missiles that slay the Belgae in the water completes the thematic 
idea of the Belgic multitude, and are the answer to the threat of them in this 
encounter. The immensity of the slaughter is also captured with an anecdotal act of 
courage, the crossing through the bodies of the fallen, a distinctive quality of this 
encounter which is illustrative of the destruction of the enemy multitude.
258
 This 
inclusion is in contrast to the numerous other instances when bodies would exist on 
the battlefield and are not described, however it gives the river crossing a grisly, 
desperate character that emphasises the sheer mass of men in the water.
259
 The 
encounter at the ford is given detail suitable to the thematic resolution of the passage, 
and it resolves the issue of enemy numbers. 
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By contrast, the actual reasons the Belgae retire are less distinctive, ensuring that the 
thematic resolution is more memorable than the actual reasons for their defeat. The 
decision making of the Belgae is described in the following passage: 
 
Hostes ubi et de expugnando oppido et de flumine transeundo spem se fefellisse 
intellexerunt neque nostros in locum iniquiorem progredi pugnandi causa viderunt 
atque ipsos res frumentaria deficere coepit, concilio convocato constituerunt 
optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti et quorum in fines primum Romani 
exercitum introduxissent, ad eos defendendos undique convenirent, ut potius in 
suis quam in alienis finibus decertarent et domesticis copiis rei frumentariae 
uterentur. ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, 
quod Diviciacum atque Haeduos finibus Bellovacorum adpropinquare 
cognoverant. his persuaderi ut diutius morarentur neque suis auxilium ferrent non 
poterat.
260
 
 
The strategic decisions of the Belgae are finally addressed, however the concilio 
convocato described is a direct result of Caesarʼs military victory.261 Consequently 
combat at the ford and the decision to retreat is closely associated, as is evident in the 
words: spem se fefellisse intellexerunt. While Caesar finally reveals that the issue of 
logistics is pressing the enemy, these are described subsequent to the defeat in battle, 
with the issue of the Aedui ravaging their lands far down the list of concerns. While it 
is not possible to determine the actual reasoning of the Belgae in the account, the 
thematic resolution at the ford is given prominence. The strategic factors appear 
almost as an afterthought, demonstrating that the narrative resolution of the battle is 
given precedence over other, possibly more relevant, reasons.  
 
Caesar continues to present the enemy as a single entity in retreat, in order to resolve 
the issue of the multitude rather than its individual elements. Once the battle at the 
ford is over, the enemy confederation breaks up and returns home.
262
 In spite of this, 
they are still described as a single entity during the narration of the pursuit, 
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demonstrating the intention to resolve the topos of the massed enemy.
263
 In spite of 
the delay in pursuit, and the clear description of the enemy as separated in cum sibi 
quisque primum itineris locum peteret, the presentation is shaped by the desire to 
resolve the dispute with the host of the Belgae and not to describe which elements 
were the particular targets of his pursuit.
264
 This impression is maintained even when 
combat commences in the narrative, as the rearmost ranks of the enemy, and those 
further from the Romans are not distinguished by tribe.
265
 The impression is that the 
Romans are attacking the entity as a whole, rather than whichever tribe was last or 
nearest. The vagueness regarding whom the Romans engaged is explained by the 
depiction on the host as a single entity in defeat.  
 
Caesar even reiterates the idea that it is the multitude that he destroys in the pursuit, in 
order to clearly address this particular threat and its resolution. As he states:  
 
Hi novissimos adorti et multa milia passuum prosecuti magnam multitudinem 
eorum fugientium conciderunt... 
 
..tantam eorum multitudinem nostri interfecerunt, quantum fuit diei spatium, sub 
occasumque solis destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt. 
266
 
 
The initial statement is enough to describe the action of the pursuit and the killing of 
those in flight. However the idea of the multitude is repeated in the second statement, 
illustrating how important the resolution of the topos is to the account. While the two 
phrases are separate, they allow the topos to be clearly reiterated at the point of the 
enemyʼs final destruction.  
 
In the description of the Belgae, Caesar traces the topos in a consistent presentation 
path from the moment the enemy appears in the narrative through to their destruction. 
The description of the intelligence gathering, the roster of forces, and the comparisons 
he draws all support the impression of the host. The narrative of the battle closes with 
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as much emphasis on the thematic scheme as the actual destruction of the enemy 
threat, also demonstrating that the account is structured to address, and finally resolve, 
this particular objective. While the account promotes Caesarʼs command of the 
confrontation by emphasising the odds against him, he achieves this aim through 
thematic references that determine the content, the context, and the structure of the 
account. While this is favourable to himself as he ultimately triumphs over this 
enemy, the Belgic encounter is important as it displays that Caesar creates his 
narrative with an aim of creating a literary impression, rather than just capturing the 
course of events.  
 
The Development of the Octodurus Narrative 
 
The development of battle narrative for presentation and not simply to reconstruct 
historical events is also evident in the battle of Octodurus, which is distinctive since it 
is one where Caesar is not present in the text and the requirement for self-promotion 
through his own achievements largely absent.
267
 The passage is not only isolated as 
the activity described occurs during winter preparations, and is not directly part of a 
major campaign, but there appears little pressing impetus for Caesar to defend 
himself, as the result is not presented as a defeat.
268
 This unique status affords a view 
of the narratorʼs approach to battle as freedom from the need for promotion of his 
own activity allows Caesar the primary objective of ensuring a positive reception 
through the style of presentation.
269
 The effect of this objective is evident in the 
representation of the commander Servius Galba and other combatants, whose motives 
and perception of events determine the language used of the battle and the description 
of activity therein.
270
 Content appears and disappears when no longer functional to 
this pattern to the narrative, and details of combat are highly stylised or absent in the 
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passage.
271
 The number of reconstructive issues, and the consistent pattern in 
capturing perception subjectively, demonstrates the predominance of the narrative 
framework over the more practical and descriptive aspects of battle narration, such as 
the movement of men and the impact of terrain. The battle of Octodurus displays that 
military source material can appear in order to enhance the style of narrative, and that 
the account is primarily directed at the reception of the episode.  
 
The perspective for the battle of Octodurus is distinctive in the Bellum Gallicum, 
which usually follows Caesarʼs own perception and reasoning by default.272 In the 
Octodurus narrative his perspective, and his own self-promotional objectives are 
resolved early in the account and he adopts the perspective of his commander at the 
scene, Servius Galba.
273
 Kraus notes Caesarʼs precision regarding events he was not 
present at, and that there is a temptation to see these as worked from legate notes.
274
 
However, there also strong evidence to suggest that Caesarʼs technique is similar to 
the use of mimesis in Sallust, which invites the audience to experience events as the 
participants did.
275
 The narrative shifts from Caesar describing his own activity and 
perspective, directly to the action that occurs in his absence, and in the abrupt shift in 
perspective there is a notion that the stylistic concern takes precedence over objective 
reporting.
276
 Caesar does not describe how the news of Octodurus came to him, so 
with no explanation for the shift in perspective, the battle is not contextualised as part 
of the commentaryʼs overall third person style of narration.277 Furthermore, Caesar 
makes no assessment of the veracity of the information, instead accepting the 
perception of the characters without authorial comment. Whether this is due to 
uncertainty at the veracity of the information is not stated.
278
 Instead the battle is self-
contained and at variance with most of the reporting in the work, where Caesar 
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narrates his own experiences, suggesting a style deliberately chosen for this battle that 
is not simply a retelling of any report he received. 
 
The style of narration is apparent in the presentation of Galba, who takes on some of 
the third person role that Caesar normally reserves for himself. The narrative has 
thoroughly developed the thought processes of Galba, as is evident in a series of 
rationales he makes for summoning a council. As Caesar states: 
 
...Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque 
de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum, quod deditione facta 
obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter 
convocato sententias exquirere coepit.
279
 
 
Galba calls a meeting because the fortifications of Octodurus are not complete and 
there is a lack of provisions.
280
 Furthermore, this occurs because he thinks the enemy 
is suitably cowed, after their surrender and the taking of hostages, actions that lead 
him to believe that battle is not expected.
281
 In this passage Caesar qualifies the 
rationale for one action, the calling of a council, with another set of reasons regarding 
the suppression of the enemy, indicating how thoroughly he is concerned to capture 
the background to Galbaʼs decision making. This complexity is indicative of the 
presentation style, where the perception and thought processes of the commander at 
the time are being carefully constructed.  
 
The emphasis on building the narrative around the perception of Galba is evident as 
information is presented as part of the characterʼs subjective decision-making, 
planning and observations. This is evident in the preliminary stages of battle, where 
Caesar takes particular care to present circumstances from within the perspective of 
the commander.
282
 After some initial fighting he describes the placement of winter 
quarters as follows: 
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Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, 
missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta constituit cohortes 
duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico 
Veragrorum qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare.
283
 
  
In this passage the action itself is expressed in a series of ablative absolutes, the effect 
being that these are compounded as a prelude and rationale for the decision-
making.
284
 These events are preconditions, so that the data is contextualised as part of 
the thoughts of Galba. Activity is incorporated into the framework that draws 
attention to the commanderʼs perception.  
 
Caesar illustrates this objective when he describes Galbaʼs thought processes after the 
battle, which directly references the subordinateʼs initial thoughts: 
 
Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in 
hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisse rebus videbat, maxime frumenti 
commeatusque inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in 
provinciam reverti contendit ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem 
legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.
285
 
 
The return to Galbaʼs initial plan illustrates that the concern is to capture the change 
in reasoning that circumstances have brought about. The officer came to winter 
quarters with one plan, but he does not wish to test fortune further. In the assessment 
of the aftermath, Caesar does not simply describe the activity of the legion or provide 
his own assessment, instead contextualising it through the main participant. The 
summation and close to the battle in particular show that the event is being 
constructed consistent with the style of presentation rather than an objective 
assessment of the subordinate commander. 
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The perspective of Galba is not unique, further indicating that the style is based on 
more than a report of the subordinate, as the approach even extends to the thoughts 
and rationale of the enemy. As Caesar states about their reasons for attacking: 
 
Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque 
opprimendae consilium caperent: primum quod legionem neque eam plenissimam 
detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa 
missi erant, absentibus, propter paucitatem despiciebant; tum etiam quod propter 
iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela conicerent, ne 
primum quidem posse impetum suum sustineri existimabant. accedebat, quod suos 
ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant et Romanos non solum itinerum 
causa, sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca 
finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.
286
 
 
This examination is quite thorough and covers the reasons the enemy decide to attack; 
the background to their motivation quite clear in the description of the hostages taken 
and the threat of Roman expansion.
287
 Their plans regarding the battle are also 
enunciated, demonstrating that not just motivations but expectations are captured to 
show their perspective.
288
 This level of detail suggests the predominance of narrative 
choice rather than just reiteration of events in the battle based on the report of 
Caesarʼs subordinate. 
 
Critique and Servius Galba 
 
The extent to which Caesar adheres to the style of narrative adopted is evident as he 
limits his own presence in the account and there are no overt value judgements that 
might interfere with the objective of capturing the perception of those described.
289
 
Caesar may have been at the mercy of his subordinateʼs report for this battle, but he 
shows no uncertainty about the details that were provided to him, and if there were 
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 3.2.2-3.2.5. 
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 Görler (1976) p. 113 makes this observation.  
288
 See also the Nervii above at pp. 66-67. 
289
 Lendon (1999) p. 306 refers to Galba‟s initial “idiocy”. This may be a harsh judgement based on the 
overall presentation of affairs by Caesar. Contrast Welch (1998) p. 93 who states the caution of 
Galba is praised.  
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any details he was uncomfortable with he does not address these, instead adopting the 
viewpoint of the character in his development of the text. This is illustrated by the 
lack of overt commentary that would indicate an attempt to judge affairs.
290
 
Elsewhere Caesar as narrator makes overt judgements, such as praise of the Nervii, or 
critical generalisations regarding Gallic character.
291
 In this battle however, the 
commentary provided only gives general observations that remain within the 
perspective of the participants. Caesar only provides one overt assessment of affairs 
when he states: ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum 
venerant, undique circumventos intercipiunt...
292
 This one comment is still tied to the 
perspective of the Gauls, as it notes the change in their expectations regarding the 
battle, and the dashing of their hopes.
293
 The qualifications provided relate to the 
perception of the characters, indicating that comments are limited to only broad 
observations about the state of affairs. 
 
There also does not appear to be any specific criticism of Galba throughout the 
account, even where such observations might be warranted by the actions 
described.
294
 Caesar states that the enemy surprised the Romans, the words used 
being: cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset.
295
 The use of 
accido suggests that the enemy attack was a happenstance and not necessarily to be 
predicted.
296
 Certainly there is no overt criticism, as this action is most likely to 
generate a comment, being Galbaʼs failure to recognise the threat before it 
eventuates.
297
 He even passes up the opportunity to review Galbaʼs activities in 
closing, and simply states when Galba retreats that ...quod saepius fortunam temptare 
Galba nolebat, thus not only attributing events to fortuna but refusing to qualify 
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 Contrast Rambaud (1966) pp. 299-300. Rambaud regards the presentation as unfavourable. See 
McDougall (1991) pp. 624-625. McDougall states that Caesar‟s representation is overall positive, an 
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 See the discussion of Gallic character at 4.5, and the Nervii at 2.27.  
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 See also 7.80.9. 
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 For an overt judgement about subordinates, see Sabinus discussed at pp. 209-213, the army at 329-
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 3.3.2. 
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 The use of the word for a happenstance seems deliberately neutral here.  
297
 3.3.1-3.3.2. 
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whether Galbaʼs final decision was correct.298 In this instance the presentation is not 
specifically designed to highlight culpability.  
 
In particular, the examination of activity at various levels in the passage is not an 
indicator of critical commentary. At two stages Galba calls his sub-commanders and 
centurions together; however this is not a criticism of Galba or his command style, as 
there is none of the dissent and vacillation that is a feature of the Sabinus and Cotta 
meeting, an incident reported in a more critical manner.
299
 Caesar himself makes use 
of such a council, demonstrating that councils are not indicative of command 
weakness.
300
 In this battle, the meetings are called but the decisions made and 
outcomes are all successful, and the interaction of commander and subordinates is not 
a criticism of itself but merely part of the objective of capturing perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, when Caesar wishes to criticise subordinates, he does so clearly, as in 
the case of Gergovia where he describes the assembly of the army and his own words 
at the time of the defeat.
301
 Consequently the description of subordinates in action in 
the battle of Octodurus should not be viewed as overt criticism of Galba, as initiative 
such as that shown by Baculus and Volusenus is certainly approved of when 
performed in other battles, even expected, and it is not a negative reflection on the 
commander.
302
 Against Ariovistus, Crassus sends in the third line and is instrumental 
in victory, even though he is in charge of the cavalry, and Labienusʼ initiative at the 
battle of the Sabis River is critical in bringing about success.
303
 In this context the 
appearance of subordinates is not an implied criticism of Galba, as they are entitled to 
act on their own initiative. 
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 See 3.6.4.  
299
 The presentation of Sabinus at 5.30 is in marked contrast, and actual words are placed in his mouth. 
There is also the threat of physical violence in that meeting at 5.31, and the use of acriter to capture 
the bitterness. See 2.27.1 and 3.23 for other councils. There is no evidence of dissent or that Galba is 
not in control of this meeting.  
300
 See British invasion 4.23.5-4.23.6. 
301
 7.52. Even in that case the criticism is delivered from the perspective of Caesar as character. See 
also the forces of Quintus Cicero discussed at pp. 164-165 below.  
302
 Klaus (1974) p. 159. See 6.38 for Baculus taking the initiative to seal a gate. See 4.25 for an 
aquilifer in Britain leading the attack. On the “Baculus-toposˮ see Gerlinger (2008) p. 157, Richter 
(1977) p. 128. 
303
 See 1.52.7, 2.26.4-2.27.1. See also 5.48 for approval of a decision of Crassus. 
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Caesar eschews the opportunity to pass these judgements and while some of the 
audience may find criticism in Galbaʼs apparent failures, Caesar also gives the 
reasons that Galba was not expecting any attack, not so much providing an active 
defence as relating the factors that capture the characterʼs perception of affairs. Galba 
is given good reasons from his own perspective for not expecting an attack, as 
hostages have been taken and peace made.
304
 This is most evident in pace facta, the 
final of the ablative absolutes before Galba goes to quarters, which is not qualified as 
apparent or superficial.
305
 Caesar does not even criticise him overtly when an entire 
village of Gauls is able to sneak off without being noticed or caught, only that this 
occurred without early observation.
306
 There is no qualification and the passage flatly 
assumes Galbaʼs perspective, as the primary objective is to maintain the style of 
narration of adopted.  
 
The emphasis on the characters at the expense of objective assessment is clear in the 
language Caesar uses to describe activity in the battle. He phrases goals in terms of 
subjective Roman hopes, not the final result.
307
 The initial plan of the Romans to 
escape is described twice in terms of safety, and there is no mention of victory or 
overcoming the enemy.
308
 Similarly the decision to defend the camp is described as: 
maiori tamen parti placuit hoc reservato ad extremum consilio interim rei eventum 
experiri et castra defendere.
309
 The use of experior is important as it captures the 
doubt of the defenders regarding the issue.
310
 The choice of words is also apparent in 
the plan of Baculus and Volusenus, which is described in terms of hope and 
uncertainty, when Caesar states: ...ad Galbam adcurrunt atque unam esse spem 
salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur.
311
 He even repeats 
himself, stating again that all hope was placed in virtus.
312
 The phrasing of their aims 
demonstrates that the passage captures the perspective of the men rather than 
focussing only on an objective victory. 
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 3.1.4, 3.3.1.  
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 3.1.4. Note that this could be seen as a defence of Galba‟s decision to winter here, as the enemy has 
been subdued. 
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 3.2.1-3.2.2. See Gerlinger (2008) p. 157, Richter (1977) p. 137. 
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 See generally Nousek (2004) p. 69. 
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 3.3.3. Even the summation of the enemy plans is described in terms of hope (spem) indicating how 
the concept extends to both sides in the affair. See 3.6.2. 
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 3.3.4. 
310
 Caesar uses this of the Nervii at 2.16.3-2.16.4, in terms of them persuading their allies to fight. 
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 3.5.2-3.5.3.  
312
 3.5.3. 
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Any message arises from the implicit nature of affairs even when comment might be 
expected by the opinions expressed therein. Caesar does not qualify, or even discuss, 
whether the Gauls are right to be angry about the taking of captives, and he does not 
even attempt to deny their accusations of Roman expansionism.
313
 This apparent 
failure to answer a charge of Roman expansion that Caesar himself places in the text 
is crucial, as it shows that an implicit criticism arising from the representation of 
enemy motives is unqualified by overt observations.
314
 While he probably expects a 
refutation to be self-evident to a Roman audience, nevertheless his lack of 
qualification indicates that the major concern is to capture the state of mind of the 
enemy, and let criticism arise from the expectations of the audience.
315
 While the 
audience may provide the interpretation, the predominance of style over assessment 
indicates that this passage is not simply a report or assessment of the events described.  
 
The Narrative Pattern to Battle  
 
There is evidence of a cycle based on the dissociation, and re-establishment of the 
will of the commander with his commands, a pattern that suggests the presence of a 
cycle that determines the overall shape of the narrative.
316
 Caesar opens his account 
by describing that Galba decided to winter at Octodurus, and the decision is enough 
for an audience to presume that the orders he gives are carried out, as illustrated in the 
statement: ...constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis 
eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare.
317
 
The expression of Galbaʼs desire is enough to capture activity, since the work of the 
men is ascribed to the commander in eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.
318
 In the 
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 3.2.5. Grillo (2011) p. 246. 
314
 This thesis notes the presence of several instances where such comments go unanswered in the text, 
as this is an internally consistent approach. See also pp. 325-326 below for the case of Dumnorix, 
where Caesar lets such claims stand without overt comment on his part. This does not indicate that 
the audience is expected to agree with their view. 
315
 See also Vercingetorix discussed at pp. 261-263 below.  
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 For discussion on overall ring composition see Torigian (1998) p. 57, Nousek (2004) pp. 60-82. For 
Nousek, in composing the work Caesar made the breakdown and re-establishment of order a 
structural aspect of the entire work. 
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 3.1.4-3.1.5. 
318
 See 3.1.6. This is a technique he has used of himself, such as in the construction of the Rhine 
Bridge at 4.17.3-4.17.10. See pp. 215-219 below. 
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implicit association of command and result, the battle opens with the will of the 
commander and the action being synchronous.  
 
Throughout the battle however, this connection breaks down, and the motivation of 
others, such as those of the Gauls and subordinates are emphasised. Two crucial 
decisions, the one to defend and the other to sally, are described only once the 
intermediary description of a meeting is interposed.
319
 Furthermore, decisions made 
are presented through an examination of the subordinates on the Roman side. At the 
critical point in the battle, when the enemy are pressing hard, Caesar describes the 
actions of Baculus and Volusenus, who present an option to turn the crisis around.
320
 
He provides personal details of the two officers so that there is no doubt as to who 
came up with the idea, crediting the two men and ensuring that the source of decision 
making and the origin of the plan are all included. The level of detail provided 
regarding the sources of the plan suggests there is a pattern that highlights the loss of 
control by the commander, as his will alone is not enough to secure results.  
 
Importantly, at the crisis, Caesar states that what was willed became actuality. When 
he describes the sally with the words: quod iussi sunt, faciunt, he specifically records 
the moment that the commanderʼs desire leads to a successful outcome, thereby 
establishing that what was decided actually occurred.
321
 The statement is indicative of 
a structure that captures the dichotomy between expectation and result, by specifically 
defining when one leads to the other as order is restored. This structural element is 
then resolved in the final commands given by Galba, where the relationship between 
commander and action is re-established:  
 
Maxime frumenti commeatusque inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici 
aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter 
demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique 
hiemavit.
322
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 3.5.3 and 3.3.1. 
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 3.5.2-3.5.3. 
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 3.6.1. 
322
 3.6.4-3.6.5. 
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The condensation of thought and action is evident again; Galbaʼs personal actions and 
motivation and the activity of the legion are synchronous. The similarity between 
opening and end suggests a cycle to the narrative that focuses on the loss of control 
and its later return once the commanderʼs will is enough to secure results. In doing so 
this cycle supports the artistic purpose of contextualising the battle from the 
perspective of this major participant.  
 
Caesar also includes incidental details when they support this objective. As noted 
above, the theme of safety is strong in the passage, as reflected the objectives 
attributed to the Romans, and the language used to describe those objectives.
323
 As the 
fighting closes, he specifically states that: sic omnibus hostium copiis fusis armisque 
exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt.
324
 The mention of the enemy arms is 
unusual, and not a common feature of battle narratives except when, as in the case of 
the Aduatuci, the pile of arms is used to illustrate the perfidy and the warlike nature of 
the enemy.
325
 Nevertheless, the disarming of the battlefield near the end of the 
passage, as the men return to their fortifications, evokes the idea of safety.
326
 In 
addition, Caesar continues the account to focus on Galbaʼs concern for safety, evident 
in the use of incolumem legionem to describe the forces he leads out.
327
 The account 
follows events through to the conclusion that best encapsulates the desires of the 
participants, demonstrating that at least one characterʼs motivation for safety is highly 
influential in determining a cyclic structure to the narrative. 
 
Elaboration in the Narrative 
 
The emphasis on the perception of the characters fundamentally determines the course 
of the confrontation described. To capture this perception, Caesar sometimes 
elaborates on details peripheral to an explanation of the actual course of the battle, 
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 See also above p. 91, below p. 99. 
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 3.6.3-3.6.4. The reference to despoiling arms at 5.51.4 is less explicit. 
325
 See pp. 185-187 below on the Aduatuci at 2.32.4.  
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nor associated with a tropaeum. 
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(2008) pp. 112-113. 
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such as the decision, which is ultimately rejected, to attempt escape from the 
enemy:
328
 
 
Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam 
omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque 
subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent, prope iam 
desperata salute nonnullae huiusmodi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis 
eruptione facta isdem itineribus, quibus eo pervenissent, ad salutem contenderent. 
maiori tamen parti placuit hoc reservato ad extremum consilio interim rei eventum 
experiri et castra defendere.
329
 
 
This passage relates the option to escape in significant detail, describing the eruption 
from the camp and the direction in which the Romans would attempt escape. 
Visualisation of the theoretical flight is encouraged in the statement that the baggage 
would be left behind, thus giving enough detail to ensure it is a clear possibility.
330
 
Details give the option force and capture the desperation of such a choice, stating that 
it would have been taken desperata salute, imbuing the content of the meeting with 
the force of the rejected option.
331
 Nevertheless while this decision to escape may 
represent the content of the meeting held, it is not carried through.
332
 The decision 
which is actually followed is described only briefly as interim rei eventum experiri et 
castra defendere.
333
 While the rejected decision is that of the minority and never 
eventuated, the details evoke a mood of desperation that captures the plight of the 
defenders. By giving such force to a decision that was ultimately not carried out, 
Caesar more effectively captures the objectives of the characters described.  
 
Caesar also brings within his scope events that occurred outside the battle itself, when 
these enhance the style of narration. He describes the reasons for Gallic belligerence 
at the point in the narrative where they have been placed on the battlefield, looming 
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 See also 5.28, where the decision not followed grants Caesar the opportunity to address his opinion 
that Sabinus and Cotta should have stayed in the camp. See pp. 209-213, 335-339 below.  
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 3.3.2-3.3.4. 
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 3.3.3. 
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 3.3.4. 
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over the defenders and about to attack.
334
 However the description of their motivation 
relates to factors that occurred prior to the attack, including the build-up of resentment 
at the Roman presence, the taking of hostages and Gallic intelligence gathering.
335
 
None of this is described prior to the confrontation; instead Caesar incorporates it into 
the state of mind of the protagonists as they appear on the battlefield. The extent to 
which motivation is designed to develop the narrative structure of the passage is 
apparent as it diverges greatly from other accounts, such as the Helvetian campaign in 
Book One, in which the motivation of the enemy is clearly described prior to the 
battle itself.
336
 In the Octodurus narrative both motivation and expectations become 
part of a pattern to the battle in the interests of capturing the participantsʼ perspective 
of events.  
 
Content is not just included but also removed for effect, and information regarding 
physical circumstances disappears once it has served the aims of the passage. This is 
evident in Galbaʼs decision to fortify the village:337 
 
Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis ad 
hiemandum concessit, alteram vacuam ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit.
338
 
 
Caesar includes terrain, such as the river, in the description as it forms part of Galbaʼs 
preparations for camp, however the river does not feature in the rest of the account.
339
 
Similarly, the village is mentioned as the location of the winter quarters, however the 
presence of buildings that could interrupt the fortifications, catch fire, or serve as 
refuge are not mentioned in the battle itself.
340
 Importantly, Caesar states that the 
defences are only partly completed when describing Galbaʼs motivation, however the 
partially completed fortifications have no discernible effect in battle and their 
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 3.2.1. 
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 This extends the focalization that Nousek (2004) notes at p. 69 to include the enemy. See also 6.8.1 
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 3.1.6. 
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incomplete nature is not mentioned again.
341
 Major aspects of the defensive landscape 
that are covered as part of Galbaʼs reasoning are not included in the description of 
combat, illustrating that information is discarded when it does not capture the 
perception of the participants. 
 
Similarly, Caesar omits information regarding the preparations for battle in favour of 
the defenderʼs objectives. He reports that there is scarcely time to prepare for combat 
in the result clause: ...vix ut rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque 
administrandis tempus daretur...
342
 Important historical information may have been 
omitted as he excludes whether there were any unusual preparations required due to 
the topography, short time frame, or incomplete fortifications.
343
 Nevertheless, the 
sentence covers the objectives of the defenders, and the use of conlocandis and 
administrandis are strong but indefinite actions considering the undefined rebus.
344
 
Caesar is selectively specific, favouring the things that had to be done over the actions 
themselves, thereby emphasising the participants and their objectives.  
 
Even details regarding the participants disappear when they are no longer required. 
Virtus is a characteristic envisaged as part of the plan to sally out, Caesar stating of 
Galbaʼs orders that: omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.345 While this statement 
shows that the quality was a contributing factor in the victory that followed, the idea 
is not developed in the description of combat.
346
 Virtus remains an implicit concept 
only, and while regarded as important, no elaboration occurs at the tactical level.  
 
Importantly, Caesar replaces an examination of virtus with the expectations of the 
enemy, indicating that the priority is for perspectives unrelated to the minutiae of 
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 3.4.1. 
343
 The importance of this statement is that Galba‟s objective of fortification had not been completed. 
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the fighting. See pp. 201-204 below. On the etymological meaning of virtus see Riggsby (2006) pp. 
83-96. 
102 
 
combat.
347
 As the Romans sally, physical details are subordinated to the concept that 
the desires of the enemy do not eventuate: 
 
...neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt. 
ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant, undique 
circumventos intercipiunt...
348
  
 
Rather than describe the physical effect of the attack, Caesar concentrates on the 
effect it has on their ability to react mentally, through the use of cognoscendi.
349
 More 
importantly he sums up that the situation they expected has now been reversed; the 
use of spem being important because it is phrases the defeat in terms of their initial 
plans.
350
 The description of their mental state shows that the perception of the 
characters predominates, and actually replaces, information regarding the actual 
destruction of the enemy. 
 
The narrative often entirely omits content that does not capture the subjective 
experience of the participants. Caesar states that prior to the battle Galba fought 
several initial engagements in the region, but passes this over with the statement: 
Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis.
351
 
These battles and assaults represent a whole range of important campaign 
information, such as how thoroughly the enemy were beaten and how secure Galba 
made the region prior to encampment, yet he does not elaborate on them as they only 
reflect objective information regarding the campaign itself.
352
 The selectivity indicates 
that the style of narrative selected has created omissions regarding the strategic 
background to the conflict. 
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The Description of Combat  
 
An effect of Caesarʼs style of narration  is that combat is presented from within the 
perceptual framework of the combatants, showing that objective information 
regarding combat has been incorporated into the overall style of the account.
353
 One 
major example is a refusal to engage with the physical circumstances of the fighting, 
presumably as these do not reflect the state of mind of the participants. Combat is 
given only a very general character, as Caesar only wishes to capture progress in the 
broadest terms. This is evident generally throughout the battle, where combat is not 
described in detail, but is most striking in the initial attack.
354
 He describes the enemy 
as attacking ex omnibus partibus, which would indicate an attack from across the river 
as well.
355
 However the presence of enemies attempting to cross the stream, or 
attacking from within the uninhabited part of the town are all absent in the account. 
Similarly the Gallic assault is stated in only the most general of terms, with 
information absent, such as which walls the enemy attack.
356
 This brevity relates to 
activity that occurs for a long time, which in this instance is described as six hours.
357
 
However the summarisation suggests that as these details are all objective data, and 
do not illuminate the state of mind of either side, they have only been summarised 
briefly.  
 
Furthermore the subjective viewpoint is used to capture more immediate tactical 
information, such as the manoeuvres of the enemy prior to combat. This is apparent in 
the meeting of the Roman commanders, where background information is provided as 
follows: 
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 Nousek (2004) p. 69. 
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 This is apparent in the sally by the Romans, which is given no spatial reference apart from the 
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...quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam 
omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque 
subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent...
358
 
 
Caesar focuses the approach of the enemy through the eyes of the defenders with the 
use of conspicerentur, illustrating that the arrival of the enemy and the cutting off of 
escape are visualised subjectively.
359
 By introducing movement and tactical data 
through this subjective viewpoint, he demonstrates that the actual manoeuvres in the 
battle are presented according to the characters.  
 
Important activities on the battlefield such as commands are also presented in this 
manner. While this is apparent at the start in the foraging activity, which is presented 
as part of a command using iussisset, the most striking example of Caesarʼs style is 
apparent in his narration of the Roman sally.
360
 Prior to the sally he describes the 
preparation as part of a command, stating:  
 
Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper 
intermitterent proelium ac tantummodo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore 
reficerent, post dato signo e castris erumperent atque omnem spem salutis in virtute 
ponerent.
361
  
 
The action of recuperating and conserving ammunition is captured as part of Galbaʼs 
orders, the subjunctives intermitterent, exciperent and reficerent being indirect 
commands introduced by certiores facit. As the subjunctives erumperent and 
ponerent also cover the actual sally, they demonstrate that the reporting of command 
substitutes for narration of the movement of men in the battle.  
 
The objective of capturing Galbaʼs perspective is clear as the sally itself is only 
described in basic terms, Caesar stating: Quod iussi sunt, faciunt ac subito omnibus 
portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus 
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 3.3.2-3.3.3. 
359
 Note also way the enemy move up is given three times in the passage, similar to the manner Caesar 
narrates the Nervii confrontation with a series of approaches. The similarity suggests a common 
literary approach to battle. See above at p. 68.  
360
 See 3.2.1. Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset. 
361
 3.5.3. 
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facultatem relinquunt.
362
 While he provides some detail, such as the use of the gates, 
the summary that the men did as they were commanded serves to replace the action 
implicit in the initial command.
363
 This emphasis on the command over the actual 
action demonstrates the integration of the descriptive into the subjective perspective. 
 
Even when Caesar provides purely descriptive information he illustrates the objective 
of capturing the subjective experience of the characters through the context in which 
the information is provided. The narration of the main enemy attack is the most 
objective description within the battle, with little or no focus through the perception of 
the participants.
364
 Nevertheless it still fits within the overall thematic framework.
365
 
The unique character of the section is evident in the description as follows: 
 
Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque 
administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, 
lapides gaesaque in vallum conicere. nostri primo integris viribus fortiter repugnare 
neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, ut quaeque pars castrorum 
nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre, sed hoc 
superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris 
viribus succedebant; quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, 
ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi 
constiterat relinquendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.
366
 
 
The unusual nature of the passage is indicated by its stylistic isolation, framed within 
the similarity of the framing words daretur…dabatur.367 The use of the historic 
infinitive to describe the onrush of the enemy is at variance with most of the battle, 
which is largely narrated using third person singular or plural forms to describe the 
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 3.6.1-3.6.2. Note also the vividness of the historic present in faciunt. 
363
 3.6.1. See pp. 215-220 below on will and action. Kraus (2009) p. 161 notes this is not unique to 
Caesar. 
364
 See also the Venetii battle discussed at pp. 138-141. 
365
 Effectively this passage is isolated within the focalized episode that is noted by Nousek (2004) p. 
69. 
366
 3.4.1-3.4.4. 
367
 See Weinryb, (1988) p. 278. Weinryb states that when a text removes all allusions to the narrator it 
seems as if objective historical reality presents itself, as if events speak for themselves.  
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actions of individuals or groups.
368
 In marked contrast to the rest of the narrative, 
Caesarʼs style in this passage is distinctly descriptive, and itʼs somewhat exceptional 
nature at variance with the dominance of perception in the rest of the account.  
 
In spite of the distinct nature of the descriptive passage, the events described are 
contained within the framework of decisions made by the participants. The passage 
follows on immediately from the vote by the Romans to fight, placing it as a 
consequence of that decision. Caesar is even clear that the attack described comes so 
swiftly that there is barely time to act on the decision, demonstrating that the 
subjective decision of the defenders is used to contextualise the fighting that 
follows.
369
 Most importantly, the adoption of a descriptive passage serves to 
contextualise and explain the circumstances, adding a sense of urgency and 
desperation in which the decisions and thoughts of the defenders appear. While the 
passage is isolated stylistically, it nevertheless occurs within a sequence where the 
subjective experience of the combatants dominates the structure.  
 
Moreover, the combat passage forms preconditions to which individuals respond, and 
Baculus and Volusenus propose their option to break out of the camp as a response to 
the action described. The description continues as follows: 
 
Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur ac non solum vires, sed etiam 
tela nostros deficerent atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum 
scindere et fossas complere coepissent resque esset iam ad extremum perducta 
casum...
370
 
 
An extended cum clause describes the state of the defence, indicating that the action 
described in it is antecedent to the actions of Baculus and Volusenus. The details 
provided, such as the lack of missile weapons, the tiredness of the Romans, and the 
enemy pressing closely and breaking up the fortifications, are all descriptive. 
However their presentation within the cum clause indicates that they are preconditions 
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 See the use of repugnare and mittere. There are exceptions i.e. the use of acciderat at 3.2.2. This 
third person impersonal verb does not change the emphasis on the individuals.  
369
 This may explain why Caesar uses a generic description for the defence plans, as the importance is 
that there is little time to make the decision. See 3.4.1. 
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 3.5.1-3.5.2. 
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to the plan of Baculus and Volusenus for survival.
371
 The choice of presentation 
indicates that information is presented within a framework where it is consequent to, 
or a precondition for examination of the perceptual aspect of the battle. 
 
Caesar gives other indicators that the descriptive passages are primarily transitional 
between one decision and another. The fight itself is framed by the repetition of 
integriis viribus to describe first the Romans, then the Gauls.
372
 This is not simply 
economy of words, but defines combat in terms of a change of advantage from one 
side to the other. The repetition indicates the reversal of circumstances between the 
initial discussion to defend the camp, and the current state of affairs, which leads to 
the second meeting.
373
 The repetition helps to mark the boundaries and to place the 
descriptive elements within the pattern of meetings and decisions.  
 
The dominance of the perceptual objective means that Caesar also does not explain 
when the perspective of the participants and the progress of the battle conflict. This is 
evident in the dichotomy between the enemy plans and unfolding events. The enemy 
base their decision to attack in part on their ability to rush down and hurl weapons 
against the fortifications from above: 
 
...tum etiam quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem 
decurrerent et tela conicerent, ne primum quidem posse impetum suum sustineri 
existimabant.
374
 
 
This plan does not seem to occur in actuality, as the Romans are able to hold up the 
enemy for at least six hours, and it is never explained why the impetus is held up for 
so long.
375
 Caesar makes no explanation for the huge discrepancy between the enemy 
plan and the actual conflict, or why the enemy are so wrong.
376
 Any link between plan 
                                                 
371
 3.5.1.  
372
 3.4.2, 3.4.3. On style and repetition regarding the Helvetii battle see Williams (1985) p. 224 and see 
below at pp. 170-177. The repetition there is to reflect exhaustion. 
373
 3.3.1, 3.5.3. 
374
 3.2.4-3.2.5. 
375
 Note the use of impetus here, where the use of the word for an attack on a fixed position suggests 
that it is not technical jargon. See Lendon (1999) p. 285, who regards the word as a specific military 
term. Also note the accusative infinitive construction governed by existimabant to illustrate that this 
is their opinion. 
376
 Ramage (2003) pp. 338-339, fn. 27 notes that with few exceptions the consilia of the enemy are 
unsuccessful. 
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and action is only implied, as his interest appears to be in the motivation of the 
enemy, which does not extend to explaining when these plans are not reflected in the 
battle itself. Furthermore, the iniquitatem of the battlefield implies a detriment to the 
defenders, due to the location of the fort.
377
 However this detriment has no bearing on 
combat when the Romans sally out, and what was seen as relevant at the start is not 
explained at the end.
378
 More critical is that it is actually the Romans who have a 
height advantage in the battle, Caesar stating: neque ullam frustra telum ex loco 
superiore mittere.
379
 The terrain serves a function in explaining the decisions and 
attitudes of the participants but is not reflected in the progress of the battle, illustrating 
that the narrative is not constructed to explain such details.  
 
The predominance of perception creates another internal inconsistency as Caesar is 
not primarily concerned with the physical topography of the battlefield. He initially 
states that Galba fortified the camp with ramp and ditch, capturing the decision to 
encamp and prepare for winter through the use of munivit, a word which also suggests 
that the fortifications were completed.
380
 However he later states that the fortifications 
were not complete when describing Galbaʼs reasons for calling a meeting.381 Both of 
these statements reflect the will of the commander, or decisions made at the time that 
they appear in the narrative. They also indicate no compulsion to consistently 
represent the status of the fort.
382
 The physical status of the fortifications is only 
referenced when it has a bearing on explaining Galbaʼs choices, meaning that the 
actual state of the fortifications is not clear.
383
  
 
The difficulty of reconstructing the battle is evident as the account prevents a 
thorough examination of the circumstances of victory. The idea that the superior force 
of Gauls is surrounded is explicit in circumventos, but that the Romans manage to 
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 3.2.4. Caesar objectively describes the camp as at a lower elevation at 3.1.5. See Lendon (1999) p. 
302 who regards iniquitus as more of a technical terrain description. Note that even if the detriment is 
psychological, it has no effect on the sally. 
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 3.6.1-3.6.3. 
379
 3.4.2. 
380
 3.1.6.  
381
 3.3.1. 
382
 Even if the ditch and parapet were completed in the first instance but other defensive works not 
done, the presentation is not designed to clarify this for the audience. 
383
 See also the use of the walls of Avaricum at 7.23, the fortifications of the Aduatuci at 2.29 and the 
Fortifications of the Britons at 5.21. These are discussed at pp. 186-187, 166-167, 295-296. 
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achieve this with vastly inferior numbers not explained.
384
 Caesar does not explain 
how a legion depleted of two cohorts is effectively able to surround a vastly superior 
force, and the enemy is merely described as undique circumventos.
385
 While a partisan 
Roman audience might see the victory as a result of the virtus of the Romans, Caesar 
does not describe how the men are able to move out while under attack and achieve 
this result. Reconstruction of the circumstances is not possible, as he limits the 
description of physical manoeuvres in his account. 
 
The presentation also creates difficulty reconstructing an accurate temporal picture of 
historical events, illustrated in the meeting of the Roman commanders. In the first 
meeting Caesar raises the possibility of flight, however the enemy attack almost 
immediately afterwards.
386
 As he states, there was scarcely time to prepare for the 
defence of the camp.
387
 Whether there was time to actually organise a breakout and 
retreat to safety is unclear, as the enemy attacked so quickly that just organising the 
defence was a challenge.
388
 Whether the Romans actually had any options at this time 
is unclear as there is no explanation of this temporal issue. 
  
When Caesar does include contextual information he sometimes struggles to 
incorporate this into his objective, demonstrating that the insertion of objective data 
can be discordant with his general approach. This is evident in the description of 
enemy casualties, the rout of the enemy being stated in the following manner:  
 
...ex hominum milibus amplius triginta, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra 
venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coniciunt 
ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur.
389
 
 
In this instance the narrative shifts from the perspective and aims of the participants to 
an objective assessment of the casualties, in order to give a numeric value to the 
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 See the topos of the enemy horde addressed above at pp. 71-88. See also 5.51.4 for another example 
of a sally described only briefly. 
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victory. In doing so Caesar breaks the temporal consistency, by not providing a 
contextually or perceptually consistent background to the figure.
390
 This radical 
departure from the format of the passage as a whole may be evidence that he struggles 
to smoothly include an objective numerical assessment, and that the casualty list 
clashes with his overall narrative approach.
391
 He is required to change his technique 
to account for it, as a narrative based on character perception and such details are not 
always complementary. 
 
The lack of general engagement at the level of objective commentary demonstrates 
that Caesar has a distinct stylistic plan for the battle that is not simply a report of the 
historical event.
392
 The battle is only marginally related to the overall progress of the 
campaign, which presents an opportunity to create a more literary scheme for the 
events.
393
 The attention drawn to the perspective of the participants is an artistic 
choice, one that demonstrates the objective is not elucidation at a purely military 
level, since it occurs at the expense of information relevant to the reconstruction of 
the confrontation. The battle narrative is an artistic creation, where the individual 
elements are selected for their relevance to the thematic and literary concerns of the 
passage, and these concerns determine the content, the structure, and the language 
used when writing and placing the battle in the commentary.
394
 The manner in which 
Caesar structures the account with precedence given to the subjective experience of 
the characters suggests that he is motivated strongly by the style of presentation in his 
choice of content, and that this concern informs the text more than an objective 
accounting of the progress of the battle, or an assessment of his subordinateʼs action 
and the veracity of the actions described. 
 
While the notion that Caesar would be compelled to reconstruct battle according to 
the needs of military reporting is difficult to determine, the criteria by which he 
constructs his accounts for reception are much clearer, through an examination of the 
relationships that exist in the text. Literary and stylistic designs are apparent in the 
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 Compare Caesar‟s approach to numbers evident in the catalogue of the Belgae 2.4.1-2.4.10 and the 
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description of battle, the context in which it is portrayed, and the narrative structure. 
The objective of evoking a reaction from the audience is evident in the account of the 
Helvetii and the Nervii, where the overall pattern of description is designed to 
generate a feeling of suspense. The effect of a literary scheme is present in the 
confrontation with the Belgae, where the topos of the multitude replaces a more 
detailed account of the event. However the extent to which Caesarʼs construction of 
battle narrative varies from a reconstruction of historical events is particularly evident 
in the Octodurus passage, where a shift in narrative style in order to portray the 
characters has a fundamental effect on the manner in which the battle is constructed. 
These considerations are a core concern in the battle narratives and, as demonstrated, 
fundamentally influence the choice of content and the manner of presentation. The 
studies of this chapter therefore indicate how far Caesarʼs battles diverge from a 
reconstruction of combat in order to influence the reception of the text. The rest of 
this thesis examines the persuasive role of battle narrative, and that narrative 
strategies are utilised so that battle supports or creates impressions favourable to 
Caesar, or his interpretation of the characters and events described.  
 CHAPTER 2: PERSUASION AND BATTLE NARRATIVE 
 
 
In Chapter One it was illustrated that Caesarʼs battle narratives are much more 
sophisticated than simple reports of battle, as in the process of creating the narrative 
stylistic choices determine the content of the passage. This chapter demonstrates that 
Caesar uses these battlefield descriptions to influence the audienceʼs understanding of 
the passage, whether this is to address a stated purpose for the account, or through the 
creation of an implicit interpretation using the military data presented.
1
 Dixon states 
we might call Caesarʼs style Roman factual reporting, the “steady use of retrospective 
summary, the runs of parallel subordinate clauses, the step by step nature of the 
campaign account”.2 However an ostensibly factual reporting style does not preclude 
the creation of a persuasive narrative, and Damon notes that in the Bellum Civile, 
Caesar persuades through simple language even though he does not have long, 
complex sentences that appear to have the purpose of persuading a reluctant reader.
3
 
This chapter illustrates that there is a persuasive element embedded in the narrative of 
battle that either supports the meaning of the overall episode, or in a manner similar to 
the observations of Barthes and Woodman, creates one through the choice of content 
provided.
4
 Support of a stated objective is apparent in the otherwise very brief account 
of the defeat of the Tigurini, which shows that detail are provided to interpret the 
battle as an act of vengeance.
5
 A more subtle technique is used in the siege of 
Gergovia, where the objective of blaming the soldiers for the defeat is clear, but 
exempla and anecdotes are used to support this understanding.
6
 Numbers also play a 
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 It is important to recognise that the battles examined in this chapter are included for their 
demonstration of Caesar‟s techniques, and the objectives they address are also suitable to later 
chapters of the thesis. For example, Caesar‟s description of the naval campaign against the Venetii is 
highly defensive in nature, as he had difficulties in conclusively defeating the enemy. The case study 
is therefore applicable to Chapter Five, which looks at other battles where Caesar explains his 
conduct of campaigns such as the first invasion of Britain. Similarly, the battle against Ariovistus has 
a self-promotional objective, as it proves Caesar‟s contempt for the enemy reputation, a topic 
addressed in Chapter Four. These battles are examined in the current chapter as they are particular 
illustrative of Caesar‟s techniques in meeting his objectives, and are their presence not indicative of a 
lack of other objectives. 
2
 Dixon (1992) p. 70. 
3
 Damon (1994) pp. 184-195. At p. 185 Damon notes how this leaves interpretation up to the audience. 
4
 See Barthes (1970) pp. 245-246 on meaning embedded in narrative. See also Woodman (1992) pp. 
207-215 on the issue of meaning in text.  
5
 1.12. 
6
 7.36-7.52. For a comprehensive examination of exempla refer to Chaplin‟s introduction (2000) pp. 
11-31. 
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persuasive role and an examination of the second invasion of Britain illustrates that a 
contextual element, the forces of the enemy, are used to create implicit messages 
about the campaign.
7
 Most importantly, Caesarʼs battle narratives work in conjunction 
with, or directly address, the surrounding text in order to persuade the audience, and 
in the Venetii episode, battle supports the objective of explaining difficulties 
described in the overall campaign.
8
 The battle against Ariovistus and the Germani in 
Book One is also determined by the preceding narrative, in this case by the 
description of a near mutiny at Vesontio, and the boasts of the Germanic leader 
Ariovistus.
9
 The battle addresses the reputation of the Germani, supports Caesarʼs 
disregard for their alleged prowess, and demonstrates the superiority of the Romans. 
These battle passages all conform to a thematic pattern, or are used persuasively to 
influence the audience, illustrating the various means by which Caesar uses battle in 
pursuit of stated or implicit interpretations of his material. 
 
Vengeance at the River Arar 
 
Caesar sometimes has a stated message that his battle description supports, as is 
evident in the defeat of the Tigurini at the river Arar. This account omits a detailed 
battle description but elaborates on the meaning as the enactment of vengeance 
against an old enemy, something that scholars have noted previously.
10
 The effect of 
this interpretation is evident as the battle is extremely short and only minimal details 
of combat are required to achieve this objective. In comparison to the simplification 
of the actual combat section the extent to which the justification is elaborated 
indicates that the size of an encounter, the extent to which an enemy is defeated, and 
any complexities are not necessarily the determinants for the narrative, if Caesar is 
able to establish his interpretation in a shorter passage.
11
 In this case, the major 
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 5.8-5.23. 
8
 3.7-3.16. 
9
 1.31-53. 
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 See Kraus (2009) p. 168; Melchior (2004) p. 28; Gerlinger (2008) pp. 274-276. See also Riggsby 
(2006) pp. 176-177, and Ramage (2001) p. 149. Note also that the context of vengeance is not 
mentioned in the Helvetii battle at 1.24-1.28, even though there is an implication at 1.12.7 that 
vengeance is an aspect of both these battles as the Tigurini are first (princeps) to pay the penalty. 
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 The defeat of the Tigurini achieves its objective of establishing the idea of vengeance in one chapter, 
whereas the Sabis River narrative from 2.17-2.28 has multiple objectives, including stylistic and self-
promotional objectives, and is over eleven chapters in length. See pp. 66-71, 192-204, 222-238 below 
for the various objectives of the Sabis River narrative. 
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objective is to show the historical and personal ramifications for Rome and Caesar, 
and the details of battle narrative are used to support that aim. 
 
The brief description of the fight indicates that Caesar is only concerned with the 
basic details of combat.
12
 The battle itself is a highly successful one according to the 
account, but there is little information on the victory or its short term implications. 
The enemy are attacked impeditos et inopinantes, which is a bare minimum of detail 
required to capture the state of the tribe, the sudden approach of the Romans and the 
location of the battle at a river which the enemy are trying to cross.
13
 The entire 
canton is impeditos, illustrative of how the forces at the battle are identified as a single 
unified body in order to capture the basic nature of the confrontation.
14
 Similarly the 
three Roman legions involved are not given dispositions or separate detail that might 
allow a more detailed analysis of how events unfolded.
15
 Nevertheless the military 
objective of eliminating enemy forces is addressed through the simple explanation 
that the Tigurini represent a quarter of the total number of Helvetians.
16
 Importantly, a 
whole range of possible information could have been provided after the battle, such as 
the effect of removing a quarter of the entire Helvetian confederation, but Caesar does 
not discuss the effect of this loss on the Helvetii.
17
 He provides the minimum detail 
necessary to understand the conditions and the result, demonstrating that such military 
concerns are not the primary purpose of the passage. 
 
By contrast, what description exists is designed to convey a message that the Tigurini 
are the recipients of vengeance. The enemy are effectively helpless in the face of the 
Roman attack, either dying without any resistance or stealing away to the woods.
18
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 Mannetter (1995) pp. 104-105 regards this battle as foreshadowing the fate of the Helvetii in general. 
If the battle passage has an introductory role, this may also explain the brevity of the combat 
described. See also Martin Jr. (1965) p. 65. 
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 1.12.3. Another major example of a short narrative is the battle against the Usipetes and Tencteri, 
which devotes only two chapters to the combat itself at 4.14-4.15. 
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 Tribal elements not crossing the river would probably still be impeditos, due to them simply being 
caught by surprise. However Caesar makes no differentiation between the individual elements, and it 
is therefore unclear if anyone was actually crossing the river. 
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 1.12.2-1.12.3. 
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 1.12.4-1.12.5. 
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 Kraus (2009) p. 168 notes how the “post-battle wrap up” is unusual here in its reversion to the past. 
The rest of the Helvetii make no reference to this loss, nor does Caesar mention it in the battle 
against them at 1.24-1.26. In particular, it does not affect their arrogance at 1.13.3-1.13.5 and they 
even appear to dismiss the loss at 1.13.5. 
18
 Note the use of abdiderunt at 1.12.4. See also the Usipetes and Tencteri account discussed below at 
pp. 309-319. 
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The Tigurini are also held responsible as a group, in stark contrast to the recently 
mentioned Orgetorix, who plotted for control of the Helvetii at the start of Book One, 
and whose criminal activities were those of the individual.
19
 Even though Caesar may 
have known of their leaders, the battle is interpreted as an act of vengeance against all 
of the people.
20
 Consequently, the choice of content ensures that the message 
regarding retribution against the entire people is communicated. 
 
The message regarding vengeance, alluded to in the battle passage, is openly 
described at the end and directly states the retributive theme. Caesar reveals that the 
thus far unnamed element is the Tigurini, who have a particular history that makes the 
course and result of the battle perfectly justified.
21
 By structuring the battle so that the 
revelation concerning the Tigurini happens at the end, Caesar presents the battle more 
clearly as a fortuitous act of punishment.
22
 As he states: quae pars civitatis Helvetiae 
insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenas persolvuit.
23
 He 
even invokes the possibility that this was divinely engineered.
24
 The revelation at the 
end clearly indicates the battle is an act of punishment, and illustrates that Caesar 
wishes it interpreted as such. 
 
Caesarʼs purpose is evident in the two major impressions that he creates at the end of 
the battle. He makes reference to history in order to explain the context in which the 
battle should be viewed, illustrating that the meaning, rather than the combat itself, is 
the primary concern of the passage.
25
 He even mentions individual Romans killed 
previously, the consul Lucius Cassius and Lucius Piso, thereby ending the narrative 
with a list of personal and public outrages.
26
 Their deaths, rather than any Roman 
casualties from the event, indicate that the narrative is designed to emphasise the 
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 See 1.2-1.4 for Orgetorix. 
20
 A similar approach is used in the account of the Aduatuci at 2.33, the Venetii at 3.16, the Usipetes 
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no mention of individuals is given. 
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 Matthews (2010) p. 79 notes that the Tigurini were present with the Cimbri and Teutones in the 
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 See also the numbers of the Helvetii at 1.29, and the numbers of the Usipetes and Tencteri at 4.15. 
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 1.12.6-1.12.7. 
24
 1.12.6. 
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 See Ramage (2002) p. 131. Ramage notes that the defeat of Cassius by Helvetians in 107 BCE is 
mentioned six times in Book One at 1.12.6, 1.13.4, 1.13.7, 1.14.1, 1.14.7, 1.30.2. This suggests that 
the defeat of the Tigurini may also be part of a broader pattern in Book One.  
26
 1.12.7. 
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vengeance element over any empirical assessment of the battle.
27
 An elaborate combat 
narrative is not necessary is to convey this stated message. The account of the 
Tigurini is therefore a clear example of a battle narrative that is designed to persuade 
the audience; in this case that victory against them was an act of retribution against a 
historical enemy of Rome.  
 
Anecdote, Exemplum and Battle Narrative  
 
The content of battle narrative can be used in a more elaborate manner than that 
apparent in the Tigurini account, and Caesar utilises rhetorical techniques, in 
particular exempla, and other combat anecdotes to support any objectives he has 
regarding particular episodes.
28
 Wheeler notes that combat anecdotes in the Bellum 
Gallicum have been misused at times and is highly critical of Goldsworthy, who 
appears to take them literally, stating that the use of combat anecdotes ignores 
historiansʼ “penchant for the dramatic effect of such exempla” and the possibility that 
the “exceptionalˮ of such anecdotes may not be typical.29 An appropriate view of 
combat anecdotes is espoused by Kraus, who notes, citing Cicero, that historians 
presented truth in artistically persuasive ways “availing themselves of the ʻpaint box‟ 
of rhetoric”.30 Cicero in particular notes that exempla are types of comparisons that 
strengthen or weaken a case by the authority/precedent or experience of a certain 
person or event, suggesting that these figures may appear for their persuasive 
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 Seager (2003) pp. 19-20 notes that L. Cassius was killed by the Helvetii. Seager also notes there are 
ongoing references to previous injustices that appear in the earlier parts of Book One. This illustrates 
how Caesar places his actions in their historical context. In the case of the Tigurini, this is clearly 
evident in the battle narrative, however as discussed at pp. 170-177, a major objective in the 
Helvetian narrative at 1.24-1.26 is to introduce the enemy and there are no overt references to the 
historical context.  
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 7.36-7.52. Riggsby (2006) pp. 142, 154, regards these figures as epigrams that cap instances of 
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On exempla in rhetoric, see Chaplin p. 13. Cicero Orat 120 states that exempla gain credibility for 
the speaker and delight the audience. Powell (1998) pp. 122-123 regards these as included to sooth 
the bitterness of the defeat. See also Price (1975) pp. 97, 120 for further discussion. On anecdote see 
Wheeler, (1998) p. 645. See also D. Nolan, (article forthcoming) “Caesar‟s Exempla and the Role of 
Centurions in Battleˮ. Goldhill (2009) pp. 105, 111-112 has a general discussion of anecdote from 
the second sophistic period, and notes the need for more study in this area.  
29
 Wheeler (1998) p. 645. 
30
 Kraus (2005) pp. 242-243. See Cicero ad Att 2.1.1-2.1.2 and the idea that history is a task for the 
orator, and Cicero De Orat 2.62 and Quintilian 10.1.31 ʻthe closest thing to [epic] poetry‟. See also 
Wiseman (1993) pp. 132-138. A similar analysis is presented by Paul with regard to sieges, who 
notes that while some aspects of siege motifs intersect with history, both have their associations in 
rhetoric and skills in oratory. 
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impact.
31
 In this section, Caesarʼs exempla and other combat anecdotes are shown to 
be fundamentally persuasive, and in the battle of Gergovia he utilises them to 
implicitly explain the defeat as due to a loss of self-control among the soldiers.
32
 
These vignettes are not just stylistic embellishment to a primarily descriptive account, 
nor are they included to record the deeds of exemplary characters. Instead they are 
included to implicitly reinforce Caesarʼs interpretation of the battle. 
 
Caesar makes ongoing use of exempla throughout the Bellum Gallicum to support 
various objectives. In the battle of the Sabis River, the character of Publius Sextius 
Baculus is utilised to prepare for the arrival of Caesar in the text, as he serves to 
represent the general state of the legions and the need for Caesarʼs intervention.33 
Baculus is singled out, from all the wounded men, to represent the damaged status of 
the legion at a critical point in the narrative.
34
 Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo are also 
utilised in an account in Book Five, to support the critical objective of condemning 
Sabinus and Cotta through a contrast to the defeated commanders.
35
 Other figures, 
such as an aquilifer in the British landing, a pair of Gallic cavalrymen in Book Four, 
and Considius the frightened subordinate, are used similarly to address the Caesarʼs 
objectives for the text.
36
 The frequency of their appearance in the battle narratives of 
the work is indicative of Caesarʼs use of exempla to add persuasive force to a passage.  
 
Details are included so that these exempla have highly memorable roles. This is 
evident in the Octodurus narrative, where the contribution of Baculus and Gaius 
Volusenus is designed to draw attention to their plan for survival.
37
 As Caesar states: 
                                                 
31
 See Cicero de Inv 1.29.46, on confirmatio and 1.49 for his definition, as discussed in Price (1975) pp. 
104-105. 
32
 See Choitz (2011) pp. 137-138, 154-155. Note that this section is also an example of how Caesar 
justifies his campaign conduct, discussed generally in Chapter Five pp. 277ff. See Kraus (2010) pp. 
50-59 who notes the presence of several aspects to the narrative, such as the Aeduan revolt. This 
thesis focuses on the particular objective of explaining defeat, and the use of exempla and other 
anecdotes to achieve that objective. See also Kraus (2009) p. 167 on exempla. See Gerlinger (2008) 
p. 231 on the apologetic nature of the passage. 
33
 See pp. 233-235 below. Welch (1998) p. 90 notes that Baculus is used as a device “the faithful and 
brave centurion”. 
34
 See 2.25.1. 
35
 See p. 338 below. See Brown (2004) p. 307. Brown‟s interpretation of the centurions‟ contest is that 
it is to show the expiation of the Sabinus episode. Rambaud (1966) p. 231 states that Vorenus and 
Pullo are an antithesis to Sabinus and Cotta, and Rasmussen (1963) pp. 27-29 regards the speech of 
Pullo as a specific reminder of Sabinus‟ words. 
36
 See Considius discussed above at pp. 62-63, the unnamed Aquilifer discussed at pp. 258-260 below, 
and the cavalrymen discussed at pp. 311-313 below.  
37
 3.5.2-3.5.3. 
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...resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum, P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili 
centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item 
C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam 
adcurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum 
auxilium experirentur.
38
 
 
The phrase resque esset iam extremum perducta casum indicates that the context of 
this intervention by the men is at a crisis point.
39
 Caesar does not just include the plan 
they propose, but describes the two men rushing to Galba, the use of accurrunt 
designed to capture and track the physical activity, thereby encouraging visualisation 
by the audience.
40
 The critical importance of their intervention is apparent as their 
plan is hyperbolically described as unam...spem salutis.
41
 The incident, critical as it is 
to the historical victory, is given a highly dramatic character in the narrative, 
indicating that Caesar is not only recording the pertinent details of the menʼs 
proposition but drawing attention to this particular incident. 
 
Moreover, this dramatisation is not merely to provide a vignette, as the men serve 
symbolic roles. Baculus appears symbolic of the plight of the legion, a representative 
role consistent with other narratives in which he appears, such as the Sabis River 
account.
42
 The cross referencing is evident in the statement: P. Sextius Baculus, primi 
pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus.
43
 This 
ostensible reminder of the characterʼs name also establishes a link to the crisis point 
of the previous battle.
44
 The reminder of Baculusʼ wounds evokes an atmosphere of 
desperation at this point, and gives personification to the dangerous state of affairs.
45
 
The specific evocation of his previous wounds suggests that Caesar uses the figure to 
                                                 
38
 3.5.1-3.5.3. 
39
 3.5.1.  
40
 3.5.2. See Klaus (1974) p. 159. 
41
 3.5.2. 
42
 See 2.25.1. Kraus (2010) p. 56. As Kraus states characters such as Baculus “focus action … are 
granted rare direct speech, and generally serve as the stylised representatives of (Caesar‟s) legions”. 
See also 6.38 for another appearance of Baculus. 
43
 3.5.2. This also makes him symbolic of resilience. 
44
 See pp. 233-235 below.  
45
 See also 6.38 where Baculus represents intervenes personally in combat. Baculus is representative of 
the near defeat of the legion in that passage. See Gerlinger (2008) p. 227. 
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similar effect, to evoke the previous crisis in the currently problematic status of the 
legion. 
 
While Baculus is representative of the legion, the description of Volusenus represents 
the plan that they suggest.
46
 Volusenus is described as: tribunus militum, vir et consilii 
magni et virtutis.
47
 By describing him as consilii magni, Caesar links the plan with the 
manʼs personal characteristics, making Volusenus a representative figure. Virtus is 
also mentioned as an element of the sally, indicating that his characteristics 
foreshadow the implementation of the plan.
48
 In this instance, just as with Baculus, 
the presentation of Volusenus indicates that an individual supports Caesarʼs 
understanding of the battle. 
 
The exempla in the Gergovia passage follow this pattern of use throughout the text, 
and their use is contextualised by an outright assessment of the battle by Caesar.
49
 He 
states that the historical battle occurred in spite of his assessment that an attack on the 
city of Gergovia was not a sensible option.
50
 This meaning is clear in his summation, 
where he describes the loss of control among the soldiers, something he 
communicates through a speech:  
 
Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem militum cupiditatemque 
reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent, quo procedendum aut quid agendum 
videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque a tribunis militum 
legatisque retineri potuissent…quantopere eorum animi magnitudinem 
admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus 
                                                 
46
 See p. 101 above. 
47
 3.5.2. 
48
 3.5.3. 
49
 Kraus (2010) p. 57 fn. 55 cites Cato Orig HRR as support for the idea that Marcus Petronius serves 
as an exemplar of “sacrificial glory”. While this is correct, there is a more direct objective in the use 
of the figure. 
50
 7.43.5-7.43.6. Caesar‟s plans at Gergovia are stated, that he would withdraw from Gergovia without 
it looking like flight. See also 7.45.7-7.45.10, and 7.52, where he admonishes the troops for 
advancing too far. See Mannetter (1995) pp. 114-115. Kagan (2006) at pp. 163-175 accepts this 
explanation by Caesar as correct for the historical event. However Kagan relies heavily on the battle 
narrative itself to build her case, information that is highly problematic in the absence of other 
evidence.  
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oppidi tardare potuisset, tantopere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere quod 
plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent...
51
 
 
As is clarified in this statement, the men lost control and advance too far in spite of 
his desires and assessment of the situation.
52
 This explanation forms the context for 
the narrative, where blame is attached to the soldiers.  
 
Caesar most notably utilises combat exempla to illustrate his assessment, and 
describes the overenthusiastic desire for rewards in Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the 
Eighth Legion, whose motives are described as follows: 
 
L. Fabius centurio legionis VIII, quem inter suos eo die dixisse constabat excitari 
se Avaricensibus praemiis neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum 
ascenderet, tres suos nactus manipulares atque ab his sublevatus murum ascendit, 
eos ipse rursus singulos exceptans in murum extulit.
53
 
 
The reference to Avaricum and booty is a description of individual motivation, but is 
one that can also be applied to the men in general.
54 
The description of Lucius lifting 
up the men is a minor but important detail, at is associates his own motivation with 
the other soldiers, thereby showing the behaviour as completely motivated and 
implemented by the lower ranks. Luciusʼ motives reflect what Caesar states is the 
problem, and the characterʼs actions are illustrative of how the individual is used to 
draw attention to the loss of control among the men. 
 
Furthermore, Caesar immediately uses another exemplum to support his interpretation, 
demonstrating the extent to which he utilises these individual stories to reinforce the 
objective of the passage. After Lucius dies, the centurion Marcus Petronius repents for 
his part in the acts of culpability.
55
 Marcus is described as follows: 
 
                                                 
51
 7.52.1-7.52.4. 
52
 Melchior (2004) p.31 notes the lesson in the text, but states it is that Roman soldiers die when they 
disobey or are overzealous. Note that this protects Caesar from implications of cupiditas. 
53
 7.47.7. 
54
 On the supporting role of the two exempla see Choitz (2011) p. 142. 
55
 Kraus (2010) p. 57 fn. 55. Kraus regards the role of Marcus Petronius as a sacrificial one. See also 
Hall (1998) pp. 16-17 on syntax. 
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… L. Fabius centurio quique una murum ascenderant, circumventi atque interfecti 
de muro praecipitabantur. M. Petronius, eiusdem legionis centurio, cum portas 
excidere conatus esset, a multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans multis iam 
vulneribus acceptis, manipularibus suis, qui illum erant secuti “quoniam” inquit 
“me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, 
quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. vos data facultate vobis 
consulite.” simul in medios hostes inrupit duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta 
paulum submovit. Conantibus auxiliari suis “frustra” inquit “meae vitae subvenire 
conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. proinde abite, dum est facultas, 
vosque ad legionem recipite.” ita pugnans post paulo concidit ac suis saluti fuit.56 
 
Caesarʼs use of cupiditate here is an exact reference to the general soldiery who all 
behave this way.
57
 Marcus not only admits his error in a direct speech, but redeems 
himself through combat, sacrificing himself to achieve safety for the men and to make 
up for his mistake.
58
 Along with Lucius Fabius, his presence is designed to support 
the overall contention that the men are at fault, and the doubling is particularly 
indicative of the extent to which Caesar uses anecdotal argumentation.
59
 The 
individuals and their behaviour appear in order to support the message regarding the 
battle. 
 
Caesar also uses combat anecdotes to illustrate his overall assessment of affairs. In 
particular he utilises the details of the Nitobrigian king, who is forced to flee the 
advancing Romans:
60
 
 
...ac tanta fuit in capiendis castris celeritas, ut Teutomatus, rex Nitiobrogum, subito 
in tabernaculo oppressus, ut meridie conquieverat, superiore corporis parte nuda 
vulnerato equo vix se ex manibus praedantium militum eriperet.
61
 
                                                 
56
 7.50.3-7.50.6. 
57
 7.52.1. 
58
 Gerlinger (2008) pp. 228-231. 
59
 Kraus also notes the pairing of the two centurions. See Kraus (2010) p. 55 on the literary aspect of 
doubling. See also Kraus p (2010) p. 57. Kraus addresses the question of why Marcus is given the 
speech. Note that by giving Marcus a speech, an opportunity is given to verbalise Caesar‟s overall 
assessment of culpability among the men.  
60
 On anecdote and evidentia see Wiseman (1993) pp. 140, 146. 
61
 7.46.5.  
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While the incident is notable for the rank of the enemy, the details support Caesarʼs 
assessment that the men lose control and advance faster than could be expected. As he 
indicates, even the enemy are caught unawares by the speed of the advance. The 
reference to a desire for booty, evident in the use of praedantium, further establishes 
culpability as arising from the menʼs motivation.62 The details of the vignette 
reinforce the overall interpretation and assist in the objective of exonerating Caesar 
from responsibility.  
 
However this is not the only anecdote used to describe the loss of control, as indicated 
by the details of the women of Gergovia: 
 
Matres familiae de muro vestem argentumque iactabant et pectore nudo 
prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut 
Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent; nonnullae 
de muro per manus demissae sese militibus tradebant.
63
 
 
It is clear through the anecdote that the men are in a position where they are out of 
control, or struggling to stay in order. The temptations offered, and the description of 
the men even in possession of the women, is anecdotal, but is an example of the 
cupiditas that is attributed to the soldiers overall.
64
 Therefore, while Kagan states that 
Caesar is blaming Fabius as an individual, this ignores the more representative role 
that he serves, as the loss of control is clearly occurring more widely, with a frontage 
of three legions and numerous centurions in attendance.
65
 The details show the 
temptations that drive the men on to the walls against orders, illustrating the 
integration of combat vignettes into the interpretation of the battle. 
 
Throughout the account of Gergovia, Caesar integrates anecdotal details of combat 
into a comprehensive picture that supports his interpretation of the battle, and assigns 
clear culpability for the affair. The attention to detail, while it appears superficially of 
                                                 
62
 7.46.5. Kagan (2006) p. 167 does not address the representative role of the Nitobrigian king, 
illustrating how such anecdotes can be overlooked. Kagan takes the incident with the King literally 
and suggests it may even be directly responsible for the loss of control. 
63
 7.47.5-7.47.7. 
64
 7.48.3-7.48.4. Note also that when the battle turns in favour of the enemy, the women appear again 
to illustrate the change in circumstances. Kraus (2010) p. 55 notes this use of the women.  
65
 Kagan (2006) p. 167. 
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interest in describing events, appears carefully designed to support the stated 
interpretation. The use of anecdotes is indicative of how thoroughly Caesar integrates 
combat details as stylistic devices into the literary schema of his battle narratives, and 
that battle is designed to persuade the audience through the content selected. 
 
Persuasive use of Numbers and the Britanni 
  
In a similar manner to the use of exempla, Caesar utilises contextual details such as 
numbers to support or establish impressions for his audience. In Chapter One it was 
illustrated that Caesar does not simply use numbers to clarify the details of a conflict, 
and that his information is clearly not transmitted for elucidation of numeric 
relationships. Instead the use of numbers for self-promotion and persuasive force is 
apparent throughout the work, and the second invasion of Britain is one account that 
illustrates that numbers and other contextual information about forces exist to support 
Caesarʼs interpretation of his activity, rather than to clarify the details of the 
confrontation. As Riggsby notes of the work as a whole, it is “merely descriptive on 
its surface”, a statement that is particularly relevant to the use of numbers.66 Numeric 
information can be seen to support objectives not related to clarification of battle, but 
to an interpretation of the campaign or the extent of Caesarʼs victory.  
 
Caesar shares with other sources the citation of extraordinarily large numbers in 
several battles, a use that may be for the simple purpose of establishing the greatness 
of his victory. The problem of numbers in general has been noted by Richter, in 
particular that the extremely large numbers cited are a highly problematic feature of 
ancient historiography.
67
 Caesar is no exception and cites numbers that are very large, 
as is apparent in the Belgae confrontation discussed in Chapter One and in the Alesia 
account.
68
 As Daly notes of Polybius, this use of numbers may be for the purpose of 
drama, and Caesar certainly appears to cite numbers when it emphasises the scope of 
the encounter.
69
 This is immediately apparent in the Belgae encounter, where the 
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 Riggsby (2006) p. 208. 
67
 Richter (1977) pp. 156-158. See also Herodotus 7.60, Arrian Anab 3.8.2-3.8.6 for numbers cited in 
the millions. 
68
 See 2.4 for the Belgae, and Alesia 7.75. 
69
 Daly (2002) p. 23.  
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topos of the enemy horde adds tension and a sense of danger to the passage.
70
 
However the impression of vast odds also adds to the greatness of Caesarʼs 
achievement in defeating them, and may not simply be a record of enemy 
encountered. 
 
The appearance of numeric information to give force to a victory is particularly 
apparent throughout the Bellum Gallicum when such odds appear at the end of a 
passage. This is evident in the defeat of the Helvetii, where the census numbers 
revealed at the end have a revelatory effect in drawing attention to the numbers of 
enemy defeated.
71
 Similarly, the numbers of the Usipetes and Tencteri are related at 
the end of their battle narrative, even though it is not the numbers of combatants that 
is given.
72
 Unlike their appearance in the works of historians like Polybius or Livy, 
the details do not always appear to be a comparison of forces as they only appear at 
the end of the account.
73
 These details are not provided at the start of the campaign 
narrative where they might assist in understanding the forces involved in combat, but 
exist in order to support the extent of his achievements. 
 
Where Caesar does provide numbers prior to a battle, the details nevertheless appear 
aimed at self-promotion. The battle against the Belgae, examined in Chapter One for 
its creation of the topos of the multitude, is an example of Caesar structuring his 
account to emphasise the odds against him.
74
 As was demonstrated in Chapter One, 
this topos is highly reductive and is not designed to provide elucidation about the 
battle, as it simplifies the actions of a massive force, not accounting for the actions of 
individual tribes or other elements.
75
 Instead, the topos functions to create a single 
entity against which Caesar and his forces triumph, even though Caesar may only 
have faced some of the tribal elements as they retreated, due to the sheer size of the 
force described.
76
 The simplification of the numeric odds has a persuasive role as it 
draws attention to the commanderʼs ability to triumph in the face of overwhelming 
odds.  
                                                 
70
 See above pp. 71-88. 
71
 1.29.  
72
 4.15.  
73
 See above p. 48 fn. 55. 
74
 See pp. 71-88 above on the topos of the Gallic multitude.  
75
 See pp. 79-88 above. 
76
 See pp. 86-87 above.  
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In the second British invasion, Caesar uses the numeric information to create more 
particular impressions than the odds faced as the numbers cited support specific 
messages about the course of the campaign. When he mentions during the campaign 
that the enemy leader Cassivellaunus dismisses all his troops except for 4,000 
chariots, there is no initial number to compare it with.
77
 Nevertheless, the figure is 
clearly indicative of a relative threat, and that these forces and Cassivellaunus are still 
dangerous, as they are much greater than the 1,700 cavalry Caesar has with him at the 
time.
78
 The number is clearly designed to explain the threat that Cassivellaunus poses, 
and to explain why the enemy are able, through an irregular form of warfare, to 
prevent the Romans from moving freely.
79
 The numbers are given as part of an 
analysis of the strategic and tactical landscape, rather than to explain the total 
numbers in combat.  
 
The choice of which enemy forces to enumerate in this campaign illustrates that 
information is chosen to support general observations, in this case, the idea that the 
enemy chariots represent the main threat to the campaign.
80
 Caesar never mentions 
the infantry of the enemy, even though these were clearly present in the first 
campaign and most likely used by the Britons in the second.
81
 Nevertheless they do 
not feature in the narrative, which focuses on the role of chariots and cavalry and the 
challenges these posed for his forces.
82
 He only selects the units that best illustrate the 
points he is making about the conduct of the affair, in this case how the chariots and 
cavalry of the enemy are the main threat, and as such he is only including military 
data pertinent to those arguments. 
 
Furthermore, Caesar uses contextual details to summarise the results of campaign. He 
mentions no tribal names in the early part of the episode, only stating a general 
                                                 
77
 5.19.1. This is most evident at 5.8.6 where no estimate of forces is given. 
78
 5.19.1. Caesar‟s numbers are not given but can be estimated from 5.8, less those left at camp 
mentioned at 5.9.  
79
 See 5.19.2-5.19.3. See Bradley (2009) p. 1088 on the use of the chariot.  
80
 See below pp. 245-260, 283-291, 319-335 for a full explanation of Caesar‟s objectives in the first 
and second invasions. 
81
 The presence of enemy infantry in the first invasion is evident at 4.24 as the enemy cavalry and 
chariots are sent ahead, presumably of the main force of infantry. In the second invasion, Caesar is 
able to pursue the enemy with both his own infantry and cavalry at 5.10.1 after defeating them, 
suggesting that their infantry slowed them down.  
82
 See 4.33 and 5.16 for Caesar‟s analysis, which focuses on the cavalry and chariots. 
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division according to maritime status.
83
 However in the last four chapters of the 
account he not only mentions a list of the tribes who capitulate, but also the kings 
defeated.
84
 He even mentions the captured tribal leader, Lugotorix who has made no 
appearance in the narrative so far.
85
 This belated mention of names and tribes at the 
very end of the episode demonstrates that the information is not provided to clarify 
the conflict prior to battle. While an audience can retrospectively apply such 
information to the whole account, the details provided are not directed at early 
clarification of such circumstances. The list of tribes and kings primarily exist in order 
to summarise the results of the campaign. They indicate that Caesarʼs use of numeric 
data and lists are a support of his general contentions about the campaign and his 
victory, more than a clarification of the protagonists for his audience. This particular 
campaign illustrates the highly specific manner in which Caesar utilises numeric and 
contextual information to influence the audience understanding of the events 
described.  
 
Campaign and the Venetii Battle  
 
There is a close relationship between battle narrative and the surrounding text, and 
content is sometimes designed to support a concern regarding the larger episode rather 
than the battle itself. This occurs in the description of the naval battle against the 
Venetii, which provides an example of how battle narrative can be narrated in order to 
present a unified explanation for the campaign.
86
 The concept that defines this episode 
is the difficulties Caesar faced in prosecuting war against the Venetii, and this 
impression determines the content and structure of the battle narrative.
87
 While the 
battle brings the campaign to a close, the choice of content is not driven by a need to 
                                                 
83
 5.11.8. Note the tribe of Cassivellaunus is not mentioned, at this point, and in the digression on the 
island of Britain Caesar refers to people simply using variations of cultus, as at 5.12.1, or their 
location i.e. interiores at 5.14.2. This avoidance of tribes suggests a deliberate strategy of holding 
over the tribal names for the very end. See also Richter (1977) pp. 93-95.  
84
 5.21.1-5.21.2, 5.22. See Mannetter (1995) pp. 138-175 cf. p. 141, on catalogues, and the apparently 
“superfluous” catalogue here. 
85
 5.22.2-5.22.3. 
86
 3.7-3.16. See also the fighting in Britain in the first invasion, where combat supports the 
interpretation of the campaign. This is discussed at pp. 283-291 below. 
87
 See Schadee (2008) p. 166 on the construction of this part of Gaul. 
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reconstruct the circumstances of battle itself.
88
 In particular the presentation of 
combat, which describes the use of falces as a counter to the enemy ships, is an 
example of how the issue of Venetii naval superiority is addressed, at the expense of a 
full understanding of how the combat was fought.
89
 Reconstruction is subordinated to 
the broader purpose of persuading the audience to accept the presentation of the 
overall campaign. 
 
In order to understand the battle narrative, it is important to recognise Caesarʼs 
objective throughout the campaign narrative, which is to stress the difficulties of 
fighting the Venetii. As Ramage notes, the presentation of the campaign could be 
classified as labor, due to the frustration involved in its resolution.
90
 The particular 
issues faced in the campaign are something Caesar clarifies in the description of the 
Venetii, and the reasons for their position among their peers. As he states:  
 
Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum 
earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare 
consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno 
impetu maris atque aperto Oceano paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, 
omnes fere, qui eo mari uti consuerunt, habent vectigales.
91
 
 
This passage makes mention of topographic features such as the openness of the sea 
and lack of ports, rather than just state that the Venetii control the region, thereby 
introducing the unique terrain and foreshadowing the problems it poses.
92
 The passage 
is also specific about the reasons for Venetii dominance, and states aspects of their 
auctoritas that cause Caesar the most difficulty in resolving the campaign. The 
                                                 
88
 See Conley (1983) p. 181. Conley notes the importance of the campaign and that the battle is a 
“strategic turn” within a “tactical engagement”. Levick (1998) pp. 65ff is primarily concerned with 
the historical context of the account and to support Stevens‟ conclusions about the campaign. 
Erickson (2002) p. 617 provides a metaphorical reading of the battle narrative based on virtus as a 
theme. 
89
 3.14.5-3.14.7. In regards to technology see generally Rey (2010) p. 33 who states that the ancient 
world had little concept of progress and did not use modern interpretations of causality. In 
opposition, see Lendon (2005) p. 10 who supports the idea of ancient concepts of technological 
progress. See also Hanson (1999) p. 395 who states that ancients were aware of how important 
superior equipment was on the battlefield and its effect on victory. He says Caesar “often” cites such. 
90
 On the campaign as labor, see Ramage (2003) pp. 341-342. 
91
 3.8.1. It is interesting to note how quickly the Venetii are built into a major threat in this passage, 
through the risk of them serving as an exemplar of rebellion to other Gallic groups. 
92
 See Mannetter (1995) pp. 97-118 on foreshadowing. 
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mention of Britain is important as it establishes their familiarity with the open ocean 
and general facility at sea. The reference also alludes to the alien nature of the region 
for a Roman fleet, which does not normally function outside the Mediterranean. 
While ostensibly introducing the Venetii and the reasons for their pre-eminence, 
Caesar also establishes the conditions that govern his presentation of the whole 
passage.  
 
The importance of the campaign conditions is evident as Caesar even addresses them 
in his portrayal of culpability. He highlights the criminality of the Venetii, stating of 
their preparations that: quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant.
93
 Similarly he 
phrases the need for campaigning in terms of the requirement that their crime be 
punished.
94
 The association of these characteristics with challenges such as terrain is 
most evident in the enemy rationale for war.
95
 As Caesar states: 
 
...hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant. pedestria esse itinera 
concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum 
paucitatemque portuum sciebant; neque nostros exercitus propter frumenti inopiam 
diutius apud se morari posse confidebant; ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem 
acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, Romanos neque ullam facultatem 
habere navium neque eorum locorum, ubi bellum gesturi essent, vada portus insulas 
novisse; ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo 
atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant.
96
  
 
The nature of the terrain is presented within the context of enemy confidence, so that 
the physical location and the arrogance of the enemy are closely associated.
97
 
Similarly the problems of fighting on the ocean are presented with attention to 
ethnicity, as the Venetii compare the sea to the native waters of the Romans. The 
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difficulties are given a partisan character, and the sheer preposterousness of a 
Mediterranean power attempting warfare at sea in the Atlantic emphasised through 
the use of superlatives vastissimo and apertissimo.
98
 In each case, the conditions are 
presented and associated with the arrogance and confidence of the Venetii, 
demonstrating the extent to which the campaign circumstances have been integrated 
even into the attitude of the enemy.  
 
These circumstances are repeated at several points throughout the passage, indicating 
the concern to remind the audience of the difficulty of the campaign. After stating the 
conditions, first in the introduction and then through the attitude of the Venetii, 
Caesar is careful to confirm the veracity of their statements, stating: erant hae 
difficultates belli gerendi, quas supra ostendimus, sed multa tamen Caesarem ad id 
bellum incitabant.
99
 The word difficultas is used both here and later, so that the initial 
assessment is reinforced through reiteration.
100
 Furthermore reinforcement is included 
in other issues, such as the description of Venetii naval resources in a passage on the 
evacuation of townsfolk.
101
 These qualifications and reiteration demonstrate the 
importance of clearly defining the challenges as part of the scope of the overall 
account.  
 
Even information regarding the alliances of the enemy are included to stress the 
obstacles faced in prosecuting the war. Sources as early as Strabo have noted that 
Caesarʼs actual campaign might have come about due to his plans for an invasion of 
Britain, which in turn led the Venetii to oppose him.
102
 While Caesar makes brief 
mention of Britain, he does so within the context of the naval abilities of the Venetii, 
who are reinforced by British contingents.
103
 The inclusion of British forces may help 
justify Caesarʼs later invasion of the island, but it is important to note that it appears 
in this passage within the governing paradigm of Venetii strength. 
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The difficulties form the foundation of the account, so that they appear at the expense 
of actual information regarding the progress of the campaign.
104
 After relating the 
disposition of his legates Caesar describes his own advance when he states: ipse eo 
pedestribus copiis contendit.
105
 However after this the chronological nature of the 
narrative is largely abandoned to describe in a more general fashion the defences that 
topography afford the enemy. As he states of the terrain: 
 
Erant eiusmodi fere situs oppidorum, ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque 
neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod bis accidit 
semper horarum duodenarum spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu 
naves in vadis adflictarentur. ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediebatur. ac 
si quando magnitudine operis forte superati extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque 
his oppidi moenibus adaequatis suis fortunis desperare coeperant, magno numero 
navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, sua deportabant omnia 
seque in proxima oppida recipiebant; ibi se rursus isdem loci opportunitatibus 
defendebant.
106
  
 
This passage highlights how Caesar blends activity into the purpose of the passage, 
which is to describe the problems faced. The passage begins by describing the nature 
of the terrain, but also includes aspects of progress such as the siege of towns and the 
flight of the enemy.
107
 Progress is described primarily in relation to the problematic 
terrain and the enemyʼs naval superiority. 
  
Other information provided is only rudimentary in nature, and appears in the account 
as secondary to the description of the problems. This is evident in the account just 
prior to the battle. As Caesar states: 
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Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi 
neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit 
exspectandam classem.
108
 
 
The details are basic, not even giving the number of towns taken, as the purpose is not 
to emphasise the successes.
109
 No location names, such as ports, are given anywhere 
in the account, and even the town of the Venetii is not named and may only be 
assumed once the battle is finally resolved.
110 
Spatial relationships, such as the 
location of fleet and army in relation to each other, are also not provided, so that while 
Caesar states that he had to await his fleet, the location of neither force is specified.
111
 
Even here he cannot avoid a value judgement, capturing his frustration with the words 
frustra tantum laborem. The campaign progress, in particular the successes, are only 
given a cursory description and are incidental to the main thrust of the passage, which 
centres on the obstacles to victory and the attempts to overcome them. 
 
There are also important omissions in the movement of resources that further 
demonstrate that only obstacles receive attention. The construction of ships that 
Caesar orders are not described, and must be assumed from the appearance of the fleet 
in the narrative.
112
 The account omits all reference to the process once the order is 
given, and Dioʼs attempt to address this gap is indicative of the missing dimension in 
Caesarʼs version, where Dio at least attempts to explain the full context by stating that 
Caesar made ships much earlier before attacking the separate towns.
113
 Similarly, the 
movement of Brutus and the fleet to the lands of the Venetii is not recorded.
114
 How 
and when these resources, critical to ultimate success, arrive is not described. They 
are simply assumed, indicating that when Caesar does not meet an obstacle to victory 
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he does not provide elaboration.
115
 The omissions illustrate that he does not account 
for physical progress or include relevant details when they do not support the 
governing message. 
 
Where Caesar provides campaign data, he nevertheless does so in relation to the 
general difficulties faced. This is shown in the presentation of fleet inactivity, which 
he states as follows:  
  
Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant, quod nostrae naves 
tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, 
raris ac prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.
116
 
 
The information that the fleet is held in port is included in order to explain the ease 
with which the enemy act. Details are rudimentary, as the main purpose of the 
statement is to record the reasons success is held up, and to again describe the 
problematic nature of terrain and weather conditions. The passage demonstrates that 
descriptive details are only provided to reinforce or explain the impediments to 
success.  
 
Caesar even presents his successes to generate this effect, by giving emphasis to the 
inconclusive nature of the victories described.
117
 The Romans perform successful 
actions throughout the campaign, storming several towns, and forcing the occupants 
to flee.
118
 Therefore, the information conveys that Caesar makes progress as the 
campaign continues, however he includes the ability of the Venetii to resist later 
stating: ...sua deportabant omnia seque in proxima oppida recipiebant; ibi se rursus 
isdem loci opportunitatibus defendebant.
119
 The use of proxima and rursus isdem 
emphasise the ongoing nature of the problem, as the enemy leave one defeated town 
only to resist in another nearby location. The ongoing nature of the difficulties is also 
illustrated as prior to the final battle the speed of the Roman ships is presented as only 
a mitigating factor against Venetii superiority, in spite of the actual taking of these 
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towns.
120
 Caesar could have shown these other victories in a more positive manner, as 
a victory against the odds, however the content is designed to show early victories as 
inconclusive, and pre-eminence is given to the idea that the whole affair is a difficult 
one to wage. 
 
The background to the campaign is not the only area that is determined by the concern 
with general conditions, and technical data is specifically included to support this 
interpretation.
121
 The description of the enemy ships, immediately following an 
explanation of how the weather holds the Roman ships in port, shows that the 
technical description is actually addressed to the inability of the Romans to prosecute 
the campaign.
122
 It is clear in the description of the ships that Caesar is specifically 
addressing these conditions, and the technical data is just a particularly detailed part 
of an address to the challenges. As he states: 
 
Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque erant: carinae aliquanto 
planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere 
possent; prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum 
tempestatumque adcommodatae; naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et 
contumeliam perferendam; transtra ex pedalibus in altitudinem trabibus confixa 
clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine; ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis 
revinctae; pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, sive propter lini inopiam 
atque eius usus inscientiam, sive quod est magis veri simile, quod tantas tempestates 
Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non 
satis commode posse arbitrabantur.
123
 
 
This part of the description re-establishes the problems of the campaign within the 
technical details, demonstrating that Caesar is reiterating enemy superiority and not 
simply describing their naval skill. All the features at this stage, the high prows and 
poops, the strength of the ships, their anchors and sails, and even size of the nails 
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appear in response to the implied question of why the Venetii are functioning at sea 
while the Romans are caught in port.
124
 To make it particularly clear, Caesar initially 
describes the enemy ships in comparison to the Roman construction, thereby 
indicating the relative superiority that they enjoy under the circumstances. All the 
details are supporting evidence to illustrate the initial paradigm of the difficulties 
under which the Romans labour.  
 
Even the fighting strength of the ships is designed to address the campaign rather than 
any specifics of battle. Caesar provides the following description of general combat 
between Romans and Venetii: 
 
Cum his navibus nostrae classi eiusmodi congressus erat, ut una celeritate et pulsu 
remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et 
adcommodatiora. neque enim his nostrae rostro nocere poterant, tanta in iis erat 
firmitudo, neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa 
minus commode copulis continebantur.
125
 
 
This passage addresses the campaign, as it describes the facility of the ships in terms 
of the weather and the geography of the region. While specific details such as the use 
of the ram, missile weapons and grappling hooks are all describing generic combat, 
they actually answer any implied questions as to why the Romans are unable to 
prevent the Venetii from escaping by sea. They still fall within the context of an 
explanation of general enemy superiority over the course of the war. 
 
Caesarʼs approach to his own knowledge regarding the campaign supports this 
impression, as he adopts the perspective that best suits a negative portrayal of events. 
The Venetii must appear strong and their confidence is related to the terrain, so 
Caesar displays relative omniscience with regard to their early plans. By contrast, he 
displays a lack of knowledge regarding Venetii sail construction, a technical matter 
that would have been known from the interrogation of any Venetii involved in 
shipbuilding.
126
 The lack of knowledge regarding Venetii sail making presents Caesar 
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as vulnerable, lacking knowledge precisely when describing an aspect of enemy naval 
strength. While this display of retrospective knowledge appears somewhat selective, it 
nevertheless fits the account as it reinforces the image of vulnerability. The selective 
approach to Caesarʼs recollection appears to support the overall contention that this 
was a particularly difficult campaign to resolve conclusively.  
 
Campaign Objectives in the Battle  
 
The battle supports Caesarʼs presentation of the difficulties, as the final confrontation 
specifically addresses and resolves the features ascribed to the campaign, in particular 
Caesarʼs inability to close with and destroy the Venetii.127 This is evident as after he 
describes the defeat of the enemy, he focuses on the destruction of their naval power, 
such as the elimination of old and young males, and the elimination of the Venetii 
navy as a fighting force.
128
 By contrast assets taken but not related to the naval issue, 
such as the town, receive little attention.
129
 The resolution emphasises the elimination 
of those aspects of Venetian power that Caesar states were the problem in prosecuting 
the campaign, staying consistent with the overall narrative.  
 
Although the elimination of enemy naval power would have been important in the 
historical encounter, the objective of reinforcing the campaign difficulties is evident 
as Caesar is more concerned to address and resolve the overall paradigm, than to 
reconstruct the circumstances of the actual confrontation.
130
 The lack of a 
reconstructive purpose is evident in the presentation of enemy ship dispositions for 
battle, which are not designed to clarify the encounter. As Caesar states when the 
enemy first appear: 
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Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum 
paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae ex portu profectae nostris 
adversae constiterunt.
131
 
 
Important information such as the spatial relationship of the fleets is absent, as are 
details regarding the Roman fleet, such as numbers and types of ships involved.
132
 
Furthermore, no information essential for understanding a naval battle is provided, 
such as initial weather conditions. The later description of a change in weather is 
particularly pertinent, as there are no preconditions for comparison.
133
 Erickson 
regards the discrepancies between Caesar and Dio as the result of Dioʼs confusion 
regarding the start of the battle, this confusion evidence of how Caesar does not have 
the primary purpose of reconstruction in mind.
134
 Such an omission is illustrative of 
Caesarʼs disinterest in establishing a full understanding of the battle.  
  
The description of terrain also illustrates that the presentation is not designed to 
accurately address the topography of the battle.
135
 Caesar describes the battle as 
fought close to shore, and he states that the crews could see and be seen from nearby 
high points.
136
 This one terrain feature has no influence within the battle, and in 
particular the close proximity to shore has no effect on the ships. The presence of 
shoals, and the threat of running aground or any other possible dangers inherent in the 
location are all absent. Even the feature itself is described in a rudimentary fashion, so 
that the high points are not described as a headland, mouth of a river or using any 
other identifying epithets.
137
 Rice Holmes has noted that such lack of clarity is not 
always the case in this campaign, supporting the idea that the battle displays even less 
detail than the basic data conveyed in the overall account.
138
 The presence of this 
terrain feature within the passage is not an indicator that Caesar is providing a spatial 
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reference, as the terrain is given only a basic description and has no effect on the 
physical progress of the battle. 
 
Important information regarding the motivation of the protagonists is also missing, 
further showing that explanation of the event itself is not the concern of the passage.
 
Most notable is the omission of information as to why the Venetii decide to fight.
139
 
Even if they have no more towns to flee to, Caesar does not state so, and they simply 
sail out of a harbour.
140
 Unlike other battles where the reasoning behind the enemyʼs 
decision is explored, and in marked contrast to the complex motivation earlier 
ascribed to the Venetii, there is little insight at the commencement of the 
engagement.
141
 While the defence of the town seems the reason based on later 
interpretation, Caesar does not elaborate such details in contextualising the battle.  
 
Similarly, Caesar does not account for why the Romans choose to fight.
142
 He awaits 
the arrival of the fleet and then the two sides engage in combat.
 
While he later states 
that the wind fell enabling the Romans to overtake the fleeing enemy, he does not 
account for why the Romans would choose to fight under initially less favourable 
conditions.
143
 Furthermore he has built an expectation of Roman frustration 
throughout the campaign, as the Venetii have been superior in previous paradigmatic 
confrontations, and he gives no reason at the start of the account as to why the 
Romans believed this encounter would be different.
144
 The early stages of the account 
are vague regarding tactical details even when these are important for establishing the 
reasons for battle, indicating a general lack of interest in communicating such 
minutiae. 
 
In contrast to the lack of detail regarding the battle itself, the information has strong 
links to the presentation of the campaign, demonstrating that the choice of content is 
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aimed at addressing the broader context. The dangers of campaign addressed at the 
start of the episode are present in the description of the crews of the enemy ships, 
which represent every tribe, or type of armed man possible.
145
 They represent a threat 
Caesar specified when he sent legates to the various parts of Gaul due to fear of a 
general uprising.
146
 In this instance the description reinforces the fears regarding the 
threat of a general uprising, and the limited information provided has a direct 
association with the broader campaign. 
  
Similarly, the general superiority of the Venetii throughout the passage is addressed 
through the dispositions for battle.
147
 Only the numbers of Venetii ships are given, so 
no relationship can be established between the two sides and the number is of limited 
value for understanding the battle. Nevertheless these numbers address the general 
superiority of the Venetii fleet, which has been stated as numerically large on several 
occasions.
148
 The use of paratissimae to describe the ships reinforces this concept, 
and although it does not provide any specific details regarding the nature of the 
preparations, it does serve to remind the audience of the skill of the Venetii at sea.
149
 
The choice of details selected therefore illustrates that Caesar is not trying to aid 
understanding of the event, but to reinforce a feature of the campaign regarding the 
enemy. 
 
Even the main reconstructive episode in the battle bears important omissions due to 
the need to address the campaign and show how the campaign, not just the battle, is 
resolved. The final stage of the battle is largely reconstructive, but is still influenced 
by the purpose of addressing the campaign.
150
 As Caesar states:  
 
Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac 
tranquillitas exstitit, ut se ex loco movere non possent. quae quidem res ad negotium 
conficiendum maximae fuit opportunitati. nam singulas nostri consectati 
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expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis inter ventu ad terram 
pervenirent, cum ab hora fere quarta usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.
151
 
 
Data regarding the battle is included here, such as the duration and an effective 
casualty report regarding the Venetii who are almost totally wiped out. Nevertheless 
the account lacks clarity due to the lack of Roman numbers, and it is uncertain if a 
numerically inferior Roman force hunt the Venetii down and surround them one by 
one, or if superior Roman numbers swamp the eventually becalmed ships.
152
 This 
absence is explained as the objective is to capture the final obliteration of the Venetii 
fighting strength, and to resolve the issue of their elusiveness. 
 
Combat is where the thematic link of the battle to the campaign is most clear. Caesar 
structures the account so that one technical factor, the falces that the Romans 
improvise, addresses and resolves the problems raised regarding the naval superiority 
of the enemy, and the narrative exaggerates its importance in bringing to end the 
ability of the enemy to outmanoeuvre or flee the Romans.
153
 This resolving device is 
highly literary and not an indication of technological determinism in the account, as 
Caesar may be misrepresenting the manner in which the falx is deployed, in order to 
create a singular resolution to battle and campaign. The use of the hooks is certainly a 
tempting technological reason to explain the result of battle, and Rey in particular 
notes that military history has a tendency towards technological determinism, 
especially in intra-ethnic conflicts.
154
 However Roland notes that technological 
descriptions are not necessarily designed to be schemata, but are literary descriptions 
and adhere to literary, not deterministic criteria.
155
 Therefore the description of 
technological details such as ships or falces should not automatically be accorded 
status within the work as technological artefacts alone. The artefact adheres to the 
literary rules as much as speeches or any other literary structures designed to meet 
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authorial aims.
156
 The device is a technological artefact, but in this case can be given 
prominence due to its importance in addressing and resolving the issues of the 
campaign. 
 
The persuasive role of the hooks is evident in their role as a resolving device, 
referring back to the ongoing issue of enemy naval superiority, as they ensure that this 
superiority is overcome through the course of the battle narrative. The literary 
importance of the falces is evident as their position in the narrative ensures they have 
the most impact as a resolving device, and Caesar is very clearly limiting their 
presence to the battle itself in the following statement: 
 
Neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus 
singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae 
insisterent. Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis 
tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore 
loco satis commode tela adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent.
157
 
 
Caesar presents the matter as if the Romans have no solution to the speed of the 
enemy, and describes how they enter battle with almost no way of countering the 
enemy naval capabilities.
158
 This is further apparent in the following passage: 
 
Una erat magno usui res praeparata ab nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque 
longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium. his cum funes qui antemnas ad 
malos destinabant, comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato 
praerumpebantur. quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut cum omnis 
Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus 
navium uno tempore eriperetur.
159
 
 
                                                 
156
 See Raudzens (1990) in general for a discussion of the dichotomy between technology and victory. 
See also Dodington (1980) p. 9 on the similarity between engineering and speeches in terms of 
literary purpose. 
157
 3.14.3-3.14.5. 
158
 Dodington (1980) p. 34 regards the absence of planning by the commanders as designed to 
undermine any engineering skill in his subordinates. However, it is not possible to determine the 
actual conditions except that Caesar wishes the battle to be envisaged as where the hooks are first 
used. 
159
 3.14.5-3.14.8. 
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As the above passage demonstrates, the description of falx construction is brought 
within the battle narrative itself, ensuring that precautions designed to defeat the 
enemy and any mention of their implementation only appears as part of the battle 
when the issue is finally resolved. The absence of previous battles where activity such 
as the construction of countermeasures could be addressed suits the generation of this 
impression, and is supported by the statement that the commanders do not know what 
to do prior to the confrontation.
160
 However, as suggested through magno usui it is 
most likely these hooks were constructed beforehand in the historical campaign, and 
the fleet was much more prepared for combat than the indecision of the commanders 
would suggest.
161
 The commanders must have been aware of activity on their ships, in 
particular as the falces must have been distributed widely among the ships in order to 
be effective.
162
 Therefore in delaying description of the falces until the battle Caesar 
may deliberately exaggerate the uncertainty of the commanders, in order to create a 
suitable introduction of the device. The battle is when the countermeasure is first 
envisaged and deployed, as the text suggests the Romans enter battle with no plan or 
method prepared earlier. 
 
In contrast to the reconstructive difficulties associated with the construction of the 
falx, the persuasive role is apparent as Caesar gives this one device a powerful causal 
position in the narrative. He states that in spite of the difficulties faced against the 
largely invulnerable Venetii ships, that this one thing is in favour of the Romans, and 
the construction of falces allows them to cut the rigging.
163
 The instrumentʼs role in 
the battle is evident as once they are brought into use, the Romans are able to resolve 
the affair in hand-to-hand combat, and he states: 
 
                                                 
160
 Levick (1992) p 64, fn. 24 notes how prior scholars have deduced the presence of previous battles 
in the actual campaign. Caesar states the falces were made magno usui at 3.14.5. This supports this 
conclusion that they were developed earlier than the battle. See above p. 140 for the commanders at a 
loss as to what to do. 
161
 See McDougall (1991) p. 625. Matthews (2010) p. 65 notes a similar situation in regards to Plutarch 
Marius 25 and changes to the pilum. 
162
 While Dodington (1980) p. 34 argues that the hooks are attributed to the men, he regards this as part 
of a pattern of Caesar emphasising his own technical skills over his officers. 
163
 See 3.14.4-3.14.6 for both the invulnerability of ships to rams or boarding, and the mitigating factor 
of the hooks. 
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Ut cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis 
omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur. reliquum erat certamen positum in 
virtute.
164
 
 
The use of falces cancels out the facility of the enemy with regard to their ships, 
allowing the affair to be decided by virtus, indicating that the hooks are highly 
decisive for the result.
165
 They appear instrumental in resolving the affair and 
allowing the Romans to triumph in shipboard combat, illustrating their role as a 
resolving device. 
 
The presentation of the hooks serves to resolve the issue of general Venetii 
superiority, but its literary role is apparent as it comes at the expense of details 
essential to understand the battle. Caesar proceeds to a description of the falces 
without describing any activity in the battle prior to their use, and some important 
information is omitted in favour of this emphasis. One important aspect of the battle 
omitted is any reference to manoeuvres. Manoeuvres would form the preconditions 
under which the hooks are brought into operation, and would have been a significant 
factor in the historical Roman victory.
166
 Caesar is also vague on pertinent details 
such as whether the Venetii ships rely solely on sails, or used a combination of sails 
and oars.
167
 The hooks operate on the sails, and it is also unclear how far the enemy 
would rely on sails in closing with the Romans, as ships would have most likely 
cleared their decks for close combat or protection from fire. At the very least the sails 
would be relatively superfluous in determining victory once close combat began.
168
 
While the falces allow the flight of the enemy to be prevented, this explains the 
eventual capitulation of the enemy and does not account for the initial act of closing 
                                                 
164
 3.14.7-3.14.8. 
165
 Erickson (2002) p. 611 explains the battle in terms of superior Roman virtus, with technology 
merely cancelling out the enemy naval advantage. This ethnographic interpretation, while possibly 
explaining the representation of the enemy, does not account for the emphasis Caesar places on other 
difficulties such as terrain, and his apparent need to explain the campaign‟s problems. 
166
 See 3.14.2-3.14.3. See also the absence of cavalry manoeuvre in the Usipetes account, and the 
movement of auxiliaries in Belgae account discussed at pp. 216, 315 below. 
167
 3.13.7 is the only mention of oarage and this is in regards to Roman ships. 
168
 See Casson (1971) pp. 121ff for a general discussion of naval combat, boarding and common use of 
marines over rams. The issue of clearing for action is less certain. However the main issue is that the 
use of hooks on poles indicates that the ships have already closed with one another, and that the sails 
should no longer be relevant in the ensuing close combat. The sails seem only relevant to the flight, 
raising the question of what was actually occurring on this battlefield when the hooks were put into 
use. It is entirely possible they were only used as part of preventing the flight of the enemy. This is 
how Dio regards their use at 39.43.4. 
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with the ships, and the ability of the Romans to cut the lines only accounts for part of 
the battle. The presence of the falx as a resolving device in the narrative is apparent as 
the technical explanation is insufficient to explain the result of the battle.  
 
Caesar has been highly selective in his choice of technical content, to create the 
impression that the falces are the critical feature of the battle. This is evident in the 
description of hand-to-hand combat, which ignores the other technical aspect of the 
Venetii ships, that being their superior size and defensibility. Close combat is 
described in two instances as follows:  
 
Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant. 
 
…milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves contendebant.169 
 
In both instances virtus is featured as an aspect of combat.
170
 Nevertheless the 
statement does not address or explain how the Romans physically overcome the ship 
height of the enemy which affects both missile fire and presumably the ability of the 
Romans to board.
171 
The Romans are not slowed nor do they suffer casualties, and 
Caesar shows that once he has addressed and overcome technical superiority, he 
abandons further technical data related to combat.
172
 Also in spite of an earlier 
statement that the enemy ships allow missiles to be thrown with ease, there is no 
mention of the effectiveness of this against the Roman boarders.
173
 Caesar in effect 
abandons the height advantage once the hooks have resolved the issue of closing with 
the enemy. In omitting this detail he demonstrates selectivity regarding technical 
matters through the description of one factor on the battlefield. He is not intent on 
recreating all the physical circumstances under which the Roman troops actually 
fought. 
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 3.14.8, 3.15.1-3.15.2.  
170
 See Lendon (1999) pp. 313-314, 318-319 on virtus in general. This also explains the absence of 
virtus among the Venetii that Erickson interprets as a disparagement of Venetii courage. See 3.5.3 for 
virtus in the Octodurus passage, where a similar situation arises in Caesar‟s account and virtus is 
used to explain the Roman sally and issues such as maneuver, numbers and even tiredness. 
171
 See 3.13.8, 3.14.4 on the height of the enemy ships.  
172
 See also the missing terrain in Usipetes and Tencteri, discussed above at p. 55 and the missing 
wagons in the Germanic battle, discussed below at pp. 153-154. 
173
 3.14.8-3.14.9, 3.15.1-3.15.3. The reference is to missile weapons being discharged from the higher 
ships, which has an effect on the ability to fight at close quarters. 
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Importantly, no heavier missile weapons are described, such as the use of catapults or 
scorpions. Caesar specifically mentioned tormenta as available against the Belgae in 
Book Two, and in the actual campaign he had time to build or mount such equipment 
on his ships, as this campaign lasted all summer.
174
 Furthermore he clearly had some 
siege weapons with him by the time of the British invasion, which were mounted on 
ships and given an important role in the landings there.
175
 Therefore the absence of 
heavier equipment in the Venetii narrative is not likely due to their absence in the 
historical campaign. Their exclusion may indicate that the account is focused 
primarily on the falces and only documents the use of other tools, such as the failure 
of the ram, when they serve to address his interpretation of the campaign. 
 
The objective of resolving the campaign with this device is apparent as once the 
hooks are implemented, the account is universally presented in a positive manner. The 
campaign has been presented negatively so far, and no positive interpretation of battle 
is given prior to the description of how the falces function, indicating that they have 
been given pre-eminence as the first successful Roman activity in the campaign.
176
 
The battle goes all the Romansʼ way once the hooks have been deployed and no 
setbacks of any sort are mentioned.
177
 The Romans triumph easily in hand-to-hand 
combat, meeting little resistance, as is clear in the statement: nostri milites facile 
superabant.
178
 Even the weather goes the way of the Romans, and while this does not 
mean Caesar has lied about conditions, his use of opportunitas shows that he is 
unremittingly positive after the hooks are used.
179
 The campaign narrative hinges on 
their use, as once they are used the tone of the account entirely changes to the positive 
resolution. 
 
Caesarʼs selectivity regarding the resolution of the affair is again evident as a major 
aspect of his justification for war is not fully resolved in the episode. He is very 
                                                 
174
 See 2.8.4 for tormenta described in the fortifications. Caesar certainly had artillery equipment with 
him in the historical campaign, as is evident in the Belgae confrontation. He had plenty of time to 
equip his ships as he states that this campaign was fought over summer.  
175
 See 4.25.1-4.25.2. It is clear that tormenta were mounted on boats in the British invasion.  
176
 See 3.14-3.15 and above at p. 140. 
177
 3.14.8-3.15.5. 
178
 3.14.8. 
179
 3.15.5. See also pp. 309-310 below for a change in tone in the Usipetes and Tencteri account. 
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particular at the start of the passage to emphasise the culpability of the Venetii with 
regard to the detention of legates, this being described as contrary to the rules of 
nations.
180
 Nevertheless the fate of the Roman legates after the campaign is not 
described, and whether they survived or not appears of less importance to his 
resolution than the issues of the campaign itself.
181
 Moreover he makes no further 
reference to the exemplary nature of the Venetii in inspiring revolt, so that the battle 
only serves to resolve local issues in the text and is not contextualised within the 
concerns that he initially addressed.
182
 While Caesar follows his description of this 
campaign with the activity of Sabinus and other subordinates, he makes no 
assessment of the effect that the defeat of the Venetii had on the threat of general 
uprising.
183
 In doing so he demonstrates that the subject that the battle is designed to 
resolve is highly selective, and directed at the set of difficulties he faced in 
prosecuting the overall affair. 
 
The persuasive role of the battle against the Venetii can be seen as it is primarily 
designed to address the campaign first, with a coherent and full understanding of the 
battle itself placed secondary to this main concern. The content, particularly the 
emphasis on the falces, is more important to an understanding of how Caesar 
understands and presents the episode as a whole, rather than to address the battle. 
Caesar uses the falx in order to resolve the theme of ongoing difficulties, and while 
the use of the tool in the historical battle is not disputed, the device is given a 
prominent position in order to resolve the theme of naval strength. Other aspects of 
the narrative, such as the numbers and the cutting of the sails, while problematic in 
terms of reconstruction, all address this thematic concern. The account of the Venetii 
shows how the battle narrative and the description of a particular campaign can be 
inseparable in terms of the information provided, Caesarʼs persuasive objectives, and 
the manner that combat is presented to support these overall concerns.  
 
                                                 
180
 3.9.3. 
181
 See 3.8.2, 3.10.1-3.10.3. 
182
 See above pp. 126-135.  
183
 See 3.17.1ff for Sabinus and the events that follow the battle. 
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Ariovistus, Caesar and the Germanic Reputation in Battle 
 
An examination of the battle against Ariovistus and the Germani in Book One reveals 
that it is also designed to support the contention of the campaign, in this case to assert 
that Caesarʼs interpretation of the Germani, and the superiority of Roman virtus, is 
correct.
184
 The narrative raises the German martial reputation in the description of 
negotiations with Ariovistus, then describes Caesarʼs own opinion of it in the mutiny 
at Vesontio, and finally proves his assessment right in the battle.
185
 Combat 
circumstances, episodes within the battle, and contextual details all have a thematic 
connection to the antecedent passages on the Germanic reputation, and aim to dispel 
the idea of their martial superiority through the battle narrative.
186
 As Jervis notes, the 
Germanic reputation far exceeds their abilities, and it is this underlying argument that 
extends from the campaign narrative through to the resolution of the battle.
187
 It is an 
argument that would appeal to a parochial Roman audience and portray Caesar 
positively at the same time, as it impresses them with his understanding of war and 
the enemy. Information is included to show Roman mastery over the enemy, and the 
correctness of his initial assessment that reputation of the Germani in war is 
unfounded.  
 
Caesar establishes early in the episode his pattern of argument and addresses the 
importance of the Germanic reputation, particularly for virtus, as he describes the 
Germanic leader boasting about this very quality.
188
 As he recounts of Ariovistusʼ 
words: …intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos 
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 1.31-53. See Martin Jr. (1965) and more recently James (2000) on the mutiny and the representation 
of Caesar. See also Ramage (2001) on the justification for war. See Martin Jr, (1965) p. 65 who notes 
another theme “Ariovistus the Ingrate”. Another major concern of the passage overall is the 
movement of the Germani into Gaul and the justification for war. See Riggsby (2006) pp.178-189, 
Heubner (1974) pp. 149-170; Christ (1974) p. 257-292. Christ p. 271 notes problematic aspects of 
Ariovistus‟ behaviour as represented. This section focuses on the construction of the battle in regards 
to the Germanic reputation. 
185
 There are also general similarities between this battle and Plutarch Marius 13-27. See also James 
(2000) p. 58, Melchior (2004) p. 39, Lendon (1999) p. 313. 
186
 Melchior (2004) pp. 39-42 notes a vengeance pattern to the overall passage.  
187
 Jervis (2001) p. 80. 
188
 On the representation of Ariovistus see Martin Jr. (1965) pp. 64-65; Ramage (2001) p. 164; Nousek 
(2006) pp. 67-68. On enemy boasting see Riggsby (2006) p. 49-59. See also Diodorus Siculus 5.29.3, 
5.31.1, Strabo Geog 4.4.5. Note however that boasting is often in reference to Gauls. McDougall 
(1991) p. 621 notes how the presentation of Ariovistus‟ speech echoes the battle in defining 
Germanic behaviour. Barlow (1998) p. 145 notes three uses of arrogantia in the whole work, two of 
which are used in the description of this Germanic campaign at 1.33.5, 1.4.4. 
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XIIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.
189
 Ariovistusʼ boast is not only an early 
reference to martial skill, but appears in indirect speech, drawing attention to the 
claim.
190
 More importantly, it appears as a challenge, an insult to Rome that must be 
answered.
191
 Just as Ariovistus must be defeated in battle, it should also be recognised 
that his claims might also be addressed.
192
 This is particularly so as emphasis on 
virtus continues throughout the account, with the word directly employed eight times 
in the campaign narrative.
193
 It appears evident that Caesar gives the quality pre-
eminence, both through direct speech, in which a challenge is raised, and through an 
ongoing reference to the concept. 
 
Caesar includes in Book One an extended passage describing a mutiny at Vesontio, a 
highly problematic passage in self-promotional terms, which nevertheless allows him 
to address the narrative objective.
194
 In the Bellum Civile, he makes no mention of the 
two major mutinies that occurred, despite them being resolved successfully by the 
time he wrote.
195
 In the Bellum Gallicum, however, the reluctance of the troops to 
fight against the Germans, a mutiny in all effects, is given an extended narrative.
196
 
The inclusion of a mutiny is ostensibly at odds with ideas of self-promotion. Its 
inclusion in the Bellum Gallicum is indicative of how strongly the theme of the 
Germanic reputation has influenced Caesarʼs choice of content.197 Even potentially 
damaging information is included if it serves a thematic purpose, in this case the 
martial reputation of the enemy. 
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 1.36.7. See also 1.44. Nousek (2004) p. 146 also notes how individuals emphasise themes that run 
throughout work. 
190
 See also Nordling (1991) p. 168. 
191
 See Lendon (1999) p. 311 on the idea of a challenge. Note that not all enemy claims are answered, 
see pp. 325-326 below, however note that these other statements do not include directly address 
Caesar as this one does. 
192
 Kraus (2009) p. 171 notes the personal aspect of the battle and Ariovistus. See Pitcher (2007) on 
characterisation in general. 
193
 Virtus is used eight times in the episode, of a total of 68 in the work, a frequency that suggests 
intention to address the quality. While Murphy (1977) p. 235 sees timor as the theme of Ariovistus 
episode, the frequency of the word virtus strongly suggests it is the direct theme. 
194
 Note this is the specific reputation Caesar has defined in the mutiny passage.  
195
 See Suetonius Div Iul 69-70. See Fantham (1985) p. 120 for a discussion of the mutinies in the civil 
wars and their suppression in Caesar. See also Powell (1998) p. 115. 
196
 1.39-40. 
197
 James (2000) examines generally how the mutiny supports Caesar‟s self-representation. However it 
is important to note that the mutiny passage raises concepts that extend through to the battle.  
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The references that are raised in Ariovistusʼ boasts, and that carry through to the 
battle narrative itself are directly addressed in the mutiny. The introduction of the 
mutiny demonstrates that Caesar continues to develop the ideas: 
 
Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae commeatusque causa moratur, 
ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti 
magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis 
esse praedicabant, saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque 
aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse...
198
  
 
This passage elaborates and reiterates the contention that the Germani have a 
particularly fierce reputation in battle, and describes the reasons for such a reputation. 
They are reputed to be particularly large, and skilled in arms, and most importantly 
incredibili virtute, attributes that support and develop the ideas that Ariovistus 
claims.
199
 Pitcher notes that Caesar portrays such claims as wild and excessive, as the 
content of the passage describes the reaction of the men in hyperbolic terms, with 
weeping and the writing of wills evidence of the extreme reaction of the troops.
200
 For 
Pitcher, this is designed so that there is no faith in their judgement and therefore the 
audience is sceptical of stories of Germanic prowess. Whether this particular 
interpretation is intended by Caesar, the narrative nevertheless shows an acute 
awareness of how the Germani are perceived and the role that their reputation plays in 
the conflict. 
 
Following the mutiny passage other details are included in order to address the 
prowess of the enemy, even when these play no part in contextualising the battle. This 
is evident in the description of martial techniques, which demonstrate their skill in 
battle but have no relevance to the course of the battle. Caesar states of Germanic 
fighting methods: 
 
Ariovistus his omnibus diebus exercitum castris continuit, equestri proelio cotidie 
contendit. genus hoc erat pugnae quo se Germani exercuerant: equitum milia erant 
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 1.39.1. Pitcher (2007) pp. 107-108 notes the purpose of “building up” in ancient historiography. 
199
 See Riggsby (2006) 49-59. 
200
 Pitcher (2007) p. 108. See also Gelzer (1968) p. 171 fn. 8. Gelzer notes how the representation of 
Caesar‟s own hysterical tribunes may be directed at some of the aristocrats in his own army.  
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sex, totidem numero pedites velocissimi ac fortissimi, quos ex omni copia singuli 
singulos suae salutis causa delegerant; cum his in proeliis versabantur, ad hos se 
equites recipiebant; hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant; si qui graviore vulnere 
accepto equo deciderat, circumsistebant; si quo erat longius prodeundum aut 
celerius recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitatione celeritas, ut iubis equorum 
sublevati cursum adaequarent.
201
 
  
This description is not designed to illustrate the course of combat, as it does not have 
any apparent bearing on the way the skirmishes are resolved.
202
 More importantly, it 
does not serve any context for the main battle, which only includes infantry 
activity.
203
 As the use of si shows, this is a general description of fighting techniques, 
one that demonstrates the Germanic skill in combat.
204
 While it is not directly 
influential in explaining the course of combat, it is illustrative of the exercitatio of the 
enemy in arms. The passage is therefore indicative of the construction of the account, 
which is primarily to address the alleged prowess of the Germani. 
 
Caesarʼs Assessment of the Reputation 
 
While the issue of the Germanic reputation is an ongoing concern, Caesar also 
provides his own opinion of this in the Vesontio account, formulating a response that 
informs the construction of the battle narrative.
205
 James has examined how Caesar 
creates himself as an authoritative figure in this passage, but it is also important to 
note that he specifically addresses the issue of virtus, and that the enemy reputation is 
exaggerated when he states: 
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 1.48.4-1.48.7. 
202
 See 1.48-1.49. The description is there to simply visualise how the enemy wage their cavalry 
engagements, and this description of Germani tactics appears at a point where Caesar is describing 
five consecutive days of cavalry engagements between the two forces, while the main elements are 
held in camp. Caesar does not state who won these engagements, or the effect on morale or even his 
own assessment of the spirit of the two sides. There is simply no result to these encounters, either 
physically or psychologically.  
203
 See 1.51-1.53 for the battle. 
204
 These are open conditionals. 
205
 1.39-1.41. 
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...cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent? factum eius hostis 
periculum patrum nostrorum memoria, cum Cimbris et Teutonis a C. Mario pulsis 
non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritus videbatur...
206
 
 
Caesar in these passages overturns the concept of Germanic prowess with an appeal to 
history, one of three that he makes in this account in order to show that the enemy can 
be beaten.
207
 In this case, he establishes that he regards the reputation as false, thereby 
setting up a paradigm for interpretation of the ensuing battle.  
 
Furthermore, Caesar shows the extent of his dismissal of such rumours in this 
passage, further supporting his understanding for battle in this episode. He states he 
would lead the Tenth Legion alone against the enemy if necessary, an idea that shows 
his contempt for their reputation, and for their numbers which are much greater than 
his own: 
 
Quodsi praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua 
non dubitaret, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. huic Caesar legioni 
indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime.
208
 
 
Since Caesar would lead one legion alone against the enemy he provides a potential 
state that indicates his opinion of their reputation.
209
 He establishes the context for 
how such an argument should be resolved, as he has absolute confidence in the 
Roman ability to prevail.
210
 He thereby provides a precedent for understanding how 
the battle should resolve itself in order to prove that he is correct. 
 
Moreover, Caesarʼs speech at the mutiny is eventually reinforced by the responses of 
the men, who act as internal supporters of his opinion and are not only persuaded to 
accept his judgement in such matters, but actively agree with his assessment: 
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 1.40.4-1.40.5. James (2000) details the three appeals at pp. 58-60. James notes the self-promotional 
nature of the passage, and that Caesar is showing the Germani can be beaten. 
207
 See 1.40.5-1.40.6, 1.40.7-1.40.10. See James (2000) p. 60.  
208
 1.40.15. 
209
 Also note that this shows Caesar‟s lack of fear. 
210
 James (2000) p. 58. The speech of Caesar at Vesontio refers specifically to Marius and the Cimbri. 
Caesar in the speech shows that the Romans are always better in battle. 
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Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus 
egerunt, uti per eos Caesari satis facerent; se neque umquam dubitasse neque 
timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium, sed imperatoris esse 
existimavisse.
211
 
 
As this passage illustrates, Caesarʼs judgement is accepted as correct, his contempt for 
the rumours supported by the army.
212
 He therefore includes within the account 
secondary narrators who support his opinion of the enemy reputation as they are 
persuaded by his arguments.
213
 Through the use of the soldiers in the resolution of the 
mutiny Caesar sets the terms for the forthcoming confrontation, and his own 
assessment of how events should be resolved.  
 
In the description of activity prior to the battle the Tenth Legion appears as an 
exemplum, one that is particularly dismissive of the enemy reputation.
214
 Caesar not 
only proposes advancing with just this one legion, but later establishes their lack of 
concern as one individual expresses a joke at the idea of being mounted, showing his 
utter disregard for danger, in marked contrast to the earlier fear of the army.
215
 
Furthermore, when tested in a preliminary skirmish, the Tenth Legion performs as 
expected, obeying orders and confirming the commanderʼs assessment of their 
virtus.
216
 The extensive and sometimes anecdotal details provided regarding the Tenth 
Legion suggest they are utilised to support the idea that the reputation of the Germani 
enemy is unfounded. 
 
Caesar furthermore shows that the rumours of enemy prowess are unsubstantiated 
when Ariovistus is shown acting contrary to his own boasts. Ariovistus demonstrates 
an element of fearfulness when he makes the following demand: 
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 1.41.3-1.41.4. 
212
 James (2000) p. 61. See also after a skirmish at 1.46.4, and 4.14 in Book Four. 
213
 See Martin Jr. (1965) p. 64 on secondary narrators. 
214
 See pp. 116-123 above on the use of exempla and other anecdotes. 
215
 1.42.5-1.42.6.  
216
 1.46.1-1.46.4. Note however that the Tenth Legion plays no part in battle, as the objective is to 
show overall Roman superiority. 
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Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se 
ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret; alia ratione sese 
non esse venturum.
217
  
 
This comment is very unusual as an attribute of motivation, as Ariovistus appears 
more afraid of being surrounding by infantry than cavalry.
218
 There is no attempt to 
explain this as an attempt by Ariovistus to have an advantage, however his behaviour 
suggests a lack of confidence in Germanic virtus.
219
 Through the activity of the 
meeting, Caesar demonstrates a contrast between the earlier boasts and Ariovistus‟ 
own trust in such abilities.  
 
Virtus and the Array of Battle 
 
The role of the battle in supporting Caesarʼs assessment is evident as the Germanic 
reputation for martial skill and courage is one of the main issues in constructing the 
battle narrative. This is most apparent in the dispositions of the forces and the 
reasoning described for the battle, at which point Caesar establishes contrasts that 
examine the nature of courage on each side, and the relative superiority of Roman 
virtus. These contextual details are provided to support the literary role of the passage, 
such details not providing enough detail about the battle to be useful for a full 
understanding, or not referenced again once the battle is described. Instead the 
introduction to battle reinforces the message that the reputation of the Germani is an 
idle boast, and shows that with regard to martial prowess the Romans not only match 
the enemy, but are clearly superior.  
 
Details regarding the disposition of forces appear designed to establish the conditions 
for a direct comparison of virtus. Caesar describes the dispositions on the day of the 
battle as follows: 
 
                                                 
217
 1.42.4-1.42.5. 
218
 Pelling (1981) p. 761 believes Caesar feared the Germanic cavalry in the historical encounter. 
However in the written account Ariovistus is the one more afraid of the Roman infantry. This may 
also reflect Ariovistus‟ desire to have superior military support at the meeting. 
219
 See 1.36.7 for the boasting of virtus. 
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Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris, quod satis esse visum est, 
reliquit, alarios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod 
minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad 
speciem alariis uteretur...  
 
Ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit. Tum demum necessario 
Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus 
intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, 
Suebos...
220
 
 
These dispositions differentiate the sides to prepare for the resolution of the issue of 
reputation once combat commences.
221
 The forces are only identified in their basic 
form to demonstrate that this is a contest of Roman against Germanic infantry, with 
the absence of Roman auxiliaries from the front line, and a total absence of references 
to Germanic cavalry.
222
 The main concept communicated is that this is an essential 
meeting of Roman infantry and the Germanic tribes, with no details such as numbers 
given regarding the size of the forces.
223
 The only important detail is relative, that the 
Romans have fewer numbers, making it clear that in the numerical contest, the 
Romans are actually at a disadvantage on a man-to man basis.
224
 Therefore, in the 
description of the disposition of the forces, the details prepare the narrative for a 
resolution to the ongoing concern with the Germanic reputation. 
 
Through the dispositions for battle Caesar addresses the issue of virtus in order to 
contrast from where each side receives its inspiration for battle, and to illustrate the 
superiority of the Roman influences on courage and performance in battle.
225
 The 
contrast is evident in the way witnesses and sources of courage for the two sides are 
portrayed: 
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 1.51.1-1.51.2. 
221
 Mannetter (1995) p. 149 notes the use of asyndeton here to give the impression of size regarding the 
Germanic forces.  
222
 Despite all the description of Germani cavalry fighting techniques, they have no existence within 
the battle narrative, nor is there even a mention of whether they were absent, neutralised, or 
ineffective. 
223
 See pp. 50-51 above on the numbers for this battle. 
224
 On the topos of enemy numbers see above pp. 71-79. 
225
 Jervis (2001) p. 80. See Riggsby (2006) pp. 86-96 on the source of virtus. For Riggsby, experience 
is also a related quality. 
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Omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga 
relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes passis 
manibus flentes implorabant, ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.  
 
Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes 
suae quisque virtutis haberet; ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam 
hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit.
226
 
 
In the first passage, an important source of Germanic motivation is described, with 
women weeping and imploring their men. The women are not encouraging their men, 
but foreshadowing the consequences of defeat with the words: ne se in servitutem 
Romanis traderent.
227
 These details also have little influence in the battle narrative 
itself, demonstrating that they are included to establish this contrast of motivating 
factors. The women appear on wagons that play no part in the course of the battle, 
neither impeding the eventual flight of the Germani nor being mentioned as an 
obstacle to pursuit.
228
 This is in marked contrast to Tacitusʼ account of fighting in 
Britain against Boudicca, as in his account wagons have a recognisable presence on 
the battlefield once combat begins.
229
 The description therefore appears to exist 
largely to explain the source of Germanic courage, all of which involve the prevention 
of flight.
230
 By contrast, the Roman source of morale is much more positive, as Caesar 
describes officers appointed to legions to witness, rather than to cajole, courage in the 
men.
231
 As the Roman orders directly follow the passage about the women, this issue 
                                                 
226
 1.51.1-1.51.3. Lendon (1999) p. 314. 
227
 1.51.3. See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 78-81 on the topos. 
228
 1.51.2. Kraus (2007) p. 375 notes of Quintilian 8.3.66-8.3.70 that details must first be focalized by a 
human perspective i.e. a witness within the text. This may also be an explanation for the presence of 
the women.  
229
 Contrast Tacitus Ann 14.37 and the battle of Watling St. Caesar states that the women lined up in 
the wagons to prevent retreat by the Germani, a practice Tacitus also reports among the Britons. 
Unlike in Tacitus however, the women and wagons play no part in Caesar‟s battle. They do not 
prevent escape, hinder the pursuit or serve as a rallying point for the Germani. They, like the cavalry, 
disappear from the narrative. Caesar does not completely account for something, illustrating that the 
interest lies in the practice, not the effect on the battle. 
230
 This seems to work in opposition to the idea that the further from Rome, the tougher the enemy, as 
in this case the source of enemy strength is compared poorly to that of the Romans. See Jervis (2001) 
p. 63. As Jervis notes at p. 80 the Germanic reputation does not stand up in actual battle. 
231
 While commanders certainly appear to be witnesses to the bravery of men, Caesar disposing of his 
officers to do so is an unusual addition to the narrative. See 1.21, 2.20, 4.22, 4.23, 7.40, 7.45, and 
7.49, for comparisons. Caesar usually only describes his orders when he wants a particular 
manoeuvre or action performed. It seems unlikely that this is the actual command he gave.  
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of motivation is directly contrasted. The Germans have their wives; the Romans have 
their commanders to inspire them.
232
 In the dispositions of the two forces, 
distinguishing features that contrast the sides and demonstrate the superiority of the 
Romans are selected. 
 
Caesar further presents the attitude of the Germani towards battle to indicate their lack 
of courage, and that the reputation they have for warfare is unfounded in practice. He 
shows that the Germani fight according to dictates other than courage, as their 
matrons determine what is auspicious for battle.
233
 Whether this is why they are 
reluctant on the day of battle is unclear, but when he states: tum demum necessario 
Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt he describes an enemy that appears neither 
eager for battle nor confident of victory.
234
 The representation of enemy motivation in 
the preparations for battle undermines their reputation, indicating that these details are 
included to support the earlier assessment by Caesar.  
 
The Germanic Reputation in Combat 
 
The combat passage is critical as a resolution to the issue of reputation, and the 
description of the fighting is designed to differentiate the two sides clearly, just as 
motivation was directly contrasted in the array of battle. Caesar describes the clash of 
infantry in the following terms: 
 
Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt, itaque hostes repente 
celeriterque procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coniciendi non daretur. Relictis 
pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. at Germani celeriter ex consuetudine sua 
phalange facta impetus gladiorum exceperunt. reperti sunt complures nostri, qui in 
phalangem insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent. cum 
hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro cornu 
vehementer multitudine suorum nostram aciem premebant.
235
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 See also the contrast of Roman virtus and Gallic ingenuity at Avaricum discussed at pp. 165-166 
below.  
233
 1.50.4-1.50.5. Contrast the Nervii eagerness for battle discussed at pp. 200-201 below.  
234
 1.51.2. 
235
 1.52.3-1.52.7.  
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The concern for differentiating the opponents by racial character is evident since 
ethnic detail is included to emphasise the differences.
236
 The Germanic response to 
the Roman charge is not only that they form a phalanx, but also that this is done ex 
consuetudine sua.
237
 Caesar also includes weapons that distinguish the Romans, 
specifically mentioning that pila are dropped prior to combat.
238
 In the confrontation 
and the description of intense close combat, Caesar is concerned to include details that 
clearly distinguish the protagonists from each other. 
 
The description of the battle itself resolves the issue the reputation of the enemy, by 
demonstrating the superiority of the Romans in hand to hand combat. The narrative is 
particularly focused on this contrast of attributes, and details are provided to make the 
thematic resolution memorable.
239
 Repetition in the passage is used to establish the 
idea that this is a particularly intense form of combat in which the issue of virtus is 
likely to be important.
240
 Caesar repeats himself in close proximity regarding the use 
of swords when he states: relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. at Germani 
celeriter ex consuetudine sua phalange facta impetus gladiorum exceperunt.
241
 He 
describes the dropping of pila, uses the word comminus, and the ablative of 
instrument for swords to vividly describe the actions of the men.
242
 Nevertheless, he 
states again, in the very next sentence, that the impetus gladiorum was held up by the 
enemy.
243
 The repetition intensifies the vividness of the fighting through elaboration 
that could simply have been summarised through the use of acriter, a term used 
elsewhere to summarise fierce combat.
244
 The elaboration shows how important it is 
to create the impression of an intensely fought close encounter between the sides. 
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 See also the Britons discussed below at pp. 247-250, and the Helvetii at pp. 170-174. 
237
 See also pp. 174-175 below on the use of the word phalanx. While this may indicate the Germani 
are good at forming up in this way, Caesar does not clarify this in the battle. Like the Helvetian 
phalanx at 1.24.5.2, it helps to distinguish the sides.  
238
 On pila use see Matthews (2010) p. 72. See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 185-197. Note that Gerlinger is 
not convinced of the realism of this passage. 
239
 This is also the case with the pila volley against the Helvetii discussed at pp. 170-174. 
240
 The absence of Germanic cavalry or other details might be designed to create this effect. Pelling 
(1981) p. 742 also notes that the terrain is given a “very simplified model”. See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 
162-163 on manliness and celeritas in this encounter.  
241
 1.52.4-1.52.5. Note also the other instance of repetition in this battle discussed at p. 63 above. See 
also 7.88 where at the climax of the battle the men are described as dropping pila to fight with 
swords.  
242
 1.52.4. See Webb (2012) p.p. 12-15 on vividness.  
243
 1.52.4-1.52.5. 
244
 See the Helvetii battle and use of acriter in a summary capacity at 1.25.6-1.25.7.  
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Having established the conditions for thematic resolution, the narrative focuses on 
exemplary actions of bravery that answer any preconception that the Germani are to 
be feared. While the enemy are pressing on the right wing, Caesar makes it clear that 
this is due to greater numbers, so that the superiority of Roman virtus is not 
undermined by the setback that occurs on one part of the battlefield.
245
 Combat is 
instead given meaning by the description of men grabbing shields and pulling them 
down to get at the enemy, so that individuals perform courageous, almost self-
sacrificial acts that bear a striking resemblance to a republican ideal, the devotio.
246
 
They also demonstrate through their actions that the greater size of the Germani is 
inconsequential in combat, as it is specifically the Romans who strike from above.
247
 
While this detail may only apply to some men, it serves as a universal anecdote that 
captures the savagery of the combat and the superior ferocity of the Romans. Caesar 
creates a generalisation, answering the perceived reputation of the enemy with a 
narrative built around acts of exemplary Roman courage. 
 
The link between these feats of bravery and the results of combat are vague; as they 
are primarily provided to illustrate the ferocity of the Romans. As Caesar states, these 
men could be found on the battlefield, but he is unclear about what effect they have 
on the outcome.
248
 While men probably did do this in the historical battle, it is not 
defined whether they did so on the victorious left, the struggling right or across the 
whole front. What matters is that men were willing to do this, and the simple fact they 
were there. Caesarʼs use of Latin, particularly the generic subjunctive, is crucial 
here.
249
 Its use supports the idea he is thinking of character, and the kind of men who 
perform brave deeds. This section of the battle is thus conceptualised as an aspect of 
Roman virtus, and to convey the idea that when matched man to man, the Romans are 
better than their Germani counterparts. Contextual issues, such as where these men 
                                                 
245
 A similar technique might be noted in the Helvetii battle, where Caesar specifies that the Boii and 
Tulingi appear on the flank with 15,000 men, possibly to show the superiority of the Romans, as they 
are able to counter their arrival easily. See 1.25. Note while this thesis uses the word wing, Caesar‟s 
word is actually cornus. 
246
 See Livy 8.9.12-8.9.14 on the devotio. Feldherr (1998) pp. 92-93 discusses the characteristics of the 
devotio further.  
247
 1.52.6. On size, see the mockery of the Aduatuci discussed below at pp. 186-187. 
248
 1.52.5. 
249
 1.52.5-1.52.6. The use of the generic subjunctives in insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et 
desuper vulnerarent are important in establishing the general qualities. 
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appeared and whether they affected the course of the battle, are less important than 
developing the idea of Roman character in the narrative. 
 
The literary objective is most evident as the passage on close combat occurs in spite 
of the battle being decided by other criteria. The actions of the Roman commander, 
Publius Crassus, are instrumental in bringing about victory: 
 
Cum hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro 
cornu vehementer multitudine suorum nostram aciem premebant. id cum 
animadvertisset P. Crassus adulescens qui equitatui praeerat, quod expeditior erat 
quam ii, qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio 
misit.
250
 
 
Clever thinking and observation support the wavering line in battle, not virtus.
 251
 
Importantly, this is the first mention of Crassus and the cavalry, illustrating that the 
units only appear when necessary to explain this particular action.
252
 This lack of 
context for the actions of Crassus are themselves indicative of the overall literary 
purpose of the battle, since in spite of their importance, Caesar is more focused on 
integrating the issue of virtus and its resolution in order to address the objective of the 
passage.  
 
Furthermore, the final stages of the account suggest a concern to resolve the initial 
reputation, as evidenced by the anecdotal information provided in the pursuit.
253
 
Details are provided in the enemy rout that show how utterly Ariovistus has been 
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 1.52.6-1.52.7.  
251
 This is also the case for Labienus in the Sabis River narrative discussed at pp. 237-238 below. On 
subordinates, see Welch (1998) p. 89. As Welch notes Caesar is balancing direct self-promotion with 
recognition of his subordinates. In this regard, the passage is not designed to marginalise Crassus 
directly, but to credit him within the broader narrative pattern. Note Caesar also establishes a 
thematic link between himself and the resolution of virtus, addressed below at pp. 220-221. On 
Crassus see also pp. 205-207. 
252
 Note how Crassus is not mentioned at the start of battle, as the context is of virtus and the 
commanders as witnesses. 
253
 Other anecdotes are discussed above at p. 116-123. See also the anecdotes of the Helvetii fighting 
among their wagons at 1.26 to illustrate their characteristics, discussed below at pp. 175-176 and the 
multitude of the Belgae, whose size is indicated by smoke fires discussed above at p. 74. 
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reduced in this battle and how inconsequential his boast ultimately was.
254
 As Caesar 
states at the end:  
 
Duae fuerunt Ariovisti uxores, una Sueba natione, quam domo secum duxerat, altera 
Norica regis Voccionis soror, quam in Gallia duxerat a fratre missam: utraque in ea 
fuga periit; duae filiae: harum altera occisa, altera capta est. C. Valerius Procillus, 
cum a custodibus in fuga trinis catenis vinctus traheretur, in ipsum Caesarem hostes 
equitatu persequentem incidit. quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa 
victoria voluptatem attulit, quod hominem honestissimum provinciae Galliae, suum 
familiarem et hospitem, ereptum ex manibus hostium sibi restitutum videbat neque 
eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna deminuerat. is se 
praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in 
aliud tempus reservaretur; sortium beneficio se esse incolumem. item M. Metius 
repertus et ad eum reductus est.
255
 
 
This passage elaborates on the pursuit with some incidents that appear of personal 
interest, such as the capture or killing of notable enemies and the recovery of 
captives.
256
 While these stories do have interest of themselves, they also serve to 
highlight the complete and utter defeat of the enemy leader and his plans, the extent of 
his reduction evident in the later statement: Ariovistus...naviculam deligatam ad 
ripam nactus ea profugit.
257
 The elaborations of such details suggest that Caesar at 
least in part is demonstrating how utterly Ariovistus has been defeated and how far his 
boasts and ambitions are from the final result. 
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 For the reversal of enemy plans see Octodurus discussed above at pp. 101-102. On the reversal of 
circumstance initially favourable to the enemy see Erickson (2002) p. 612. Note how Crassus is not 
mentioned in pursuit, even though he was in charge of the cavalry. The flight to the Rhine is 
described, the objective of which is similar to 4.14-4.15 noted at p. 305 below. For problems 
regarding the distance between the battlefield and the Rhine see Ewan (2009) p. 107. 
255
 1.53.4-1.53.8.  
256
 See Melchior (2004) p. 41. Melchior regards the issue of casualties and prisoner recovery in the 
battle as there to offset the escape of Ariovistus, by the showing loss of his family. 
257
 1.53.3. Kraus (2009) p. 171 notes that the escape of Ariovistus by little boat “miniaturises this great 
German”. He dies at least by 5.29.3. Also note at the conclusion of the Helvetian battle at 1.26. 
Caesar stated that when the baggage and camp were taken, the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his 
sons were captured, which on its own might suggest that Caesar was including these people as war 
booty, and their value in the narrative comes from their political value. It is interesting to note the 
inclusion of such details in the two major battles of Chapter One, with less precision regarding booty 
as the work progresses. Also note that Procillus the legate of Caesar appears at 1.19.3 and 1.47.4. See 
also Vercingetorix, who is marginalised in the Alesia narrative as discussed below at pp. 275-276. 
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The thematic importance of the pursuit is evident since the rescue of two legates 
captured earlier may also have been included to show that Ariovistus and his army are 
in the end of little consequence.
258
 Caesar makes the rescue a central feature of the 
final assessment, and even states that it gives him as much pleasure as the victory.
259
 
The greatest emotion in the narrative is reserved for this anecdote, Caesar using 
particularly strong language to convey his joy, through the use of words such as 
voluptas and gratulatio.
260
 He even calls the potential loss of one of these captives a 
calamitas, the word being particularly strong as it is usually reserved for disasters of 
greater significance that affect the state.
261
 He summarises a conversation between 
himself and Gaius Valerius Procillus, so that the narrative shifts from the events 
unfolding around them as the enemy are run down, to this incident of personal 
interest.
262
 The passage displays an interest in elements that are less related to military 
victory, which in the end is revealed to be a matter of little consequence. Such a focus 
illustrates how idle the words of Ariovistus were, how empty the idea that the 
Germani were ever a force to be reckoned with, and that Caesar was correct to dismiss 
any fears in the face of this enemy. 
 
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that persuasion rather than reconstruction 
guides the narration of battle, and that there are a variety of ways in which Caesar 
uses battle narrative to support his interpretation or presentation of affairs. Battle can 
directly address a stated interpretation, as illustrated in the defeat of the Tigurini. An 
argument or contention can also be implicitly supported by details such as exempla, 
combat anecdotes and other details, as shown in the narration of Gergovia or the 
second invasion of Britain. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the campaign against the 
Venetii, battle descriptions look to the surrounding text for their context and meaning. 
In the case of the Venetii, the battle addresses and resolves the issues faced in the 
overall campaign, and is highly selective in this regard. As seen in the battle against 
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 On the enemy flight to the Rhine see Seager (2003) pp. 30-34. 
259
 Martin Jr. (1965) p. 65 notes the positive representation of C Valerius Procillus. 
260
 1.53.6. 
261
 1.53.6. See 1.12.6, 1.13.7, 1.31.6, 2.14.4, 7.77.4, 7.90.6, for examples of calamitas affecting the 
state in the Bellum Gallicum. Note that the term is often used in relation to a major disaster, such as a 
famine or a defeat, see Cato Agr, 141.2, Pliny Nat 14.125, Cicero Phil 5.43, Livy 3.31.6, but there is 
evidence for the personal effect i.e. Livy 2.22.7, 28.43.12. 
262
 This is also evident in the embellishment Caesar provides. Caesar gives additional information to 
emphasise the plight of Gaius and the humiliation he suffered, by relating that three chains that 
bound him at 1.53.5. This extra detail is clearly intended to engage the audience and is an 
unnecessary addition if Caesar were only interested in relating the fact of the rescue.  
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Ariovistus, the persuasive aim of the battle is to answer and resolve the overall 
campaign narrative, and the question of the Germani reputation. It is an argument that 
would appeal to a Roman audience, but persuasive nonetheless as it portrays Caesar s 
superior knowledge of warfare and the enemy. Information is provided, exempla are 
used, and combat is described in order to reinforce this concept, as battle narrative is 
inextricably linked to Caesarʼs interpretative schema. This understanding of battle is 
inherent to the rest of this study, which examines how battle narrative is formulated to 
generate impressions related to those involved in the passages, whether these are the 
forces and peoples encountered, or the person of Caesar himself. 
CHAPTER 3: CAESARʼS CHARACTERS AND BATTLE 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, Caesar uses the content of battle for the persuasion 
of his audience, through details that implicitly support his interpretation of an 
episode. However he does not just use the content to support his understanding of the 
event itself, and in this chapter, case studies are used to show that Caesar specifically 
utilises battle to establish characteristics, or to support his interpretation of the 
characters described in the text.
1
 This is not simply the result of their presence as 
historical figures, as through battle the narrator defines the nature of his enemies or 
encourages a particular impression of their behaviour. Kraus notes that Caesar draws 
on, but does not “slavishly” follow established preconceptions regarding his 
characters.
2
 It is therefore important to examine the narratives as there is a difference 
between a purely descriptive account of enemies faced or general ethnic 
representation, and Caesarʼs portrayal of battle, which utilises contextual information, 
or descriptions of combat to define the characters in particular ways. Caesar creates 
the characters that best suit the circumstances under which he narrates each section of 
the work.
3
 For example, battle can be used in an introductory manner, such as in the 
Bibracte narrative, which is constructed to establish the behaviour of Gauls for the 
audience.
4
 Furthermore, the topos of the Belgic multitude examined in Chapter One 
has a more important objective than to simply describe the odds against Caesar, as the 
topos is given unmartial and disruptive characteristics through the context of the 
battle narrative. In the siege of Aduatuca, the physical environment of the siege is 
used in conjunction with the attitudes of the defenders to show their arrogance, 
perfidy and general aggression.
5
 However the use of battle to define characteristics is 
no more evident than in the Sabis River account, where the Nervii are defined by their 
virtus in order to create a worthy enemy for Caesar, even though the attribute is 
                                                 
1
 See in general Jervis (2001); Riggsby (2006) pp. 48-53; Rawlings (1998); Schadee (2008); Heubner 
(1974); Gerlinger (2008) pp. 235-243. See Welch (1998) and Powell (1998) on officers.  
2
 Kraus (2009) pp. 165-166. On general ethnography see Wells (2001). 
3
 See Jervis (2001); Riggsby (2006) pp. 48-71 and Rawlings (1998). To a certain extent, the previous 
case studies have addressed this objective, as the topos of the Belgic multitude is a stylistic portrayal 
of an enemy, and the defeat of Ariovistus‟ claims addresses the reputation of the Germani as a 
people. See pp. 71-88, 146-161 above. 
4
 1.24-1.26.  
5
 2.1-2.12, 2.29-2.33. Gardner (1983) p. 184 notes that Caesar “repeatedly” uses character as 
justification for military action.  
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highly problematic in explaining the course and result of the battle.
6
 Caesar also uses 
the details of battle to assign credit or blame to individuals, even if it is simply to 
praise subordinates such as Crassus and Labienus. The military circumstances can 
even be used in order to assign responsibility, as is the case with the failure of 
Sabinus.
7
 While the individual objectives may vary, the consistent role of battle 
narrative and the details provided is to imbue the forces and individuals with 
characteristics that establish or support Caesarʼs interpretation of them for his 
audience. 
 
Establishing Characteristics through Battle 
 
At a fundamental level, Caesar utilises battle to capture the essential characteristics of 
the protagonists. Wells has noted overall patterns of representation regarding the 
enemy, and that Caesar separates Gauls and Germani in the interests of defining his 
field of conquest.
8
 Such defining of enemy characteristics is evident in battle as the 
confrontation of Romans and their enemies, where the differences between them are 
established by the details of combat. Sometimes the passage calls for a simple ethnic 
dichotomy, such as the use of pila volleys in Book Six and the Bibracte narrative to 
answer the confidence of the enemy with a distinctly Roman response.
9
 Details 
provided also distinguish the opponents, such as the description of gaesa and lapides 
hurled by the Gauls in the Octodurus narrative, which is enough to determine that the 
                                                 
6
 See Jervis (2001) p. 52. 
7
 See generally Powell (1998). See also Kraus (2009) p. 167 on Labienus and Sabinus. On Crassus see 
Welch (1998) pp. 92-93. Note that other individuals, such as Vercingetorix and Ariovistus, are 
addressed in their relevant case studies. 
8
 Wells (2001) pp. 112-113. Wells states that Caesar views people as culturally static, and that his 
representation suggests that was how the landscape always was. However Wells cites the growth of 
oppida as an example of change that refutes Caesar‟s presentation. Similarly Wells states that certain 
groups such as the Belgae may have come about through interaction with Roman world and how they 
then identified themselves. As Wells notes at p. 116 if Caesar can distinguish Gauls and Germani 
with the Rhine as a boundary he can claim to have completed the conquest of a people. 
9
 On the pilum see 6.8 in general and 6.8.6 for the pila volley. Also 1.25 for the Bibracte narrative and 
1.23.3 for the implication of Helvetian confidence. Also see 1.13.4. For other uses of the pilum see 
1.52.4, 2.27.5 and 7.88.3. All appear at important parts of their respective battle narratives. At 1.52 
the resolution of the Germanic reputation is addressed, and at 2.27 the virtus of the Nervii is 
addressed. At 7.88 the battle of Alesia is resolved. There are few other uses at 2.23, 5.44, and 7.62. 
At 5.44.6 the exempla of Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus appear. See also 7.15. Note how the enemy 
is confident of victory again, something Caesar rarely shows of himself. See Riggsby (2006) p. 49 on 
boastfulness. 
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Gauls are foreign, barbaric and primitive.
10
 Such an objective may also be evident in 
terrain in the battle of Octodurus. The fortifications of the Roman camp are described 
only generally, so that they could easily be those of a standard Roman camp, with 
fossa, and vallum along a standard four sides, thereby identifying the Roman nature 
of the defenders.
11
 The information, while limited regarding the circumstances of 
battle, establishes the basic theme of Roman against barbarian aggressor, thereby 
capturing the essential nature of the participants. 
 
The Octodurus narrative also illustrates how Caesar simplifies information in order to 
create impressions regarding the characteristics of the enemy, and combat is reduced 
to terms of enemy national character. Caesar does not describe Gallic numbers at the 
start of the account, but features of the barbaric are inherent in the Gaulsʼ superior 
numbers, represented by the use of multitudo, a term used effectively in the previous 
book to define the Belgae.
12
 The generic description of the enemy attack as ex 
omnibus partibus, and the implication in neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore 
mittere, that there are so many of them they are impossible to miss, both capture this 
fundamental characteristic.
13
 Furthermore the absence of details regarding the Gallic 
attack aids this interpretation, as the implication is that overwhelming force is the 
preferred tactic, a simplistic strategy that nonetheless suits a partisan account of ethnic 
character. The limited details provided assist in establishing the details of the enemy 
and the nature of fighting against them. 
 
Battle does not just establish fundamental characteristics, and Caesar provides 
information in order to invite a more direct assessment of the forces described. In the 
siege of Quintus Cicero in Book Six, Caesar breaks up combat based on his criticism 
that some Roman units failed to behave correctly in combat when attacked while 
                                                 
10
 3.4.1-3.4.2. This is the case elsewhere in the work where Caesar gives little specific detail of Gallic 
forces to identify them, relying on broader ethnic characteristics to describe them, such as in the 
Helvetii battle where the pila identifies the Romans against unprotected Gauls at 1.25.2. See also the 
Belgae battle for assaults and the use of stones. 2.6.2-2.6.3. Riggsby (2006) pp. 101-105 regards the 
work as showing a development of technology among the Gauls. 
11
 See 3.1.6 where only vallum and fossa are mentioned. Without a comprehensive defensive layout, it 
is possible that Caesar encourages the visualisation of the defence as typically Roman. Note how 
complex the fortifications must have been, as Caesar states that there was a town with even a river in 
the middle at 3.1.6.  
12
 See 3.2.1. On the topos of the enemy multitude see above pp. 71-88. 
13
 See 3.4.1-3.4.2. 
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foraging.
14
 These units are therefore described to address the issue of correct 
behaviour, with details included to deliberately invite the various possible results that 
their varied experience might bring about.
15
 This is apparent in his description of the 
men foraging, whether they are calones, new recruits or experienced soldiers.
16
 Their 
differing responses to an attack by the enemy contrast various responses, whether it is 
open flight, panic induced inactivity, or the determined actions of the experienced 
soldiers.
17
 Caesar even describes the actions of the individual Baculus, an exemplum 
who through extraordinary courage and adherence to discipline leaves his sickbed and 
helps restore the situation.
18
 Baculus provides a clear exemplar of behaviour that 
contrasts with the circumstances of the surprise attack, in order to demonstrate the 
correct response to such a situation, and the manner by which such matters are 
restored. Contrasts of behaviour are used to explain events, or to contextualise the 
response, indicating that battle is used to assess and rate the performance of the 
participants.  
 
Battle is also used to draw other contrasts in behaviour between the Romans and the 
enemy.
19
 Caesar makes a statement that illustrates this objective in the siege of 
Avaricum: 
 
Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuiusque modi Gallorum occurrebant, 
ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae a 
quoque traduntur, aptissimum.
20
 
 
As is apparent in this passage, Roman virtus is in direct opposition to the ability of 
the Gauls to imitate and adapt, which provides a context for understanding how the 
battle is portrayed.
21
 The description of their measures against the Romans, such as 
                                                 
14
 See 6.36-6.37. 
15
 6.39-6.40. Note also there is criticism of Quintus Cicero in this account, for not obeying Caesar‟s 
commands. See 6.42.1-6.42.2. 
16
 6.36.2-6.36.3. 
17
 See 6.39-6.40. See 6.40.4 for the correct response by the veterans: hoc veteres non probant milites. 
18
 6.38.1-6.38.5. 
19
 See also Octodurus noted above p. 164, and the Helvetii noted below at pp. 171-175. 
20
 7.22.1-7.22.2. 
21
 Riggsby (2006) p. 98. Riggsby regards the representation of the Gauls at Avaricum to be designed to 
make them parallel Roman virtus. Kraus (2010) p. 45 notes of Avaricum the contrast of Caesar‟s 
practicality against the tendency of the Gauls to “adornment” and “overdone rhetoric”. See also 
Kraus (2010) p. 48 for the direct contrast of Gauls and Romans, and the idea of the Gauls as imitative 
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the use of hooks, mines and fortifications are associated with general characteristics 
of the Gauls.
22
 This contrast is particularly illustrated by the lack of a temporal 
structure to the measures taken, which are merely listed rather than described as a 
progression of activity.
23
 The lack of such context illustrates that combat is 
constructed as a contrast of behaviours, where the combatants are described in order 
to represent their different qualities.  
 
A significant amount of military detail is included in the campaign narratives to 
define the enemy, and campaign and battle work in conjunction to ascribe 
characteristics to them. This is evident in the Nervii campaign, where contextual 
information is presented to portray the enemy as fundamentally aggressive. Prior to 
the Sabis River battle Caesar states that the Nervii do not receive mercatores within 
their borders.
24
 The implication of this is that they act outside normal trade relations 
and discourse.
25
 This in turn implies that they are fundamentally aggressive, possibly 
even relying on raiding instead of trade.
26
 The progress of the campaign supports this 
as the Nervii focus their strategy around the location of a baggage train, hide in the 
woods, and even head straight for the Roman camp when battle commences.
27
 While 
it is not explicitly stated that the Nervii are raiders, the presentation is consistent with 
the overall implication that they are belligerent in nature.
28
 The passage is therefore 
instrumental in contextualising the character of the enemy for the audience, and is 
part of an overall literary construct regarding the representation of the enemy. 
 
The use of information to capture the nature of the enemy is also apparent in the 
fortifications in Britain, which explain the landscape of battle, but are also included in 
                                                                                                                                            
of Roman techniques. See also Caesar‟s tribute to the Gauls at the Sabis River, discussed at pp. 192-
204 below.  
22
 7.22. 
23
 7.22. Note the measures are simply listed. Contrast this to the overall linear temporality of the books. 
See Riggsby (2006) pp. 154-155. See a similar approach in the Venetii account of Caesar‟s own 
activity pp. 130-131 above. See also Levick (1998) p. 64. 
24
 2.15.4.-2.15.5. 
25
 See Jervis (2001) p. 63-75, Torigian (1998) pp. 49-50 for different objectives attributes to this 
representation. 
26
 Such aggression is evident in several accounts where Caesar is on the offensive, such as the siege of 
Avaricum discussed at pp. 291-297, and Aduatuca discussed at pp. 184-192 below. 
27
 See 2.17.2-2.17.4 for the strategy, 2.19.6 for use of abditi. See 2.23.4-2.23.5 for the movement to the 
baggage at the start of battle. 
28
 This is at odds with the circumstances, as they are actually in defence of their homeland, the stated 
objective of the Belgae overall at 2.10.4. 
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order to address the belligerence of the enemy.
29
 Caesar mentions a battle fought at a 
stronghold in woods, where he makes it clear that the Britons fortify natural places 
due to their warlike propensity.
30
 He further demonstrates this purpose in battle when 
he states of the stronghold of Cassivellaunus: oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum 
silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa 
convenire consuerunt.
31
 This explanation of terminology shows that Caesar has as 
much concern for the nature of the enemy as the conditions of battle. Importantly, the 
defences play no further role in the description of the Roman attack, suggesting the 
purpose is primarily to explain this aspect of their nature.
32
 In this case, apparent 
contextual details play little role in the narrative of battle as they are primarily 
designed to establish the broader representation of the enemy and their customs. 
 
Information included to define enemy characteristics can come at the expense of the 
historical circumstances of battle, as is apparent in the Germanic battle in Book One, 
where details are included in order to highlight the barbaric nature of the enemy. This 
information is discordant with an understanding of battle, as Caesar describes the 
Germanic custom of casting lots, but only provides the practice, without reference to 
the actual circumstances of battle.
33
 As he states: 
 
Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar, quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, 
hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset, ut matres 
familiae eorum sortibus vaticinationibusque declararent, utrum proelium committi 
ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam 
lunam proelio contendissent.
34
  
 
                                                 
29
 See Jervis (2001) p. 141. Jervis states that Caesar stresses the primitiveness of Gauls as part of his 
self-promotion. See below pp. 182-183 on the primitive siege techniques of the Belgae. Riggsby 
examines the idea of primitiveness at pp. 73-83. 
30
 5.9.4-5.9.5. See also 5.12.2 where he mentions that the Maritime tribes were invaders seeking booty. 
There is an emphasis on internal divisions that while not the focus of this thesis, is evidence of his 
objective of representing the enemy. See also the hedges of the Nervii at 2.17.4-2.17.5 discussed by 
Brown (1999) p. 334 and the history the Aduatuci at 2.29.4-2.29.5. 
31
 5.21.3-5.21.4. 
32
 5.21.4-5.21.6. See also the fortifications of Octodurus discussed above at p. 100. 
33
 Mannetter (1995) pp. 125-126 regards the casting of lots as foreshadowing the Roman victory, 
which is possible, but would take away from the impact of combat as the resolution to that episode, 
discussed at pp. 155-160 above.  
34
 1.50.4-1.50.5. 
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The Germani would not fight until the new moon for religious reasons, however it is 
not stated when the new moon occurred, and the audience must assume it had not yet 
happened.
35
 Due to the absence of exact dates in the Bellum Gallicum, the 
information provides insight into the practices of the enemy but with only an implied 
association with the battle.
36
 As an explanation for the course of events the practice is 
only illustrative of the nature of the enemy and not fully integrated with the rest of the 
narrative.  
 
The problematic nature of such a focus is evident as the practice also does not explain 
why the Germani engage in battle. A major engagement occurs before the final battle, 
one that is long and fought acriter according to the narrative, and which involves 
significant numbers of men, and the enemy come out of camp to fight it in spite of the 
auspices noted above.
37
 The necessitas that drives them to leave their camp for the 
final battle is also unclear, particularly as the matrons have warned against battle.
38
 
Even Caesarʼs own behaviour is not fully explained, and it is left for the audience to 
infer that he leads his forces out because he knows the Germani are reluctant to 
fight.
39
 Information is brought within the framework of the battle narrative to 
illustrate the barbaric nature of the enemy, and only inferences can be made about the 
course of battle, as it is not the purpose of the inclusion. 
 
                                                 
35
 Note that the Germani have actually already fought a battle at 1.50.3-1.50.4. Caesar‟s lack of 
clarification in regards to the earlier combat indicates that this is not the purpose of the passage, and 
that it is more likely directed at the interest of such a practice. The casting of lots is also mentioned in 
regards to a prisoner taken by the Germani at 1.53.7, and is another example of details included for 
their representation of the enemy. Caesar‟s choice of background elaboration suggests that the 
narrative is structured around this objective, as M. Metius, the other captive, is barely mentioned at 
1.53.8. 
36
 Richter (1977) p. 95. 
37
 1.50.1-1.50.5, 1.51.2-1.51.3. 
38
 The reference to necessitas at 1.51.2 may however be in regards to the idea the Germani come out 
for battle in spite of the auspices. Melchior (2004) p. 40, notes that Caesar attacks Ariovistus before 
new moon, not giving his own reasoning but we can assume to take advantage of the superstition. In 
fact, as is demonstrated elsewhere in the Bellum Gallicum, defending the wagons could actually 
place the Germani in a stronger position, so that the religious anecdote is alone insufficient to fully 
explain the behaviour of the Germani. See 1.26.1-1.26.4, 4.14.4-4.14.5 for examples where the 
enemy are able to resist among the wagons. In particular, the difficulty in rooting out opposition in 
the Helvetii battle is a feature of 1.26. 
39
 Frontinus Strategmata 2.1.16 regards Caesar as utilising the stratagem against the enemy. However 
if this is the case, Caesar does not explain why he allowed the Germani to form up before the battle. 
As he states, the Romans were right up near the camp, but allows the Germani to array themselves by 
tribe, form a shield wall and their women even set up on wagons. Contrast this behaviour to the 
Usipetes and Tencteri account at 4.14.4-4.14.5 where no opportunity is given. See Gerlinger (2008) 
p. 161. 
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Similarly, in the description of a campaign against Labienus in Book Five, no 
information is provided on the military strength of the enemy, in contrast to extensive 
details that capture the nature of Gallic resistance.
40
 Information is given on Gallic 
embassies, their meetings and plans, even where these are unsuccessful, since the 
emphasis is on conspiratorial activity, rather than the success of the missions.
41
 
Caesar even includes the statement: quo lege communi omnes puberes armati 
convenire coguntur; qui ex iis novissimus convenit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus 
cruciatibus adfectus necatur.
42
 This anecdote that the Gauls put to death the last one 
to arrive at the convention is indicative of the need to represent enemy customs and 
behaviour.
43
 This statement is a comment on the general nature of the Gauls, and 
contextualises the information as part of this observation.
44
 The details included are 
heavily influenced by the attribution of characteristics to the enemy, even when the 
actions are unsuccessful or anecdotal. 
 
Caesar also introduces indirect speech into battle to illustrate behaviour. While 
scholarship pays close attention to speeches that capture the characteristics of 
individuals like Ariovistus or Critognatus, the words attributed to groups are just as 
important for their representation of the peoples involved.
45
 This is evident in the 
siege of Aduatuca, where speech is used to form a generic attitude for the defenders.
46
 
The Aduatuci speak as a group in ridiculing the size of the Romans, asking rhetorical 
questions about their attempts to besiege the town.
47
 The specific nature of the taunts 
suggests that the general chaotic abuse of the battlefield has been directed into a 
comment on the overconfidence of the defenders and an insight into their character.
48
 
This is an example of the catcalls and abuse of battle directing attention to an 
understanding of the enemy. 
                                                 
40
 5.56. Note lack of numbers regarding the army of Indutiomarus. 
41
 5.53.4-5.53.5. See 5.55.2 for unsuccessful embassies to the Germani. See also 5.54.5. 
42
 5.56.2-5.56.3. 
43
 On representation in general, see Riggsby (2006) pp. 47-53 on the tradition. 
44
 See 5.53-5.54. The observation lends meaning to the activity, illustrating how it is not just a 
descriptive passage about campaign activity. 
45
 Note that a full examination of speech in the Bellum Gallicum is not the objective of this thesis. See 
Nordling (1991) pp. 100-112 for a general study on discourse.  
46
 See pp. 186-187 below where this is discussed of 2.30.3. Even when the speakers are identified as 
legati, they speak with one voice so that the words they use are still attributes of the Aduatuci. See 
also 1.13.3-1.13.5 where the Helvetii speak as one as well. See also Bellum Civile 1.35.3 where the 
legates of Massilia speak as one. 
47
 2.30.3-2.30.4. 
48
 See Nordling (1991) pp. 144-152 generally.  
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Furthermore, through enemy motivation for battle, Caesar is able to capture 
significant details regarding their nature. In the Octodurus narrative, he is clearly 
capturing the anger of the Gauls as he states their family members are taken obsidum 
nomine, the use of nomine evoking the idea of pretence and injustice.
49
 Fear regarding 
Roman plans, and resentment for family members taken as hostages is quite clear in 
the use of dolebant.
50
 Furthermore, contempt for the Romans is illustrated in the use 
of despiciebant, to describe the Gallic attitude to the paucity of defenders, the word 
also serving to imply confidence in Gallic numbers.
51
 The complexity of emotions 
and motivation ascribed for this battle is evidence of how thoroughly Caesar 
addresses the thought processes of the enemy. As with the other narratives addressed 
in this section, it is clear that battle plays an important role in assigning characteristics 
to the Romans and their enemies. This is so, even when such information is not 
required for the battle, or comes at the expense of clarity regarding the course of 
military affairs. 
 
Defining the Gauls 
 
Battle serves an important role in the definition of behaviour, particularly as it is 
through battle narrative that Caesar often records the details of the people he 
encountered.
52
 The objective of defining the nature of the enemy is noticeable in 
many accounts, such as the first encounters with the Germani and Britons, where their 
ways of fighting are introduced through the course of the battle narrative.
53
 It is also 
evident in the introduction of the Nervii and Belgae in Book Two, where their 
customs are expressed through the sequences of rumour and intelligence that 
contextualise the battle.
54
 However battle is not just descriptive in regards to enemy 
characteristics, and is used to create impressions about the enemy and the nature of 
war against them. This need to define the participants is evident in the first major 
                                                 
49
 3.2.5. This interpretation of nomine seems possible since the passage is focused through the Gauls. 
See Görler (1976) p. 113. 
50
 3.2.5. 
51
 3.2.4. As Caesar states, they fill up the hills around the camp at 3.2.1. 
52
 Schadee (2008) p. 159 notes a campaign oriented representation.  
53
 For the Germani and Britons see 1.48.5-1.48.7, 4.24.3-4.24.4. See also 4.2, 4.33 for further 
introductions to fighting techniques. 
54
 2.4, 2.15. 
171 
 
account of the Bellum Gallicum, the defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.
55
 In this 
battle Caesar dispenses with his justification for the campaign outside of the battle 
narrative, explaining his actions against the Helvetii earlier in Book One.
56
 The 
passage therefore functions in a general introductory role, by establishing enemy 
conduct for the audience, and illustrating certain contrasts of behaviour between 
Romans and Gauls.
57
 Caesar also builds up his Gallic enemy in the account to create a 
worthy adversary, representing their courage and tenacity, indicating how the passage 
is determined by the need to establish for the audience the scope of the challenge 
faced in Gaul.
58
 This introductory role is evident in the description of combat, in the 
manoeuvres before and during the battle, and in the manner Caesar concludes the 
account, all of which illustrate the structural role of this battle in identifying enemy 
characteristics for the audience.
59
 The battle against the Helvetii has a particularly 
potent role in establishing an understanding of the enemy, due to its positioning as the 
first major battle narrative between Gauls and Romans. 
 
As the first major battle narrative, the Bibracte account is fundamentally shaped by 
the introduction of the Gauls involved and details are included that emphasise the 
foreigness of this enemy. In order to capture the novelty of combat against this 
enemy, Caesar describes a pila volley with significant details.
60
 The volley is 
described in this way: 
 
Milites e loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. ea 
disiecta gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt. Gallis magno ad pugnam erat 
                                                 
55
 1.24-1.26. 
56
 See 1.4-1.6. 
57
 On the representation of the Gauls see Riggsby (2006) pp. 47-53. See also Jervis (2001) p. 78 who 
notes that Caesar refers to the Helvetii as strongest of Gauls and the battle proves his point. On the 
introduction of the Helvetian leadership see Barlow (1998) pp. 140-144. Rawlings (1998) discusses 
the Gauls as warriors in general. See also Kraus (2009) p. 165. Diodorus Siculus 5.28-5.29 notes that 
individuals issue challenges in front of lines and sing songs, however there is no sign of this in 
Caesar. See Strabo Geog 4.4.2 for the character of Gauls as simple but warlike. See also Walser 
(1995) p. 218 who notes the problems of the campaign in terms of Tendenz. 
58
 Note that the Gauls do not always prove worthy opponents as the work progresses. See the Belgae 
discussed at pp. 177-184 below. See also Jervis (2001) p. 52. 
59
 Collins (1972) pp. 927, 930 extends this argument and states that the length of the first is due to 
literary requirements rather than self-justification, and suggests the depth of Book One is purely 
literary as an introduction to the “whole Gallic scene”. 
60
 See Mathews (2010) pp. 63-84 on the pilum in general. As noted at pp. 47-48 above, this is not 
actually the first battle, only the first extended battle narrative in the book. Note that there is little 
evidence of vengeance in the battle narrative, unlike the Tigurini which is contextualised so at 1.12 
as noted above at pp. 113-116. 
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impedimento, quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et colligatis, 
cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode 
pugnare poterant, multi ut diu iactato bracchio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere 
et nudo corpore pugnare.
61
  
 
Kagan views this pila throw as an example of simply adding colour to the narrative.
62
 
The passage is certainly distinctive, as Caesar explains in particular detail the effect 
of the Roman pilum on Gallic shields.
63
 The language and syntax used emphasises the 
impact of the weapon, indicating that particular care has been given to make this 
passage distinct, something Williams has noted in his analysis.
64
 Caesar never repeats 
this level of detail regarding the use of the pilum, and when it is mentioned, he does 
not include any details of how or why it worked.
65
 This is so even when such detail 
might be appropriate to explain why the Romans are able to defeat their opponents, 
suggesting that the passage is determined by the place in the text.
66
 As this is the first 
instance of detailed combat described between Roman and Gaul, and the level of 
detail is unique, it appears to be included for its introductory purpose in describing 
combat between adversaries.  
 
There does not appear to be a technical need to describe the weapon in action in this 
particular battle. The details are not required to explain the course of combat for the 
audience and the narrative is not based on the requirement for technical elucidation. 
The pilum was a Roman weapon and its effect probably well known.
67
 Unlike 
                                                 
61
 1.25.2-1.25.5. 
62
 Kagan (2006) p. 115. 
63
 Caesar picks the least effective aspect of the initial volley to describe in his account. As Matthews 
(2010) p. 69 notes there are four potential effects of a pila volley, from killing, wounding and 
breaking up the formation to impeding the enemy in their use of the shield. The last, while useful, is 
less deadly than actually killing or wounding, yet is the effect that Caesar focuses on, demonstrating 
his interest in the more striking and unique effect of the weapon.  
64
 Williams (1985) p. 223. Williams regards the objective as to show the ease with which the 
Helvetians are driven back. This does not reconcile with the end of the narrative however, which 
stresses the difficulty of defeating the people. 
65
 See 6.8.6. 
66
 Caesar generally states that soldiers in a loco superiore (higher place) normally triumph over their 
opponents. See 1.25, 2.23, 3.4, 3.25, 5.9. 7.19-7.20 is the main instance where Caesar refuses to fight 
an enemy in a strong position, out of welfare for the men. For attacks from above as generally 
viewed as successful see also 3.4, 3.25, 4.23. Examples of not specifically missile are 2.23, 5.9, 6.40, 
7.19, 7.62, 7.88. See also 2.23 for the Atrebates, and at 7.62 where the first rank of the enemy is 
destroyed by missiles, and 7.88, 1.52, where pila are dropped at the climactic moment. 
67
 See Zhmodikov (2000) p. 68, on Livy at 9.13.2-9.13.5, 9.35.4-9.35.6, and 28.2.5-28.2.6 describing 
the throwing of pila then advancing with swords.  
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descriptions of enemy tactics or equipment, or descriptions of siege and bridgeworks, 
a digression on the weapon is therefore unnecessary for technical reasons or audience 
elucidation.
68
 Some of an aristocratic audience may even have been familiar with the 
pilum and its use in battle from personal experience.
69
 It therefore appears unlikely 
the weapon requires particular introduction to the audience in order to familiarise 
them with its usage. Moreover the elaboration is a reflection of the general idea that 
men fighting e loco superiore have an advantage over those in an inferior position, all 
details that could have been summarised through the use of the verb impedire to 
describe the Gallic reaction.
70
 It is also clear that not all the Gauls are affected, the 
word pluribus merely indicating a large number, not necessarily a large proportion of 
the enemy who may have numbered over 65,000.
71
 Furthermore, the enemy are 
actually put to flight in hand-to-hand combat, indicated by the use of tandem after the 
Romans close with swords, and while significant, the pila volley is only part of the 
reason for the enemy retreat.
72
 The Gauls would presumably also be at this 
disadvantage throughout the entire battle, and casualties from missiles would be more 
effective later on if the volley had the effect that is described; however there is no 
such mention.
73
 Consequently there does not appear to be any unusual significance in 
the use of pila in this particular narrative in determining the outcome of the battle. As 
the details are nevertheless included, this suggests a narrative, rather than a technical 
objective for the passage.  
 
Given the passageʼs prominence at the start of the battle, these details establish Gallic 
characteristics in the face of a distinctly Roman technique.
74
 The vast numbers of 
                                                 
68
 See 2.6 on sieges, 3.13-14 Gallic boats, 4.17-18 on the Rhine Bridge. As Dodington (1980) pp. 1-7 
argues these are not necessarily included in detail for technical elucidation. 
69
 See Wiseman (1998) on publication, but note that the idea of general dissemination is rejected by 
Riggsby (2006) p. 13. Note that Bishop and Coulston (1993) p. 43 recognise that Caesar‟s 
description of the pila toss pinning multiple shields has the implication this did not normally occur. 
70
 See the Atrebates at 2.23 and others 1.12, 2.10, 3.19, 3.24. For 4.24, 4.26 see pp. 254-260 below on 
the landing in Britain. See also the description of Pullo at 5.44 for how Caesar separates the detail of 
combat and the use of impedire. 
71
 See 1.29 for the numbers. This assumes the same proportion of fighting men in just the Helvetii as 
for the confederacy all together. It is unclear how many from the census were in the battle. 
72
 1.25.5-1.25.6. The pilum appears to function less effectively than where missiles alone change the 
outcome of an encounter, such as against the Atrebates, whom Caesar says are driven off by missiles 
only, and only later killed by swords as they struggle in the water at 2.23.1-2.23.2. See also 7.62, 
7.81. 
73
 1.25.5-1.26.4. 
74
 Melchior (2004) p. 35 notes the dichotomy of Roman pila and the matura/tragula is an emphasis on 
foreignness. The emphasis on the enemy wagons at 1.26 is also indicative of their foreign nature. 
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Helvetii, who are recorded in later documents, are here found in the confertissima 
acie with which they face the opening volley of Roman pila.
75
 The narrative also 
illustrates their behaviour in combat, and the pilum has a striking effect at this point, 
as individuals shake their arms, casting off the shields and fighting nudo corpore.
76
 
They do not just drop their shields, as Caesar is careful to state that they attempt to 
shake out the pila for a long time, suggestive of unfamiliarity with what happened to 
them.
77
 More importantly, as opposed to the normal soldierly reaction of fear in 
response to an attack on their unshielded side, the Helvetii opt to fight unprotected; 
the choice of word praeoptare important is it indicates a preference for this 
unsoldierly, but courageous form of battle.
78
 How far soldiers encumbered so had a 
choice in the matter is debatable, if, as Caesar states, their shields were pinned to 
othersʼ. However this depiction casts them as impressive in battle, with an attention 
drawn to their physical form that is consistent with the emphasis on their body 
elsewhere in the sources.
79
 The elaboration of detail in this early instance of combat 
serves to introduce the enemy by establishing their behaviour in combat against 
Roman adversaries. 
 
Further introduction is evident as the enemy are described in terms that indicate their 
foreign way of fighting. The use of the word phalanx to describe the Gallic shield 
wall is not merely a technical description, as while this word serves functionally to 
describe the formation adopted, the word is only ever used again in Book One, in a 
description of the formation of the Germani.
80
 Just as with the details of the pila, the 
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 1.24.5. For this recurring aspect of the Bellum Gallicum, see the catalogue of the Belgae at 2.4 and 
Octodurus at p. 164 above. See also pp. 79-88.  
76
 1.25.4-1.25.5. 
77
 See also landing in Britain discussed at pp. 249-250 where there is emphasis on the unfamiliarity of 
the Britons with Roman weapons and ships.  
78
 1.25.4. For fear of attacks on the unshielded side see 2.23, 2.25 4.25, 4.26, 5.35. Note that even 
Caesar at 2.25.2 first grabs a shield before nearing the front lines. See Jervis (2001) pp. 44-53. On 
Gauls see Diodorus Siculus 5.29. 
79
 See Strabo Geog 4.4.2. See also Cicero Prov Cons 33.10 for bellicosus. Also Riggsby (2006) pp. 56-
57 and See Jervis (2001) pp. 17-53 on their warlike nature and the tradition. See also Polybius 2.28 
where they are willing to go into battle naked. On the physical form, see Jervis (2001) pp. 34-39, 
Livy 5.11, 7.10.7, 7.26.9, 22.46, Polybius 2.19. 3.114. However as Jervis notes at p. 45 the picture of 
Gauls is inconsistent, and they are also depicted as cowardly and easily defeated. See Polybius 2.19, 
Livy 7.26.9, 35.11, In regards to tenacity, the Gauls are represented as socially fickle at BG 4.5, and 
fierce in battle, if unable to endure hardship in the republican tradition. See Livy 5.48, 33.36, 35.5, 
Polybius 3.79. 
80
 See 1.52.4. In both cases Caesar describes a Roman response that specifically targets the shields. In 
the Helvetian battle, the Romans break up the phalanx with pila, in the Germani battle it is the 
actions of Roman individuals leaping onto the enemy and grabbing their shields. It is important to 
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use of the word only in the first book suggests that, unless the audience is to believe 
that the Gauls and Germans never use this formation again, Caesar is including the 
word as an introduction to the techniques of the enemy in a manner his audience will 
understand.
81
 It appears he is concerned to include information with the exclusive 
purpose of explaining foreign techniques and behaviour in combat, in order to 
introduce the nature of battle against this particular enemy.  
 
Following a brief description of combat, the final part of the narrative also 
demonstrates a construction directed at the representation of the enemy, as it is highly 
selective regarding the activity described.
82
 Caesar finishes the battle with the taking 
of the enemy baggage, and only elaborates for the audience the events that occurred 
at the wagons.
83
 Other Gallic contingents disappear from the narrative, as evident in 
the statement: alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et 
carros suos se contulerunt.
84
 There is absolutely no information on how this other 
Gallic element fair, demonstrating how selective he is regarding the closing passage 
of the narrative.
85
 The selection of this aspect of the battle suggests it is chosen 
deliberately for an illustrative purpose rather to provide information on the course and 
rewards of battle.  
 
The introductory purpose of the final passage is apparent as it is concentrates on 
distinctive enemy characteristics. As Williams notes, the structure of the initial 
section with the pila gives way to a smoother style for the main confrontation, before 
switching back for this final encounter around the wagons, so that there appears to be 
                                                                                                                                            
note that in no other battle do the shields play a part in the combat, and neither does Caesar describe 
a phalanx being formed. Consequently, the description of the enemy formation in the Germanic 
battle is less about describing ethnic fighting practices and more to do with Caesar contextualising 
the actions of the Romans as a reaction to the fighting style of their opponents.  
81
 It is also interesting to note that Caesar at 1.29.1 mentions specifically the discovery of Greek 
documents in the Helvetian camp, suggesting he wishes to establish a link between Gauls and 
Greeks. A Greek author is also mentioned is in the excursus on Germani at 6.24.2. It is unclear if this 
has a relationship to the use of the phalanx. 
82
 Note the smoothness and brief detail in the central section of the account at 1.25.6-1.25.7. These also 
appear as Caesar reacts to the arrival of the Boii and Tulingi in the flank. This could possibly be 
designed to show the ease of Roman manoeuvrability on the battlefield, as the third line counters the 
enemy threat. 1.25.6-1.25.7. 
83
 1.26.1-1.26.4. 
84
 1.26.1-1.26.2. 
85
 They disappear at 1.26.1.  
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literary emphasis similar to how the battle was begun.
86
 As this is the first mention of 
a situation in the battle where the Romans take wounds, in spite of the length of the 
battle so far, the final stage is also more desperate in comparison to the rest of the 
event, and therefore notable.
87
 As Caesar states: 
 
Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo 
carros obiecerant et e loco superiore in nostros venientes tela coniciebant et 
nonnulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque 
vulnerabant. diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt.
88
 
 
The account ends in a description of combat that draws attention to a distinctive 
feature of the enemy, as it focuses on combat around their wagons.
89
 Furthermore, the 
information on dart and javelin throwers establishes their ethically different status, 
through their use of foreign weapons.
90
 The concluding passage, centred as it is on 
this one point of the battle, appears deliberately chosen to introduce the enemy by 
focussing on aspects that are different to Roman warfare and society.  
 
Furthermore the final stage of the narrative is also an examination of the behaviour of 
this new enemy. The passage follows a description of Helvetian courage that 
contextualises events, when Caesar states: aversum hostem videre nemo potuit.
91
 The 
image of Gauls fighting from below the wagons supports this objective as it evokes 
the idea of men being systematically sought out in their hiding places among the 
defences, as they put up individual resistance.
92
 In this respect the use of the word 
nonnulli vividly creates the image of individuals, who are described inter carros 
rotasque so the audience can visualise where they are placed.
93
 The use of the 
imperfect and participles in the passage, such as venientes, coniciebant, subiciebant 
                                                 
86
 Williams (1985) pp. 223-224. As Williams notes, repetition of forms of iacere and the abrupt syntax 
reflect the exhaustion of the combatants at this stage of the battle.  
87
 See Williams (1985) p. 224. Melchior (2004) p. 35 notes the impacts of wounds in this battle. 
88
 1.26.3-1.26.4.  
89
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 55, on the nomadic representation.  
90
 Caesar could have simply used tela to describe the missiles. 
91
 1.26.3. Jervis (2001) p. 78. On problems with this concept see Gerlinger (2008) pp. 144-146. 
92
 See also Avaricum at 7.25.1-7.26.1, and the description of Gauls desperately trying to destroy the 
Roman siege works. It is another account that establishes the fundamentally tenacious nature of the 
Gauls as individuals. 
93
 The scene is of individuals among the carts and wheels, fiercely resisting until rooted out by the 
Romans. 
177 
 
and vulnerabant are also demonstrative of Gallic tenacity in defeat.
94
 As a 
representation of Gallic behaviour, through the final, inexorable process of mopping 
up and butchering the enemy, the fighting among the wagons is indicative of their 
tenacity and courage.
95
 The selection of detail is influenced by the need to define 
enemy character in combat, and the purpose of the battle in defining behaviour 
fundamentally influences the choice of content in this final stage of the account. 
 
In the first major battle narrative of the Bellum Gallicum, Caesar utilises the content 
to focus on the unusual and challenging nature of the enterprise undertaken in Gaul. 
The pila volley is described in detail in order to focus on the physical form of the 
enemy, their tenacity and foreignness. Similarly, the fighting among the wagons is 
selected for elaboration as it highlights the difference between Romans and this 
nomadic people, while further building up a worthy enemy through the difficulties 
described in bringing them to defeat. The first major battle of the work therefore 
appears important to Caesar for its role in introducing and defining the enemy for his 
audience, and establishing the characteristics that he desires to convey.  
 
The Nature of the Belgic Multitude 
 
Battle narrative is not just introductory, but can also serve to assign negative features 
to the enemy. While Caesar builds up his Gallic enemy in the Helvetii narrative 
described above, that representation is not necessarily evident in all accounts. The 
topos of the Belgic multitude, discussed in Chapter One, is created not only to 
describe the size of the force, but to attribute to it a disruptive and unmartial quality.
96
 
Strabo and Diodorus Siculus have both noted the warlike nature of the Gauls, but 
Caesar qualifies this concept in his interpretation of the Belgae.
97
 Their vast army is 
presented as part of a violent rebellion or other form of resistance to with a distinct 
                                                 
94
 1.26.3-1.26.4. 
95
 Note how Caesar makes no mention of any flight in this battle, except a general retreat during the 
night at 1.26.5. 
96
 See 2.1-2.11, discussed above at pp. 71-88. See also Mannetter (1995) pp. 153-154; Seager (2003) p. 
29. Hall (1998) p. 12 also notes Roman values i.e. constantia are compared to the mobilitate et 
levitate animi of Gauls such as the Belgae 2.1.3 and states that examples are more than ʻnationalistic 
self-advertisement‟. For Hall at p. 15, these are about Caesar‟s “national” Romanness controlling the 
world. See also Kraus (2009) pp. 165-166 on the fractious nature of the Gauls. See also Riggsby 
(2006) p. 56.  
97
 Strabo Geog 4.4.2, Diodorus Siculus 5.29. 
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lack of martial quality to their actions. The battle and its contextual data are presented 
so that the creation of the topos is not just a simplification of battlefield 
circumstances. It is designed to attribute negative characteristics to the enemy and 
encourage an interpretation of them for the audience. 
 
The idea of a multitude as a negative entity is established throughout the Bellum 
Gallicum, so that the Belgae appear as a manifestation of generally bad traits. Caesar 
uses the word multitudo to describe the Romans when they perform poorly; 
demonstrating that the word does not just indicate the size of an entity but that there is 
a lack of military prowess or organisation in such a body.
98
 In addition, multitudes 
have popular or criminal connotations, as clarified elsewhere in the work where a 
multitude is made up of latrones or other unsavoury elements.
99
 Moreover multitudo 
is placed in opposition to exemplary characters, such as Lucius Vorenus, Titus Pullo 
and Marcus Petronius, so that the word stands against heroic exempla.
100
 Caesar is 
therefore not just adopting the term as a numeric indicator, but is associating it with 
mobs and other unsavoury gatherings, possibly drawing on the popular connotations 
of the word.
101
 The representation is congruent with an overall scheme, where enemy 
numbers are associated with martial weakness or placed in opposition to exemplary 
action.  
 
The representative role of the multitude is evident as it is ascribed with some 
fundamentally negative qualities regarding order and the lawful state of affairs. This 
appears in the passages preceding battle, where increasing detail is given about the 
host as the narrative progresses, with the following stated: 
 
                                                 
98
 See Caesar‟s cavalry when defeated at 1.15.3. Note how this does not conflict with the idea that they 
are individually courageous, as established in the manner they fight at 2.11. However as an entity, the 
multitude does not display martial skill. Schadee (2008) p. 159 notes a campaign oriented 
representation of Gauls in general, which could explain a general inconsistency between the idea the 
Belgae are strong in the introduction at 1.1, and their representation in this confrontation. See also 
7.70.3 for Gauls in flight at Alesia. 
99
 For the use of multitude, see 5.27.4 for popular connotations, 3.17.4 for negative associations with 
latrones. See also negative judgements 1.2.5, 1.15.3. On the general poor behaviour of Gauls see 
Riggsby (2006) pp. 56, 61. 
100
 See 5.44.6, 7.50.4. On exempla see pp. 116-123. 
101
 The word does have popular connotations see Cicero Dom 4, Att 2.21.1, Livy 6.1.10, 24.25.8, but 
how far Caesar draws on the political meaning is unclear. Within the Bellum Gallicum however, it 
has strong negative connotations.  
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Reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse Germanosque, qui cis Rhenum incolant, sese 
cum his coniunxisse, tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem, ut ne Suessiones 
quidem fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, 
unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, deterrere potuerint, quin 
cum iis consentirent.
102
  
 
This iteration of rumour and intelligence reinforces the character of the conflict and 
the dreadful nature of the conspiracy, with the use of tantum...furorem an indication 
that this multitude exists in a state far from ordered affairs.
103
 Caesar even uses 
anecdotal information, such as the statement that relatives and brothers have joined 
up with the enemy, and describes the terrible scope of the threat as it overcomes law 
and order. Details are included in order to establish the existence of the Belgic host in 
opposition to ideas of order and stability.  
 
The representation of the enemy as inherently destabilising is evident in the catalogue 
of forces, examined in Chapter One, which is structured to convey the disordered 
nature of the host.
104
 While the tribes are generally listed in decreasing order of 
numbers provided, with some exceptions among the lesser tribes, the issue of 
leadership is one that Caesar makes clear is at odds with the contributions, as the 
Bellovaci have promised the greatest number with even more in reserve, and demand 
the leadership of the whole war.
105
 However the Suessones, with fewer men, are 
actually given command.
106
 Consequently there is disharmony between the sizes of 
contingents in the catalogue of troops, and the presentation of leadership, so that the 
tribes are presented as joined together in uneasy alliance.
107
 Importantly, the dissent 
of the Bellovaci shows that they will not just defer to leadership that is just and wise, 
                                                 
102
 2.3.4-2.3.5. The need for this elaboration for the audience in terms of explaining Caesar‟s activity is 
superfluous, as Caesar has already acted, by bringing his army in response to the confirmation by the 
Senones and the other Gauls.  
103
 See Aeneid 1.150 for a similar representation of furor.  
104
 2.4. 
105
 2.4.5-2.4.6. See also 7.36, 7.63. Caesar places emphasis in the inherent divisiveness and desire for 
command among the enemy. See Mannetter (1995) p. 148, in particular of the Alesia catalogue. On 
the idea of disorganisation in the order of a catalogue see Mannetter (1995) p. 153. 
106
 2.4.6-2.4.8. The Suessones have command due to the iustitia and prudentia of Galba. Mannetter 
(1995) p. 153 notes how the leader Galba plays no part in the actual war yet gets a name. See 2.13 for 
the next mention of Galba.  
107
 Mannetter (1995) pp. 153-154. The description of Galba is not evidence that Caesar regards the 
identification of leaders as important. As is clear in the description of the Bellovaci, Caesar does not 
always list who the leaders are. 
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since such characteristics are specifically mentioned of the actual leader, Galba of the 
Suessones.
108
 The catalogue of troops is used to create the impression of 
disorganisation and disrespect for good rule.  
 
The catalogue also illustrates the inherently dangerous and destabilising nature of the 
Belgic host, as it aligns them with the Germani, who had been described as disruptive 
in the previous book.
109
 Caesar describes racial origins that associate the Belgae 
closely with a major antagonist who previously upset the order of affairs by entering 
Gaul and appropriating land by force. Moreover the Belgic roots even show an 
association through similarity of actions. Like Ariovistus, the Belgae came from 
across the Rhine, drawn by the wealth of the land, and they appropriated it for 
themselves, even expelling the local inhabitants.
110
 By describing the catalogue so, 
the Belgae are associated not only with recent enemies of Rome but with their 
destabilising influence.  
 
The Belgae are further portrayed as just like these traditional enemies, so that the host 
is established as fundamentally aggressive in nature. A historical injustice against the 
Romans is introduced when Caesar states: 
 
...Gallosque, qui ea loca incolerent, expulisse solosque esse qui patrum nostrorum 
memoria omni Gallia vexata Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi 
prohibuerint.
111
  
 
That the Belgae are no better is evident through the use of memoria, used to link the 
deed from the past with the present behaviour of the Belgae.
112
 The Belgae also took 
on martial airs as a result of this history, evident in the statement: earum rerum 
memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent.
113
 
The Belgae may have stopped the Teutones and Cimbri, but their immediate response 
within the narrative is to behave poorly, assuming magnos spiritus, and the memory 
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 2.4.7. 
109
 See 2.4.2 for their Germani roots. See 1.49-1.53 for the Germanic battle. In particular see 1.31 for 
the effect of the Germani on Gaul. 
110
 2.4.1-2.4.2. 
111
 2.4.2. See also pp. 113-116 above on the Tigurini, and p. 187 below on the Aduatuci.  
112
 2.4.3. 
113
 2.4.3. 
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of their deed is twisted into personal ambition, thus making them no better than their 
enemies.
114
 Their resistance to invasion is in itself a source of disharmony, in order to 
assist in their representation as a dangerous and destabilising entity.  
 
Such ideas are developed further through anecdotal information provided in the 
catalogue. Caesar specifically uses the word multitudo in conjunction with 
destabilising behaviour when the Bellovaci desire command, as they demand rule in 
part due to their numbers of men.
115
 There is therefore an association between the 
catalogue and ideas of arrogance and desire for command. Such a representation is 
consistent with another account, the Helvetian migration, where they felt constrained 
by their surroundings: pro multitudine autem hominum et pro gloria belli atque 
fortitudinis angustos se fines habere arbitrabantur.
116
 The catalogue of the Belgae 
similarly utilises the numbers of the Bellovaci to establish characteristics such as 
ambition, arrogance and generally disruptive behaviour.  
 
Finally, the catalogue closes with a reminder of the expansive nature of the Belgic 
host as it associates the last tribal groups with their Germanic origins. The Condrusi, 
Eburones, Caerosi, and Paemani are described as Germani.
117
 By grouping them 
together Caesar clarifies the link between the past and the current conflict. The 
Belgae were originally Germanic; they are acting the same as the Germani, and even 
include those people in their ranks. The positioning of these tribes at the end of the 
catalogue, even though they are providing similar numbers of troops to the smaller 
Belgic tribes, gives them prominence in rounding off the ideas of expansion and 
aggression. The catalogue, as part of the general topos of the multitude, is a stylistic 
device used primarily to support the representation of the participants, in this case to 
refine through the contextual information the inherently destabilising nature of the 
enemy.  
                                                 
114
 Moreover, at 2.4.7 Caesar specifies that Diviciacus was King nostra etiam memoria the repeated 
use of the word memoria linking him personally to the airs they took on at 2.4.3. 
115
 et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere 2.4.5.  
116
 1.2.5. As can also be seen when comparing the two passages, the implication of the word with 
regards to the Helvetii is of an unnatural amount, as their multitude is too great for their borders. See 
also 5.27.4 for the overturning of leadership. This is often the case in the Bellum Gallicum that the 
word is specifically associated with a threat, usually in battle. See 1.35.3, 1.33.3, 1.44.6, 1.52.6, 
2.8.4. The depiction of the Belgic host also has the connation that it should not exist under normal 
circumstances. 
117
 uno nomine Germani appellantur 2.4.10.  
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Not only is the host of the enemy a disruptive force, but it acts in a simple and 
unsophisticated manner. Enemy motivation and plans in battle are presented to reduce 
their activity and command structure to a simple form, so that there is no apparent 
order or structure to their behaviour. This is evident in the crossing of a river:  
 
Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt eo consilio, ut, si 
possent, castellum, cui praeerat Q. Titurius legatus, expugnarent pontemque 
interscinderent, si minus potuissent, agros Remorum popularentur, qui magno nobis 
usui ad bellum gerendum erant, commeatuque nostros prohiberent.
118
 
 
Caesar does not describe which elements attempt to cross the shallows; only that part 
of the overall force does so, the use of the third person plural in conati sunt reducing 
the command structure to its most basic element.
119
 The host is also given a general 
lack of thoughtfulness and acts in haste as apparent in the statement: hostes protinus 
ex eo loco ad flumen Axonam contenderunt.
120
 The enemy, in spite of its huge 
numbers acts as a single unit in rushing to the river, and Caesar carefully describes its 
action as performed protinus, to give it haste and lack of thought.
121
 The lack of detail 
gives the impression of a mass acting in a unified and thoughtless manner, so that the 
topos of the multitude supports the objective by establishing the fundamentally 
disorganised behaviour of the enemy.  
 
The word multitudo is also used to ascribe qualities to the host such as barbarism and 
relative primitiveness. This is evident in the description of the assault on Bibrax:  
 
Ab his castris oppidum Remorum nomine Bibrax aberat milia passuum octo. id ex 
itinere magno impetu Belgae oppugnare coeperunt. aegre eo die sustentatum est. 
Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine 
hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque 
defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succendunt murumque subruunt. 
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 2.9.4-2.9.5. 
119
 2.9.4. 
120
 2.9.3-2.9.4. 
121
 A total of 306,000 according to Caesar‟s catalogue. 
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quod tum facile fiebat. Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela conicerent, in muro 
consistendi potestas erat nulli.
122
 
 
In this passage there is no discussion of the attack, but instead the account digresses 
into a discussion of Gallic siege techniques that stresses the primitiveness of their 
methods.
123
 What the Belgae lack in technology is made up for in numbers, as the 
success of Gallic siege methodology is due to the multitude of men, which enables 
them to surround a town, and the multitude of missiles that they are able to hurl and 
strip the wall of defenders.
124
 The repetition of multitudo here is important, as it 
attributes success in Gallic sieges not so much to leadership, but to sheer mass of men 
and weapons.
125
 The digression on siege tactics is a development of the idea of the 
Belgic mass, and ensures that while no details are provided of the actual assault, the 
idea of a barbaric mob is reinforced through the description of ethnic fighting 
techniques. 
 
Importantly the digression places representation over an explanation of the battle, as 
it does not describe why the Belgae are unable to successfully assault Bibrax in this 
endeavour. According to the description of siege techniques, the Belgae are generally 
successful due to the numbers of men involved.
126
 In this case the vast numbers of the 
Belgae should, by the standard applied, ensure success, however as the narrative 
illustrates, the Belgae leave off the assault before it is finished.
127
 The digression may 
function to enhance the numeric theme, but is not helpful in explaining the way the 
events unfold in this particular siege, in fact acting contrary to the details provided on 
Belgic numbers. It furthers the image of the Belgae as a mass reliant on their numbers 
for success, without reference to the result of the particular encounter.  
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 2.6.1-2.6.4. 
123
 On technological development see Riggsby (2006) p. 76.  
124
 In sieges they achieve success through sheer weight of numbers. It is possible to see them as little 
different to the weapons they use, merely serving as the means of hurling those weapons. See 
Riggsby (2006) p. 76. 
125
 While the formation of a tortoise suggests discipline and leadership, it is clear that it only succeeds 
due to the numbers, through the nam clause that follows.  
126
 2.6.3-2.6.4. 
127
 Caesar attributes this to the arrival of his light armed troops at Bibrax, which is in itself problematic 
as discussed at pp. 77-79 above.  
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The final lines of the passage sum up the theme of the battle, and the multitude of the 
enemy is defeated consistent with the way it has been portrayed thus far. The Belgae 
retreat is described as fecerunt ut consimilis fugae profectio videretur thereby 
providing the implication of a rout, even though no actual flight occurs, since the 
enemy have chosen to return home.
128
 While the Roman pursuit is described as 
causing significant casualties, the use of occasumque solis as the only thing that 
stopped the slaughter focuses on the difference of the multitude to the superior 
Roman forces.
129
 At the end, the enemy appear more as a mob than a military force; 
the killing of them is accomplished with ease and the theme is closed in this passage. 
Given the chance, Caesar suggests that the Romans can kill as many of these enemies 
as there is time in the day, so that the battle addresses, and resolves the representation 
of the multitude and his own opinion of such an entity. 
 
The Traits of the Aduatuci  
 
The siege of Aduatuca is another account where the narrative is designed to attribute 
traits to the enemy through the course of the confrontation.
130
 Caesar integrates 
contextual aspects of the battle, in particular the terrain and history, with the 
representation of the Aduatuci, so that these features support the idea that the enemy 
is particularly arrogant and belligerent.
131
 Details such as siege works, surrendered 
weapons, the plans of the enemy and even the casualties are all designed to support 
this representation, even where these create inconsistencies in terms of motivation 
and the course of the battle.
132
 The construction of the passage develops concepts and 
includes details to support Caesarʼs interpretation of the participants. 
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 2.11.1-2.11.2. In the final passage the mob assumes its lowest form as simply a mass of individuals 
to be killed. Caesar clarifies this at the opening of the chapter, stating that they left their camp 
without order or leadership. The emphasis on killing supports this. The enemy are not a fighting 
force any more, as evident in nullo certo ordine neque imperio. 
129
 2.11.6. See also 1.50.3-1.50.4 where the description of the setting sun puts an end to some bitter 
fighting that is summarised simply through reference to wounds given and received, a highly stylised 
passage as well. See also 3.15.5, for night brings an end to the destruction of the Venetii. 
130
 2.29-2.33. 
131
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 56-57 on aggression. See also Strabo Geog 4.4.2, Diodorus Siculus 5.29. 
132
 See Paul (1982) on siege topos in general. Caesar‟s account is specifically directed at the 
representation of the enemy.  
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The narrative is designed to attribute universality to the qualities of the enemy, as it 
ensures that this particular siege is representative of the relationship of Romans to the 
whole people faced. This is apparent as all of them are described as present at the 
siege, clear in the statement: cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis sua omnia in unum 
oppidum...contulerunt.
133
 Whether this was possible within the time frame that 
followed the battle of the Nervii is unclear, however it ensures there is completeness 
to the story of this people and that all are witness to the events.
134
 The qualification 
provides a unitary nature to the observations of the battle as applicable to the 
Aduatuci as a people.
135
 The entire people are present as witnesses and participants in 
the events that follow, and any description applicable to them is in a completely 
representative capacity. 
 
The description of Roman siege works is the most apparent use of battle to define the 
Aduatuci, as details of the assault preparations are used to establish the enemy 
preconceptions of superiority. Caesar describes the events as follows:  
 
Ubi vineis actis aggere exstructo turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum inridere 
ex muro atque increpitare vocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio instrueretur: 
quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae, nam 
plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum suorum brevitas nostra 
contemptui est, tanti oneris turrim in muro posse conlocare confiderent? Ubi vero 
moveri et adpropinquare moenibus viderunt, nova atque inusitata specie commoti 
legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt, qui ad hunc modum locuti non se existimare 
Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta 
celeritate promovere et ex propinquitate pugnare possent, se suaque omnia eorum 
potestati permittere dixerunt. Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia 
ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuatucos esse 
conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac 
                                                 
133
 2.29.2-2.29.3.  
134
 According to Caesar the Aduatuci were on their way to join the Nervii. See 2.29.1. By describing 
them as a whole however, the Aduatuci serve as internal witnesses to the events, a concept Feldherr 
discusses in regards to Livy. See Feldherr (1998) pp. 4, 10. Kraus (2007) p. 375 Quintilian 8.3.66-
8.3.70. The major example of spectacle is at Alesia, discussed below at pp. 270-276. However see 
also pp. 333-334 on combat in Britain, pp. 221-222 on Caesar in the Venetii account. 
135
 Note however that the Aduatuci revolt again at 5.38, so like the Nervii there is completeness to the 
episode at odds with the historical context. See above p. 51 on the Nervii. 
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suae virtuti invidere, a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. sibi praestare, 
si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati, quam ab 
his per cruciatum interfici, inter quos dominari consuessent.
136
 
 
The point of view adopted in this passage is that of the enemy, so that the audience 
considers the events being depicted from their frame of view and the homines 
tantulae staturae are visualised through their perspective, where the comparative 
smallness of the Romans is emphasised.
137
 The contempt of the Aduatuci is evident as 
they look down not only on the siege works but the smaller Romans themselves.
138
 
The narrative is specifically directed to achieve this, as the actual construction of 
ramp and mantlets are in an ablative absolute construction and the view of the siege 
tower is presented through the perspective of the Aduatuci.
139
 The text is structured to 
develop the character of the Aduatuci as it focuses the activity of the battlefield 
through their position in order to highlight their complacency and arrogance as 
defenders.  
 
Furthermore the topography of the battlefield is integrated into this representation, so 
that physical circumstances reinforce the purpose of establishing the character of the 
Aduatuci. Caesar describes the dimensions and structure of the town early in the 
narrative, in order to impress on the audience concepts of loftiness, size and 
superiority:  
 
Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes despectusque haberet, 
una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius ducentorum pedum 
relinquebatur; quem locum duplici altissimo muro munierant; tum magni ponderis 
saxa et praeacutas trabes in muro conlocabant.
140
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 2.30.3-2.31.6. 
137
 2.30.4. This theme is further indicated as the movement of the siege works are also reflected 
through the observations of the enemy. The similarity of construction in the two passages, which 
both use the action to develop the attitudes of the Aduatuci, demonstrates how Caesar‟s purpose is to 
define their behaviour. See Pascucci (1973) p. 493. 
138
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 49-53 on size, pp. 73-105 on the changing nature of siege craft and the 
representation of the Gauls as foreigners.  
139
 2.30.3. 
140
 2.29.3-2.29.4. 
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The town, like the Aduatuci, has a despectus on the Romans.
141
 Caesar then describes 
the dimensions of the slope that provides egress to the town, and ends the technical 
description with the Aduatuci engaged in activity on the walls, preparing large beams 
and boulders, ensuring that the passage ends with the people and the town working 
together against the Romans.
142
 Consequently the people and the town are closely 
linked, with characteristics of the town and the people interwoven in the narrative. 
The physical dimensions of the fortress are therefore contextualised within the 
thematic design regarding the arrogance of the people.
143
 The fort is more than a 
topographical feature, as it is integrated into the presentation of the enemy. 
 
The purpose of the battle is evident as the historical context is used to clearly 
establish their aggressive and dangerous nature. Immediately following the 
description of the town, the history of the Aduatuci is described, most importantly 
their link to the Cimbri and Teutoni, thereby establishing the Aduatuci as historical 
enemies of Rome.
144
 As Caesar states: 
 
Ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui cum iter in provinciam nostram 
atque Italiam facerent, iis impedimentis, quae secum agere ac portare non poterant, 
citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiam ex suis ac praesidium, sex milia 
hominum, una reliquerunt. hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, 
cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium 
pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerunt.
145
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 See p. 185 fn. 134 above and pp. 270-272 below on Alesia.  
142
 The use of the imperfect in conlocabant ensures that there is activity, and the people have a physical 
presence in the narrative at this point. For dispicio, see also Octodurus and enemy motivation 
discussed above at p. 92. 
143
 As Riggsby (2006) pp. 79-80 notes such descriptions, particularly at 7.23 and the technical 
description of Gallic walls are designed to highlight aspects of Gallic character, in that case, their 
technological development. Note however in this instance the parallel between the walls, and Gallic 
size, both of which Caesar is able to neutralise in the battle.  
144
 This is also seen in the catalogue of the Belgae at 2.4.3 where history is used to define their warlike 
and arrogant nature. See Riggsby (2006) p. 49. Just as the catalogue of the Belgae used the Germani, 
described above at pp. 180-181, so too history it is used here, more obviously to establish the status 
of the Aduatuci as enemies, even though, as Caesar describes, they were clearly not part of the forces 
who came into conflict directly with Rome. 
145
 2.29.4-2.29.5. 
188 
 
In this passage Caesar establishes that the Aduatuci have a history of violent 
behaviour in a belligerent environment.
146
 The history of animosity is directly linked 
to historical enemies of Rome through the origins of this people who were part of the 
migration of the Cimbri and Teutones. This historical background is consequently 
directed at illustrating the aggressive nature of the enemy and their hostile 
relationship to Rome, as part of the development of their character. 
 
Caesar also demonstrates that this historical context is currently applicable as the 
Aduatuci demonstrate further aggressive behaviour. The siege commences with acts 
of aggression by the Aduatuci, who make frequent forays and engage in 
skirmishes.
147
 In spite of advancing into the lands of the Aduatuci, the Romans do 
not, within this passage, open hostilities, and the Aduatuci notably are the only 
aggressors as the Romans perform a circumvallation.
148
 Importantly, the construction 
of the Roman circumvallation happens after the description of these attacks, giving it 
a defensive quality.
149
 This quite striking disjunction in the aggressive dimension of 
the siege allows the development of the Aduatuciʼs belligerence to continue 
unimpeded from the previous historical description.
150
 The reference to their 
genealogy and history continues into the opening of the siege in order to demonstrate 
the continuation of the historical context into current behaviour.  
 
Once defeated, the terms and description of the surrender are important as they also 
identify traits of this people. The literary element to the presentation of the 
negotiations is most present in the role that the arms play within the narrative, as the 
                                                 
146
 There are some problems apparent in this introduction in contextualising the battle. First, the 
Aduatuci are described as originating from only 6,000, who were left as a guard to equipment and 
livestock when the Cimbri and Teutones passed through. How they then became a people with 
numerous towns and a large force of armed men is not explained. At 2.29.1 Caesar also opens this 
account with a reminder that he has mentioned the tribe before, and that they were coming to aid the 
Nervii. The mention of the Nervii clearly serves to justify the following siege on the grounds that the 
Aduatuci are hostile to the Romans. While the Aduatuci played no active role in either the main 
battle with the Belgae or the Sabis river confrontation, the reminder stresses that they were involved, 
albeit peripherally. The opening introduction to the siege is not a military assessment of the forces of 
the enemy, but rather ensures that the defenders are placed within the framework of the Belgic 
opposition and the previous battles. 
147
 2.30.1-2.30.2. See pp. 163-164 above on Gallic aggression. See also 2.4 on history and arrogance. 
148
 2.30.1-2.30.3. 
149
 2.30.2-2.30.3. Note how the circumvallation is described as a precondition of the Aduatuci staying 
in their defences, rather than as an active Roman project. 
150
 McDougall (1991) p. 629 notes that Dio generally spends significantly more time on the Aduatuci 
siege than the Sabis River battle, with more emphasis on aspects critical of Caesar. 
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surrender of Aduatucan weapons is given a striking level of detail in order to establish 
the warlike nature of the enemy.
151
 The anecdotal statement about the size of the 
mound of weapons, which almost reaches the walls, draws attention to the initial 
presentation of the Aduatuci, by serving as a visible reminder of their initial contempt 
for the Romans as they watched from above.
152
 Caesar also states that this was not 
even their whole stockpile of weapons as indicated by the comment: tamen circiter 
parte tertia, ut postea perspectum est, celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis 
eo die pace sunt usi.
153
 As the great pile of arms that the Aduatuci hurl from the walls 
is huge, but is not their whole store, Caesar indicates the sheer volume of weaponry 
owned by this aggressive tribe. The close contrast in this instance of pax and celo also 
indicate the guilt of the Aduatuci, and makes clear that they are holding back from 
surrender, tainting the peace that Caesar states he supplies.
154
 He further states that 
they are able to quickly manufacture additional arms, so innovative are they in the 
preparation for war.
155
 Consequently the description of surrendered arms has a strong 
thematic purpose in developing the warmongering nature of the Aduatuci, and the 
nature of their belligerence.  
 
In the description of the plans of the Aduatuci to betray the Romans, the narrative 
supports the representation without addressing actual military objectives. The manner 
the Aduatuci break the peace is described as follows:  
 
Sub vesperum Caesar portas claudi militesque ex oppido exire iussit, ne quam noctu 
oppidani a militibus iniuriam acciperent. illi ante inito ut intellectum est consilio, 
quod deditione facta nostros praesidia deducturos aut denique indiligentius 
servaturos crediderant, partim cum iis quae retinuerant et celaverant armis, partim 
scutis ex cortice factis aut viminibus intextis, quae subito ut temporis exiguitas 
postulabat, pellibus induxerant, tertia vigilia, qua minime arduus ad nostras 
                                                 
151
 2.31.4-2.31.5. The Aduatuci ask to keep their arms, in a passage that reminds the audience of the 
way they and their neighbours constantly make war on each other, and links this statement with the 
historical war making of the people. 
152
 See 2.32.4. See Webb (2012) p. 12. 
153
 2.32.4. 
154
 See 2.32.4. 
155
 2.33.2. This matches their warlike nature in general. 
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munitiones ascensus videbatur, omnibus copiis repente ex oppido eruptionem 
fecerunt.
156
  
 
In this description, the contrast of Caesarʼs concern for the wellbeing of the 
townspeople and their elaborate plans to betray him are notable. This demonstrates 
that the plans and preparations support the case for the guilt of the Aduatuci. Their 
motivation in attacking however is unclear and although the attack seems a 
particularly desperate move, Caesar is remarkably silent about why they would do so, 
except for the assumption of natural duplicity or rashness.
157
 This silence on 
motivation fails to account for the objectives the enemy hoped to achieve in 
performing the deed, or why they changed their previous stance.
158
 The passage 
supports the thematic concern of establishing the general nature of the Aduatuci, but 
does so at the expense of the circumstances of battle. 
 
Similarly, the Aduatuci act inconsistently within the narrative due to the manner they 
are represented. The idea that the enemy is foreign is evident in the description of 
Roman siege techniques, which are described as nova et usitata to the Aduatuci.
159
 
The enemy even state that Roman prowess may be due to divine aid, they are so 
impressed.
160
 However Caesar does not explain why they could be so overawed, yet 
then turn on the Romans in the face of such divine assistance.
161
 The motivation of 
the Aduatuci is not explained, the change in attitude of the defenders remains unclear, 
both being sacrificed to the thematic need of presenting the Gauls as untrustworthy 
and warlike.
162
 A concept of enemy perception is raised, and then dropped, as 
consistency does not apply to motivation, but to the objective of representing general 
enemy characteristics.  
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 2.33.1-2.33.3. 
157
 On faithlessness see Cicero Prov Cons 33 and Riggsby (2006) p. 56. It is possible that Caesar does 
not feel the need to explain their actions, as being Gauls they are in his opinion fickle and impulsive. 
See also 4.5, 6.20. 
158
 See Rambaud (1966) pp. 117-118. 
159
 2.31.1. See also the Gauls at Noviodunum at 2.12.5. 
160
 2.31.2. 
161
 2.31.2. In this case, even the presentation of character is inconsistent or unexplained, except for the 
idea that the Gauls are fickle and inconsistent. 
162
 Dodington (1980) p. 22 suggests they were not really awed by the siege works. 
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The one detailed description of combat is designed to establish the desperation and 
fierce courage of the Aduatuci. In describing an infantry attack from the town the 
details are highly simplified, and it is only stated that the enemy attack where the 
slope seems least steep.
163
 How they reach this undefined point, whether they use 
sally ports or come down the rocky slopes is all absent from the narrative. In spite of 
this lack of clarity regarding movement, the idea that the enemy are desperate is clear, 
as enough details are given to establish the combat in terms of character. As Caesar 
states:  
 
Pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris fortibus in extrema spe salutis 
iniquo loco contra eos qui ex vallo turribusque tela iacerent, pugnari debuit, cum in 
una virtute omnis spes consisteret.
164
  
 
The use of the debuit places emphasis is on the type of men who would fight this 
way.
165
 The enemy are willing to attack in circumstances that leaves them impeditos 
so their courage and determination is emphasised.
166
 Gallic character is prominent 
here in their courage, recklessness and folly, and details that might explain their 
rationale for combat or their methodology are omitted. The description is indicative 
of how the narrative is primarily designed to support the interpretation of the enemy.  
 
It is also notable that the casualties of battle support the impression of enemy 
desperation even though they are problematic in explaining the result of battle. Caesar 
originally stated that the Aduatuci were able to supply 19,000 men to war, suggesting 
that, as he states all were present in the town, 15,000 should have survived the night 
assault.
167
 However he states that after the assault the town had no defence, in spite of 
the possible presence of such numbers to continue the fight.
168
 From a numeric 
perspective there are unresolved questions. However taken purely as indicative of the 
character of combat, they support the representation of the enemy as warlike and 
                                                 
163
 2.33.2. 
164
 2.33.4-2.33.5. 
165
 See also the Romans against the Germani discussed in Chapter Two pp. 155-157. The main verb 
debuit is indicative, but describes a behavioural pattern. 
166
 See also the Gauls fighting unshielded in the Helvetii account discussed above at pp. 173-174 above 
and the virtus of the Nervii described at pp. 192-194 below. 
167
 See 2.4.9-2.4.10. Note this is a simple mathematical analysis that reflects Caesar‟s disinterest in the 
numeric context, except where it reinforces the representation. 
168
 Even if the enemy lost their will to fight, Caesar does not say so. 
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tenacious in defeat, an enemy who in fighting uphill lose 4,000 men.
169
 The empirical 
problems raised by the numbers are due to the objective of the figure, which is to 
illustrate the enemy courage in defeat.  
 
A primary objective in the narrative of the Aduatuci is to capture the characteristics of 
the enemy, which is evident in the structure and details of the account. Issues such as 
the contempt of the people, their perfidy and warlike nature are fundamental 
objectives of the narrative and appear in the description of combatants, the terrain, 
incidental details like the mound of surrendered weapons, and the construction of 
extra arms from household supplies. Even the final display of wild Gallic courage is 
included for its implications regarding their nature, and details like the actual sacking 
of the town itself are summarised only briefly in comparison.
170
 Such details establish 
Caesarʼs preoccupation with the interpretation of participants through battle narrative 
and the role of battle in establishing their characteristics for his audience. 
 
The Virtus of the Nervii 
 
The Sabis River is notable in its assignation of attributes as Caesar utilises the 
contextual details of the episode to highlight the virtus of the Nervii, even if the 
quality is not well understood throughout the course of the battle.
171
 While this 
narrative is examined further in Chapter Four as Caesar constructs the overall passage 
in order to enhance the impact of his own contribution, as part of that objective, he 
also creates an enemy worthy of a great victory and the details of the encounter are 
used to build up the quality of the opponent.
172
 This approach qualifies the view of 
Lendon who uses the Sabis River account to argue that the battles are built on three 
themes of animus, virtus and tactics, as Lendon regards the references to virtus as 
based on Caesarʼs communication of causality, an approach that does not consider 
                                                 
169
 2.33.5-2.33.6. Note there are no Roman casualties mentioned either, as the emphasis is on the 
determination of the enemy. 
170
 2.33.7. The issue of justification is addressed further in Chapter Five pp. 291-319 in regards to 
Avaricum and the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri. 
171
 2.15-2.28. See Riggsby (2006) p. 191. Jervis, (2001) p. 52 notes the idea of virtus disconnected 
from battle. See also Jervis (2001) p. 62 for the “moral map” of Gaul established at 1.1.3-1.1.4. 
Brown (1999) has an excellent overall study on the literary aspects of this battle.  
172
 See pp. 222-238 for Caesarʼs more direct self-promotion through the narrative. 
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other authorial objectives in this analysis.
173
 Caesar only ensures that references to 
virtus appear as part of an introduction to the battle, and details of the battle itself do 
not feature enemy virtus until the end of the passage.
174
 Only at this point does he 
stress the characteristic and only then with regard to the manner that the enemy acquit 
themselves, where he openly states a tribute to their virtus.
175
 As Brown states “The 
interest in virtus that we have noted in Caesarʼs proem informs the battle-description 
itself, which opens and closes with vignettes of Nervian heroism”.176 The use of 
virtus conveys a message about the enemy, and the narrative is essentially used to 
create the impression of formidable enemy worthy of the Roman commander, 
separate to what are identified as the important aspects of the historical victory. 
 
Caesarʼs interpretation of the enemyʼs quality as adversaries is evident in the 
description of the Nerviiʼs last stand, where he openly describes his impression of 
them: 
 
At hostes etiam in extrema spe salutis tantam virtutem praestiterunt, ut cum primi 
eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus 
pugnarent, his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus, qui superessent ut ex tumulo tela 
in nostros conicerent pilaque intercepta remitterent: ut non nequiquam tantae 
virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere 
altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficillimis animi 
magnitudo redegerat.
177
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 Lendon (1999) pp. 277, 280, 320. Lendon pp. 316-317 attempts to explain the address to virtus as 
due to Caesar‟s understanding of warfare and a development of the Greek tradition of narration. For 
criticism of Lendon‟s use of battle scenes see Gerlinger (2008) p. 26.  
174
 Melchior (2004) p. 21 notes regarding the courage of Nervii that it shows Caesar was wise to allow 
the coalition to disperse at the start of Book Two. See also Rawlings (1998) p.188. fn. 30. Rawlings 
notes the overall frequency and use of virtus in the work. McDougall (1991) p. 634 notes how Dio 
plays down the Nervii and makes them unworthy opponents at 39.3. 
175
 2.27.3-2.27.5. See Lendon (1999) pp. 319, 323. Lendon argues this is due to Caesar‟s understanding 
of the quality in actual battle. This thesis argues it is a representation of the enemy in the form taken 
in the text, and not reflective of Caesar providing his understanding of actual combat. See Brown 
(2004) p. 304 for criticism of Lendon. 
176
 See Brown (1999) p. 335 on virtus.  
177
 2.27.3-2.27.5. 
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The purpose of the passage is clarified in this piece of apparent sententia and the best 
evidence of the objective regarding the battle.
178
 Gotoff notes that the passage is 
unusual, and that previously scholars had even regarded it as a later emendation, due 
to its rather striking nature, however it is consistent with the interpretation, if not the 
course of the battle narrative.
179
 The passage only provides anecdotal information, 
such as the Nervii fighting on top of their dead comrades, as the details support the 
general idea that they fought: ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari 
deberet.
180
 Gerlinger also notes the problematic nature of this passage from a 
reconstructive perspective, highlighting the difficulties of fighting on top of soft 
bodies, and Caesar does not rate the ability of the Nervii to fight in this manner, 
except for the implication they all died.
181
 This problem is likely due to the status of 
the passage as a tribute to the protagonists rather than a battlefield description, the use 
of ut indicative of how Caesar wishes his audience to assess the courage of each 
side.
182
 The comparison is designed to weigh up sides and their character rather than 
offer a meaningful descriptive discourse on the battle.  
 
This understanding of the battle is foreshadowed from the commencement of the 
campaign against the Belgae, demonstrating the extent of Caesarʼs concern to 
communicate the reputation of this particular tribe and prepare the narrative for their 
arrival. As part of the catalogue of the Belgae, he first introduces the Nervii as 
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 See Gotoff (1984) p. 17. Note how bodies appear in order to illustrate a point about the virtus of the 
Nervii, or at 2.10.1-2.10.4 to show the sheer number of Belgae who made up the multitude. See p. 85 
above. See also Livy 30.34 for bodies at Zama. On potential problems with this representation see 
Gerlinger (2008) pp. 150-154. 
179
 Gotoff (1984) pp. 15-16. See also Brown (1999) pp. 341-342. 
180
 This bears features in common with other battle narratives of the Bellum Gallicum where themes 
are enunciated through the use of generalised battle conditions. Caesar has constructed previous 
battles around character, for instance the types of Romans who would hurl themselves on enemy 
shields against Ariovistus, and the Helvetii who would shake of their shields and fight with 
unprotected chest. See 1.25.3-1.25.5 for the Helvetii and 1.52.5 for the fighting against the Germani. 
Just as with those previous encounters, Caesar makes use of a generalised aspect of character to 
invite the assessment of virtus. Important motivational aspects of the battle are abandoned to create 
the assessment. The implication is therefore one of choice, and a refusal to retreat. By distilling this 
final stage of the battle down to the generic, Caesar ensures that the issues of character and the 
discussion of the extraordinary courage of the Nervii are followed through to their conclusion. 
181
 Gerlinger (2008) pp. 19, 150-154. 
182
 Note how this qualifies Lendon (1999) pp. 318-319. Lendon believes Caesar commences with a 
tactical assessment of affairs, such as the terrain and the early successes of the legions on the left and 
in the centre. He then regards the concentration on the Twelfth Legion as evidence that Caesar 
wishes to highlight the importance of animus, and the morale of the men. Finally, the comment 
regarding virtus is seen as indicative of a Roman concern with this quality and its causal significance. 
For Lendon the narrative moves through three phases, from tactics to animus to virtus. This theory is 
imposed across the whole narrative, to explain a shift in Caesar‟s emphasis as the story progresses. 
This neglects a purpose to the writing beyond the explanation of the historical event. 
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Nervios, qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint.
183
 The Nervii, 
who do not play a major role in this earlier battle, are nevertheless given a distinctive 
introduction.
184
 The audience is therefore prepared for their later role through the 
information that they are extremely wild, and are culturally and physically remote 
from the other Belgae.
185
 In drawing attention to them, Caesar demonstrates that even 
in the description of a narrative in which they play no part, he is laying the foundation 
for the later confrontation, and the exceptional status of the Nervii is part of a pattern 
in the overall text.  
 
Following the first introduction of the Nervii, Caesar makes other narrative choices in 
order to address their virtus, indicating that the Book is structured to highlight the 
exceptional nature of this enemy. Two states, the Bellovaci and the Suessones, 
receive an extended narrative of their capitulation after the Belgae are defeated.
186
 
However in narrating the third state to fall, the Ambiani, he chooses not to narrate any 
of the details, such as negotiations, discussions, or any physical movements of the 
forces.
187
 The fate of the Ambiani is summarised with a simple statement of their 
surrender.
188
 In place of more detail about the Ambiani, the narrative shifts to 
enquiries about the Nervii, indicating their relative importance.
189
 The collapse of the 
Belgic states is not carried to a conclusion in the fall of the Ambiani, and the 
narration of the third stateʼs collapse is sacrificed in order to direct attention to the 
representation of the Nervii, and prepare for the interpretation of their behaviour in 
the forthcoming battle. 
 
The introduction of the Nervii shows clearly the pattern of addressing their virtus, as 
it gives attention to this characteristic over a more empirical assessment of the 
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 2.4.8-2.4.9.  
184
 On the catalogue see above pp. 74-77. Caesar states that the catalogue was only those promised to 
the war at 2.4.8. Note also that the extra detail regarding the Nervii appears unrelated to their 
numerical strength, which never features again until they are defeated.  
185
 For Melchior (2004) p. 21 the courage of Nervii shows that Caesar was wise to allow the coalition 
to disperse at start of Book Two. 
186
 The fall of these states is covered at 2.12-2.14. 
187
 2.15.2-2.15.3. 
188
 2.15.2-2.15.3. qui se suaque omnia sine mora dediderunt. 
189
 See 2.15.3-2.15.6. See in particular 2.15.2-2.15.3. Note the immediate shift in the statement ab eo 
loco in fines Ambianorum pervenit, qui se suaque omnia sine mora dediderunt. eorum fines Nervii 
attingebant. 
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people.
190
 According to the text Caesar does not confirm, nor receive information 
about numbers or fighting strength of the enemy, instead asking about their natura 
and mores.
191
 The information he receives provides elaboration on the initial 
assessment made in the Belgic catalogue.
192
 As he states: 
 
Quorum de natura moribusque cum quaereret, sic reperiebat: nullum esse aditum ad 
eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium 
inferri, quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum virtutemque remitti 
existimarent; esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare 
reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem 
proiecissent; confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem 
pacis accepturos.
193
 
 
The earlier description of the Nervii as ferus is elaborated on, with some specific 
details about why they are so wild and relatively hard natured compared to other 
Belgae.
194
 Importantly, previous numbers cited are not qualified, and the 50,000 
promised in the earlier catalogue of the Belgae remains the only figure referenced 
throughout the entire account.
195
 The answer to Caesarʼs question elaborates on 
details that clarify the character of the enemy, in particular the representation as a 
people of exceptional virtus, but it is highly selective in order to address his aims for 
the narrative.  
 
Caesar clearly at some point knew important tactical information about the Nervii, yet 
chooses to not discuss it here. As evidenced by his knowledge of the infantry focus of 
the Nervii, and the manner that they fortified the landscape with hedges, he seemingly 
knew about some of the tactics of the enemy prior to the battle.
196
 It is most likely that 
neighbours of the Nervii would have known this information and provided it if asked, 
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 Brown (1999) p. 334. See pp. 45-51 above on numbers. See also Pascucci (1956) p. 136. 
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 2.15.3. 
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 2.4.8. See Kraus (2009) p. 167. Kraus notes the segregation of those seen as distant from Rome. 
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 2.15.3-2.15.6. 
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 For ferus see 2.4.8. See Riggsby (2006) p. 16 on wine. See also Brown (1999) p. 334. 
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 2.4.8. Note how in the earlier Belgae account numbers were important, but now such factors are not 
given attention as the emphasis is on a characteristic. 
196
 2.17.4-2.17.5. These are discussed above at pp. 66-71. One final effect of this is that the 
narrator/commander is blinded to the physical location and strength of the enemy at this point, 
enhancing the threat of an unexpected or surprise attack, an impression that is developed as the 
narrative progresses. 
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however it is not mentioned at this point. The emphasis here is on the nature of the 
enemy, and tactical information regarding topography and fighting techniques are 
withheld.
197
 The information on the Nervii is purely an assessment of their nature, 
and the absence of other information suggests that the information is being revealed 
in order to establish their character. 
 
The answer to the questions about the Nervii also reveals the structural intent 
regarding their representation, as the use of a secondary narrator allows the passage to 
substitute for a speech in terms of behavioural insights.
198
 In many battles, Caesar 
takes care to include speeches and negotiations where he is able to outline concepts 
such as the justice of the battle, and the treachery or arrogance of the enemy.
199
 In this 
battle, a new protagonist is introduced but the nature of the conflict described means 
that there is no opportunity for negotiations. By having a secondary narrator, Caesar 
can integrate the representation of the enemy into his military enquiries, in particular 
the elements that make up their reputation for virtus.  
 
The construction of the reply allows the unknown narratorʼs comments to blend with 
the attitudes of the Nervii themselves, so that the essential elements are captured and 
the virtus theme enunciated similar to how it would be in an enemy speech. This 
concept is evident in the structure of the passage and the manner of narration, where 
the identity of the character using indirect speech, evident in the accusative infinitive 
construction, is not clearly identified.
200
 As Caesar is careful not to name who the 
speaker is, whether one of the Ambiani, or even a loyal ally like the Remi or Aedui, 
the words could almost be coming direct from the Nervii, and in fact suit them better 
than the unnamed speaker, as they are critical of anyone who would be in discussion 
with the Romans.
201
 The shifting subject of the passage confirms this, as it moves 
from an estimation of the ways and nature of the Nervii, to their attitudes, and the 
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 See 2.17.4-2.17.5.See above pp. 66-71 for a discussion of this effect. 
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 Martin Jr. (1965) p. 64 notes how a secondary narrator can also add veracity and examines 1.31.  
199
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Mor 803B who criticises the convention. 
201
 Anyone in discussion with Caesar is negotiating, an activity they despise.  
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manner they rebuke other Belgae and refuse to engage in negotiations.
202
 The 
construction of the passage shows that in spite of no direct communication existing 
between Caesar and the Nervii, he has a method of summing up their attitudes. The 
passage allows Caesar to develop the characteristics of the Nervii as it serves some of 
the functions of speech between the main protagonists. 
 
This interpretation is also evident in the manner Caesar isolates the Nervii, so that the 
audience is directed to view them as distinct from the rest of the Belgae. The defining 
feature of the Belgae in Book Two is an indistinguishable mass, whose numbers are 
neither effective in battle nor their courage and fighting spirit exceptional.
203
 In 
contrast to this mass, he states that the Nervii do not trade in common goods, with the 
implication that the weakness that affects others is not applicable to them.
204
 They are 
isolated culturally, as they do not trade in goods they regard as subversive to their 
animus.
205
 The Nervii even regard themselves as superior to the other tribes, rebuking 
those who capitulate to the Romans.
206
 The passage even prepares the audience to 
admire this enemy, as Caesar implies Roman qualities in them when they despise 
those who would lay low virtus and the patria.
207
 Prior to the confrontation, this 
passage serves to define the Nervii as protagonists different to the rest of the Belgae, 
and to make them worthy opponents for a Roman audience. 
 
However the distance the Nervii have from others is only a metaphorical divide, and 
indicative of how the presentation is a literary construction. The Nervii are very far 
removed according to the catalogue; however they are also described as bordering 
directly on the Ambiani, a Belgic state.
208
 The use of the superlative seems excessive 
considering that no emphasis is placed on the distance travelled.
209
 The commentary 
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 The Nervii are described by the unnamed speaker as contemptuous of the Belgae who capitulated, 
which is not strictly speaking part of their nature and ways, but something that would only come 
from direct communication with them.  
203
 On the Belgae see above pp. 71-88. On their characteristics see pp. 177-184 above. 
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 2.15.4. See also Jervis (2001) pp. 62-65. 
205
 2.15.4-2.15.5. 
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 2.15.5-2.15.6. As Brown notes the description of Nervian defences is used to isolate them, as these 
exist to defend against their neighbours. See Brown (1999) p. 335. For the hedges see 2.17.4. 
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 2.15.5-2.15.6. While Jervis (2001) p. 65 focuses on the idea of virtus; the mention of patria may 
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 longissimeque absint 2.4.8-2.4.9. See 2.12-2.15 for the states that capitulate, the Suessones, 
Bellovaci and Ambiani. See 2.15.3 for the Nervii bordering on the Ambiani, the use of the word 
attingunt clear evidence of proximity, not distance. 
209
 See Pelling (1981) pp. 741-742. 
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appears to discuss a physical factor such as distance, but it is the nature of the group 
that is developed.  
 
Most importantly, this introduction functions to openly anticipate the end of the 
battle.
210
 The key element of virtus, essential to the conclusion to the battle, is clearly 
enunciated here.
211
 The courage of the Nervii is iterated several times, through the 
repetition of virtus, and their refusal to compromise on issues of courage.
212
 The 
foreshadowing of their last stand at the end of the battle is evident in their contempt 
for those who capitulate, and their rejection of any attempts at negotiation.
213
 The 
purpose of the passage is clear in preparing the audience for how the battle 
description closes, through the concentration on this one particular aspect of the 
enemy. 
 
A second piece of intelligence gathering is utilised to further elaborate on the Nervii 
reputation in war, and to establish their status as worthy enemies by demonstrating 
their authority and power: 
 
Cum per eorum fines triduo iter fecisset, inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a 
castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse; trans id flumen omnes Nervios 
consedisse adventumque ibi Romanorum exspectare una cum Atrebatibus et 
Viromanduis, finitimis suis nam his utrisque persuaserant, uti eandem belli 
fortunam experirentur; exspectari etiam ab iis Atuatucorum copias atque esse in 
itinere; mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur, in eum locum 
coniecisse, quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.
214
  
 
                                                 
210
 See Mannetter, (1995) pp. 103 on foreshadowing. Mannetter discusses 2.17.2 and the marching 
order. This thesis disagrees with Mannetter‟s idea that the mention of captives is supposed to 
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not inform the content of most of the battle, only the general context. 
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 2.16.1-2.16.5. 
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Caesar uses this passage to give the Nervii prominence among their peers, situating 
them in a Belgic hierarchy just as he did the tribes of the catalogue.
215
 Two tribes join 
the Nervii with a third on the way, peoples described as persuaded to join them. The 
Nervii possess a high reputation among their neighbours, enough to convince those 
neighbours to test out their fortunes in war together. Furthermore, Caesar relates the 
movement of the Aduatuci, even though the Aduatuci will not feature in this battle, so 
that the Nervii appear to be the locus for a gathering of forces.
216
 The fact that these 
tribes were already committed to war is not mentioned here, as the instrumentality of 
the Nervii is the objective of the passage.
217
 The second piece of intelligence is 
important as it allows the Nervii to be presented as a worthy foe, as a tribe of 
significance among the Belgae with a clear reputation and respect of their neighbours.  
 
The purpose of establishing the nature of this enemy is particularly evident in the 
manner in which Caesar presents their campaign as an offensive one. He does not 
stress the essential defensiveness of the Nervian objective; instead he presents them 
as marshalling their forces, with a focus on their willingness to fight.
218
 The Nervii 
may be stationary awaiting the Romans, but they have been busy, and have persuaded 
others to join them.
219
 More importantly, they await the Romans with the objective of 
testing the fortunes of war, a statement that implies they are keen to try themselves 
against the Romans.
220
 The repetition of exspectare…exspectari implies that they are 
not acting defensively but merely pausing, staying in one place and waiting for an 
opportunity to fight.
221
 The repetition also foreshadows the actual battle and their 
attack, as the plans of the Nervii involve attacking when the baggage train comes into 
view, and the passage anticipates that surprise attack.
222
 The presentation establishes 
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 See the descending order of authority in the Belgae discussed at pp. 179-181 above. Note the 
absence of any dispute of leadership in regards to the Nervii, illustrating their uncontested authority.  
216
 See 2.29 for their appearance after the battle. 
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and already had promised men for the war. See 2.4 for the full list of tribes. 
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 2.16.3.  
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222
 Whether the attack was actually a surprise is unclear, certainly the presentation of the battle 
attempts to give this impression. See 2.17.2-2.17.5, for the plan. 
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that the forthcoming attack is related to their eagerness for combat, as the 
characteristics of the people and the plan are conflated to establish their aggression. 
 
Even defensive precautions are associated with this aspect of their nature, and the 
manner Caesar narrates the relocation of their family members is designed to support 
the idea of a combat focused enemy. The Nervii are described as locating their 
families in marshlands because these people are the ones least useful in battle.
223
 This 
reasoning suggests the Nervii are discarding the non-combatants, those useless for 
fighting, an action more appropriate for a tribe keen for battle. While the safety aspect 
is implicit in the location where they are placed, the primary reason is because these 
people are useless for war. The Nervii choose to settle matters in the manly act of 
battle and have prepared themselves accordingly, indicating that these precautions are 
used to show the Nervii are acting consistently with their representation as fierce 
warriors. 
 
In a marked contrast to this ongoing portrayal in the campaign narrative, virtus is not 
addressed adequately in the battle, as it only exists to create a worthy enemy, rather 
than to explain the course of events. Caesar only contextualises the account with 
virtus at the start of battle. In his speech to the Tenth Legion virtus is stated to be a 
factor that is required by the men.
224
 In spite of such an introduction, he does not 
directly use the term until the conclusion. During the battle he explains events in 
terms of manoeuvre, leadership and topography.
225
 For example, the success of the 
Ninth and Tenth Legions is phrased in terms of a combination of terrain and the 
exhaustion of the enemy.
226
 Similarly, he accounts for key actions on the battlefield in 
terms of training and leadership, such as the ability of the Romans to form up under 
pressure at the start, and his own ability to stabilise a potential rout.
227
 Within the 
battle, virtus can only be implied, demonstrating that the term has limited application 
except in providing general commentary and context.  
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The dichotomy between the impression Caesar creates, and an ostensible 
reconstruction of battle is never more apparent than in the closing stages of the battle, 
when the descriptive aspects of the narrative start to break down in favour of 
developing the idea of virtus:  
 
Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta, ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus 
confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos 
hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent, equites vero, ut turpitudinem 
fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnantes studio se legionariis militibus 
praeferrent.
228
 
 
In this description of the closing stage, important physical aspects of the battlefield 
disappear, such as the camp, the legions and even the locations of the units, so that 
where exactly this final stage occurs is unclear. Caesar does not narrate where or how 
Roman units contribute, such as the Tenth Legion and the arrival of the 
reinforcements, who merely affect what he calls tanta...commutatio. Even whole units 
disappear from the narrative, and the final fate of the Eighth and Eleventh Legions is 
left unsaid; the last heard of them is that they were engaged in combat near the 
riverbank.
229
 Caesar almost completely abandons descriptive details, suggesting that 
his purpose at this point is not to summarise or clarify the actual state of the 
battlefield for his audience, as the narrative drops details unrelated to virtus.  
 
Caesar instead chooses to describe the units who best illustrate the theme of virtus. 
Gotoff notes that the passage focuses on the three units who were probably least 
effective in bringing about the defeat of the Nervii, the wounded, cavalry and calones, 
the latter of whom are not even armed.
230
 Nevertheless, each unit is chosen as it 
demonstrates aspects of courage, whether it is overcoming wounds, restoring self-
esteem or fighting unarmed against armed men.
231
 These units are unrelated in 
battlefield terms but are nevertheless compared through a literary matching.
232
 Virtus 
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 2.27.1-2.27.3. 
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 2.27.1-2.27.3. See Gotoff (1984) pp. 15-16. As Gotoff states there are three groups of Romans who 
have to overcome a specific difficulty. Note that Caesar does not clarify if these are the cavalry who 
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 See Eden (1962) p. 110. 
232
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is highlighted through the difference in status before and after the change in 
circumstances, and who therefore has the greatest difficulties to overcome at this 
point.
233
 Caesar concentrates on the units whose transformation from cowardice or 
weakness to courage is most striking, not on the most effective fighting units, as his 
objective is to develop a thematic, not descriptive conclusion to the battle that is 
focused on the representation of the enemy as a worthy foe, and the overall 
interpretation of the battle against that criterion. 
 
The status of the passage as a tribute to a brave opponent is further evident in the 
problems it creates for understanding the overall course of battle. In the early stages 
of the battle, Caesar does not overtly stress the difficulties that the enemy faced, 
possibly to avoid influencing the tension of the early narrative.
234
 The battle therefore 
lacks clarity, as Caesar withholds context for understanding the affair until the end, 
and only introducing the difficulties faced by the enemy at the end in praise of their 
virtus.
235
 He also leaves the audience with an impression of courage that only seems 
to account for one part of the battlefield as he describes the Nervii fighting over the 
bodies of their fallen, and as noted above whole legions disappear from the 
account.
236
 The varying criteria for inclusion demonstrate that virtus is applied to the 
character of the enemy, but at the expense of understanding the course of the whole 
battle. 
 
Further information is provided that illustrates the aim of developing a worthy enemy, 
as the virtus concept is alluded to after the battle. Caesar provides an account of the 
devastating toll that this battle took among the Nervii, in his description of 
discussions with the people who were left behind by the fighting men.
237
 This comes 
close to the last stand, and so provides a numeric assessment of that courage.
238
 This 
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 The fact the Romans drive off some elements so easily is evidence of this, Caesar noting the effect 
of higher ground at 2.23.1. Nevertheless the passage has focused on the speed of the enemy, the 
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Legion. See pp. 66-71 
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 On unfavourable locations see Lendon (1999) p. 302. 
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 Again Caesar is using a secondary narrator here for verisimilitude, but with a profound literary 
effect. See the Helvetii battle at 1.21.1-1.21.3, where Caesar uses a census to show the scope of the 
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 Brown (1999) pp. 341-342 notes this. See also the Aduatuci above at pp. 191-192. 
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may explain why the narrative of the battle ends with the last stand, as the literary 
purpose is to leave this paramount in the audienceʼs mind.239 The manner in which 
the virtus of the Nervii is referenced, from the moment they are introduced through to 
the negotiations with the non-combatants, suggests that the book was written with this 
particular interpretation of the battle in mind. 
 
The tribute to virtus in the final stand of the Nervii does not provide the evidence to 
judge how effective the quality is in determining the course of battle, with much of 
the battle still unresolved at the close of narration.
240
 Similarly, the effect of the 
recovery of various elements, such as the calones is also unexplained, and they only 
illustrate the theme. The shift to a discussion of virtus at the end of the battle is a 
transformation in the narrative to a purely literary assessment, based on the criteria of 
addressing the nature of the Nervii. The final passage is a comment on the enemyʼs 
courage, the clearest evidence that Caesar is abandoning any descriptive approach 
altogether to praise them with a sample vignette. In this regard, he carefully 
constructs his account to address the idea and to create the impression of his choosing 
regarding the participants. 
 
Caesarʼs development of the Nervii ensures that this particular enemy is a memorable 
one worthy of the Roman commander. He utilises contextual information such as 
intelligence gathering to develop this impression, and within the battle itself 
concentrates on details that further emphasise the qualities of the enemy. The battle 
construction has an important role to play in establishing the charactersʼ place in the 
narrative and their relationship to Caesarʼs achievements, even where this comes as 
the expense of clarity regarding the course of combat. The confrontation with the 
Nervii is therefore a distinctive example of how Caesar utilises battle to create 
impressions regarding the characters described, in this case to build a worthy enemy 
that reflects the greatness of the commander in defeating them.  
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Individual Credit and Responsibility 
 
The role of battle in creating impressions regarding groups is matched by its portrayal 
of individuals, where details of conflict are selected to create or support an 
interpretation of particular characters. While Pitcher notes a “spareness” to Caesarʼs 
presentation of character, the narrator still manages to encourage an impression of 
these individuals using battle, whether that is the diminishment of Ariovistus, where 
the boasts of the enemy commander are offset by his eventual defeat, or 
Vercingetorix, who is contrasted to Caesar in terms of his command capabilities.
241
 
The representation of these individuals through battle is addressed in their relevant 
case studies.
242
 This section specifically addresses some of the individual 
subordinates who act in the absence of their commander, who Welch notes are 
generally treated well in the text.
243
 Examples include the meritorious behaviour of 
Crassus against the Aquitani, where there is a clear reference to his abilities in the 
details of battle selected for the work.
244
 Similarly the description of Labienus and his 
measures against the Eburones and Nervii in Book Five, and the Treveri in Book Six, 
includes details to indicate his care, foresight and ability to cope with the threat.
245
 
However, one of the most important character representations is an exception to these 
positive portrayals, and in Book Five, the account of battle assigns responsibility for a 
massacre to Sabinus.
246
 The battle narrative displays considerable focus on this 
individual and his relationship to the course of events, in order to attribute direct 
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 Pitcher (2007) p. 106 notes that Caesar “shows a reversion to the spareness of Herodotus and 
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Note also there is criticism of Quintus Cicero at 6.42.1-6.42.2. 
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responsibility to him. As with the other instances examined, the battle has a specific 
purpose in directing attention to Caesarʼs interpretation of the individual described.  
 
The description of Crassusʼ campaign against the tribes of the Aquitani is a clear 
example of how Caesar contextualises battle to assign credit to subordinates.
247
 This 
is evident in the motivation ascribed to the forces involved in one battle, which is 
stated as follows: 
 
Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua 
virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem, quid sine 
imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent, perspici 
cuperent.
248
 
 
In this passage the motivation assigned to the troops is that of performance without 
the support of the imperator or the rest of the army, a self-promotional aim that 
ostensibly indicates the importance of Caesar.
249
 However, the specific reference to a 
youthful leader is actually a contextual statement that places Crassus in a central role, 
where his youth is contrasted with the achievements made.
250
 Consequently, the 
campaign should be interpreted as an assessment of his abilities, whether that is his 
precautions prior to setting out, or his performance in battle.
251
 During the campaign 
he shows clemency, he makes important preparations on siege works and supply, and 
consults with the troops as required.
252
 Eventually Crassus is successful, and the 
extent of his victory is evident in the catalogue of tribes who submit; similar to the 
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at 2.26.5. 
250
 Crassus is described as adulescentulo duce. This is the only use of the two words together in the 
text. Note he is also mentioned as giving another harangue at 3.24.5. See Welch (1998) p. 92. 
251
 Note how his perspective is adopted, his decision making examined in a similar manner to the 
Octodurus narrative discussed above at pp. 88-111.  
252
 Note clemency at 3.22.1, preparations at 3.21.2, supply and decisions at 3.20.2, and consultation 
with the troops at 3.23.8. 
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manner Caesar represents his own victories.
253
 The details of the campaign are part of 
an examination and accreditation of the young commander and the military data 
provided serves this overall objective. 
 
The account of Labienus and Indutiomarus in Book Five is also designed to highlight 
the Roman officerʼs abilities.254 An attack on the person of Indutiomarus by the forces 
of Labienus ultimately decides the campaign, and Caesar appears careful to ensure 
that the overall presentation draws attention to the subordinateʼs importance.255 The 
attack on Labienusʼ camp is described with very few details except where they impact 
on his person, an example being the way terrain is described to demonstrate his 
confidence.
256
 Similarly, the reason the Nervii abandon the fight once Indutiomarus 
falls are unclear, especially considering their previous reputation in combat and 
Caesarʼs statement that they intended to attack in any case.257 By contrast the decision 
of Labienus to attack the person of Indutiomarus is included, even though the names 
of those who successfully killed the enemy commander are absent, the importance 
being the decision of Labienus and the effectiveness of his plan.
258
 This selectivity is 
indicative of the agency given to Labienus at the expense of other details related to 
battle.  
 
Similarly, in the battle against the Treveri in Book Six, details are provided to credit 
the stratagem employed by Labienus, which is evident in the description of the plans 
of each side and the manner in which Caesar describes those elements that indicate 
how thoroughly successful the plan was.
259
 In this account the enemy is described 
                                                 
253
 3.27. Crassus effectively takes on a role normally assigned to Caesar, who lists tribes that submitted 
to him, for example at 2.34, 5.21. 
254
 5.56-5.58. Kraus (2009) p. 167 notes an essential contrast between Labienus and Sabinus. See 
Welch (1998) pp. 98-101 on Labienus. Rambaud (1966) p. 298 regards Caesar as downplaying the 
role of Labienus, which is not the case in this account. See also Jervis (2001) p. 160. 
255
 5.58.4. 
256
 5.57.1. See also 5.57-5.58 on Labienus‟ care to muster cavalry. 
257
 5.58.7. For their reputation see above at pp. 192-204. See 5.56.1 where the Nervii are planning war 
anyway. 
258
 5.58.6. Contrast Gallic cavalry named at 4.12, discussed below at pp. 309-313, where naming them 
is important for that narrative.  
259
 See 6.7-6.8. Welch (1998) p. 99 notes how Caesar promotes himself in this account, particularly at 
6.8.3-6.8.5 where Labienus‟ exhortation is similar to that of Crassus in mentioning the imperator. 
See also the stratagems of Labienus at 7.57-7.62, where emphasis is on his rationales. He is given 
virtus, and even a speech. 
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only in general terms and details such as their location are vague in the narrative.
260
 In 
describing the circumstances, only Labienusʼ plan of feigned flight is communicated, 
and no mention of important relative strengths of the sides is given.
261
 However there 
is a great deal of precision regarding Labienus and his precautions, such as the 
deployment of a reserve to guard the baggage.
262
 Even the inclusion of the enemy 
perception achieves this effect, as Labienusʼ forces are perceived as an exiguam 
manum, establishing the feeling of superiority that the enemy enjoy and an 
understanding of why they are lured into the trap.
263
 Other reasons given for why the 
Treveri attack are also included to explain why they fall for the ruse, and their 
impatience at waiting for the Germani, the lure of booty, the size of Roman force and 
its apparent fear are all described.
264
 While this describes enemy objectives, it does so 
in order to highlight the extent to which the enemy is duped by the Roman 
commander. The details appear to describe why Labienus is so successful, illustrating 
that they support the representation of the individual. 
 
The details of battle that are provided all serve to support the successful behaviour of 
Labienus and the account is summarised, or elaborated in accordance with this 
prerequisite. The centrality of Labienus is most apparent in the rare inclusion of a pre-
battle harangue, which is designed to capture his competency.
265
 The speech is given 
before the men are even in battle formation, according to its place in the narrative, but 
nevertheless establishes Labienus in the commanderʼs role, not just as formulator of 
                                                 
260
 For example at 6.7.1 Caesar states that enemy was two days away, and then states they set down 
fifteen miles away. This does not mean the Treveri moved at 7.5 miles a day, as Caesar is not 
concerned with the relationship of empirical details. Caesar wants to convey concepts of proximity 
and countermeasures more than empirical relationships. Note also at 6.7.5 the details of the river are 
only given when Labienus makes camp. This does not address the defensive nature of the position for 
the enemy, who may also use it that way. The effect is that Labienus is being careful in using the 
river, but the enemy are more aggressive.  
261
 6.7.6-6.7.8. 
262
 6.7.4. Note the lack of numbers for the enemy; they are simply a great of force of infantry and 
cavalry. Precision regarding Labienus‟ forces in opposition is important as it establishes the care of 
the subordinate.  
263
 6.8.1. This reference to the Romans is about promoting Labienus, and the emphasis is on the 
cleverness of his trick and the success with which it works. See also Sabinus at 3.17-3.19, where 
there are many similarities such as the trickery of the commander, and the complex reasoning of the 
Gauls.  
264
 6.8.1-6.8.2. Note the summary of the terrain as iniquo loco at 6.8.1. There is a major inconsistency 
not explained by the account, which is why the Treveri wait for reinforcements when they are shown 
to have overwhelming superiority. Caesar only focuses though on the aspects of the plans that 
support his objective for Labienus. 
265
 Note how Crassus is similarly said to have urged his troops on at 3.24.5 and 3.21.1 While Galba is 
not given a speech at 3.4, the circumstances there are described to show there was no time before the 
assault.  
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the plan, but as the central figure of the short narrative.
266
 By contrast once Labienusʼ 
plan is successful, Caesar quickly resolves the combat, the enemy flight and even the 
overall campaign, and the submission of the enemy state is all given together very 
quickly.
267
 The details of the account and even the results of battle are primarily 
included to recognise the abilities of Labienus, and his measures that lead to the 
defeat of the enemy. This otherwise brief account nevertheless displays the role of the 
narrative in creating an impression regarding the individual.  
 
The Behaviour of Sabinus  
 
In Book Five battle narrative serves a more comprehensive role in generating an 
impression regarding a subordinate, and the account of the massacre of Sabinus and 
Cotta is designed to establish blame for the defeat and massacre of Roman forces.
268
 
While the censure of Sabinus in this regard has been well established, the impact this 
has on the description of combat has been less studied.
269
 Caesar constructs the 
account of the confrontation to support his overall opinion that the forces left the 
camp in error, and to show various failures of command by Sabinus.
270
 In describing 
the episode information is provided about the campaign, the forces and their 
movements, often within the context of an analysis of this individual and his 
                                                 
266
 6.8.3-6.8.5.  
267
 6.8.5-6.8.7. Note the sequence. The Germani return home at the flight of the Treveri, not at the 
submission of the state, associating them closely with Labienus‟ plan. Note also the similarity of the 
account to the Octodurus narrative discussed at pp. 101-102 above, where combat focuses on the 
defeat of enemy expectations as much as the physical circumstances. 
268
 5.26-5.37. Brown (2004). See in particular pp. 297-300. Brown has an excellent analysis of the 
contrast of this and the Quintus Cicero siege at 5.38-5.52, referred to further below at pp. 335-339. 
Welch (1998) p. 93, notes how Sabinus is not criticised in the earlier representation of him at 3.17-
19, but is held entirely responsible for the massacre. In particular see 3.17.7 for Sabinus‟ caution in 
the previous account. Welch also notes how this passage is longer than that used to describe the 
whole summer‟s campaigning in Britain. For the massacre see also Powell (1998) p. 116 and 
Melchior (2004) p. 46. For other criticism of a subordinate see 6.42.1-6.42.2. 
269
 Carrington (1939) p. 104 suggests Sabinus was the senior commander and thus responsible. 
Rosenstein (1990) p. 114-152 discusses how defeat is viewed as an aspect of morality of the 
commander. This explains how virtus could recover a reputation even in defeat. Therefore a defeated 
commander could attract no criticism if he behaved morally. As Rosenstein notes at p. 116, an 
example is Flaminius, who is reinstated with aristocratic values in the Livy account, in contrast to the 
earlier Polybius account. See Polybius 3.84.6, Livy 22.6.2-22.6.4. See Rasmussen (1963) pp. 21-27. 
Rasmussen examines the speech of Sabinus to show how it emphasises the folly of his plan. 
270
 See 5.52.6. Note the singular genitive for legatus, establishing it is Sabinus who is blamed. For 
leaving the camp see pp. 335-339 below, as the account of Quintus Cicero illustrates the correctness 
of staying. On the relevance of character see Nousek (2004) p. 172. 
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culpability.
271
 As the description of combat reveals, the overall assigning of 
responsibility, and the account for the battle as a failure of character, is a significant 
factor in the creation of the battle narrative.  
 
In his description of the overall episode, Caesarʼs primary objective appears to be the 
examination of the failed commander. Sabinus is an unreliable character who is 
described as shouting continually and behaving in an unseemly manner at the council 
of Roman defenders.
272
 The attribution of direct responsibility to Sabinus is also 
evident as the activity described enforces the contention that Sabinus makes a mistake 
in leaving camp.
273
 In a conference of commanders, Sabinus has his way and follows 
the invitation of the enemy to leave.
274
 Iteration of the length of the baggage train and 
overall column length as the Romans leave is clearly designed to reinforce the 
vulnerability of the forces, and the idea that leaving the camp openly exposes them to 
an attack while on the march.
275
 This point of vulnerability is also apparent in the 
attention given to the behaviour of the soldiers, in particular their attitude towards 
personal possessions.
276
 Caesar describes the menʼs concern for personal baggage in 
order to show the risks of leaving camp, as it highlights that men are dangerously 
close to acting as individuals when poorly led, and are less of an effective fighting 
entity when travelling with baggage.
277
 This concept is specifically reinforced in the 
description of battle, where the men check the baggage during the fight and add to the 
confusion as a result.
278
 The details of the baggage and personal possessions are 
included for their relevance to the decision of Sabinus, as they not only describe the 
men, but highlight the flaws in decision making that are instrumental in the disaster, 
and are part of the overall censure of the commander. 
 
                                                 
271
 Powell (1998) p. 117. Powell states Sabinus is “blackguarded” as the sole author of the disaster. 
272
 Powell (1998) p. 118 notes the inappropriate emotion of Sabinus. See clamitabat at 5.29.1. See also 
5.33.1 for the most dramatic example of fear and lack of judgement. At p. 118 Powell notes Sabinus‟ 
response to Cotta is “rabble rousing” when he involves the troops and a ʻdemagogic punch” in short 
alliterative phrases. See Powell (1998) pp. 118-119. As Powell notes this type of demagogic 
behaviour was used by Clodius against Lucullus and the optimates. 
273
 See Brown (2004) pp. 296. 
274
 On negotiating with the enemy, see p. 336-337 below.  
275
 5.32.2, 5.35.3. 
276
 5.31.4-5.31.5, 5.33.6. 
277
 5.31.4. Note the contrast to Cicero‟s defence discussed at p. 337-338 below.  
278
 5.33.6. 
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The failures of Sabinus are also established through the description of combat. Caesar 
clearly constructs the account to indicate how important correct behaviour is for the 
result. This is evident in the description of the Roman response to the ambush, which 
contrasts good and bad behaviour in combat: 
 
Tum demum Titurius, ut qui nihil ante providisset, trepidare et concursare 
cohortesque disponere, haec tamen ipsa timide atque ut eum omnia deficere 
viderentur; quod plerumque iis accidere consuevit qui in ipso negotio consilium 
capere coguntur. at Cotta qui cogitasset haec posse in itinere accidere atque ob eam 
causam profectionis auctor non fuisset, nulla in re communi saluti deerat, et in 
appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia 
praestabat.
279
 
 
The passage concentrates on a contrast in behaviour, rather than the actual steps taken 
in response to the attack.
280
 Sabinus shows no foresight, whereas Cotta has foreseen 
the result and acts as a commander should.
281
 While Caesar mentions such behaviour, 
he does not state what this actually means, as Cotta may have foreseen the result, but 
no precautions are actually mentioned.
282
 This lack of detail regarding the 
consequences of their behaviour and activity is due to a focus on how they comport 
themselves in battle rather than the actual orders and measures taken. 
 
Combat is given a narrative structure in which Sabinus is given instrumentality in 
determining not only events, but the values on display.
283
 The sides are effectively 
equal, as the Romans are able to resist in spite of the failure of command.
284
 However 
Sabinus negotiates, dies and then the enemy make an attack that is immediately 
successful, associating his death with the final overrun of the defenders.
285
 No 
explanation is given as to how or why this is able to succeed, when Caesar shows that 
                                                 
279
 5.33.1-5.33.3. 
280
 Brown (2004) pp. 297-298.  
281
 Powell (1998) p. 119 notes not only how Sabinus fails to foresee the ambush, but panics once the 
fighting starts. At p. 120 Powell asks whether Ambiorix would have said the men “may” be spared in 
treating with Sabinus. The point is that Caesar is using the words to show Sabinus is selfish. 
282
 Caesar does not even define who ordered the army to form up in a circle, stating it was non 
reprehendendum at 5.33.4. 
283
 Welch (1998) p. 93, notes how this change in the character from his earlier portrayal at 3.17-3.19.  
284
 5.34.2. 
285
 5.34.3-5.37.4 
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the Romans are holding their own at this point. The result of battle is hinged on 
Sabinusʼ surrender, his death and those commanders he had with him. Caesar further 
uses anecdotes, in particular exempla, to clarify that the Romans are defending 
courageously, and the narrative describes the fates of individuals who represent 
Roman courage and pietas in the face of hard combat.
286
 These men partially redeem 
the situation through the display of Roman values.
287
 Sabinus in the following 
passage yields to the enemy, a drastic contrast to the behaviour of his subordinates, 
and the placement breaks the maintenance of Roman ideals with an instance of 
cowardly behaviour that leads directly to defeat.
288
 Following Sabinusʼ death, the 
closing description of Cotta dying courageously, the action of the aquilifer in 
throwing the standard into the camp, and the Roman suicides all fall within this 
sequence of contrasting behaviour that defines the battle structurally.
289
 The frame of 
reference is a contrast around which the progress of the battle narrative is developed, 
in order to highlight the character of Sabinus and his instrumentality in the defeat.  
 
This focus on contrasts occurs at the expense of the actual manoeuvre and movement 
of men. The manner in which the Romans form a circle is not mentioned, nor is the 
actual nature of the attacks by the enemy described at this stage.
290
 The initial enemy 
attack is stated in terms of what they are attempting to do, attacking the rear and 
preventing escape, but in response to the Roman circle, the enemy are simply 
described with the statement that they have a plan.
291
 What this exactly means in 
                                                 
286
 This is why there is no mention of numbers with which to compare the side, as the objective is to 
create a parity that Sabinus undermines. See 5.35.6-5.35.8. This includes the wounded Cotta, but also 
men who had served as centurions. Their description at this point appears to be purely to demonstrate 
the endurance of the Romans and their adherence to values such as pietas, as is evident in the 
description of Quintus Lucanius attempting to save his son. Powell (1998) pp. 120, 122-123, notes 
that vignettes appear as distractions usually when things are going poorly, however the objective here 
is more important as it provides contrasts to Sabinus.  
287
 Brown (2004) pp. 299-300. 5.35.5-5.35.6. Note there is a corruption at 5.34.2 where the word pares 
is specifically used in erant et virtute et numero pugnandi pares. While the use of the term supports 
this argument, the rest of the text is sufficient to show the concept and the balancing of the battle.  
288
 5.36.1-5.37.3 is particularly important, as Sabinus treats with this enemy, whereas Cotta‟s response 
is a short negative at 5.36.3. The sending of an interpreter here is a rare inclusion, but an important 
reminder of how this is a foreign enemy. 
289
 Brown (2004) p. 300. See 5.37.4-5.37.7. Cotta dies with the soldiers at 5.37.4. Powell (1998) p. 121 
also calls the tale of the standard bearer “a soothing distraction”. See also the representation of Curio 
in the Bellum Civile at 2.42.4-2.42.5. These characters contrast dramatically with Sabinus who is 
granted no redemptive end. 
290
 5.33. Much is unclear in this battle, such as where the other commanders were. It is not even clear if 
the battle stopped while the negotiations occurred. However the effect of what is included is 
important; the submission of the flawed leader equals enemy victory. 
291
 at barbaris consilium non defuit 5.34.1. 
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combat is unclear, as Caesar limits his description to general issues of motivation, 
such as the desire for booty, and the urging of troops to fight hard.
292
 The only 
planning mentioned occurs later in the passage, after the Romans put up resistance, 
where Ambiorix orders his men to fall back and use missiles in order to wear out the 
cohorts.
293
 The structure of the battle is primarily one of behavioural contrasts, and 
those aspects of battle that enable a critical assessment of Sabinus, even if this occurs 
at the expense of the activity undertaken. 
 
The case of Sabinus is an exceptional one, with the narrative structured to focus on 
his behaviour and personal responsibility for an unusual defeat. However it is part of 
a pattern in which battle is utilised to encourage Caesarʼs interpretation of the nature 
and characteristics of those represented. Information is included to develop 
impressions, whether that is to introduce the enemy, as is the case with the Helvetii, 
or to illustrate other qualities such as barbarism. Such details form the foundation of 
accounts and create an interpretation regarding the nature of enemies like the Belgae 
and Aduatuci. In the case of the Nervii, the complexity of the representation is at odds 
with the description of combat, where virtus defines the interpretation of battle, but is 
not fully accounted for through the course of combat. Battle also appears constructed 
to prioritise the interpretation of individuals, whether these be praised or condemned, 
and serves an important role in Caesarʼs understanding of behaviour and 
characteristics. This role of battle is critical considering that the main character of the 
Bellum Gallicum, Caesar himself, is the central figure of the work, and the persuasive 
role that battle plays in his representation is the focus of the rest of this study. 
                                                 
292
 5.34.1-5.34.2. Note also the general construction at 5.34-5.35, which summarises the conditions of 
battle and the difficulties, but states that the Romans are able to hold on.  
293
 5.34.1-5.34.4. 
CHAPTER FOUR: BATTLE AND THE PROMOTION OF 
CAESAR  
 
 
 
This chapter illustrates that the construction of battle supports a major objective of the 
Bellum Gallicum, the self-representation of Caesar, and that promoting the author and 
commander is the prime persuasive role of many of these accounts. The self-
promotional aim of the work is well established, Osgood arguing that Caesar uses the 
overall text for political purposes through ongoing self-representation designed to 
evoke parallels with other great commanders.
1
 At a fundamental level this self-
promotion is evident in the manner in which Caesar locates himself throughout the 
work, and the way he structures combat to emphasise his own presence. In battle there 
is also a relationship between the commanderʼs presence on the battlefield and the 
resolution of thematic issues, as illustrated in the battles against Ariovistus and the 
Venetii.
2
 However, the case studies of this chapter have been selected as they indicate 
the extent to which battle narrative is guided by self-aggrandisement, as self-
promotional statements do not sit within an otherwise descriptive narrative. A study 
of the Sabis River battle shows that the objective of structuring the literary turning 
point of the battle around Caesarʼs own contribution fundamentally drives the 
description of combat.
3
 Even where the commander is absent, the importance of his 
presence can be evident, and the siege of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp is analysed to show 
how the purpose of drawing attention to the commanderʼs arrival determines the 
structure of the battle.
4
 These case studies show that the construction of battle 
narrative is determined by the objective of maximising the impact of Caesarʼs 
personal presence and contribution. 
 
                                                 
1
 See Osgood (2009) p. 351. Osgood states that Caesar starts as a Marius averting the threat from the 
North, then becomes a Pompey “fighting at the colourful edges of the earth” i.e. in strange lands, 
with strange animals and dark forests. By the end he has set himself up as exemplar of qualities such 
as celeritas and clementia. See also Welch (1998) pp. 85-86; Riggsby (2006) p. 207-214; Collins 
(1952) p. 50; Goldsworthy, (1998) p. 211. While reliant on an essentially reconstructive motive 
behind battle narratives, Goldsworthy still recognises the self-promotional objective, as does Lendon 
(1999) p. 277, although Lendon only states battle is “possibly” to show Caesar and his men 
favourably. Rambaud (1966) p. 5 regards this as integral to the issue of Tendenz. See also Ramage 
(2003) pp. 367-368 on Caesar‟s virtues. 
2
 1.52, 3.14. 
3
 2.17-2.28. 
4
 5.38-5.51. 
215 
 
The goal of battle narrative is not just emphasis on Caesarʼs contribution or presence, 
but also to portray his qualities as commander.
5
 This objective is evident in the siege 
of Aduatuca, where the conflict is described to illustrate his clementia.
6
 The landing 
in first invasion of Britain is a more comprehensive example of self-portrayal, where 
the narrative focuses on the contribution of the commander, with the account 
structured around the difficulties that the army faces and the manner in which he 
overcomes these.
 
Another self-promotional objective is evident in Book Seven, which 
is structured as an ongoing contrast with his opposites in the Gallic command, most 
notably the Gallic leader Vercingetorix. Throughout Book Seven, the role of battle is 
to show Caesarʼs qualities and to draw contrasts favourable to himself, an objective 
that is particularly apparent in the Alesia passage.
7
 As these accounts illustrate, self-
promotion is an essential goal and a driving force in battle narrative, as his person and 
abilities fundamentally determine the structure and content of the passages. 
 
The Centrality of Caesar 
 
Caesarʼs importance is evident throughout the work as except for some passages on 
subordinate or enemy activity, the commentaries largely follow the person and actions 
of the commander through his campaigns.
8
 The dominant style of reporting is notable 
in the first account of battle against the Helvetii, where the narrative is structured in 
terms of his activity. Following negotiations with the Helvetii, the construction of 
fortifications to prevent their passage is described as follows: 
 
Interea ea legione, quam secum habebat, militibusque, qui ex provincia 
convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, 
qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum decem novem murum in 
altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit.
9
 
                                                 
5
 Goldsworthy (1998) pp. 204-212. See also pp. 155-161 above. In the battle against Ariovistus, Caesar 
addresses the idea of Germanic ferocity, but also his own disregard for their reputation. The narrative 
proves his assessment to be correct. 
6
 2.29-2.33. 
7
 7.69-7.89. As Nordling (1991) p. 141 notes Vercingetorix can be regarded as one of several “straw 
men”. See also Jervis (2001) p. 171. 
8
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 206 for the centrality of Caesar. Note however that at p. 153 Riggsby argues 
that the war, rather than Caesar is the focus of the commentary. See also Görler (1976) pp. 99-103 on 
the narrator/character. 
9
 1.8.1-1.8.2. 
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The use of the third person singular in this passage is a fundamental feature of the 
Bellum Gallicum, and demonstrative of the centrality of Caesarʼs character, where it is 
he who constructs the wall through the instrument of the soldiers.
10
 While he captures 
the essential activity that occurs, as narrator and participant he plays a central role. 
 
The self-promotional objective is also clear throughout the conflict with the Belgae in 
Book Two, where there is a focus on Caesar as the main protagonist and his response 
to the enemy forces, even where this sacrifices clarity regarding the course of 
events.
11
 Specifically, orders given to Sabinus only imply that these were successfully 
carried out, as it is the precaution taken by Caesar that appears important.
12
 Similarly, 
after giving orders to his auxiliaries to go to Bibrax, Caesar does not state what these 
troops did there, with a whole range of activity omitted.
13
 He does not even describe 
how these auxiliaries made their way back to him to contribute at the main battle, 
illustrating that units appear and disappear as required by the self-promotional 
objective, without consideration of some of the more complex issues that underlie 
their appearance.
14
 This is also apparent at the end of the Belgic account, and his 
involvement in the destruction of the enemy host. As he states of the final slaughter 
and the Roman return to camp, the Romans performed ut erat imperatum.
15
 The 
situational vagaries that underlie the orders are less important than the fact they were 
ordered by Caesar, the central figure of the commentaries. 
 
Caesar provides another example of combat against the Germani in Book One that 
illustrates that the battle narrative is primarily shaped to address his own contribution. 
Here, as the Romans entrench and prepare camps, he describes an attack by the enemy 
as follows: 
 
                                                 
10
 The use of perducit here is indicative. See also Kraus (2009) p. 161, who notes that this is not unique 
to Caesar. On the third person usage see Rüpke (1992) pp. 212. Rüpke regards this as an 
appropriation from history. See Riggsby (2006) pp. 149-150 and Bömer (1953) pp. 248-249. 
11
 See also pp. 71-88 above. See also 5.49-5.51 where the attack from Caesar‟s camp is described very 
briefly at 5.51.4. That account has similar problems to Octodurus, discussed at pp. 104-105 above. 
12
 Sabinus is sent across the river to fortify the opposite bank at 2.5.6. This is assumed to be done at 
2.9.4-2.9.5.  
13
 2.7.1-2.7.3. Caesar only describes the reaction of the enemy to their arrival.  
14
 How they return with over 300,000 Belgae in the field, including cavalry, is not explained. 
15
 2.9.6. Caesar at 2.9 generally describes his own leadership and orders, including the appointment of 
sub commanders. See Octodurus discussed at pp. 88-111 where Galba fulfils this role. 
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Eo circiter hominum numero sedecim milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus 
misit, quae copiae nostros terrerent et munitione prohiberent. nihilo setius Caesar, ut 
ante constituerat, duas acies hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere iussit. 
munitis castris duas ibi legiones reliquit et partem auxiliorum, quattuor reliquas 
legiones in castra maiora reduxit.
16
 
 
This passage describes a major battle, as it details numbers of forces and dispositions 
that indicates a sizable confrontation. However, it does not describe the combat at all; 
the implication of a battle is only evident in the order that two legions repulse the 
enemy, and their success indicated by munitis castris.
17
 Two concepts are 
communicated, that the orders were obeyed and that these led to success, but it is not 
clear how this actually occurred.
18
 The lack of combat illustrates that when Caesar 
simplifies his account, he can do so in favour of his own contribution, even where this 
leaves the course of events unclear. 
 
This centrality of the character is particularly evident in the first extended battle 
against the Helvetii, where the start of the battle gives emphasis to the person and 
contribution of the commander.
19
 As Caesar states of the preparations for combat: 
 
Postquam id animadvertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subducit 
equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit. ipse interim in colle medio 
triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas 
legiones, quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat, et omnia auxilia conlocari, 
ita uti supra se totum montem hominibus compleret, interea sarcinas in unum locum 
conferri et eum ab his, qui in superiore acie constiterant, muniri iussit.
20
  
 
In response to the advance of the Helvetians, Caesar orders the Romans to the nearest 
hill, and sends the cavalry against the enemy. The use of ipse to describe his own 
                                                 
16
 1.49.3-1.49.5. Caesar summarises a major engagement involving six legions, 16,000 Germani and all 
their cavalry in this passage. Caesar shows no interest in describing such a large confrontation, or 
even if one actually occurred, as emphasis is on his order and Roman resilience to fear. For the 
overall objective see pp. 146-161 above. 
17
 Kraus (2009) p. 161. 
18
 See also 4.32.2 and 4.34.1-4.34.3 for examples during the first British campaign. 
19
 See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 63-64. Kraus (2009) p. 161 notes 7.8.1-7.8.4 as an example of third person 
singular use in order to centralise Caesar.  
20
 1.24.1-1.24.4. 
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activity is important here as it places the commander on the battlefield and his 
proximity to the disposition and array of the army.
21
 The sequence of animadvertit, 
misit, instruxit and iussit are all demonstrative of how the account focuses on Caesar 
and his activity.
22
 The continual reference to his activity or understanding is indicative 
of how the contribution of his person is an essential aspect of the battle narrative. 
 
The self-promotional objective of the Helvetii account is apparent as events are 
related in order to associate Caesar closely with the objective of the passage. In 
Chapter Three it was demonstrated that the account is structured as an introduction to 
combat with Gallic adversaries, and that the passage concentrates on those aspects of 
battle that support this purpose.
23
 Nevertheless, Caesar also places himself on the 
battlefield to give emphasis to his own contribution, and the start of the account is in 
part determined by this objective. This is evident as he places his person where he is 
most closely associated with the introduction of Romans and Gauls in combat. As he 
states: 
 
Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; 
ipsi confertissima acie reiecto nostro equitatu phalange facta sub primam nostram 
aciem successerunt. Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis 
equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium 
commisit.
24
 
 
The passage describes the commanderʼs activity just prior to combat, so that he is 
closely associated with the initial clash. He makes his contribution memorable with 
the anecdote that he removes all of the horses. He also mentions an exhortation, and 
how he personally commences the battle.
25
 Caesar is therefore closely associated with 
the first instance of combat in the Bellum Gallicum, and given a critical place in the 
narrative in order to promote his own contribution on the battlefield. 
 
                                                 
21
 The reflexive pronoun draws attention to Caesar‟s personal involvement. 
22
 See Nordling (1991) p. 172-174 and Jervis (2001) p. 175 in general. 
23
 See above pp. 170-177. 
24
 1.24.4-1.25.2.  
25
 suos proelium commisit 1.25.2. See Williams (1985) p. 222. 
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The importance of self-promotion in this passage is clear as the narrative sacrifices 
details of combat in order to focus on Caesarʼs presence. As examined in Chapter 
Three, the cavalry encounter that allowed him time to deploy his forces is summarised 
briefly, in order to focus on the Roman pila volley and its effect on the Gauls.
26
 
Caesar tells the audience what he does with the cavalry, simply noting their 
contribution by stating that they are cast back, at which point they disappear from the 
narrative. He thereby describes his own activity, but not that of the unit that 
performed an integral role in the historical encounter.
27
 Furthermore the cavalry 
appear as part of a sequence of ablatives absolute that pile preliminary actions 
together just prior to his personal intervention.
28
 The construction of the passage 
draws attention to the commander and details unrelated to the self-promotional 
objective are subordinated. 
 
Furthermore, the passage may narrate events out of sequence in order to associate 
Caesar closely with combat, again demonstrating that the promotion of his own 
activity supersedes clarity in the overall account.
29
 He describes his activity in 
removing mounts, illustrating that the objective is to describe his own role as 
inspiration for the men just prior to combat.
30
 He has the horses removed, gives the 
speech to his men, and then orders battle to commence after the enemy have come up 
sub primam nostram aciem.
31
 Such activity probably occurred earlier in the historical 
encounter, in particular the harangue, as it seems unlikely that this activity occurred 
once the enemy were close.
32
 It is also important to note that he exhorts the men after 
removing the horses, an action which, while plausible, places him on foot and would 
                                                 
26
 See pp. 170-177 above. 
27
 1.24.1-1.24.2. See also p. 202 above. 
28
 1.24.5. 
29
 See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 63-64. Williams (1985) p. 222 only notes the self-promotional aspect in the 
construction of the passage. However Williams is not attempting to determine clarity in regards to 
the course of the battle narrative. 
30
 1.25.1-1.25.2. It is not denied that such an action could take place, however the inclusion is to show 
his personal disregard for danger and his relationship to the army. 
31
 1.24.5. While Caesar may have given the order to attack, he is unlikely to have been able to order the 
individual cohorts to loose pila. However, the close association of the order and the volley enhances 
the relationship of command and orderly action, even though the actual volley would probably have 
been timed to hit advancing Gauls as they came in range of individual cohorts. The sequence has a 
clear literary purpose within the structure as the actions of Caesar lend order to the Roman volley, 
and he appears to act without haste in response to the Helvetian advance. See Hall (1998) p. 12.  
32
 On harangues in general, see Marincola (2007) p. 124; Nordling (1991) pp. 136-139; Hansen (1993) 
pp. 161-162. 
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have affected his ability to give a speech to the army.
33
 All these issues create 
problems in interpreting the sequence of events and the manner in which the battle 
unfolded. They nevertheless indicate the purpose of describing Caesarʼs importance 
on the battlefield and his personal contribution, sometimes at the expense of clarity 
regarding the battle itself. 
 
Thematic Placement of Caesar 
 
Caesar locates his character on the battlefield to promote himself through association 
with any message he wishes to communicate, and any thematic resolution to the 
episode. This is evident in two battles examined previously, where he has very 
specific messages to convey. In the battle against Ariovistus and the Germani, Caesar 
describes his location on the battlefield in order to associate his presence with the 
resolution of the question of virtus and Germanic martial superiority.
34
 Similarly, in 
the naval battle against the Venetii, he describes his contribution with reference to 
topography, which is an ongoing concern, so that he is also placed in a strong 
thematic position when this campaign issue is resolved.
35
 While both instances give 
clear credit for victory to other factors on the battlefield, they are also constructed to 
promote Caesar, through association of his character with the overall thematic 
objective.  
 
It was demonstrated in Chapter Two that the battle against Ariovistus and the 
Germani is constructed to show the superiority of Roman soldiery through a 
description of close combat. In this account Caesar also describes his own placement 
in order to associate him with the resolution of this message.
36
 He does not emphasise 
his command role, taking care to state at the start of the battle that he is situated where 
he thinks the enemy weakest, and presumably where the requirement for martial skill 
                                                 
33
 On the controversial nature of harangues see Lendon (1999) pp. 292, 298; Hansen (1993) pp. 161-
162. Note that in this case, the content of the harangue is not the issue, but its location in the text. 
34
 1.51-1.53. See also below at pp. 222-238 for the Nervii battle, where the account is constructed 
around the contribution of Caesar. 
35
 3.14.8-3.14.9. 
36
 On the theme of virtus, see pp. 155-161. See also Ramage (2003) p. 332. 
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will turn the battle.
37
 With the right wing struggling, he describes the turnaround in 
the following manner: 
 
Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus adulescens qui equitatui praeerat, quod 
expeditior erat quam ii, qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus 
nostris subsidio misit. Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga 
verterunt neque prius fugere destiterunt, quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex 
eo loco circiter quinque pervenerunt.
38
 
 
Caesar describes Crassus as freer to react; an implication that suggests the commander 
is busy due to the intensity of the fighting.
39
 He is closely associating his presence 
with the thematic resolution of the battle, even while describing an action 
instrumental in bringing about victory.
40
 In locating himself, and summarising the 
resolution of the battle this way, it is apparent that combat is structured to place him 
in proximity to the ideas that the battle communicates, and to maximise his 
association with this resolution.  
 
A similar objective is evident in the battle against the Venetii. As illustrated in 
Chapter Two, the battle is constructed to address the resolution of the difficulties of 
prosecuting the campaign in the coastal regions where the Venetii are located.
41
 In 
this battle the use of the falx enables the Romans to board the enemy ships, and 
Caesar describes his own presence as follows: 
 
Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, 
atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut 
                                                 
37
 1.52.2-1.52.3. Importantly, Caesar includes himself in the ranks of men, being careful to state his 
own location, so that in any resolution, it has been identified where he specifically was on the 
battlefield and that he was involved. Note that this does not mean he is manufacturing information, 
only that his selection of the data is designed to heighten the association. 
38
 1.52.7-1.53.2. 
39
 Welch (1998) p. 100. Welch notes that the narrative is constructed so there is no doubt as to Caesar‟s 
superior contribution and overall control. 
40
 Welch (1998) p. 88 states care was required to ensure a situation didn‟t arise where the legates 
shifted attention away from the real hero. 
41
 See pp. 126-145 above. Note that Erickson (2002) identifies the theme of the passage as virtus. 
However, the role of Caesar as spectator and his thematic placement on the battlefield is not 
accounted for. See Oppermann (1933) pp. 37-43, on the role of Caesar being emphasised in the 
Venetii battle. 
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nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset. omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde 
erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.
42
 
 
Caesar includes his own presence ostensibly to describe the effect on the morale of 
the troops, however it must be noted that such detail is not always included in his 
battles even where it would be relevant.
43
 As character however, he is present in the 
battle at a thematically powerful point.
44
 His presence on a high point recalls the 
terrain that has proved so instrumental in delaying a resolution.
45
 Consequently his 
presence in such a location places him physically at a locus where a feature that was 
initially favourable to the enemy now is turned against them, in this case by allowing 
Caesar to inspire his men and ensure victory at the point where the neutralisation of 
their sea power occurs.
46
 The selection of information supports the self-promotional 
objective, as it he ensures he is present in a thematically appropriate location. 
 
Self-Promotion in the Sabis River Narrative 
 
 
Self-promotion can be more thoroughly integrated into a narrative, and in the account 
of the battle of the Sabis River, the objective of relating Caesarʼs personal 
contribution, and making it one of the most memorable aspects of the battle, has a 
profound effect on the manner in which the battle is presented.
47
 Opperman, Brown 
and even Lendon, who is primarily concerned to show that Caesar is reconstructing 
the historical event, note that the account is highly self-promotional in objective; 
however the extent to which the combat passages have been constructed to achieve 
                                                 
42
 3.14.8-3.14.9. 
43
 Caesar‟s placement is not entirely unusual, as he often describes his inspirational role, such as 
against the Helvetii 1.24 and at Alesia 7.88. However he does not always do so, in the battle against 
Ariovistus at 1.52 the emphasis is on the role that legates and sub-commanders play as witnesses to 
valour.  
44
 See Conley (1983) p. 181. Conley recognises that the battle is won by factors other than Caesar. 
However, this does not negate his thematic placement. See also Jervis (2001) p. 59. 
45
 3.12.1. 
46
 See Erickson (2002) p. 612. 
47
 2.17-2.28. See Nousek (2004) p. 148. Nousek notes the manner Caesar is shown to be in control 
throughout the narrative. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 206. See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 39-43 on realism. 
See also Görler (1980) on the narrative objectives. 
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that objective is illustrated in this section.
48
 The battle narrative is extensive, with 
events described occurring simultaneously across a broad frontage, and the text is 
devoted to much more than the creation of the worthy enemy examined in Chapter 
Three.
49
 Caesar gives order to this long account so that his personal intervention is 
given maximum presence and instrumentality in the account. In particular, he uses 
topographic separation and temporal presentation to enhance the impression of defeat 
until his intervention.
50
 He holds the result in abeyance, building the passage to a 
climax that centres on his person.
51
 The level of detail then increases at the point of 
his entry into combat to highlight his involvement, indicating the structural 
importance of self-promotion.
52
 The overall idea of victory is not encouraged until 
Caesar enters combat, so that his personal action is the most memorable and important 
part of the passage.  
 
The importance of self-promotion is evident as Caesar prepares for the personal role 
he plays early in the account of the fighting. As he states at the start of hostilities: 
 
Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum, quod erat 
insigne, cum ad arma concurri oporteret, signum tuba dandum, ab opere revocandi 
milites, qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant, arcessendi, acies 
instruenda, milites cohortandi, signum dandum.
53
  
 
While this passage describes the things he has to do, it also acknowledges the need for 
personal intervention, by dwelling on the person of the commander and the critical 
role he plays in the battle.
54
 Caesar is critical to so many things, and by stating these 
                                                 
48
 Lendon (1999) p. 309. Oppermann (1933) pp. 37-43 notes the general self-promotion in the Sabis 
River account. See more recently Brown (1999) p. 339. See also Lendon (1999) p. 277 for the 
reconstructive interpretation. 
49
 See pp. 192-204 above. The representation of the Nervii and the issue of virtus are the other 
objectives in this narrative. 
50
 This is not to say Caesar did not find such factors important in battle. See Lendon (1999) p. 320 and 
pp. 324-325. However, the narrative has additional objectives than just relating the circumstances of 
combat and the reasons for victory. 
51
 Brown (1999) p. 337. Brown at p. 339 notes how the audience is meant to see Caesar as heroic in the 
way he turns the battle against the enemy. Jervis (2001) p. 77 notes how extra space is given to 
difficult battles. Jervis also notes how difficult victories contain a clearly identifiable turning point.  
52
 See 2.25.1-2.25.2 for the details just before his intervention. 
53
 2.20.1-2.20.2. 
54
 Brown (1999) pp. 336-337. 
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measures, the need for his future intervention is foreshadowed as the measures 
indicate his importance in responding to the enemy attack.  
 
One method used to promote the commander is to ensure that the battle is 
compartmentalised, so that early successes are not highlighted as significant, and the 
narrative crisis occurs in the place of Caesarʼs choice.55 As he states: 
 
Quam quisque ab opere in partem casu devenit quaeque prima signa conspexit, ad 
haec constitit, ne in quaerendis suis pugnandi tempus dimitteret. Instructo exercitu 
magis ut loci natura deiectusque collis et necessitas temporis, quam ut rei militaris 
ratio atque ordo postulabat, cum diversis legionibus aliae alia in parte hostibus 
resisterent saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus 
impediretur, neque certa subsidia conlocari neque quid in quaque parte opus esset, 
provideri neque ab uno omnia imperia administrari poterant. itaque in tanta rerum 
iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii sequebantur.
56
  
 
Several impressions are created in this passage. The isolation and disorganisation of 
the Roman army is evident in the use of aliae…alia, and other forms of the indefinite 
such as quaque and quoque.
57
 The message is that the army is not a single entity, and 
each legion has to function separately in the battle. This is in contrast to the battle 
against the Germani, where the army is treated as a whole and legions on the wings 
are elements of that army.
58
 The difference is therefore a narrative choice regarding 
the level of detail, one that identifies and isolates the legions.
59
 The last line however 
is the most important as it provides a frame of reference for the actions that follow. In 
this case, the words itaque in tanta rerum iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii 
sequebantur contextualise that victory for one legion is not indicative of victory in the 
                                                 
55
 It is important to note here that the narrative crisis point and the actual crisis in the battle could be 
synchronous. If the Twelfth Legion broke and ran, this could have been devastating, depending on 
when this occurred in relation to the return of Labienus‟ victorious legions. While the actual nature of 
the crisis is difficult to independently determine, the creation of a narrative directed towards one part 
of the battlefield is clear. 
56
 2.21.6-2.22.2. 
57
 quam quisque ab pere in partem casu devenit. 2.21.6. Gotoff (1984) p. 8 notes that the use of 
quisque rather than milites emphasises individuality. 
58
 See 1.52. 
59
 See 1.52.2, 1.52.6. In the battle against the Germani Caesar simply states that the wing was pressed 
by the enemy, but does not develop it into a significant crisis in the narrative, merely stating that 
Crassus reacted to it and sent the third line in. 
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battle.
60
 This passage, as an introduction to the battle, establishes a framework in 
which Caesar can describe victory, not based on the activities and successes of the 
army as a whole, but around a crisis point of his own choosing, in this case the legions 
that come under the heaviest attack.  
 
Importantly, the exact nature of this isolation is unclear and the effect it has is difficult 
to determine, suggesting that the details are provided more for narrative structure than 
as an explanation of affairs. While the hedges obscure vision and make it less likely 
that help will be forthcoming between legions, overall vision seems to be unimpaired 
in the battle, as commanders and units do actually provide support to each other.
61
 At 
no point do any of the legions suffer through lack of vision, in fact it is sight that 
causes such a panic among both auxiliaries, and the Twelfth Legion itself, when it 
begins to be outflanked.
62
 Even the sight of Caesar is unimpaired and he does not 
record any lack of vision that he might have had at the time, as illustrated in his 
assessment of the status of the Twelfth Legion, which he seems able to see easily.
63
 
The effect of vision on the battlefield is only felt in the statement itself, and supports 
the generalised comment that the situation is critical and in tanta rerum iniquitate.
64
 
Even more important is that the hedges do not inhibit movement of any unit, 
including the attackers.
65
 The terrain does not even prevent more complex manoeuvre 
such as that performed between the Seventh and Twelfth Legion, indicating that the 
statement is not reflected in the activity on the battlefield.
66
 This is not to say that this 
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 Even Lendon notes that the structure of the account is not conducive to a causal explanation of 
events. As Lendon states of the episodic quality to the narrative, “This shifting of the camera 
between these different points of view, combined with the rushing speed of Caesar‟s narrative, 
produces accounts of battle that are highly artistic and impressionistic, series of self-contained 
vignettes, rapid slide shows rather than movies, where the causal relationship between vignettes is 
often implied rather than stated”. Lendon (1999) p. 317. Lendon notes that the narrative approach of 
Caesar does not lend itself automatically to a reconstruction of the battle and the reasons for the way 
it progressed, due to this highly visual representation of affairs.  
61
 This is in spite of the revelation later that vision and the ability of one legion to help another are 
instrumental in turning the battle around. Labienus sees events clearly at 2.26.4-2.26.5; even Caesar 
takes in the state of the Twelfth when he arrives at 2.25.1-2.25.2. Sight is very clear at particular 
moments in the battle. Brown notes the role of the hedges in establishing the warlike nature of the 
Gauls. See Brown (1999) p. 334.  
62
 2.24.2. Caesar is clear why the followers can see the victorious Tenth Legion, but they can also see 
back to the camp as well. 
63
 See 2.25.1-2.25.2. 
64
 2.22.2. See also Lendon (1999) p. 318. 
65
 This is most clear in the initial attack of the Nervii, at 2.19.6-2.19.8 and their ability to form a tight 
battle line 2.23.4. 
66
 2.26.1-2.26.2. 
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feature did not have an effect in the historical event.
67
 However in accounting for it in 
the narrative, at no point do the hedges have any effect on movement or in impairing 
vision.
68
 Their effect is intangible, demonstrating that they are used to enhance the 
atmosphere, the vulnerability and isolation of the legions, and support the idea of a 
general state which separates and isolates the ability of the army to function as a 
single entity.  
 
This impression of separation serves to contextualise the victories of the Ninth and 
Tenth Legions narrated early in the passage, ensuring that their success is isolated on 
the battlefield and victory is not indicated at this stage of the narrative. As Caesar 
states:  
 
Legionis nonae et decimae milites, ut in sinistra parte aciei constiterant, pilis emissis 
cursu ac lassitudine exanimatos vulneribusque confectos Atrebates, nam his ea pars 
obvenerat, celeriter ex loco superiore in flumen compulerunt et transire conantes 
insecuti gladiis magnam partem eorum impeditam interfecerunt. Ipsi transire flumen 
non dubitaverunt et in locum iniquum progressi rursus resistentes hostes 
redintegrato proelio in fugam dederunt.
69
 
 
This is a clear victory, with success apparent in the manner the legions draw swords, 
drive the attackers back and pursue them vigorously; however it is applicable just to 
the two legions, as the qualifier regarding isolation has specified. Even the term 
redintegrato proelio is only relevant to these forces.
70
 The terrain qualifier ensures 
this is only seen as a victory in one spot against one tribe. The overall battle still 
remains in doubt, and the crisis point occurs at a point later in the account.  
 
More importantly, the success of these legions is followed by a series of events that 
serve to undermine the effect of the success, as the positioning of less successful 
action in the narrative indicates: 
 
                                                 
67
 The actual battle, not the narrative construction. 
68
 Kagan (2006) p. 135 regards vision as critical, but does not reconcile this with the presence of the 
hedges and the effect Caesar describes that they have on the battlefield. She merely states that Caesar 
was “fortunate” to see what he did.  
69
 2.23.1-2.23.3. 
70
 2.23.2. 
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Item alia in parte diversae duae legiones undecima et octava, profligatis 
Viromanduis quibuscum erant congressi, ex loco superiore in ipsis fluminis ripis 
proeliabantur.
71
 
 
The passage that describes the success of the Ninth and Tenth Legions involves the 
use of perfects like compulerunt, interfecerunt and in fugam dederunt.
72
 The less 
certain actions of the Eleventh and Eighth Legions are suspended through the use of 
the imperfect proeliabantur, so that the more problematic activity is ongoing.
73
 Their 
combat is never resolved, so that the initial success is followed by a less definitive 
encounter. The effect is that any notion of overall success engendered by the earlier 
passage appears temporally earlier, and the importance of Caesarʼs intervention for 
the overall state of affairs maintained in the account.  
 
This pattern continues, as the narrative switches to a description of the right wing 
where the crisis comes, and provides the most detail of this encounter. As Caesar 
states: 
 
At totis fere castris a fronte et a sinistra parte nudatis, cum in dextro cornu legio 
duodecima et non magno ab ea intervallo septima constitisset, omnes Nervii 
confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato, qui summam imperii tenebat, ad eum 
locum contenderunt. quorum pars aperto latere legiones circumvenire, pars 
summum castrorum locum petere coepit.
74
 
 
The use of the word at prepares the audience for a setback, qualifying that the 
successes described earlier are not to be taken as indicative of victory.
75
 The return to 
the perfect does not diminish this impression of temporal linearity, as it is still located 
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 2.23.3-2.23.4. 
72
 2.23.1-2.23.3. 
73
 It is unclear what order these affairs occurred in during the historical event, or if it is even possible to 
order them with a simple chronology as the activity of the successful legions must have taken some 
time, with activity occurring simultaneously. Their relationship to the less certain action of the 
Eleventh and Eighth legions is unclear. 
74
 2.23.4-2.23.5. 
75
 Kagan (2006) p. 131, argues that Caesar is careful to show sequence and chronology correctly in this 
battle. However Caesar‟s choice is designed to achieve a literary effect and build towards the crisis. 
Contrast epic, as noted by Gilbert (2001) p. 24 where sequential narration of temporal events is not 
so important. Caesar‟s balancing of historical source and narrative objectives are clearly evident in 
his order here. 
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in the text after the first success. Caesar furthermore indicates that this is the most 
important part of the passage, as he provides details regarding the Nervii designed to 
make them memorable, including the name of their leader.
76
 The Nervii are given 
more character than any other element on the battlefield, including a leader who is 
only mentioned now. The use of omnes is also relatively superfluous, but nevertheless 
helps to create an image of size and strength.
77
 The additional detail ensures that the 
early successes on the battlefield are subordinated in the passage and the engagement 
of the audience quickly shifts to the events where the crisis occurs and where the 
commander personally appears. 
 
In order to understand that the battle is structured for self-promotion, it is important to 
examine how the camp and the baggage of the Romans are presented.
78
 By 
understanding the inconsistent representation of both, it is then possible to see their 
role in the narrative and Caesarʼs structure for the battle. The baggage and camp 
appeared to play an important role in the historical account, a role that is consistent 
with the importance it plays in other battles, particularly regarding morale.
79
 However 
the status of the camp in the Sabis River account is ambiguous, and shifts as necessary 
to support the self-promotional objective of Caesar. In this regard, Caesar establishes 
the importance of the baggage and camp prior to the battle when he describes the 
plans of the Nervii.
80
 Based on incorrect intelligence they have received, the Nervii 
intend to attack the Romans as soon as their baggage train appears, and they assume 
this will result in them cutting off and isolating the first legion, to the dismay of the 
other legions following.
81
 What Caesar does not explain is why the Nervii do not react 
to the fact that six legions appear before the baggage even arrives, and while it may be 
possible to construe reasons for their failure to react, what is critical is that there is 
little mention of the huge difference between plan and actuality, except to say that the 
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 omnes Nervii confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato 2.23.4. 
77
 If accurate, that would be up to 50,000 Nervii as stated at 2.4. It may therefore be a hyperbolic 
statement of numbers. 
78
 2.23.4-2.23.5. 
79
 See 5.33 for men deserting standards to protect their baggage, and also see 1.26 for the ferocity with 
which the Helvetii defend their baggage. 
80
 2.17.2-2.17.4. 
81
 2.17.2-2.17.4. 
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Nervii attack on the signal they had originally planned.
82
 There is no assessment 
because the concern is only to highlight the importance of the baggage to the enemy, 
and the course that the battle follows when they attack the camp. 
 
Another important aspect of the battle that is not explained is the status of the camp 
itself. Caesar refers to the enemy plan as predicated on attacking the first legion in 
marching order before it has actually fortified the location.
83
 The use of castra here 
indicates an incomplete fortification, as the attack is to be launched immediately.
84
 
When the Nervii attack, he states the following:  
 
Interim legiones sex, quae primae venerant, opere dimenso castra munire coeperunt. 
ubi prima impedimenta nostri exercitus ab iis qui in silvis abditi latebant visa sunt, 
quod tempus inter eos committendi proelii convenerat, ita ut intra silvas aciem 
ordinesque constituerant atque ipsi sese confirmaverant, subito omnibus copiis 
provolaverunt impetumque in nostros equites fecerunt.
85
 
 
The passage gives the impression that the Romans have only just started work; the 
sentence on fortification is followed immediately by the attack. The rhythm of the 
narrative suggests a lack of time and work has only just begun, which is consistent 
with a sudden unexpected attack or ambush. However, as described later, work had 
been commenced, as the men leave their workstations to form up for the attack.
86
 The 
camp does not seem to be complete at this part of the narrative.  
 
This problematic status is apparent as Caesar later describes the camp as not just a 
place on the battlefield, but as if it were complete. The camp is described as 
possessing gates, the decumana porta, and serving as a refuge for the retreating 
auxiliaries, suggesting that it is more than merely some marked out ground.
87
 The 
                                                 
82
 2.19.6. Note that they may have been unable to alter their plans, but Caesar does not feel compelled 
to address a major disparity between plan and actuality, leaving the audience to interpret the Nervian 
lack of flexibility. 
83
 2.17.2. The idea the fortifications are not complete is because it is the legions who seem to be the 
ones who do the fortifying. See 2.19.5-2.19.6. 
84
 2.25.2. 
85
 2.19.5-2.19.7. 
86
 2.21.6. 
87
 2.24.2. The camp is a refuge, suggesting this must be more than just the location where the gates will 
go.  
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Nervii also make for it in the battle as if it were an important objective.
88
 How the 
camp was completed when the men left the work to commence battle is not explained, 
and even the reserve legions could not have done the work as they only arrive at the 
end of the battle.
89
 This lack of clarity regarding the status of the camp is evident 
throughout the narrative, as Caesar never specifies how complete the fortifications 
were. Consequently there are two potentially conflicting representations of the camp, 
the one early in the narrative, that is only just being fortified, and the one during the 
battle that has a physical presence and value as an objective for both sides. 
 
A similar problem is evident in the depiction of the baggage. The arrival of the 
baggage is the signal for the Nervii to attack, suggesting that it is only just appearing 
on the battlefield when they advance, and Caesar makes no mention of a delay 
between the arrival of the baggage and the attack of the Nervii.
90
 Nevertheless the 
calones have time to enter the camp, although the baggage train at this point still 
seems to be in transit.
91
 Importantly, the Treveri later relate that the baggage has 
fallen with the camp; giving the impression the baggage and camp are to be treated 
similarly.
92
 While the apparent inconsistency could be explained if the Nervii only see 
the baggage train as it enters the camp, Caesar does not specifically state this even 
though it would be simple to do so. He does not trace its movement on the battlefield 
and ambiguity is therefore present in both the description of the camp and the 
baggage.  
 
This confusion in the representation of the camp and baggage is clearly explained by 
the purpose that they play in self-promotion, particularly the camp itself. In the early 
stages of the battle Caesar appears to emphasise the speed of the Nervii and to present 
the battle as one where the Romans are caught by the unexpected attack.
93
 The 
                                                 
88
 2.23.5, 2.24.3-2.24.4.  
89
 See 2.26.3. 
90
 Note that the attack of the Nervii and the impression of speed in the narrative are not disharmonious 
if the intent is to capture the effect of surprise. However it should be noted that there is an immense 
impression of speed 2.19.6-2.19.8, in spite of the actual time it would have taken to cross the river. 
Caesar is clearly hyperbolic when he states they seemed to be in all places at one time, and his intent 
does not seem to just be descriptive.  
91
 See 2.24 in general for the calones.  
92
 2.24.5. 
93
 2.19.6-2.19.8. See Brown (1999) p. 336 who examines the passage where the Nervii attack, to show 
how the language is used to represent speed and irresistible force. The camp and baggage have been 
specified as the objective of the enemy, and the Nervii are represented as aggressive raiders. See p. 
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impression that the site is only just being fortified suits this presentation, as the attack 
appears to occur as soon as the Romans arrive, making it seem like an ambush and 
suggesting the idea of defeat in the early stages of the narrative. Nevertheless, as the 
passage progresses the camp appears to add tension to the narrative by presenting a 
vulnerable objective and target of the enemy. The actual military vulnerability is not 
disputed; however the narrative status is important, as it is being used to support the 
impression that the successes of the Ninth and Tenth legions are not indicative of 
victory.
94
 These uses maintain the result of the battle in the balance until the 
intervention of Caesar. The narrative purpose however is most notable in the final 
stages of the battle where the camp and baggage disappear. They do not even feature 
in the final stand of the Nervii, who are described at one point as filling it up with 
their men.
95
 Once these features serve their literary purpose they disappear. The actual 
state of the baggage and condition of the camp is never clear, and is not intended to be 
clarified, as they evoke the idea of Roman defeat, and entertain various concepts of 
vulnerability prior to Caesarʼs intervention in the narrative. 
 
Once the Nervii are shown to reach the camp, the passage approaches the crisis of the 
battle, and Caesar describes the flight of the Treveri in a clear attempt to build the 
narrative towards the point of his own intervention. To do so, he describes a statement 
made by them that is not even within the temporal and physical framework of the 
battle:  
 
Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio 
est singularis, qui auxilii causa a civitate missi ad Caesarem venerant, cum 
multitudine hostium castra nostra compleri, legiones premi et paene circumventas 
teneri, calones, equites, funditores, Numidas diversos dissipatosque in omnes partes 
fugere vidissent, despera tis nostris rebus domum contenderunt; Romanos pulsos 
                                                                                                                                            
166 above. This impression might be undermined if the Nervii appeared to hold back for a 
considerable time. When the camp suddenly appears more complete in the battle, this also suits the 
idea that the Nervii would naturally make for it as they would be after booty. An apparent descriptive 
inconsistency is explained when the representation of the enemy is the criteria for judging the 
narrative. 
94
 2.23.4-2.23.5. 
95
 2.24.3-2.24.4. Lendon (1999) notes this problem p. 319. 
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superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostes potitos civitati 
renuntiaverunt.
96
  
 
According to this passage the Treveri flee the battle and return home, thereby placing 
their actions outside the battlefield, and probably even later than the date of the 
battle.
97
 However, their flight encapsulates ideas of defeat as not only do they notice 
the camp filled with the enemy, but in their description of the battle as lost, they give 
final place to the camp, giving an impression of an army that is almost beaten.
98
 As 
Steinberg notes of fiction “As the straight chronological order of presentation is the 
most logical and hence natural arrangement, any deviation from it is clearly an 
indication of artistic purpose”.99 The activities of the Treveri in their homeland may 
therefore fall outside the scope of the actual battle, but are brought into the narrative 
as they entertain the idea of defeat at this point. 
 
Importantly, the extension of the temporal and geographic framework of the account 
enables Caesar to further develop the idea of a narrative crisis point. The report of the 
Treveri enables a battlefield summary to occur from the perspective of internal 
witnesses who are frightened and shaken participants.
100
 The Treveri appear to be 
almost omniscient, and are able to summarise what is wrong across the entire 
battlefield.
101
 They do not mention the success of the Ninth and Tenth Legions, and 
mainly focus on the beleaguered Twelfth and the camp.
102
 The Treveri are given a 
broad but highly selective perspective, as this summarises the battlefield at its worst. 
This account is a highly artificial part of the battle narrative, as it describes affairs that 
are selective and most likely occurred after, or away from the battlefield, in order to 
enhance the idea of a looming disaster.  
 
                                                 
96
 2.24.4-2.24.5. 
97
 Kagan (2006) p. 132 omits this temporal anomaly. 
98
 2.24.3-2.24.5. Steinberg (1993) p. 33. Note that the representation of the Treveri, while interesting of 
itself, is directed at a specific narrative objective regarding Caesar. 
99
 See Steinberg (1993) p. 33. 
100
 Brown (1999) p. 335 believes that Caesar refers to the courage of the Treveri sarcastically. This is 
possible, but whether they are courageous or not, their statement is presented in order to be refuted 
through action.  
101
 Caesar has nevertheless clarified that vision was severely restricted by the hedges. 
102
 Also the role of the Treveri provides a spoken statement of Roman defeat that Caesar can later 
address through the action of the narrative. In this context, the actions of Caesar immediately 
following the Treveri‟s words are critical as they are a refutation of those statements, and his actions 
should be seen as counter to their opinion. See also the boast of Ariovistus at pp. 146-149 above. 
233 
 
The importance of the passage is apparent as Caesar follows it immediately with a 
return to his own activity, so that his appearance in the narrative occurs when the 
situation is described at its most dire.
103
 Immediately following the passage on the 
Treveri, he returns to the point in the battle before the Tenth legion has crossed the 
river, so that he can describe himself setting out from encouraging them and as he 
approaches the most problematic part of the field.
104
 The sequence of events has been 
narrated out of temporal order with regard to the activities of the Tenth, as he has 
already related that they were ultimately successful.
105
 This temporal backtracking 
occurs in order to follow Caesarʼs course across the battlefield towards the point of 
the crisis. 
 
Caesar describes his arrival at the Twelfth Legion and relates its imminent collapse to 
invite contemplation of the scene as he witnessed it. The level of detail is included to 
establish the danger of the situation: 
 
Caesar ab decimae legionis cohortatione ad dextrum cornu profectus, ubi suos 
urgeri signisque in unum locum conlatis duodecimae legionis confertos milites sibi 
ipsos ad pugnam esse impedimento vidit, quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus 
occisis signiferoque interfecto signo amisso, reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere 
centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo fortissimo 
viro multis gravibusque vulneribus confecto, ut iam se sustinere non posset, reliquos 
esse tardiores et nunnullos ab novissimis desertos proelio excedere ac tela vitare, 
hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere 
instare et rem esse in angusto vidit neque ullum esse subsidium, quod submitti 
posset.
106
 
 
                                                 
103
 2.25.1. 
104
 This is an instance where Kagan‟s argument is particularly problematic. Kagan presumes that the 
Twelfth fought later than the Tenth, an impression brought about by the narrative structure. See 
Kagan (2006) p. 133. Steinberg‟s understanding of temporal manipulation appears more applicable in 
this instance See p. 232 above. The complexity of a narrative capturing simultaneous activity, in 
conjunction with the self-promotional objective, also explains the temporal confusion. 
105
 See 2.23.1-2.23.3. Caesar also repeats the activity of the Nervii. They crossed the river at the start 
and made for the camp, and then they do so again later in the narrative. Although not strictly a 
duplication, Caesar is forced by his construction to include them twice at 2.19.6 and 2.23.4, as he is 
of his own actions at 2.21.4, 2.25.1. 
106
 2.25.1-2.25.2. 
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As Brown states, this passage is exceptionally long, a monumental sentence and the 
longest in the commentaries.
107
 The level of detail is designed to establish the idea of 
an imminent collapse, with a mix of information on the general circumstances, 
individual and unit losses, and even the inclusion of the exemplum Baculus.
108
 All the 
items encapsulated by the frame of vidit…vidit effectively enclose the narrative so that 
Caesarʼs perception is intense at this point.109 The audience is being invited to 
perceive the battle as he saw it, to gauge and consider his possible reaction to these 
events, just prior to the point where he takes personal action on the battlefield.
110
 As 
he states, the matter is angustus, a clear comment on how this point should be 
viewed.
111
 The narrative narrows its focus tightly on the affected legions, to capture 
the extent of the danger and prepare for Caesarʼs intervention with a vivid picture of 
the need for action.  
 
Caesar adopts a highly selective approach to the information that he describes in this 
passage, qualifying his perspective at the time of the battle with additional 
information to that he would have witnessed at the time.
112
 He mentions specific 
casualties, such as the number of centurions lost, focussing on the Fourth Cohort in 
particular. While details such as the loss of a standard bearer might be obvious as he 
comes upon the Fourth Cohort, and he might even be aware of the loss of the 
centurions there, he claims knowledge that almost all centurions in the legion have 
been killed or wounded, something unlikely to be known unless an ongoing casualty 
                                                 
107
 Brown (1999) p. 337.  
108
 See the Helvetii battle and the pila volley 1.25.2-1.25.5. See Webb (2012) p. 12. See also De Jong 
(2007) p. 10 for general comments on the rhythm of a passage. As De Jong notes p. 517, Barthes 
called this effect “l’effet de réel” which Webb also discusses. See Melchior (2004) p. 20. Melchior 
notes that the number of centurions fallen is used to show the intensity of combat. A good contrast to 
this passage is 2.23.1-2.23.4 where the success of Labienus and the Ninth and Tenth legion is only 
briefly described in spite of the idea they fight an extended battle down, across the river and into the 
enemy camp.  
109
 See Gerlinger (2008) p. 82. On focalization, see above on Octodurus at pp. 88-111. On style see 
Eden (1962) p. 110. See also 4.32.1-4.32.4 for Caesar‟s limited perception in a battle in Britain. See 
also generally Grillo (2011) pp. 243-253 on narrative style.  
110
 Conley (1983) at p. 176 notes that the men are still cunctantes after his intervention. For Conley, 
Caesar is not the decider, and argues at p. 177 that Baculus is a character who “not only shares in the 
glory, but whose role is so dramatic that it arguably overshadows Caesar‟s own”. While Baculus is 
certainly memorable, he performs no deeds in themselves, and his placement within the overall 
structure actually draws attention to the need for Caesar‟s personal intervention.  
111
 See the role of Baculus below pp. 233-235 and 2.25.1-2.25.2 where angustus is used. 
112
 Kagan (2006) pp. 132-133 presumes he would have seen the Ninth and Tenth Legion crossing the 
river at this point. Kagan does not appear to fully account for the shifting of limited perspective and 
narrator‟s role. To Kagan, if Caesar does not describe it, he did not see it at the time. 
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report was being provided to him.
113
 What appears likely is that Caesar has added to 
his original impression information received after the battle, to support the picture of 
imminent disaster he comes across.  
 
The narrative includes the use of Baculus as an exemplum in a representative capacity 
that illustrates that attention is drawn to the state of affairs as the commander arrives 
on the scene. While scholars like Kagan see vignettes like this as adding colour, 
Baculus serves a more direct literary purpose in directing attention to the desperation 
of the situation.
114
 Baculus, like the legion, has taken many wounds in the same 
manner the legion has lost many centurions. Most importantly he is not described as 
out of the fight so that his ambiguous status as wounded and not quite able to stand is 
also representative of the overall situation.
115
 While the threat that the legion will soon 
fall is evident as Baculus is not able to stand, he has not yet fallen, as is evident in ut 
iam se sustinere non posset.
116
 His uncertain state places the situation in a state of flux 
as the commander arrives, and raises the possibility that the matter is not yet decided. 
It is important to note that Baculus‟ role in the narrative is primarily a representative 
one, his contribution being not particularly noteworthy otherwise. While his wounds 
are clearly extraordinary, the activities that led to him being wounded, or the hazards 
that centurions endure are not described. His heroism falls in the past, and outside the 
narrative itself, just as the legion itself has reached this state prior to Caesar‟s arrival. 
Baculus‟ role is an indicator of what has transpired previously, an effective literary 
device as it alludes to the ferocity of events Caesar has excluded from his narrative. In 
this case, the description of Baculus also paves the way for a turnaround and 
demonstrates that he not only personifies the status of the legion, but prepares the 
audience for a turning point in the narrative. Baculus is therefore integral to the 
portrayal of the battle, as he is a manifestation of the status of the legion, while also 
an anecdote that foreshadows the turnaround caused by Caesarʼs intervention. 
                                                 
113
 See Kagan (2006) p. 135 who only deals with the general status of the legions that Caesar saw and 
does not mention the casualty lists provided. Contrast Grillo (2011) pp. 244-249 on the omniscient 
narrator. 
114
 Kagan (2006) p. 122 calls elements like this description at the “subtactical” level designed to add 
colour to a descriptive narrative of what Caesar regarded as important. As argued in this study, these 
elements are the important feature, as they are narrative choices that illustrate Caesarʼs objective for 
the passage. Brown (1999) pp. 337-378 notes how Baculus features in several of Caesar‟s battles, 
engaged in heroic action. See also Gerlinger (2008) p. 157, Richter (1977) p. 128. 
115
 2.25.1. While virtus may be implied, and is probably encouraged, virtus only informs the meaning 
of the account as addressed above at pp. 192-204. It is only one of the purposes of his appearance as 
he has a more direct narrative role regarding Caesar. 
116
 2.25.1. 
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Caesarʼs intervention is an entry into combat which contrasts dramatically with the 
action so far. He visualises his own advance and central role in the reversal of 
circumstances as follows: 
 
scuto ab novissimis uni militi detracto, quod ipse eo sine scuto venerat, in primam 
aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites 
signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent. cuius 
adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu 
imperatoris etiam extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium 
impetus tardatus est.
117
 
 
With the rearmost men retiring from the fight Caesarʼs actions are contrasted as he 
advances, so that the audience follows his person moving forwards as the first positive 
action at this critical point.
118
 As Brown states, “The climactic moment is Caesarʼs 
entrance into the thick of the fray, which the audience is encouraged to view not 
simply as prudent but heroic, an extension of the courage demonstrated by Baculus 
and the other killed or wounded officers, into whose shoes Caesar must step in order 
to avert a general collapse”.119 His personal advance stands in dramatic contrast to the 
threatened flight as the first positive steps taken towards overall victory. 
 
There is no rush to turn the battle around quickly and the change starts with the least 
effective positive steps, building towards the tactically important with emphasis on 
the centrality of the commander. Caesar states of his personal effect on the Twelfth
 
Legion that the attack of the enemy is only slowed, the use of tardatus est at the end 
of the passage holding events in the balance.
120
 He then stabilises the Seventh Legion 
so that paulatim sese legiones coniungerent and, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare 
coeperunt.
121
 The impression is of a great force slowly being resisted, an image 
                                                 
117
 2.25.2-2.25.3. 
118
 For temporal issues see Gerlinger (2008) p. 39. 
119
 Brown‟s comment is actually a discussion of how Caesar must have had bodyguards and adjutants 
with him, but the point is still relevant, that Caesar takes a personal role at the crisis point. See 
Brown (1999) p. 339. 
120
 2.25.3. The idea of the enemy being slowed is important considering the numbers described.  
121
 2.26.1-2.26.3. 
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consciously created through the sequence of events and use of paulatim.
122
 Like the 
forces of the Belgae in Book Two, the enemy is a mass that in this case can only be 
shifted slowly.
123
 The passage only then switches to the external events such as the 
arrival of the reserve legions and the intervention of Labienus, so that from the 
centrally focused point, movement flows out to the peripheral activity. The 
construction establishes Caesar as the locus from which victory arises, to centralise on 
his person this change on the battlefield. 
 
Caesar then narrates other factors that affect recovery of the battle, from perspectives 
that maintain the centrality of his own position. Following the recovery of the Seventh 
and Twelfth Legions, he relates the events that had an effect on the course of the 
battle.
124
 He describes the arrival of the baggage legions, and as he states that the 
enemy sees them on the highest point, he clarifies their military importance of the 
arrival and the effect on morale.
125
 However the location of Labienus, who also 
observes the action around Caesar, serves more than a geographical purpose, as it 
balances the high point on which the other reinforcements are seen.
126
 The audience is 
encouraged to view the commander and the struggle in a centralised position even 
though it is unclear where exactly this stage of the battle is being fought, whether it is 
at the camp or nearby.
127
 The perspective of this activity maintains Caesarʼs 
centrality, so that his importance is maintained even as the narrative describes the rest 
of the battlefield. 
 
It is important to note that the passage also recognises the features that actually turned 
the historical battle around, and the presentation balances a literary crisis centred on 
Caesar, with the events considered important for victory. The return of Labienus is 
important as it allows the Nervii to be attacked from several directions, and Caesar 
shows that he considers this critical when he states: horum adventu tanta rerum 
                                                 
122
 The use of paulatim, to indicate a gradual and piecemeal turnaround works in conjunction with 
tardatus est above.  
123
 See pp. 71-88 above on the multitude topos, noting the importance of visualisation through the 
smoke of the campfires discussed at p. 74. Visualisation is important to capture the size of the forces 
involved. 
124
 2.26.1-2.27.3. 
125
 2.26.3-2.26.4. 
126
 summo collo is used at 2.26.4. 
127
 Labienus may see the situation in the camp, as the Nervii were described by the Treveri as in the 
camp; however the relationship between camp and the location of the legions is unclear.  
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commutatio est facta.
128
 Nevertheless literary emphasis is given to Caesarʼs own 
position on the battlefield when he states: 
 
Et Labienus castris hostium potitus et ex loco superiore, quae res in nostris castris 
gererentur, conspicatus decimam legionem subsidio nostris misit. qui cum ex 
equitum et calonum fuga, quo in loco res esset quantoque in periculo et castra et 
legiones et imperator versaretur, cognovissent, nihil ad celeritatem sibi reliqui 
fecerunt.
129
 
 
This passage initially provides some tactical information for Labienusʼ decision, who 
acts when he sees the camp being overrun. However the objectivity of the first 
statement is qualified with words such as quanto…periculo, and the accumulation of 
detail, through et castra et legiones et imperator.
130
 The use of imperator is 
particularly important, as it establishes Labienusʼ relationship to his commander, and 
ensures that when the subordinate rushes back, he does so largely of personal loyalty 
and concern. The sequence of evidence, danger, recognition and then action creates 
force, with the impetus driven by the view of the commander at the heart of combat. 
The structure in this instance focuses on factors that establish Caesarʼs importance 
even while describing other activity that is instrumental in victory.  
 
The Sabis River narrative is one of the longest battle narratives in the Bellum 
Gallicum, and much of the complexity of the narrative is driven by the promotion of 
Caesarʼs personal contribution, and the creation of a literary structure that focuses on 
his importance on the battlefield. While he recognises important aspects of the battle 
in his account, the extent to which it is developed around the importance of the 
commander is evidence of the self-promotional role that it plays. Apparent 
inconsistencies or temporal and geographical problems with the battle can be 
reconciled through consideration of this objective, and the importance that self-
aggrandisement plays in the construction of the narrative. 
 
                                                 
128
 2.27.1. 
129
 2.26.4-2.26.5. 
130
 The repetition of et is important for linking the camp, the legions and the person of Caesar. 
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Caesarʼs Importance in the Quintus Cicero Siege 
 
Even where Caesar is not physically present in a battle narrative, self-promotion can 
be apparent in the manner in which the account emphasises his importance. His 
character is absent from much of the defence of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp described in 
Book Five, until his arrival causes the enemy to break off the siege and engage in an 
unsuccessful encounter against the relieving force.
131
 Caesar consequently structures 
the narrative to demonstrate the timeliness of his own arrival, holding matters in 
abeyance until he arrives to resolve them.
132
 The passage is constructed as a series of 
measures and countermeasures, so that the possible result is unclear, and when Caesar 
arrives, attention is drawn to the instrumentality of his intervention.
133
 As Brown 
notes, Caesarʼs centrality is continually asserted throughout this episode, and this 
explains the relative absence of Cicero, or his perception, from a narrative about his 
own activity.
134
 This is a marked contrast to the Octodurus narrative where Caesar has 
no influence, and indicative that when he can portray a battle to emphasis his own 
contribution, the fundamental structure can be affected.
135
 While his arrival probably 
did secure victory in the historical event, the content of the battle is chosen 
specifically to maximise his importance as the critical factor in ensuring success. 
 
Caesar establishes that the camp is entirely cut off, and in desperate need of rescue, so 
that it is clear that his arrival is essential for the successful resolution of affairs. There 
is no mention in this account of any possibility that the defenders might hold out 
independently, and details such as the logistics of the enemy staying in the field are 
omitted entirely.
136
 Instead the isolation of the camp is stressed, as indicated by the 
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 5.38-5.51. Brown (2004) p. 302 notes it is the consilium of Caesar that is stressed. See also pp. 304-
305. See also Welch (1998) pp. 96-97. Welch notes political considerations regarding the 
representation of Quintus Cicero. See also Labienus, Crassus and the men performing as if Caesar 
was there 3.21.1, 6.8.3-6.8.5. See also Ramage (2003) p. 353 fn. 65 on Caesar‟s absences, and 7.6.3-
7.6.4 where Caesar states his fears of the army having to fight without him. See below pp. 260-276 
for his centrality in Book Seven.  
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 See Jervis (2001) pp. 159-161. See Ramage (2003) pp. 335-337 on the general use of the word 
adventus, which also seems applicable here. 
133
 While Caesar‟s arrival clearly brings about a change in affairs as the Gauls abandon the siege, the 
objective of emphasising this role is evident in the preceding structure of the account.  
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 Brown, (2004) p. 304-305. 
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 See pp. 88-111 above, and pp. 280-281 on Octodurus. 
136
 The enemy numbers 60,000 by Caesar‟s account, a significant number to hold in place while 
besieging a camp. However there is a lack of defined enemy numbers at the start, which are only 
implied by the scope of the siege works at 5.42.4-5.42.5. They are not mentioned until later, so that 
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description that the roads are blocked.
137
 Anecdotal details furthermore stress the 
desperation of the situation, such as the great rewards offered to messengers for 
getting through, and even the mention of the torture of those messengers.
138
 
Throughout the episode, words are used to indicate a defence that is barely holding 
on, with descriptions that use aegre, or statements that the defendersʼ ability to fight 
are pushed to their limits.
139
 Even Cicero is described as barely holding on, thereby 
providing an illustrative example of the desperation of the situation.
140
 Such details 
are given early in the account, and while the defence continues for more than seven 
days, the opening passages establish the core concept of a situation held in the 
balance, and one that cannot continue indefinitely. The passage establishes through 
the desperation of the matter and the clear indication of isolation, the importance of 
Caesar and his arrival for the rescue of the camp.  
 
Caesar describes the defence to evoke the idea of measure and countermeasure, and 
activity is paired in order to hold the result in abeyance until his arrival. The idea is 
evident from the start, as the enemy rush to surround the camp, which is countered by 
the men rushing to the ramparts and the preparations for the defence.
141
 The extent to 
which the idea of a stalemate is conveyed is evident as the timeframe advances to the 
seventh day of the siege, without reference to specific activity on each day, so that the 
contrast of besieged and besieger is the major notable feature of this period.
142
 Most 
importantly, the state of balance is indicated by the quanto...tanto clause below: 
 
Quanto erat in dies gravior atque asperior oppugnatio et maxime, quod magna parte 
militum confecta vulneribus res ad paucitatem defensorum pervenerat, tanto 
crebriores litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur.
143
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
any ability to determine a potential outcome is not possible in the initial stages of the battle. It is at 
5.49.2 that the numbers are given. 
137
 5.40.1-5.40.2. 
138
 5.45.1-5.45.2. 
139
 5.39.4, 5.40.3-5.40.6. 
140
 5.40.7. 
141
 5.39.3. 
142
 5.43.1. See 5.40.2-5.40.5. This is evident in the statement a nostris eadem ratione qua pridie, 
resistitur. hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus at 5.40.3-5.40.4. This describes a general state of 
affairs that persists for the duration of these days. 
143
 5.45.1. 
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As is apparent, the difficulties faced are not in themselves indicative of success or 
defeat, but only the escalation of severity that lends urgency to the need for Caesar. 
Matters are held in abeyance with no indicator of an outcome, and the battle is 
interpreted as in a state of stalemate that draws attention to Caesarʼs instrumentality to 
change affairs. 
 
In one instance the siege is created as a purely narrative stalemate, as it contrasts 
activities and characteristics that are not direct countermeasures. Caesar states that on 
the seventh day a fire catches hold of the camp, detailing the effect that this has, and 
how this encourages the enemy to launch an assault.
144
 He does not describe the 
combat at this point, instead describing the valour of the Roman troops in not seeking 
their possessions.
145
 One aspect of the battle, the attack, is contrasted with an 
anecdote, the lack of concern for baggage, so that the quality of the troops, rather than 
the course of the fighting is described.
146
 The contrast of values with activity is also 
evident in the following passage which describes an enemy tower that the Romans 
destroy: 
 
Hic dies nostris longe gravissimus fuit; sed tamen hunc habuit eventum, ut eo die 
maximus numerus hostium vulneraretur atque interficeretur, ut se sub ipso vallo 
constipaverant recessumque primis ultimi non dabant. paulum quidem intermissa 
flamma et quodam loco turri adacta et contingente vallum, tertiae cohortis 
centuriones ex eo quo stabant loco recesserunt suosque omnes removerunt, nutu 
vocibusque hostes si introire vellent vocare coeperunt; quorum progredi ausus est 
nemo. tum ex omni parte lapidibus coniectis deturbati turrisque succensa est.
147
  
 
It is clarified at the start that the result is inconclusive, demonstrating the importance 
of establishing the stalemate for the audience. The details provided then assist in 
contextualising that stalemate, and why no result is forthcoming for the enemy. 
Caesar even mentions the rebukes of the centurions, in order to provide an illustrative 
example of the quality of the troops. Such a contrast of activity against troop qualities 
shows that the passage supports the general principle of the stalemate, as differing 
                                                 
144
 5.43.1-5.43.7. 
145
 5.43.4-5.43.5. 
146
 Brown (2004) p. 302. See p. 338 for further discussion of this passage. 
147
 5.43.5-5.43.7. 
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elements are used to withhold any foreshadowing of the result until the commanderʼs 
arrival. 
 
The most important indicator of the stalemate is the anecdote of two centurions, 
Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo, who illustrate the inconclusive nature of the combat 
in their endeavours. Following the above description of centurions Caesar continues 
to the behaviour of these two individuals, who advance beyond the fortifications to 
settle who is the better soldier.
148
 While their role is further examined in Chapter Five, 
their presence appears as a representative anecdote regarding the overall situation, as 
the two men display courage and support each other, kill several enemy, but return to 
the fortifications with the question of who is better unresolved.
149
 Caesar specifically 
states: ...neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur.
150
 The 
incident clearly encapsulates the objective of the battle, to describe an inconclusive 
state of affairs that maximises the impact of his arrival in the narrative. 
 
Caesar also provides information of limited importance to the course of combat in 
order to stress the importance of his own arrival. There is a great amount of 
information included about communication attempts from the camp, such as the name 
of the Nervian who provides a messenger and the message carried on a dart.
151
 The 
level of detail is indicative of the importance attached to contacting the 
commander.
152
 However, a similar level of detail is provided regarding a return 
message to the camp, and Caesar describes that he sends a message by dart to tell 
Cicero that help is on its way, and that the message is conveyed in Greek letters.
153
 
Such anecdotal data is indicative of the narrative objective, where details draw 
attention to his relationship to the defenders, and his status as rescuer of the camp. 
 
However, such details have only a superficial relationship to the battle itself. 
According to the narrative the message conveyed by dart stays on a tower for two 
days untouched, so that the defenders are unaware of the communication from 
                                                 
148
 5.44.1-5.44.14. This is a technique used in the battle of the Sabis River to describe a crisis point in 
the battle. See pp. 233-234 above.  
149
 5.44.14. Brown (2004) p. 293. See p. 338 below. 
150
 5.44.14.  
151
 5.45.2-5.45.5. 
152
 Caesar follows this with several chapters on his efforts to reach the siege. 5.46-5.48. 
153
 The weapon is a tragula 5.48.2-5.48.10. 
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Caesar.
154
 As described, the message is not found until just before the relief of the 
camp two days later, suggesting it is of limited importance to morale and the course of 
events. Attention is clearly given to an incident that stresses the importance of his 
arrival, at the expense of details regarding the defence, which continue in the interim 
for those two days.
155
 While his arrival secures success in the siege, the effect on the 
narrative is substantial as he prepares for his intervention.
156
 The self-promotional 
aspect is a fundamental feature of the structure and presentation of this battle, where 
Caesar is given an important centrality over and above his intervention in the 
historical event.  
  
Caesarʼs Clementia and Aduatuca 
 
 
The specific characteristics that Caesar wishes to portray are a fundamental element in 
the manner in which a confrontation is portrayed.
157 
Such an objective has been noted 
by scholars such as Ramage, who has catalogued the virtues displayed throughout the 
work in general.
158
 However this section illustrates that this promotional objective can 
play a major role in the manner battle is constructed, through an examination of the 
siege of Aduatuca, where the account focuses on Caesarʼs clementia, sometimes to the 
exclusion of a clear understanding of the circumstances of battle.
159
 The promotion of 
this characteristic fundamentally affects the manner in which the siege is constructed, 
illustrating that it has a significant impact on the narrative. 
 
In the siege of Aduatuca clementia is an important issue, one that is developed in the 
ongoing description of the enemies of Book Two. In the description of Bratuspantium, 
tropes such as suppliant women and children aid in illustrating Caesarʼs mercy, as 
                                                 
154
 5.48.7-5.48.9. 
155
 5.48.3-5.48.10. 
156
 Note the victory itself is covered from 5.49-5.51. 
157
 Kraus (2009) p. 169 notes that the extent of self-promotion can be very broad across the text. This 
section specifically examines a battle that is developed to highlight one characteristic. See Jervis 
(2001) pp. 161-162, 174. On clementia see Ramage (2003) pp. 350-351. See also Oakley (1997) pp. 
115-116 on Manlius and clementia, in Livy 7.9.6-7.10.14. Note that in spite of Caesar‟s references, 
clementia is a characteristic not identified by Cicero pro Leg Man 28. 
158
 Ramage (2003) p. 364. See also Riggsby (2006) pp. 205-206. 
159
 2.29-2.33. See Riggsby (2006) p. 75. Osgood (2009) p. 351, notes generally how Caesar utilises the 
work to set himself as an exemplar of clementia. See also 2.14.5, 4.15.5 of the Usipetes and Tencteri, 
another instance where Caesar is particularly harsh to the enemy, yet the narrative mentions his 
mercy. As Lee (1969) p. 103 states of that account “Caesar‟s clementia has the last word”. See also 
Powell (1998) p. 130 who notes the lack of real clementia in the Bellum Gallicum. 
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their pleas are answered when he spares the town.
160
 Similarly, the sparing of the 
women, children and old men among the Nervii is specifically mentioned, supporting 
the idea that he is attempting to communicate the quality in that account.
161
 In the case 
of the Aduatuci, there is a dramatic contrast as the whole town is ultimately sold into 
slavery, however Caesar nevertheless continues to reference clementia in the account, 
stating of the Aduatuci plea: unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac 
mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuatucos esse conservandos, ne 
se armis despoliaret.
162
 As examined in Chapter Three, the Aduatuci are portrayed as 
warlike and belligerent, thereby presenting a situation in which any form of mercy 
could be understandably denied.
163
 The Aduatuci nevertheless appeal to clementia, 
attempting to misuse it to keep their arms, and in his reply Caesar refers to his 
practice of granting mercy as part of his own custom, whether an enemy deserves it or 
not.
164
 More importantly, he mentions that he secures the town specifically to keep the 
inhabitants safe from his own men.
165
 Motivations are assigned to the combatants 
based on the expectation of clementia, allowing Caesar to utilise the account to draw 
attention to his quality in this regard. 
 
In conveying the quality, the circumstances of historical battle may have been 
simplified, indicating that this objective supersedes clarity regarding the original 
event. Caesar admits in this passage that he must protect the Aduatuci from harm, and 
why this is so is not specifically mentioned.
166
 The Romans have not had to assault 
the town, and by Caesarʼs terms there is no direct reason for harm to be expected 
based on the circumstances of the siege.
167
 This lack of an explanation could result 
                                                 
160
 2.13.2-2.13.3. See Ramage (2003) pp. 343-344. 
161
 2.28.1-2.28.3. 
162
 2.31.4-2.31.5. 
163
 See pp. 184-192 above. 
164
 2.32.1-2.32.4. Caesar reminds the audience of his treatment of the Nervii in this statement. See 
2.28.3. 
165
 2.33.1-2.33.2. 
166
 2.33.1-2.33.2.  
167
 As Caesar states at 2.32.1-2.32.2 he will accept surrender si priusquam murum aries attigisset, se 
dedidissent. The reason the enemy attack is not made clear, if they are actually overawed by the siege 
works of the Romans and believe they are divinely guided. Note that in the battles fought of this 
year, there seems to have been little possibility of booty for the soldiers directly. The defeat of the 
Belgae was against their rearguard, and their towns capitulated without assaults. While the Nervii 
camp was actually taken, they had removed their people, and presumably their valuables to safety. It 
is therefore entirely possible that Caesar had some problem controlling his men at this point due to 
issues of payment. See Riggsby (2006) p. 205 on the neglect of booty, also Collins (1972) pp. 938-
939. See also Nordling (1991) pp. 197-200. 
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from there being other issues regarding control of his men; however he only describes 
the information that highlights his own quality.
168
 In doing so, he may have omitted 
information, as his objective is to promote his own characteristic even when it may 
conflict with other details. 
 
The lack of clarity in favour of self-promotion is evident in Caesarʼs own response to 
an enemy attack. He holds back any reference to his suspicion that the enemy may 
attack, the implication of his actions being that he accepts the surrender of the 
Aduatuci at face value.
169
 Only once they have attacked does he reveal he was 
prepared for such an event, so that the battle narrative maintains a sense that Caesar 
has given the enemy the benefit of the doubt.
170
 The account of the siege of Aduatuca 
illustrates that the purpose of the narrative is to address the quality of clementia, and 
the account balances such an objective against the requirement to present other 
qualities and details of the battle.  
 
The Commander in the First Invasion of Britain 
 
 
The description of the first invasion of Britain is a specific example where Caesar 
uses battle narrative to convince the audience of his qualities as commander and in 
this case, the greatness of his achievement.
171
 In this account, contextual details such 
as the requisitioning of ships and nautical references are used to call attention to 
Caesarʼs precautions and his care as commander in the face of the challenge of this 
unprecedented venture.
172
 Specific qualities on display, such as scientia and rei 
militaris are evident in the account of the preparations and the crossing to Britain.
173
 
                                                 
168
 At the siege of Avaricum at 7.17 Caesar is clear that it is the men who take vengeance on the town. 
See pp. 291-297 below.  
169
 2.32.4-2.32.4. 
170
 Caesar has to balance the quality of clementia with good generalship. This passage has the effect of 
enhancing Caesar‟s qualities as commander by showing he is prepared. See also the massacre of the 
Usipetes and Tencteri pp. 309-313 where he balances these two qualities in a similar way. See also 
7.11 for his foresight in anticipating the flight of refugees across a river. 
171
 See 4.23-4.26 for the landing. See also Welch (1998) p. 85 who notes the purpose of the work in 
general is to present Caesar as the great Roman imperator. This representation of Caesar is 
complimentary with the view of Jervis (2001) p. 164. 
172
 4.20-4.24. See Jervis (2001) p. 166. On the idea of res gestae see Ramage (2003) pp. 362-363. See 
Schadee (2008) pp. 171-172 on novelty. 
173
 See Cicero pro Leg Man 28, for the virtues of a commander scientia, rei militaris, virtus, auctoritas, 
felicitas. Note that this section does not address these qualities directly, as the purpose is primarily to 
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However his most notable presence is as commander in battle, and in the landing at 
the beach details of combat are selected to demonstrate the obstacles he faces, and 
how he overcomes these, so that the account places emphasis on his achievement.
174
 
In his final summation he shows how important communication of the achievement is, 
and that combat details are part of a pattern of self-promotion where the battle is rated 
against his other successes.  
 
The historical expedition to Britain was a novel, unusual venture that must have 
excited the imagination of a Roman audience, something Caesar would have been 
well aware of when he constructed his account.
175
 Welch notes that soon after the 
expedition Catullus used Caesar as image of “romantic distance” and by his own 
admission, the activity of this year, including the crossing, earned him a twenty-day 
celebration in Rome, a greater accolade than that achieved for his general activity in 
57 BCE, and the same celebration as that given after the battle of Alesia.
176
 With 
these celebrations mentioned, it is reasonable to expect that the rest of the account 
would be influenced by the desire to capture the unprecedented and challenging 
nature of the task undertaken.
177
 In particular, the account of battle and the attendant 
circumstances could be expected to capture his personal contribution and suitability 
for this great venture. 
 
Caesar makes clear his concern that the account reflects personally as an achievement, 
as he makes excuses when a challenge is not overcome. In particular, his failure to 
decisively defeat the enemy at the beachhead is a major concern, and he states: neque 
longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non 
potuerant. hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.
178
 Here Caesar describes a 
missing aspect of battle, the failure to pursue, which is due to the lack of cavalry. The 
mention of failure is important as he is willing to discuss an apparent problem in order 
                                                                                                                                            
determine the role of the battle narrative; however at least two of the qualities are certainly on 
display. 
174
 See Adcock (1956) p. 38 on the reception objective. 
175
 Note the proposed epic of Quintus Cicero, who was on Caesarʼs staff. See Nousek (2006) p. 45 and 
Allen (1955) for a general examination of the epic. 
176
 See 2.35.4, 7.90.8, 4.38.5. See Welch (1998) p. 86, and Catullus Carm 11. 
177
 Welch (1998) p. 85 notes the competition with Pompey as an important factor in this account. 
178
 4.26.5. On fortuna as a virtue see Ramage (2003) pp. 357-358. 
247 
 
to reflect on his overall level of success.
179
 His final assessment that it is the one thing 
missing from his usual fortune is an indicator of how he wishes to portray this as one 
of his achievements. In this regard, the qualities of the commander, and the self-
promotional objective, can be expected to be reflected in the battle. 
 
The Challenge of the Unknown  
 
Caesar utilises the contextual details and background to emphasise the unusual 
challenges he faced and to enhance the idea of the invasion as an expansion of Roman 
endeavour. This is evident as he develops the idea of the expedition as one into an 
unknown and distant land, and the focus of contextual information is on the absence 
of information about the enemy and terrain. As he states: 
 
Quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita. neque enim temere praeter mercatores adit 
ad illos quisquam, neque iis ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas 
regiones, quae sunt contra Galliam, notum est.
180
 
 
This passage describes the lack of anything except a superficial understanding of the 
island.
181
 However, by the time of writing Caesar had visited the region, and could 
have provided information if his desire was to fully contextualise the forthcoming 
battles. This style continues throughout the account, so that when he reports the 
activity of the scout Volusenus, he never actually states what the man found out, 
ensuring that an air of mystery remains regarding the nature of the terrain and people 
encountered.
182
 Contextual information is deliberately withheld regarding the 
conditions in order to establish and evoke the idea of the unknown. 
 
The most important area of intelligence kept from the audience is the name of the 
enemy faced, an omission that enhances the idea of a venture into the unknown. There 
                                                 
179
 Caesar‟s account also fits with Melchior‟s revenge dynamic, and how the absence of vengeance 
demands an explanation. See Melchior (2004) p. 19. 
180
 4.20.3-4.20.4. 
181
 Rice Holmes recognises that Caesar may have known more than he cared to admit. See Rice 
Holmes (1911) p. 163. Krebs (2006) pp. 117-118 also notes a form of intellectual mastery as part of 
this account. Note that Caesar appears to have this knowledge by the time he wrote 5.12-5.14, as he 
describes the island in more detail.  
182
 For Volusenus see 4.21.9, 4.23.5. 
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is no information provided on tribal names or confederacies, and the enemy is simply 
introduced as hostium copias armatas prior to the landing.
183
 This is in marked 
contrast to the building up of enemies such as the Helvetii, Germani and Nervii, and is 
an omission that is indicative of Caesarʼs flexibility, in this case the withholding of 
information to create an impression.
184
 Nowhere in the account of the actual landing 
does he identify these forces, who continue to be described as hostes or barbari.
185
 
The impression is of an unknown antagonist, not even identified as Britanni in the 
account and its antecedent activity.
186
 This lack of definition is an artifice designed to 
keep their identity unknown, as Caesar reveals after the battle that these were the 
same tribes who had earlier sent hostages to him.
187
 Consequently, the omission of 
their names appears deliberate in order to evoke the idea that the commander is 
venturing into unknown lands. 
 
Furthermore, Caesar does not indicate the strength of the enemy, most importantly 
with regard to the number of men faced, and the absence of such empirical data 
illustrates his concern with impressions rather than figures. This is reflected in the 
total absence of enemy numbers in the account, for both the initial force that await 
him on the cliff tops, and the numbers that opposed the actual landing.
188
 Even after 
the battle no figures are given regarding the dead or total enemy present, so that no 
assessment of the actual level of difficulty faced can be extrapolated from his 
account.
189
 This disregard for the numeric aspect of the landing shows that Caesar is 
not attempting to provide an empirical military assessment, but is inviting his 
audience to imagine, and possibly even to exaggerate the numbers and the level of 
resistance they offer, in order to establish the idea of this venture as a notable 
achievement. 
                                                 
183
 4.23.3.  
184
 See Chapter One pp. 61-62 on the Helvetii, Chapter Two pp. 146-161 on the Germani, and Chapter 
Three pp. 192-204 on the Nervii.  
185
 4.23.3, 4.24.1, 4.24.3. (illi), 4.25.2, 4.25.4, 4.26.2. 4.26.5, 4.27.1. Tribal names are not given until 
the second invasion.  
186
 See 4.21.5 where Caesar only uses the word Britanni once, when discussing the activity prior to his 
embarkation. The inhabitants are merely the enemy, rather than a distinguishable set of tribes. At 
5.20 Caesar mentions the Trinobantes as coming to him on the mainland of Gaul, so names are held 
back for an entire book.  
187
 4.27.5-4.27.6. 
188
 See 4.23-4.24. 
189
 There is no casualty report for the enemy. For a contrast, see the Usipetes and Tencteri, where 
Caesar uses numbers to indicate how successful his surprise attack was. See 4.15.3-4.15.4. Note also 
how he uses casualties among the Nervii to indicate the intensity of their last stand. For the Nervii 
see 2.28.1-2.28.3. 
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Details regarding the enemy are only given when they evoke ideas of novelty and 
difficulty. Caesar mentions that the enemy cavalry and chariots oppose the landing, 
providing a reference to a novel method of warfare that has not been described in the 
Gallic battles.
190
 However the absence of numbers is important as it gives the 
audience neither the ability to empirically assess the intensity of this opposition at the 
beach, nor the ability to assess the potential success of such opposition.
191
 More 
importantly, the ability of chariots to function on this terrain is debatable, and what 
these men do once they reach the beach is never mentioned.
192
 Their inclusion mainly 
evokes the idea of the unusual, without discussion of actual performance in battle. 
Furthermore, Caesar appears to include details that specifically illustrate the 
opponentʼs native status. The enemy is able to enter the shallows and attack the 
Romans with missiles, action that is attributed to their familiarity with the region and 
the training of the horses.
193
 While horses may be trained to function in the surf and 
the statement is tactically relevant, the enemyʼs knowledge of the region seems less 
relevant, particularly in the treacherous and changing conditions of a beach.
194
 The 
unusual is picked out for inclusion, enhancing the foreign nature of the venture and 
the idea of a novel accomplishment for the commander.  
 
This is not the only content selected for the purpose of addressing the novelty of the 
situation for a Roman audience. When Caesar describes a flanking move by the 
warships in the landing, he describes a significant factor, as the effect is to force the 
enemy to retire.
195
 However he describes the effect on morale in the following way:
 
 
 
…naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitatior et motus ad usum 
expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus 
apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac 
                                                 
190
 Caesar makes no mention of chariot use by the Gauls in his narratives. See Adcock (1956) p. 53 on 
novelty, Riggsby (2006) p. 57 on chariots. 
191
 No relative data is forthcoming to rate numerically the two sides. Chariots are mentioned in the 
landing, but an assessment of their combat ability is withheld to later in the account at 4.33. 
192
 If Rice Holmes is correct in stating that the landings occurred between Deal and Walmer, the 
beaches in this region are made of stones on which chariots would struggle to function, assuming the 
basic material of the beaches are the same as they were at the time of the invasion. See Rice Holmes 
(1911) p. 155. 
193
 4.24.3-4.24.4.  
194
 Rice Holmes (1911) p. 158 notes they may have trained for the surf in preparation for the invasion. 
195
 The enemy retire at 4.25.2-4.25.3. 
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submoveri iussit. quae res magno usui nostris fuit. Nam et navium figura et 
remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac 
paulum modo pedem rettulerunt.
196
 
 
While missile weapons are described as effective, the passage twice describes the 
unfamiliarity of the enemy with the ships and equipment used.
197
 This statement is 
problematic considering the maritime status of these peoples. These were tribes 
familiar with the coast and presumably accustomed to oar power, even if it was not 
used in the style of Roman warships.
198
 In this instance the issue of morale appears 
selective, as it reminds the audience that this is a new adversary not encountered 
previously, and therefore draws attention to the unprecedented nature of the 
commanderʼs actions. 
 
Terrain is also included when it highlights the unusual and challenging nature of the 
expedition. Caesar notes that the enemy in the initial landing place is able to cast 
missiles from the cliff tops to the shore, information that is provided to show why a 
landing is not attempted at that spot. However it is helpful only in defining the place 
as an obstacle that has to be circumvented, there being no actual fighting that takes 
place there.
199
 By contrast, the description of the actual landing place is very brief, 
merely summarized as aperto ac plano, and no further details are provided, in spite of 
the fact that this is where the battle takes place.
200
 Topography is described in detail 
only when it poses an obstacle to be met and overcome, in order to illustrate the 
magnitude of the task undertaken by the Roman commander. 
 
                                                 
196
 4.25.1-4.25.3. 
197
 Note that the appearance of the ships and oars had no effect before or at the start of the battle from 
4.21.1-4.21.2.  
198
 Caesar claims these peoples had aided the Venetii and Gauls, and clearly had familiarity with ships 
and traders at the very least. See 3.8-3.9 for their role in the war with the Venetii, and 4.21.5-4.21.6 
for the traders.  
199
 4.23.3-4.23.4. Note that it is unclear where this might have been. There is no mention of white 
cliffs, which could indicate the lower heights to the North of Dover. However these do not have the 
steep characteristics that are a feature of the white cliffs and Caesar‟s account. If they were the white 
cliffs, Caesar‟s omission is remarkable and indicative of a very tightly focused form of self-
promotion, where geography is only referenced for its specific relevance. In general, Caesar omits 
reference to geographic features except for rivers, or where they have defensive characteristics 
related to his narrative objectives.  
200
 4.23.6. Note that in stark contrast to the depth of detail in tides and times in the crossing, Caesar has 
none of these at the beach and does not describe any conditions there. Importantly he omits tides, 
which are important for a landing, and other aspects such as winds.  
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Knowledge of Military Affairs 
 
In the face of the challenges of the invasion and the impression of a venture into the 
unknown, Caesar utilises the details of campaign and battle to communicate his 
knowledge of military affairs, in particular his diligence, care and caution as 
commander.
201
 Information given at the start of the campaign that is necessary to 
understand military context, such as the forces used, fall within a sequence regarding 
the delegation of command, as he is careful to stress his attention to the 
preparations.
202
 As the statement quicquid praeterea navium longarum habebat, id 
quaestori legatis praefectisque tribuit illustrates, the presence of warships is given as 
part of the delegations.
203
 Caesarʼs concern with his own precautions is clear as the 
subordinates mentioned play no later role in the account, and the delegations are of no 
importance for understanding the course of events.
204
 These details can be seen to 
primarily address his competence in facing the unusual challenge that the expedition 
posed. 
  
More importantly, Caesar reveals that it is the adequacy of his preparations, not the 
military data itself that is the purpose of this information. Prior to the invasion he 
gives some details of the ships he procures, being particular to note he has around 80 
transports, enough, as he confirms, to carry across about two legions. As he states: 
navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis, contractisque quot satis esse ad duas 
transportandas legiones existimabat…205 In this statement the concern is to establish 
that he thought the number of ships enough, and demonstrates that he uses the 
logistical background to focus on his own diligence.
206
 Contextual information 
                                                 
201
 See Suetonius Div Jul 58.1.1-58.1.5. Diligentia is not specifically used here; however the general 
idea of diligence is communicated. See Ramage (2003) p. 334. See above pp. 246-246 fn. 174 on rei 
militaris. 
202
 See 4.22.3-4.22.6. See also pp. 319-335 below on the second invasion. 
203
 4.22.3. See also 4.22.5-4.22.6 as he includes his delegations in Gaul in this sequence. 
204
 Note how the warships are instrumental at 4.25.1 but the commanders are not mentioned. By 
contrast, in Book Five Caesar mentions at 5.2.3-5.2.4 the number of warships for the second invasion 
when discussing preparations i.e. 600 transports, 28 warships. 
205
 4.22.3.  
206
 Caesar is careful in his preparations to describe how he ordered Gaul before leaving, which is a 
demonstration of diligence; as such dispositions are not relevant to further activity by the delegated 
commanders. See also 5.24, 5.25. Note the similar use of numeric details at 1.29, where the Helvetian 
census, as a found document of numbers, demonstrates the excellence of Caesar‟s own 
investigations. See also 1.31, where the numbers of Germani, while of limited relevance for the 
battle, show Caesar‟s informed generalship. See pp. 50-51 above.  
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regarding the forthcoming battles is clearly there to illustrate his ability to undertake 
the venture and promote his capacities as commander.  
 
The details given, in particular his plans for the invasion, also suggest through their 
lack of specificity that they are only concerned to reflect Caesarʼs personal ability to 
pursue the venture. He provides no details of his plans regarding potential landing 
places, and does not explain why he approached an initially unsuitable place except 
for an implication it was closest to Gaul.
207
 Similarly, after the first location proved 
problematic, the lack of specific detail regarding his plans is evident in his orders to 
his sub-commanders: 
 
Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis, et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et 
quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, uti rei militaris ratio maximeque ut maritimae 
res postularent, ut, quam celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad 
tempus omnes res ab iis administrarentur.
208
 
 
As the repetition of quae...quae shows, Caesar is more concerned to stress that he 
gave commands to his legates and tribunes, than to explain what exactly he 
communicated.
209
 Moreover he makes clear his knowledge of naval affairs when he 
mentions the inconstancy of the sea; however the emphasis is on his own ability to 
understand the problems and give orders to account for them.
210
 This vagueness 
regarding the details of actions taken is because the actions, not the details are self-
promotional, and communicating his competence is the governing condition behind 
the inclusion of command decisions.  
 
Caesar displays a similar selectivity regarding other references that indicates his 
concern with how his command is perceived. His disinterest in empirical data is 
evident as he does not give the distance from Gaul to Britain at this stage, but 
withholds this information until the second invasion.
211
 While he gives indicative 
travel times, the absence of such details suggests how little he is concerned with 
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 4.21.3-4.21.4. Caesar intends his audience to consider the cliff location as a potential landing place 
as is evident from his description of the defensive potential. See 4.23.2-4.23.4.  
208
 4.23.5-4.23.6. 
209
 The attribute of consilium is noted by Ramage (2003) p. 337. 
210
 4.23.5-4.23.6. 
211
 See pp. 319-321 below. 
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describing the physical parameters of the invasion.
212
 Even the seven miles that he 
states was the distance from the cliffs to the actual landing point is of limited 
significance, as it only locates the second point from the first.
213
 While marginal in 
terms of context, these details show attention to logistics that are characteristics of a 
good general, at least according to Polybius.
214
 In addition, there is an attention to the 
passing of time: 
 
… ipse hora diei circiter quarta cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit … 
 
Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo 
convenirent, ad horam nonam in ancoris exspectavit.
215
 
 
Both passages feature descriptions of time, an important aspect of co-ordinating the 
invasion of which Caesar appears aware.
216
 As these passages indicate, he uses such 
details to communicate the impression of diligence. That they have no direct 
relevance to combat is indicated as there is no mention of time once the fighting 
commences, and they are abandoned in the battle narrative.
217
 While the approach 
appears somewhat selective with regard to distances and times, it does so because its 
purpose is not to define the tactical landscape. The details are provided to show his 
concern with precision and reconnaissance, abilities that best demonstrate his 
competence as commander of the expedition. 
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 4.23.1-4.23.2. At 5.2 he finally gives distance for transit continent to Britain from the Itian port as 
30 miles. 
213
 4.23.6.  
214
 Polybius describes these aspects of command at 9.12-9.16. He pays particular attention to issues 
such as navigation. Also see for tides and times see BG 4.23.1, 4.23.4-4.23.5. 5.8.1-5.8.4. Caesar 
shows a Polybian attention to detail i.e. time, tides, weather in the first invasion of Britain, which is 
to be expected of a naval invasion, but his selectivity in regards to information is directed at his own 
abilities. See also to a lesser extent the second invasion, which addresses the problems of the first as 
discussed at pp. 319-321 below.  
215
 4.23.2, 4.23.4-4.23.5. 
216
 Caesar is also clear that he arrives with the first ships, demonstrating how he took a personal 
interest in the intelligence gathering at 4.23.2-4.23.3. 
217
 In particular, the depth of the water at the beach is not related to tidal issues, and the time Caesar 
arrived at the beach is not described. See 4.23.6. 
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The Landing as Res Gestae 
 
Having established the unprecedented nature of the invasion and his own suitability to 
lead it, Caesar describes the landing as a sequence of challenges that further enhance 
the extent of the achievement and the glory involved. He openly states at the start of 
the battle that this is particularly challenging, by making the problems of landing the 
subject of his introduction to combat. As he states:  
 
Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto 
constitui non poterant, militibus autem ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et 
gravi onere armorum pressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus 
consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum, cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in 
aquam progressi omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis audacter tela 
conicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent. quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius 
omnino generis pugnae imperiti non eadem alacritate ac studio, quo in pedestribus 
uti proeliis consuerant, utebantur.
218
  
 
In this description, a series of obstacles to landing are supposed, including the depth 
of the water, and the ability of the enemy to hurl weapons at the Romans as they 
struggle ashore. These are challenges that must be overcome for the landing to be 
successful, rather than a description of the actual movement of the men ashore. Caesar 
is therefore quite clear in his objective, and starts the battle with the challenges of a 
naval assault rather than an explanation of actual activity in order to support the idea 
of the venture as a noteworthy deed. 
 
The attention to the challenge comes at the expense of coherence regarding the 
sequence of events. In particular it is unclear whether the obstacles listed are only 
potential problems, or if the men were actually experiencing them at the time of the 
historical landing.
219
 As the final statement of the above passage reveals, the men are 
very shaken by the unusual circumstances and hold back from an energetic attack, 
which could indicate both a hesitation to approach the shore or an actual attempt to 
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 4.24.2-4.24.4. 
219
 While one interpretation is that the men have not disembarked prior to the actions of an aquilifer, 
discussed below at pp. 258-260 what is important to note is the lack of clarity here.  
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land. It is not even clear if the ships have actually beached, as Caesar only uses 
constituit to describe his arrival, a word that could mean anchoring or beaching.
220
 
This lack of clarity and possibility for misinterpretation of the state of affairs is 
indicative of a lack of coherence, since the objective is to only capture the challenges 
faced in getting the men ashore. 
 
Battle is clearly constructed to emphasise these challenges as Caesar reiterates the 
difficulties in describing actual combat. As he states: 
 
Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque 
firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi 
quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur. hostes 
vero notis omnibus vadis, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes 
conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur, plures paucos circumsistebant, 
alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coniciebant.
221
 
 
He could have ended the description at pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter, if he wished, 
but instead uses repetition to reinforce the initial assessment of the challenge.
222
 
Reiteration of the dangers is evident in the description of men struggling to find 
footing, and the ability of the enemy to manoeuvre effectively in the same conditions, 
suggesting the account is not merely descriptive but a supporting statement regarding 
his initial assessment.
223
 The description of combat is an explicit reinforcement of the 
initial conditions, and draws attention back to the challenge that the commander 
faced. 
 
Caesar relates activity on the battlefield as a set of responses to these challenges, so 
that the focus of the passage is on how he meets and overcomes the obstacles to 
victory. Once the fighting starts, he does not locate himself on the battlefield, 
illustrating that this account is not designed to stress his physical presence at any 
                                                 
220
 The meaning of the word constituo at 4.23.6 is not precise enough to determine if it means to land 
or to station the ships offshore, even with the ablatives in aperto ac plano litore naves constituit. See 
3.14.3 where it clearly means “stationedˮ rather than beached. 
221
 4.26.1-4.26.4. 
222
 On repetition see Williams (1985) p. 224, Riggsby (2006) p. 110. 
223
 See 4.24.2-4.24.4. 
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actual or thematic crisis point.
224
 Instead, he only mentions his perception of affairs, 
and his response to the unfolding situation. This is most evident in his reactions: 
 
Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris 
inusitatior et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et 
remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, 
tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit. quae res magno usui nostris fuit. 
 
Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria 
navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes conspexerat, his subsidia 
submittebat.
225
 
 
Both passages start with a statement of the commanderʼs perception, and then provide 
the details of his response, whether that is to order supporting fire, or provide general 
assistance.
226
 His orders and the action are conflated, so that the activity is described 
as part of the perspective and reaction of the commander, illustrating the role he 
wishes to be remembered for is as the one who gave the commands that brought about 
this victory. 
 
Caesar describes activity in the battle to address the manner in which these obstacles 
are overcome and descriptive passages or contextual information are limited to 
instances when the challenge is addressed. As is evident in the above description of 
the small boats, how these boats provide aid or help in getting the men ashore is not 
described, as the emphasis is on Caesarʼs countermeasure when the difficulties are 
noticed.
227
 Furthermore the warships only appear in the account when they provide 
missile cover, and Caesar never gives their fighting strength, in spite of the 
importance attributed to them.
228
 He does not even state which legions he took at this 
time, and while he gives some numeric detail that might help reconstruct battle, the 
                                                 
224
 See above pp. 215-222 for contrasts. 
225
 4.25.1-4.25.2, 4.26.4-4.26.5. 
226
 See another perceptual example at pp. 233-235 above and at Octodurus of Galba at pp. 102-109. 
227
 Moving around near shore could have been dangerous and difficult, especially if ships were already 
beaching, but all this is omitted. 
228
 4.25.1-4.25.2, 4.22.3. See below pp. 319-321 on numbers in the second invasion. Caesar has not 
even mentioned their location, and only clarifies that they were initially among the transports to 
make sense of their activity. At 4.24 their location is not mentioned. 
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quality and type of men taken are not described until they are specifically mentioned 
in combat.
229
 In particular, the slingers and archers, so instrumental in the above 
response, have not even been mentioned as part of the expedition.
230
 In omitting such 
details until the units are engaged in combat, and considering how important the role 
of these units is, their absence until active demonstrates that Caesar only addresses 
such elements of battle as required for the response to each obstacle.  
 
Caesar also ignores the opportunity to examine details other than those that must be 
disposed of to achieve success. This is most notable once the obstacles to landing are 
surmounted in the statement: nostri simul in arido constiterunt, suis omnibus 
consecutis in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt…231 A great deal 
of simplification occurs in this statement, as it does not account for any variations in 
the distance the men have to wade, or time taken to reach shore. More important is 
that this is the first time the Romans have engaged this foreign adversary, and what he 
later reveals are their fighting techniques.
232
 However the passage gives no details to 
understand how the infantry engaged the cavalry and chariots, since the primary 
concern is to show that once the obstacles are overcome, the enemy are quickly 
routed.
233
 Similarly, missile fire from the warships is given a very simplified 
description in response to enemy attacks.
234
 In adopting this approach, Caesar 
demonstrates that even novel, unusual, or potentially complex battlefield activity is 
                                                 
229
 Similarly there are no details given regarding the forces left behind, only the details of Caesar‟s 
command delegations at 4.22.5-4.22.6. The absence of numeric data indicates how the delegation, 
not the forces utilised is the concern of the passage. Note that to determine which legions were sent 
to Britain the audience must wait until 4.25.3 and 4.32.1, where Caesar introduces the legion names 
as part of particular episodes. Note also he never mentions if the enemy infantry arrive during the 
landing. 
230
 As units the auxiliaries are not mentioned at all, and it is only the missiles used that are mentioned 
at 4.25.1. 
231
 4.26.5. 
232
 See pp. 286-288 below. Caesar reserves the description of chariot fighting for later where it serves 
the purpose of exonerating him from the inconclusive nature of the campaign.  
233
 It is interesting to note the lack of distances in comparison to Caesar‟s earlier precision. The 
distance the men had to wade could be critical to an understanding of the difficulty of the landing, 
but it is not stated. Such detail would aid an audience to understand the actual battlefield 
circumstances, but Caesar only desires a general impression to be conveyed. 
234
 While it is possible that in the historical battle the fire was effective along the entire front and 
forced an enemy retreat, probably only the heavier throwers had the range, as a scorpion might have 
the range to fire along the whole front of the beach. The bows and slings may only have been 
effective against troops nearby, particularly as they were fired from ships, and probably only had the 
ability to hit targets up to at most several hundred metres away. See McLeod, (1972) p.78. McLeod 
gives an absolute maximum range of 500 metres, well short of the length of beach that Rice Holmes 
(1911) p. 160 estimates to be at least a mile long. Even if McLeod‟s figures are too high, they still 
indicate a range that is unlikely to cover the whole beach. For sling ranges see Echols (1950) p. 228. 
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not as important as establishing a selection of obstacles to victory, and when these are 
overcome information is omitted. 
 
More importantly, the description of activity is simplified in order to establish the 
challenges of the venture, as it allows Caesar to focus on activity that defines the 
nature of the achievement. He describes that the men are hesitant to advance due to 
the depth of the water, which he states as the most important factor in their failure to 
land.
235
 The effect is of a whole army that is reluctant, a very unitary approach to 
activity considering action in the actual battle was probably occurring along the entire 
front of up to eighty ships, at different points and probably under slightly different 
circumstances.
236
 By adopting this style, Caesar is able to present the depth of the 
water as a single challenge that is suitable to the purpose of his presentation, as it 
accounts for all battlefield activity according to a challenge and response dynamic, in 
this case, the danger of deep water.  
 
This approach to water depth affords Caesar the opportunity to answer the challenge 
of the venture with a single, highly parochial response. By stating all the men hold 
back due to the sea, the obstacle of deep water can be countered by the actions of a 
single aquilifer. This is evident in the description of the manʼs actions: 
 
At nostris militibus cunctantibus maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui decimae 
legionis aquilam ferebat, obtestatus deos ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ʻdesilite‟ 
inquit ʻcommilitones, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei 
publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero‟. hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex 
navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit. tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne 
tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt. hos item ex proximis 
navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.
237
  
 
                                                 
235
 4.25.3.  
236
 It may be possible that the whole army acted in this way, but Caesar is more likely giving a general 
characteristic not designed to account for variations. As is evident, the characteristic he chooses suits 
the style of narration. See Rice Holmes (1911) p. 160. See also 4.26.3 for another example of 
universos and difficulty.  
237
 4.25.3-4.25.6. 
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The action of the battle turns on this one action by the aquilifer, so that Caesar applies 
universal significance to this feature.
238
 The use of the word universi, while only 
referring to the men on the aquiliferʼs ship, is an odd choice but serves to give an 
implication of solidarity that applies to the whole army.
239
 Jervis notes that difficult 
victories contain a marked turning point for Romans such as an encouraging speech 
by the commander or individual soldiers act of bravery.
240
 In this case, simplification 
does not occur for coherency, but does so in order that challenges can be met with a 
universal response. This is a single dynamic to explain the turnaround in the battle, 
which Caesar uses for its parochial effect.  
 
The importance of the aquilifer is that he is a countermeasure that is meaningful for 
the interpretation of the venture as a notable achievement, and the presentation 
concentrates on those aspects of his action that enhance the glory and achievement of 
the undertaking. In particular, the evocation of state and commander shows that the 
aquiliferʼs words are used to remind the audience of who this invasion is on behalf of 
and the reputation at stake.
241
 The aquilifer is also identified as a Roman soldier with 
the words: qui decimae legionis aquilam ferebat.
242
 His unnamed status is an odd 
occurrence considering that Caesar normally names exempla such as Baculus and 
Marcus Petronius, and could easily have been able to find out who the man was.
243
 
However, it does make him an instrument of the state and a clear exemplar of Roman 
courage, as he is one of many soldiers on the battlefield.
244
 Therefore, while the 
record of the deed may possibly reflect something significant, this one action appeals 
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 It is possible that this was where the advance started. Caesar‟s text certainly is intended to portray 
this idea.  
239
 See Rice Holmes (1911) p. 160. As he notes, the word universos is not applied to all soldiers in 4.25 
as the line of ships by his reckoning is a mile long.  
240
 Note also Jervis (2001) p. 77. Jervis refers in particular to the role of Baculus at 2.25. 
241
 4.25.3-4.25.4. This may also explain why Caesar does not make a speech or locate himself on the 
battlefield. He is very careful to balance self-promotion with the idea that this is a Roman 
achievement. See Hall (1998) on Caesar and Rome in general. See also Hall (1998) p. 19 on the use 
of the future perfect to capture the soldierly speech. Nordling (1991) p. 80 examines why the speech 
is used by the aquilifer. See Rasmussen (1963) pp. 21-27 on the use of speeches. As Rasmussen 
notes, the aquilifer‟s speech serves as a literary climax. See Ramage (2003) p. 358 on the context of 
felicitas, which may refer to Caesar‟s fortune. Note also use of rei publicae not populus romanus. 
This is the first use of the term since Book One. See generally Ramage (2002) p. 125 where Ramage 
notes how populus romanus is used as propaganda for Caesar and appears some sixty three times in 
the work. 
242
 The man is not even given a rank or the name of aquilifer.  
243
 For Baculus see 2.25, for Marcus Petronius see 7.50. See also 5.37.5 for the aquilifer L. Petrosidus. 
244
 This seems to be precisely the effect Caesar is trying to achieve when compared to his usual naming 
of heroic individuals. Note the similarity to the unnamed soldiers in the Germanic battle discussed 
above at pp 155-157. 
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to the audienceʼs sensibilities, reminding them of the one who led the expedition and 
the implications for Rome.  
 
The first invasion is illustrative of the use of battle to promote Caesar as commander, 
through reference to his abilities, and his role in the advancement of Roman interests. 
Whether he is drawing attention to the implications for Rome, or his personal 
contribution as commander in preparing for the expedition, self-promotion shapes the 
structure of the narrative and the manner that battle is portrayed. Caesar desires the 
affair to be viewed as a personal achievement, and the content of the battle narrative 
plays a critical role in pursuit of that goal.  
 
Caesar and Vercingetorix in Book Seven 
 
 
In Book Seven, an important objective of the narrative, in particular the battle of 
Alesia, is to show Caesarʼs superiority as commander to his opposites in the Gallic 
command, most importantly Vercingetorix.
245
 Kraus notes this is a trope, and as Jervis 
states, Vercingetorix serves as a “flawed doubleˮ of Caesar.246 The narrative certainly 
shows a considerable effort to describe the campaign in terms of the influence of 
Vercingetorix, both in respect to the figureʼs centrality as the locus of Gallic activity, 
and to his personal characteristics that are often negative.
247
 Caesar then shows his 
own superiority through the centrality of his character and Vercingetorix as an 
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 7.68-7.89. See Jervis (2001) pp. 171-176. See also Barlow (1998) pp. 152-153; Torigian (1998) p. 
57; Nousek (2006) pp. 76-82; Kraus (2010) p. 44. Kraus notes how the narrative of speech and siege 
allows Caesar to “hold the spotlight” on Caesar and Vercingetorix for long periods. Pitcher (2007) p. 
114, specifically notes how Caesar uses tense to show his own good generalship i.e. at 7.11.8, 7.13.1, 
7.50.1, 7.44.3.  
246
 See Jervis (2001) pp. 171-176. Kraus (2010) p. 44 notes the trope of the paired opposite 
commanders in Book Seven. 
247
 Kahn (1971) argues Caesar has a model of tragedy in mind while writing the Vercingetorix episode. 
Pitcher (2007) pp. 106, 115, also notes the focus on the character of Vercingetorix. See also Riggsby 
(2006) pp. 121-122; Seager (2003) p. 29. See also Pitcher (1998) p. 108 on Ariovistus, who is also 
contrasted with Caesar. An example is at 1.40.2 where Caesar has his character speak on the loyalty 
of Ariovistus so that the text can go onto show that the treachery is true. As Pitcher says, it is 
designed to show more about the speaker i.e. that Caesar expects people to show consistency of 
behaviour in the absence of the contrary. As Pitcher states, Caesar‟s momentary misreading of 
Ariovistus is used by Caesar the historian, to shed a flattering light on his own character. Kraus 
(2010) p. 55 notes the pairing of Caesar and Ariovistus in Book One, and at p. 45 the contrast of 
Caesar and the Gauls at Avaricum. 
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opposed pair, and details are provided in order to address this relationship.
248
 Battle 
supports this impression and the ongoing contrast is resolved in favour of Caesar at 
Alesia, where the passage shows the Roman commander as superior to his Gallic 
opposite.  
 
The importance of Caesar is established from the start of Book Seven, where the 
motivation of the enemy and the reasons they unite are described with specific 
reference to his person.
249
 His absence from Gaul is established as an important 
consideration in the reason for the revolt, as evident in the following passage: 
 
… addunt ipsi et adfingunt rumoribus Galli, quod res poscere videbatur: retineri 
urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse. 
hac impulsi occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent, 
liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt.
250
  
 
A reason for the revolt is the absence of Caesar and the impetus this provides to the 
peoples who resent Roman rule, illustrating his central role in the narrative.
251
 
Extensive details are also given of their overall strategy, most important of which is 
the objective of cutting him off from his legions, so that not only the motivation for 
war, but the strategy of the enemy is centred on the person of Caesar.
252
 The impact 
that he has in the campaign is established in the opening of the book, forming the 
foundation for contextualising the narrative that follows. 
 
The other most important character of Book Seven is Vercingetorix, and the 
presentation of affairs is also focused on his influence and centrality.
253
 While 
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 Nousek (2006) pp. 76, 81 notes the polarity. Kraus (2010) p. 44 notes the parallel in the speeches of 
Vercingetorix at 7.29.1-5 and Caesar at 7.52.1-7.52.2, 7.53.1, and how Caesar‟s superiority is 
established in the pairing. 
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 This is the other side to Caesar‟s self-promotion as an inspiration to his own men. See Jervis (2001) 
pp. 159-161 on his inspiration to his own troops. When Caesar is absent, the enemy gain confidence. 
250
 7.1.2-7.1.4. 
251
 See the siege of Quintus Cicero‟s camp for another example at pp. 239-243. 
252
 Note the disjunction between the centrality of Caesar at the start of Book Seven, and the action and 
objectives that actually follow in the campaign. For example, the Carnutes attack Cenabum at 7.3 and 
there is no mention of any attempt to block Caesar from his armies.  
253
 While other characters such as Lucterius appear in the book, such as at 7.8.1, the contrast with 
Vercingetorix has the most effect on the battle of Alesia, which is the focus of this section. As the 
leader identified by Caesar, it is not surprising to see Vercingetorix in this central role. Nevertheless, 
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Vercingetorix is not described until after the massacre of Cenabum, which is 
performed by the Carnutes, he is associated with the account by being described as 
simili ratione, associating him with the opening of the book.
254
 The character of 
Vercingetorix, and his centrality in the uprising, is evident in the attention given to his 
family history and character.
255
 Furthermore, Caesar utilises such details in 
conjunction with the activity of campaign to represent Vercingetorixʼs nature. The 
troops he gathers are robbers or other desperate types, his family is described as 
seeking regnum, and he is the centre of activity, persuading leaders and others to 
join.
256
 He is even described as rex, and the tribes who join are described as attached 
to the man himself, due to his persuasive abilities.
257
 Activity is described in terms of 
the individual, demonstrating that the context of the book is closely related to the 
character himself, so that as with Caesar, the person of Vercingetorix is central to the 
Gallic revolt. 
 
The movement and reaction of the leaders is utilised throughout the book to illustrate 
Vercingetorixʼs inferiority as leader. This is evident in the ruthless manner he 
destroys towns to prevent the Romans from getting supplies, a measure noted as 
particularly harsh even by Caesar.
258
 This cruelty stands in marked contrast to 
Caesarʼs stated clementia in Book Two, or the apparent necessity of Caesarʼs own 
ruthless treatment of the Usipetes and Tencteri.
259
 The clash of the two leaders as 
context for events is particularly apparent in the account of Avaricum.
260
 In the siege, 
Caesar describes that he moves against Vercingetorix who had approached the town 
to relieve it.
261
 The passage focuses on the superiority of the Gallic leaderʼs position, 
                                                                                                                                            
it does raise the question of what may have been omitted to create this impression. Jervis (2001) p. 
175. 
254
 7.4.1. 
255
 7.4.1-7.4.2. As Jervis (2001) p. 171 notes “Caesar has made his enemy the dramatic centre of the 
book”. Note how the representation of Vercingetorix is aimed at the idea of regnum, through the 
behaviour of his father. See Jervis (2001) pp. 167, 170 on the centrality of Vercingetorix, including 
focalization. 
256
 7.4.3, 7.4.1, 7.4.5. See 7.4 for his musters.  
257
 7.4.5, 7.4.6. See the use of adiungit. See also Jervis (2001) p. 171. 
258
 See 7.14 in particular 7.14.10 where the measures are admitted to be harsh. See 7.31.2 for trickery. 
At 7.15 Vercingetorix opposes saving Avaricum and is harsh but bends to pleas. Jervis (2001) p. 174. 
259
 See above pp. 243-245 for clementia and above pp. 297-319 below for the treatment of the Usipetes 
and Tencteri. When Caesar leaves the exiles to their own fate at Alesia at 7.78, this apparent act of 
cruelty is still relatively less than that of Vercingetorix, who casts them out, or the suggestion of 
Critognatus that they be eaten. See below pp. 264-265 on this incident in the Alesia narrative. 
260
 See pp. 291-297 on Avaricum.  
261
 7.18.1-7.18.4. 
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with few details of the two armies, as the objective is to describe move and 
countermove.
262
 Furthermore, the focus on comparing the two characters has a 
substantial effect on the result of the aborted confrontation, where Caesar describes 
his own concern for his men, and their loyalty to him, in stark contrast to the 
bickering among the Gauls.
263
 Vercingetorix returns to his main army and relies on 
deceit to quell dissent among his allies, a passage that shows the fractious nature of 
the Gallic command and the dishonesty of their main commander.
264
 Similarly, 
Vercingetorixʼs final assessment of Avaricum, that the Romans did not win through 
virtus, is in direct contrast to Caesarʼs assessment of the battle that sets virtus against 
enemy ingenuity, as the objective is to undermine the abilities of the Gallic leader.
265
 
Such contrasts demonstrate Caesarʼs better understanding of warfare, and superior 
leadership of his subordinates.
266
 The implicit contrasts drawn in behaviour are 
specifically designed to promote the Roman leader, by establishing his clear 
superiority to his most notable opposite in the Gallic command.  
 
This structural pairing affects other descriptions of combat, as Caesar contrasts the 
motivation and activity of Vercingetorix with his own. For example, an attack on the 
Romans addresses the arrogance and relative cowardice of the Gallic leader, whose 
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 7.18-7.19. Note how Caesar does not describe numeric details of the forces of Vercingetorix or the 
Romans. Caesar does not even state the proportion of troops he took with him. At 7.19.1-7.19.4 He 
gives terrain details, however these are essentially in support of his decision not to attack the superior 
position of Vercingetorix. He even provides details of an imaginary assault on the position to 
foreshadow what would be the result at 7.19.3-7.19.4. See also 7.34.3-7.35.6 for an example of the 
two in apposition, as noted by Jervis (2001) p. 176. The extent to which the movement of the two 
dominates the early part of Book Seven is evident as even the sack of Cenabum, Vellaunodunum and 
Noviodunum are brushed over quickly at 7.11-7.12, just before Vercingetorix‟s appearance at 7.12.1 
and is within the manoeuvres of the two described from 7.9-7.15. 
263
 7.19-7.20. This is a powerful representation. Note that the first thing Caesar describes is the dissent 
and accusations, where he establishes the character of Vercingetorix and the enemy alliance. Caesar 
even includes a criticism of Gauls, and their avoidance of hard work. Caesar effectively turns what 
could be regarded as a Gallic victory into a failure of character and an example of impetuosity, and 
that the Gallic confederation is weak and founded on lies. Note also the way the accusations 
effectively come to nothing, and only appear to be included for their characterisation. 
264
 7.20.1-7.21.2 Note how the 10,000 men mentioned at 7.21.2 are never mentioned again, and it is 
unclear if these are the forces at 7.26.2-7.26.3. See also 6.11.4-6.11.5 for other divisions. See 
Riggsby (2006) p. 63.  
265
 7.29.2-7.29.4. For Caesar‟s confirmation of virtus, see 7.22.1-7.22.2 and pp. 165-166 above. See 
also Riggsby (2006) p. 84. Note also how Vercingetorix is incorrect when he states that the Romans 
will retreat at 7.20.10-7.20.11. See Rawlings p. 179. While Rawlings regards the Gauls as displaying 
virtus, this does not mean that the Romans did not possess it, and they actually triumph in any such 
contest. See also 7.9.1 for Caesar out thinking Vercingetorix. On the perversity of Vercingetorix‟s 
leadership note the following comment by Caesar: itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae 
auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur 7.30.3. 
266
 See also 7.13-7.14 for Caesar‟s superiority. 
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men swear an oath to ride through the Roman ranks twice, while Vercingetorix is not 
active in actual combat.
267
 In the same battle Caesar is described in action wherever 
his own forces waver, and other details of the battle such as numbers, the use of 
missiles, and the nature of the fighting are omitted in favour of this attention on 
himself.
268
 As the contrast illustrates, throughout the book there is a pairing of Caesar 
and Vercingetorix that has an influence on the battles described, and while 
representative of their roles as adversaries, it is also used to draw contrasts in 
behaviour and character. The selection of information suggests that contrasts that 
draw attention to Caesarʼs superiority to the person of Vercingetorix are a major 
objective and that this determines the level of detail and the choice of content. 
 
Leadership Contrasts at Alesia 
 
The battle of Alesia is heavily influenced by the need to contrast Caesar with his 
enemies, and a general comparison to the Gauls is a core concept that guides the 
narrative, where he is set in opposition to the catalogue of enemy forces, or leaders 
such as Critognatus.
269
 The narrative extends beyond the actual clash of forces, as 
attention is drawn to the spectacle, so that the narrative has internal witnesses as the 
Roman commander triumphs over his enemies in the battles fought.
270
 The 
confrontation not only describes contrasts favourable to Caesar but focuses on his 
centrality, his instrumentality in command, and his highly visible role as victor. 
 
The importance of contrasts to the account of Alesia is most evident in the speech of 
Critognatus, and the treatment of the people of Alesia by the two sides, a passage that 
is largely isolated from the course of the battle.
271
 Critognatus gives an exemplary 
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 Vercingetorix is described with the infantry, and then in retreat at 7.67.5 and 7.68.1-7.68.2. See for 
the oath 7.66.7. See Rawlings (1998) p. 182 who regards the oath as included to show superior 
Roman discipline. Mannetter (1995) p. 129 notes how oaths lead to failure, or are indicative of wrong 
doing. See also Ramage (2003) p. 346. 
268
 See 7.67.2-7.67.4.  
269
 7.68-7.89. See Jervis (2001) p. 188. Ramage (2003) pp. 337-338 notes Caesar‟s planning. On 
contrasts of Romans and Gauls see Gerlinger (2008) pp. 193-199. 
270
 See Feldherr (1998) pp. 4, 10; Kraus (2007) p. 375; Quintilian 8.3.66-8.3.70 
271
 See 7.77-7.78. Lendon (1999) p. 317 states the concept of self-contained vignettes, which is 
appropriate here. See also 7.68-7.70. Note the reason for the investment of Alesia is the slaughter of 
Vercingetorix‟s cavalry and the terror it created in his army. Caesar uses this to explain why he 
begins an investments, as they are clearly too afraid to interfere. However at 7.70 the Gauls attack 
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speech that helps to establish the moral framework of the battle through the actions 
and speech of this individual leader.
272
 The details of Critognatusʼ speech, with its 
implications of cannibalism, and the ejection of the townsfolk with the inclusion of 
details such as their pleas, establish the desperation of the Gauls and the measures 
they will go to for survival in the absence of help.
273
 While Riggsby analyses the 
speech of Critognatus and the rhetorical techniques in play such as structure, appeal to 
visible authority and repetition, for the purposes of this section, the speech is not as 
important as the problematic relationship it has with the battle narrative.
274
 As Caesar 
makes clear in the next passage, Gallic reinforcements immediately arrive, and it is 
even stated that these occurred at the same time.
275
 The need for the measures is never 
addressed, and Caesarʼs silence on the relationship between these two events is 
indicative of his concern for the character of the battle, rather than the connections of 
events.  
 
Furthermore, Caesarʼs own response to the ejection of the townsfolk illustrates this 
principle, as he simply refuses to let them through, with no statement of his reasons 
why.
276
 While possibly demonstrating good sense, his reaction has no relationship to 
the arrival of the reinforcements either, so that the response of the two sides to the 
desperation of the siege is stated purely in terms of their nature, not their relationship 
to the battlefield. More importantly, the fate of these exiles is never explained, and 
they disappear from the narrative after they illustrate this contrast. Whether they died 
in between the lines, were caught up in the fighting and killed, or survived the battle is 
                                                                                                                                            
and Caesar seems to contradict his earlier statement about the Gauls being afraid. No assessment is 
made as to why the enemy cavalry engaged in battle. 
272
 See Richter (1977) pp. 76-78. Note how Critognatus makes the speech not Vercingetorix, possibly 
to illustrate the divided nature of the Gallic command. Caesar also states this was particularly cruel 
7.77.2-7.77.3. On the fractious nature of the Gauls as represented see Kraus (2009) pp. 165-166. 
273
 7.78.1-7.78.2. The Gauls hold off such a decision until absolutely essential, however this does not 
diminish the idea in Caesar‟s account that they essentially agreed with Critognatus. 
274
 Riggsby (2006) p. 110-118.  
275
 7.79. Time is not quite clear throughout this account. Caesar does not track the siege by days, but 
characterises the event by incident, and concurrent or following activity. For instance the 
reinforcements arrive interea, it not being clear if this happens while the townsfolk are ejected, or 
during the speech of Critognatus and the debate of the Gauls.  
276
 7.78.5. Caesar describes in great detail their pleas, the fact there are children with them and that it 
was unjust to throw them out. However he then specifically states that he did not allow them through 
the Roman fortifications. He is specific here, guards are placed, even though this most likely was the 
case anyway, and Caesar himself refused them access. Caesar is using the episode to show his 
resolution, in comparison to the activity of the Gauls. Importantly, he does not provide any reason for 
why he refused the pleas of the townsfolk the implication being that this was a harsh act of war. 
Nevertheless Caesar adheres to constant conduct, the enemy fall to the lowest of depths, and this 
characterisation is placed before a full description of Caesar‟s own rationale. 
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never revealed, and Dioʼs attempt to explain their fate is evidence that even ancient 
sources noted the omission and saw it as important enough to explain.
277
 For Caesar 
however their fate is not part of the structure of the account, as the objective is to 
create contrasts that form the framework of the narrative, even at the expense of the 
relationship between events. 
 
Contrasts are established implicitly in the construction of the battle, most notably the 
way that the endeavours of the Roman commander are set against the vast numbers of 
Gauls opposed to him. Caesar describes in great detail his investment of Alesia, with a 
precise distance given regarding the circumference of the fortifications, the distances 
between defensive constructions and even an extended description of traps, the 
cippus, stimulus, and lilium that are used to impede attackers.
278
 The level of detail is 
indicative of the concern to communicate the minutiae of his preparations, and his 
industry in preparing for the siege. The contrast of these preparations with the enemy 
is apparent as Caesar immediately follows this passage with a catalogue of enemy 
forces that invites comparison with his own precision and order.
279
 The ordered 
construction of defences is set against the polyglot forces of the enemy, as is evident 
in the inclusion of maritime tribes
 
in the catalogue.
280
 Such emphasis on the character 
of the Gallic confederation, with its attendant details, is a direct contrast between the 
Roman leaderʼs organised, directed fortifications with a large and variegated mass.  
 
Some details appear specifically included to illustrate the negative traits of the Gauls. 
In a similar manner to the Belgae account, details are included that establish 
disharmony, such as the description of the Bellovaci, who are mentioned in spite of 
the information that they only send a token force.
281
 Their details show the Gauls are 
not naturally inclined to organisation or co-operation, so that the highly individualistic 
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 See Dio 40.40.4. 
278
 7.72.-7.74. See in particular 7.73.5, 7.73.9. Riggsby (2006) p. 206 notes how Caesar is described as 
constructing the defences. See Pascucci (1973) p. 501 for the idea these are not technical terms but to 
show ingenuity. 
279
 7.75.1-7.75.5. Dodington (1980) p. 55 states that the works of Alesia substitute for a catalogue of 
Caesar‟s troops, as they appear right next to Gallic catalogue. Kraus (2010) p. 49, also notes self-
promotional objectives in the description of the siege works. 
280
 See 7.75.4 where Caesar specifically mentions that they border the ocean. See Mannetter (1995) pp. 
143-148 for other uses of this catalogue, such as leadership, the unitary Romans versus the polyglot 
nature of the enemy, and enemy disorganisation.  
281
 7.75.5.  
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character of the force, its unnatural size and nature is established.
282
 The structure of 
the list, with its disorganised numerical order, and the inclusion of details such as the 
defection of Commius have this effect, as the communal cause is established as 
counter to principles of good order and fides.
283
 Finally, the enemy is ascribed with a 
singular overconfidence, as they imagine the effect of their attack on the 
entrenchments.
284
 Appearing as it does after Caesarʼs own preparations, the catalogue 
is illustrative of command comparisons in the narrative that display his relative 
superiority.  
 
The most important pairing is evident near the end of the account, where the 
superficial superiority and confidence of the Gauls is stated on several occasions, in 
preparation for Caesarʼs response through the action of battle. In describing the 
activity of the Gauls prior to the final attack of the battle, Caesar takes care to make 
clear their confidence and numerical superiority.
285
 He mentions that they have plans, 
although no mention of what these are is given, and it is just stated that they perform 
unspecified activity occulte.
286
 Caesarʼs actions are absent in contrast, and there is no 
speech, or dispositions or council of war on his part.
287
 This contrast of Gallic activity 
with a relative paucity of details regarding the Roman commander is deliberate, as it 
enables the narrative that follows to resolve how the Roman commander and his 
opposites are understood.  
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 There are many similarities here to the catalogue of the Belgae at 2.4, such as the Gallic forces 
mentioned being those promised rather than those who actually come to the battle. See pp. 71-88 
above. See also Gerlinger (2008) pp. 240-243 on order versus chaos. In particular see the way that 
the Bellovaci are utilised at 2.4, discussed at pp. 179-180 above. 
283
 For Commius see 7.75.5-7.76.3.  
284
 7.76.6. Note how it this statement of confidence is not attributed to the leaders, or Vercingetorix, 
but to every man among the enemy. For confidence also see 2.30.3-2.31.6, 3.24.2. 
285
 7.83.4.  
286
 7.83.5. The enemy plans are mentioned but not detailed, in this case merely establishing that they 
have a plan and are confident. There are several references to leadership activity in 7.83, such as the 
decision to scout and the mention of decisions, possibly to establish that this is Gallic cunning at play 
after the failure of brute strength. The stakes are thus raised as their vast force is now being 
augmented by cunning. 
287
 7.83-7.84. See also the duel of Manlius and the Gaul at Livy 7.9.6-7.9.10, where boastfulness and 
confidence of the enemy are contrasted to the Roman exemplum. See also Oakley (1997) p. 116. 
Walsh (1963) pp. 200, 255-256. Caesar‟s self-representation appears broadly similar to the historical 
exemplar in this respect. 
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Caesar and Vercingetorix in Battle 
 
The battle is specifically designed to emphasise the superiority of the Roman 
commander to his Gallic opposite. As with the campaign, activity in the siege is often 
described in terms of the actions of the two leaders.
288
 The battle builds towards a 
climactic encounter in which attention is drawn to the spectacle of the event, and the 
personal intervention of Caesar. Nousek notes that the narrative is structured to 
capture the perspective of these two leaders, and details are often described from their 
point of view to draw implicit contrasts favourable to Caesar.
289
 However at the crisis, 
Vercingetorix disappears from the account, only reappearing at the end to represent 
the defeat of the Gauls.
290
 Vercingetorix is represented to show the superiority of 
Caesar, and the battle is important in establishing the Roman generalʼs distinctiveness 
as commander.  
 
A relative flaw of Vercingetorix is that he displays a level of selfishness in the battle, 
a marked contrast to Caesarʼs general association with the Roman state throughout the 
work. This is communicated through the orders Vercingetorix gives regarding 
reinforcements, when he claims that 80,000 men will die with him if no help is 
sent.
291
 As he states:  
 
Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se 
optime de communi libertate meritum hostibus in cruciatum dedant.
292
  
 
This appeal for self-preservation in the desire for reinforcements does not include any 
of the advantages that such troops would have arriving as an armed force at the rear of 
the Romans, as the purpose is to show the self-interest of the enemy commander.
293
 
Such an appeal is in dramatic contrast to Caesarʼs activity throughout the work, which 
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 For scholarship on the campaign, see pp. 260-261 fn. 248-249 above. See also Nousek (2006) p. 80. 
289
 See Nousek (2006) p. 75 on perceptual shifts. For Caesar‟s centrality see p. 79. 
290
 Riggsby (2006) p. 100 notes the failures of Vercingetorix in regards to Alesia, such as his inability 
to sway the Bellovaci. 
291
 7.71.1, 7.71.3-7.71.4. 
292
 7.71.3. 
293
 Jervis (2001) pp. 171-180 does not directly address self-interest, but the concept is consistent with 
his deceptive treatment of fellow Gauls after Avaricum at 7.21-7.22. 
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tends to associate the Roman commander with the interests of Rome.
294
 The selfish 
character of Vercingetorix is displayed through this tactical consideration, 
demonstrating that the battle is designed to evoke a poor picture of the enemy leader 
and his rationales.  
 
More specific contrasts are also drawn between the behaviour of Vercingetorix and 
Caesar, and information is used to draw inferences about their different qualities. 
Direct pairing is evident in the contrast of preparations by the two commanders, as 
information is given about how each prepares for the siege, with no qualification as to 
the success of these measures.
295
 Caesarʼs superiority is also evident when 
Vercingetorix retreats to Alesia, and the Gallic leaderʼs selfish instinct is evident in 
his order for the baggage to follow him as he leaves.
296
 The Roman commander 
however states that he draws two legions on a hill to guard his, even though he is in 
pursuit and the threat to his baggage probably less.
297
 The implied comparison sets 
Caesarʼs concern for his army against the selfishness of the enemy leader, and the 
slaughter of the Gallic rear guard demonstrates the result of Vercingetorixʼs poor 
conduct.
298
 This implicit contrast draws attention to the difference in the two leaders 
and casts Caesar favourably compared to his opponent. 
 
The confrontation between the commanders builds in intensity, and contextual details 
that would allow a more objective assessment are sometimes briefly summarised or 
even missing due to this choice. This is evident in an early cavalry battle, which is 
described with very little detail about the dispositions or state of the forces 
involved.
299
 Specific or even general numbers are missing, even though Caesar states 
that the enemy are hampered by such factors.
300
 As the narrative progresses combat is 
only given a general character, at one point summarised as summa vi ab utrisque 
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 See Ramage (2002) p. 132. 
295
 See 7.71 and 7.74. Caesar also gives detailed descriptions of Vercingetorixʼs supply plans. He states 
that Vercingetorix calculated he had 30 days of supplies, but makes no independent assessment here 
of the actual supplies and timeframes involved. It is focused through Vercingetorix to illustrate his 
defensive mindset and his hopes of succour, rather than in the actual chances of this happening.  
296
 7.68.1-7.68.2. 
297
 7.68.2-7.68.3. As the baggage is not actually attacked, the statement is unnecessary. 
298
 7.68.2-7.68.3.  
299
 See 7.70. This is clear in way legions are said to have been placed in front of the camp by Caesar. 
There is no context for how many Romans were in the fight and how many in reserve here. 
300
 7.70.3-7.70.4. 
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contenditur.
301
 As Jervis notes the words uterque and utrimque are used to indicate 
hard fought battles, with five of the nine times appearing in the siege of Alesia, an 
indicator that combat is being contextualised based on its intensity.
302
 The 
accumulation of detail to establish intensity is evident in the following statement from 
later in the narrative: 
 
...a castris longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat 
profert. pugnatur uno tempore omnibus locis atque omnia temptantur; quae minime 
visa pars firma est, huc concurritur. Romanorum manus tantis munitionibus 
distinetur nec facile pluribus locis occurrit. multum ad terrendos nostros valet 
clamor qui post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident 
virtute constare; omnia enim plerumque, quae absunt, vehementius hominum 
mentes perturbant.
303
 
 
Generalisations are used in this passage to reduce the battle to simple concepts.
304
 
This is evident in the repetition of quae, and the remark regarding fear in the soldiery, 
which is forceful but not specific in terms of units or locations.
305
 Asyndeton is also 
used to capture the accumulation of measures such as the longurios, musculos, and 
falces in use.
306
 In the battle, a list of measures the enemy take to overcome the 
defences is similarly included such as ramps, testudo, hurled missiles and even the 
terrain listed as an accumulation of detail.
307
 While the nature of the combat at a 
double line of fortifications would have been difficult to narrate, combat is described 
in broad terms to capture the intensity, and when information is provided it appears in 
order to give the fighting only general character. 
 
Combat is described to draw attention to the spectacle and the contest of forces, so 
that the assessment of the commanders is placed within the perceptual framework of 
an internal audience. In one encounter, Caesar is clear that fighting takes place in 
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 7.70.1-7.70.2.  
302
 Jervis (2001) p. 185. See also 7.80.5, 7.81.5, 7.85.2. See 7.88.2 for the use of the word regarding 
sound. 
303
 7.84.1-7.84.5.  
304
 See Webb (2012) pp. 12-15 on vividness. 
305
 See terrendos nostros at 7.84.4-7.84.4. 
306
 Mannetter (1995) p. 148. 
307
 7.86.4-7.86.5. 
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view of all, the idea supported by the statement: erat ex oppido Alesia despectus in 
campum.
308
 This concept is iterated several times in the episode: 
 
Quod in conspectu omnium res gerebatur neque recte aut turpiter factum celari 
poterat, utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat. 
 
Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur...
309
 
 
As these statements reveal, there is an audience rating and judging the combatants, 
illustrating that the interpretative framework for battle is based around the idea of a 
contest.
310
 The description of Vercingetorix just prior to the final instance of fighting 
is particular to establish his role as a spectator, as he spies all things from the heights 
of Alesia in a position of apparent confidence.
311
 As Kraus notes, this is a technique 
used by both Livy and Tacitus, and it is utilised several times by Caesar.
312
 In this 
case attention is drawn to the internal audience, and the objective of establishing the 
spectacle is clarified by these passages regarding the witnesses to the deciding 
moments of the contest. 
 
With an internal audience established, Caesar prepares for his personal intervention 
through several methods. At the point of the final confrontation, the statement of the 
general state of affairs and objectives of the enemy clarifies the stakes involved.
313
 As 
he states, clearly showing the potential consequences:  
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 7.79.3. See also 7.80.2-7.80.3. See Kraus (2009) p. 167 on the Roman conception of exemplary 
deeds done by spectatissimi. On shifting narrative perspectives in battle see Grillo (2011) p. 256. 
309
 7.80.5. 7.84.1. See also 1.50.3-1.50.4, for witnesses to courage. See also Jervis (2001) pp. 185-186. 
310
 Caesar‟s concern is with the idea it was fought in front of all, evident in the references to the visual 
element.  
311
 7.84.1. 
312
 Kraus (2005b) notes at pp. 244-245, of Livy 1.24-1.25 and Tacitus 15.48-74, that these use 
“spectacular effects, suspense, and appeal to extra-literary experiences such as theatre-going or 
gladiatorial combat”. See also BG 5.16 where it is important that the army witness the problems of 
fighting chariots as discussed at pp. 333-334 below. See also Feldherr (1998) in general on the idea of 
spectacle. Quintilian 8.3.66 is an early source on internal witnesses. 
313
 See also the general structure of the Quintus Cicero siege at pp. 239-243 where the narrative 
prepares for Caesarʼs arrival. 
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Utrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus, quo maxime contendi 
conveniat: Galli nisi perfregerint munitiones, de omni salute desperant; Romani si 
rem obtinuerint, finem laborum omnium exspectant. 
314
 
 
Caesar reserves this moment in the battle to describe the objectives of the enemy, so 
that their aims are stated just prior to his intervention and his role in frustrating them 
most apparent.
315
 The interpretation of events, that it is an end to the labours, is most 
indicative that the battle is constructed to make the Roman commander central to the 
ending of the conflict. Just as in the Sabis River narrative, combat is also described to 
capture suspense prior to Caesarʼs physical intervention on the battlefield.316 He 
describes the overall situation and the dilemma that the Romans face as a general 
observation using words such as perturbant, and the description of general attacks 
from front and rear.
317
 By ending a chapter with the word perturbant and a statement 
about the uncertain state of mind among the Romans, Caesar creates a suspension of 
action based on the fear of his men, where all is held in the balance. He also describes 
his speech to the men, an unlikely thing to do based on the impression the battle is 
already raging everywhere, but is reserved for the midst of the battle rather than the 
start.
318
 These measures ensure that the narrative prepares for appearance of Caesar 
through implications that maximise the scope, and necessity of his arrival.  
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 7.85.2-7.85.4. 
315
 Whitby (2007) p. 77. Whitby notes some possible inaccuracies in Caesar‟s description of Alesia. As 
Whitby notes details of fortifications are “homogenised” a quality that extends to combat. See 
Nousek (2006) p. 80 on the climax of the battle. Caesar gives a dramatic account of the stakes 
involved and the objectives of the forces now, after fighting has commenced, rather than in the plans 
of the two before battle, as the dramatic moment is being drawn out with a description of the 
mindsets of the two sides. These details would probably have formed part of their plans and 
objectives prior to the battle, among the leaders anyway, but Caesar attributes it to all the Gauls in 
the middle of the fighting. The content of this passage is important, as it encapsulates the idea that 
this is the last chance for the defenders, even though this may not have actually been the case. The 
Gauls after all had already attacked several times, and Caesar appears to be applying retrospective 
knowledge to the motivation of the troops, as he knows the outcome of the fighting. As this is even 
described as a general end to labours, it foreshadows the outcome of the campaign itself. See also 
Whiteley (1956, 1981) pp. 180-181. 
316
 See also the Sabis River account discussed above at pp. 222-238. 
317
 7.84.4, 7.84.5. The actual advance, attacks and so forth are not covered, only the general conditions 
of battle. The sententia is important, Caesar stating how the Romans heard attacks from front and 
rear, and how they were reliant on others for their survival. By ending the chapter with the word 
perturbant and the statement about the uncertain state of mind among the Romans, Caesar creates a 
suspension of action based on the fear of his men, all is held in the balance, which prepares the text 
for his own intervention. 
318
 7.86.3-7.86.4. Note the similarity to Helvetii discussed above at pp. 219-220.  
273 
 
Having made clear that the matter is at an important juncture, Caesar narrows the 
focus of details to prepare for his physical intervention.
319
 He is specifically 
mentioned at the start of the three chapters that lead up to his intervention in combat, 
illustrating a pattern that defines activity within his own contribution.
320
 There is also 
a concentration of detail and activity similar to the Sabis River narrative, with a 
precise listing of cohort numbers, and the description of Labienus sending messengers 
to Caesar to find out what to do.
321
 Caesar describes his own movements on the 
battlefield drawing closer to the crisis point with each section: 
 
Mittit primum Brutum adulescentem cum cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis C. 
Fabium legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius pugnaretur, integros subsidio 
adducit. restituto proelio ac repulsis hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; 
cohortes IIII ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem se sequi, partem 
circumire exteriores munitiones et a tergo hostes adoriri iubet. Labienus postquam 
neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis undecim 
cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidiis deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios 
facit certiorem, quid faciendum existimet. accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.
322
 
 
He first sends subordinates, then goes himself to deal with trouble. He then describes 
how he rushes to Labienus, and breaks from his own movement to describe the 
situation that Labienus is in and his plea for advice, then the passage ends with the 
commander rushing to help again.
323
 The sequence builds towards Caesarʼs 
intervention through the gradual movement of his person to the crisis point on the 
battlefield.
324
 The level of detail, and the reiteration of his movement, establishes a 
narrative locus regarding the resolution of Caesarʼs command superiority.  
 
                                                 
319
 7.87.1-7.87.3.  
320
 7.85.1, 7.86.1, 7.87.1. 
321
 7.87.2, 7.87.3. In contrast to earlier confrontations at Alesia, Caesar uses precise numeric factors at 
the climactic point in the narrative. The impression of precision is given through the numbers of 
cohorts listed, four with Caesar, forty gathered by Labienus, and the splitting of cavalry. No numbers 
of Germanic cavalry are given, but the Roman forces are specifically listed. This sets up a contrast 
with the only vaguely described mob of enemy assaulting the defences, against clearly defined 
Roman units.  
322
 7.87.1-7.87.3. 
323
 Note the lack of exact detail on troops sent with Brutus, stated merely as cohortibus.  
324
 What the sequence actually was is unclear without other evidence. 
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Caesar is the centre of attention at this point, illustrating that the battle is developed to 
draw attention to his contribution at the crisis.
325
 As he states: 
 
Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat, 
turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus 
haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt. utrimque clamore 
sublato excipit rursus ex vallo atque omnibus munitionibus clamor. nostri omissis 
pilis gladiis rem gerunt. repente post tergum equitatus cernitur; cohortes aliae 
adpropinquant. hostes terga vertunt; fugientibus equites occurrunt. fit magna 
caedes.
326
 
 
This intervention is the most striking aspect of the narrative, particularly in the 
mention of the colour of his cloak, a clear reference to the spectacle of the scene.
327
 
Where forces are disposed of and how is unclear, but the matter is mentioned as 
waged with swords, and there is the mention of noise as part of the dramatic context. 
Short staccato sentences form the body of the turnaround, cohorts rush up, the cavalry 
attack from the rear, the enemy turn and are cut down.
328
 Furthermore combat is given 
short narrative space, and the actual duration not specified. The arrival of the 
commander is closely associated with the victory itself, as following his intervention 
the narrative quickly reaches the resolution of fit magna caedes. This structuring of 
his intervention illustrates the objective of associating Caesar and victory, with a 
quick summary designed to maximise his presence at the resolution of the battle. 
 
Furthermore, the passage immediately includes details designed to further associate 
Caesarʼs personal intervention with victory. He mentions casualties, particularly the 
enemy leaders, even including the taking of seventy four standards, in spite of the text 
indicating that the fighting appeared to continue.
329
 There is even mention of how few 
                                                 
325
 Note that this does not mean he did not play an instrumental role in the historical battle. The 
narrative however, is designed to specifically focus on his role. 
326
 7.88.1-7.88.3. 
327
 This is a highly visual climax that involves reference to internal spectators at 7.88.1. As Nousek 
(2006) pp. 80-81 notes, it is the climax of the work. There are various narrative techniques at play 
that indicate this, such as the ascending tricolon of commanders, and the apparent sententia at 7.86.3. 
328
 Nousek (2006) pp. 80-81. See Riggsby (2006) pp. 148. At p. 148 Riggsby notes of 7.88.2-7.88.3 
that the short choppy statements are indicative of the decisive character of the engagement, and not 
indicative of senatorial reporting style. 
329
 7.88.4-7.88.5. 
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escaped unharmed, even though it is unclear if this is just the 60,000 sent by 
Vercingetorix or the whole force of the enemy.
330
 Similar to the Sabis River narrative, 
the account of combat largely breaks down at this point, and the fate of those who fled 
to their homes is particularly evident of the simplification, as it establishes the 
conclusive nature of the Roman victory in a short space by relating events outside of 
the battlefield.
331
 The effect is that victory statistics are closely associated with 
Caesarʼs personal intervention, indicative of the strong self-promotional association in 
this section of the text.  
 
The contrast of leadership is apparent as while the Roman leaderʼs impact is 
maximised at this moment, Vercingetorix is entirely missing, with his presence only 
established as witness and symbol of defeat.
332
 Caesar includes a specific reference to 
terrain to explain why everybody could see his cloak, that also establishes his 
centrality at this point and his visibility to all witnesses, not just his own troops.
333
 He 
also mentions the effect this had on spectators in the town in order to invite 
consideration of their reactions.
334
 As this is where Vercingetorix was last placed, he 
too is relegated to the role of spectator at the end, effectively helpless as Caesar 
completes the destruction of his army.
335
 The text illustrates that Vercingetorixʼs role 
was only show, appearing before the fight in a superficially commanding position, but 
disappearing at the most crucial stage of the battle except as witness to his oppositeʼs 
superior conduct of the battle.  
 
The role of Vercingetorix as contrasting leader is apparent as he only appears after the 
slaughter and defeat to represent the defeat of the Gauls.
336
 The description of his 
words to the other Gauls indicates that Caesar provides a final assessment through the 
                                                 
330
 7.88. The enemy in Alesia somehow let their men know to retreat, and Caesar focuses on thoughts 
of flight in the enemy. 
331
 7.88.7. Note how quickly a conclusive result is obtained. The enemy disperse, as Caesar condenses 
activity at a campaign level so that the results of battle are closely linked to the overall success. 
Caesar even makes sure, as he did at 4.26.5 that this could have been even greater except of the 
exhaustion of the troops. For the Sabis River see pp. 231-232 above. 
332
 Jervis (2001) p. 155 notes a general lack of enemy leaders shown in battle. 
333
 7.88.1.  
334
 7.88.5-7.88.6.  
335
 Vercingetorix is not mentioned from 7.84.2-7.88.7. For the diminishment of a character, see also 
Ariovistus discussed above at pp. 158-160. 
336
 7.89.1. 
276 
 
perception of his opposite, in which the Gallic leader admits defeat.
337
 In the 
reckoning of these two leaders, the account demonstrates their differences in 
behaviour, and in their roles as leaders of their sides, so that the battle addresses and 
resolves the pairing evident throughout the campaign narrative. It does so by 
maximising Caesarʼs contribution at the decisive moment, and relegating 
Vercingetorix to a symbolic role where he represents the defeat and surrender of the 
Gauls, who are proven inferior to the Roman commander.
338
 The manner in which 
Vercingetorix selectively appears and disappears in the final confirmation 
demonstrates that the character is utilised in the self-promotional context of the battle. 
 
Caesarʼs concern with self-promotion in the Bellum Gallicum forms the foundation of 
numerous campaigns and the manner that particular battles are portrayed. Battles 
either address his self-representation directly, or associate him with important themes 
and their resolution. His qualities and instrumentality are integral to the description of 
battle, and the manner that he communicates these aspects of his leadership is 
demonstrative of how information that supports self-promotion has taken precedence 
over a comprehensive description of circumstances. Information is simplified or 
omitted where it does not address this aim, and structurally the text addresses self-
promotion, or in the case of Alesia, utilises a contrast of characters to show his 
superiority to his enemies. The various ways in which the content of battle narrative is 
addressed at the positive portrayal of the commander is conclusive in demonstrating 
the motives behind such accounts, and the predominant role of battle in direct self-
promotion. 
                                                 
337
 7.89.1-7.89.2. 
338
 Nousek (2006) p. 81 notes the end to the personal conflict here. 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEFENCE OF CAESAR THROUGH 
BATTLE 
 
 
The persuasive role of battle narrative is not just apparent in the display of positive 
attributes, but in the manner Caesar protects himself from potential criticism.
1
 While 
Kagan believes that whether or not Caesar had to justify his overall conduct, 
particularly war, is not relevant to an analysis of battle narratives, the battles are 
actually determined by their place in the text and specific objectives related to his 
conduct of the war.
2
 Plutarch in particular suggests that individuals like Cato were 
willing to utilise setbacks or mistakes against Caesar, such as the calls to hand him to 
the enemy after the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri.
3
 Plutarchʼs statement is a 
reminder that no matter when the work was composed, the presence of real or 
potential enemies in Rome suggested a need for defensiveness, and this is evident to 
some extent throughout the whole work. Caesar presents his qualities to illustrate 
good command, including his diligence and care, even in the face of setbacks or 
defeats.
4
 In particular combat and its circumstantial information are used implicitly to 
defend the commander, to explain his actions and support his conclusions. The case 
studies of this chapter therefore focus on battles and campaigns that illustrate a 
defensive quality, such as the combat after the landing in the first invasion of Britain.
5
 
In this passage Caesar describes that he was frustrated in bringing about a quick 
victory, and that the campaign was inconclusive in its results. Combat is described in 
order to highlight the problematic features of the campaign, and battle used to offset 
his care under the circumstances and to support the decision to withdraw. A different 
form of explanation is evident in the sack of Avaricum, where the massacre of the 
populace is given an implicit explanation through the narrative.
6
 Whether or not the 
                                                 
1
 See Ramage (2001) on the idea of bellum iustum. This study is primarily concerned with the more 
immediate concerns of individual battle narratives and the manner specific episodes are treated. 
Riggsby (2006) p. 157 notes the complications of associating Roman martial values with unjustified 
imperialism. See Seager (2003) p. 19. Pre-emptive justification is implicit in the text, and there is no 
need to state it overtly in order for it to exist. See also Heubner (1974) p. 104. Note Aeneid 6.851-853 
on the general martial justification for war. 
2
 Kagan (2006) p. 109. 
3
 See Plutarch Cat Min 51.1-2, cf Caesar 22 and below pp. 297-298. 
4
 Gelzer (1968) p. 169 notes this in general. See Ramage (2003) p. 338 on consilium as an example of a 
positive quality that also defends Caesar from criticism. On composition see pp. 26-27 above. 
5
 4.27-4.37. The major exceptions are the defeat at Gergovia, examined at pp. 116-123 above, and the 
massacre of Sabinus and Cotta, examined at pp. 209-213 above. 
6
 7.16-7.28. 
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historical massacre could have reflected badly on Caesar, details are included to 
explain that the slaughter of the inhabitants came about specifically due to the 
behaviour of the defenders and the Roman soldiery. The defeat of the Usipetes and 
Tencteri is also examined, since in this case Caesar appears to accept his own 
responsibility, but the campaign emphasises the sheer necessity of destroying these 
tribes, both in terms of the threat that they posed to Gaul, and their untrustworthiness 
as a people.
7
 The description is very brief, but manages to capture the justification for 
war, with implicit arguments about the danger of these peoples that extends into the 
account of battle.  
 
This use of battle narrative for self-defence is not just limited to individual campaigns, 
and Book Five of the Bellum Gallicum describes circumstances where the problems of 
one campaign are addressed through the presentation of another. In particular the 
second invasion of Britain addresses the problematic circumstances of the first, 
demonstrating the interrelationship of campaign narratives in defence of Caesarʼs 
conduct.
8
 More importantly, the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta, described later in this 
book is a significant defeat, and it is one that he accounts for throughout several 
episodes.
9
 For example, the need to account for defeat has a significant effect on the 
description of the second invasion of Britain, where Caesar implies that the massacre 
was not due to neglect on his part, by showing his attention to affairs in Gaul, his 
general diligence, and by demonstrating that subordinates have a level of agency that 
makes them responsible for their own actions in battle.
10
 Most importantly, after the 
description of the massacre, Caesar immediately utilises the siege of Quintus Ciceroʼs 
camp to contrast correct forms of behaviour that highlight the unsanctioned nature of 
the defeated commandersʼ decisions.11 The manner that the battles of this particular 
book work in conjunction illustrates the role that they play in supporting the 
commanderʼs overall conduct, and defending him against real or potential criticism.  
                                                 
7
 4.1-4.15. 
8
 4.27-4.37, 5.1-5.23. 
9
 Note that this does not contradict Rosenstein, (1990) p. 6 who has noted that defeat itself did not 
seem to bring unusual stigma, as Caesar is accounting for the textual representation of the defeat. In 
Caesar‟s case, he managed to recover from historical defeats such as the massacre of Sabinus and 
Cotta‟s forces, and it his reputation as presented in the text he is concerned with. 
10
 5.1-5.23. 
11
 5.19-5.51. 
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Caesarʼs Campaign Conduct 
 
Caesarʼs conduct of his campaigns in general shows a concern to forestall potential 
criticism. This is evident in delegations of command, as delegations are sometimes 
included even where the subordinates are no longer mentioned as the objective is to 
highlight Caesarʼs overall diligence. Similarly, troop dispositions, decisions by the 
commander, and descriptions that show his understanding of warfare all serve to 
protect the commander from criticism. These details are not simply describing 
activity, as the content, and manner of presentation display the objective of self-
defence. 
 
A concern to protect Caesar from potential criticism is apparent in the use of 
delegations of command to show attention to detail and actions that forestall trouble.
12
 
While such a motivation is part of the self-promotional nature of the work, it also 
functions to protect him from potential criticism, through a demonstration of his 
diligence and attention to detail.
13
 In this regard he makes general references to 
dispositions in the campaigns in order to show his mitigation of real or potential 
dangers. This is evident in the first invasion of Britain, in which Caesar describes in 
detail the disposition of his commanders in Gaul, even though they are not mentioned 
in any later activity.
14
 A similar example of delegation occurs in the Venetii 
campaign, where he includes dispositions of commanders in Gaul to illustrate his 
concern for the broader context of the campaign.
15
 The description of legates 
dispatched to the Belgae, Aquitania and other Gallic tribes is described before the 
more pertinent information that Caesar orders Brutus to gather a navy from among the 
Pictoni and Santoni, demonstrating that his own precautions come before information 
more relevant to that campaign.
16
 The mitigation of the troubles of campaign is 
evident as he states that he sent forces against the Aquitani ne ex his nationibus 
auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur.
17
 Caesar even describes 
the possible crossing of the Rhine by Germanic invaders, a threat that Rice Holmes 
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 See Ramage (2003) p. 364. 
13
 See generally Ramage (2003) p. 334 on diligentia, 337-338 on consilium. Note that this is applicable 
no matter when the work was written, as Caesar would want to explain himself to his audience 
whether the work was written periodically, or after 52 BCE. 
14
 4.22.5-4.22.6. See also 4.38 for the final actions of Book Four. 
15
 3.11. 
16
 See 3.11.5 for the orders to Brutus. 
17
 3.11.3-3.11.4.  
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rightly questions but that indicates how broadly he wishes to capture his sphere of 
concern.
18
 The effect is that the commander demonstrates a concern for the broader 
picture, which illustrates his vision and foresight in order to forestall possible 
criticism.  
 
In the defeat at Gergovia, Caesar uses the disposition and activity of his forces in a 
similar way, to demonstrate that he was not negligent in his attention to matters. The 
defeat of three legions outside Gergovia is attributed to the over enthusiasm of the 
men, establishing where the failure occurred.
19
 As illustrated in Chapter Two, 
Caesarʼs use of exempla and anecdote in the battle supports this overall assessment, 
and details of the account are included specifically to absolve Caesar of responsibility 
for the defeat.
20
 However Caesar also describes his own activity in order to forestall 
criticism, through references to his own general diligence and foresight.
21
 In the 
construction of a path between two camps, he states that after completion, even single 
men could make the trip between the two safely, the incidental detail establishing the 
adequacy of the defences.
22
 Furthermore, in his description of a journey undertaken to 
restore the loyalty of the Aedui, Caesar specifically states that he only took a light 
armed expedition.
23
 This detail is contextualised later, when he states that the siege 
weapons left behind were of great use in defending the camp.
24
 The clarification of 
such details conforms to the pattern of interpretation intended for the battle, and 
demonstrates that seemingly inconsequential details nevertheless address the objective 
of defending Caesar against allegations of poor command. 
 
Where Caesar is not directly involved in problematic circumstances, he nevertheless 
contextualises affairs so that his own responsibilities are clearly discharged. This is 
                                                 
18
 3.11.2. Rice Holmes questions the manner that the troops are disposed of, if there was a real threat of 
an uprising. He notes that Caesar should have sent the infantry with Labienus if the Belgae and 
Germani were a threat. See Rice Holmes (1911) pp. 105, 109.  
19
 See pp. 116-123 above. 
20
 Mannetter (1995) pp. 114-115. 
21
 Note that Caesar‟s defence of his conduct is highly evident in this account.  
22
 7.36.7. 
23
 7.40.1-7.40.2. 
24
 7.40.1-7.40.4, 7.41.3-7.41.4. Caesar summarises briefly what sounds like a major and tactically 
important engagement here. The camp is heavily attacked and two of the gates are even destroyed. 
The zeal of Fabius in preparing extra defences makes Caesar‟s choice a good one and suggests that 
the situation was well in hand in the historical event, while not obfuscating the closeness of the affair. 
See also 7.47 where he describes the stratagem of using muleteers as fake cavalry, and the movement 
of legions to the smaller camp in disguise, making it clear that this was successful in deceiving the 
enemy. 
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clearly evident in the Octodurus account, where he is not present, but nevertheless 
clarifies that in spite of the problems his subordinate faces, there is a need for the 
expedition.
25
 As he states: 
 
Causa mittendi fuit, quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum 
portoriis mercatores ire consueverant, patefieri volebat. huic permisit, si opus esse 
arbitraretur, uti in his locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret.
26
 
 
Here Caesar describes an example of sound decision-making by himself. There is the 
rationalisation for these decisions in the repetition of causa, the use of volo and the 
subjective use of opus esse, all of which capture his thought processes.
27
 He 
introduces the campaign with the process of his own thinking, and in doing so, 
discharges his own responsibilities for the events that follow, by showing the 
necessity of the expedition. 
 
Caesarʼs concern for his own conduct is further evident in the Octodurus campaign, as 
he includes details that are no longer referenced once they have illustrated his 
diligence. He states that he sent cavalry with the commander Galba, so that it is clear 
what complement of forces Galba set out with.
28
 However he only provides the 
minimum detail necessary, stating that they were parte equitatus, and then he omits 
any further mention of them in the battle that follows.
29
 Even during the flight of the 
enemy the cavalry are not mentioned, nor is there any reason given why they might 
not have contributed.
30
 As with the Nervii account, where two whole legions are 
dropped from the battle once they serve the narrative purpose, in this instance the 
cavalry disappear from the account entirely.
31
 In the Octodurus narrative the units 
appear in order to explain Caesarʼs own conduct, and disappear when they are no 
longer required to illustrate his diligence.  
 
                                                 
25
 See above pp. 88-111. The more notable example of the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta is discussed 
below at pp. 319-339 and at pp. 209-213 above.  
26
 3.1.2-3.1.4. 
27
 All these words reflect the reasoning of Caesar, causa establishing the cause, opus esse the necessity, 
and volo the desire itself.  
28
 3.1.1. This shows how Caesar promotes his own attention to detail as commander.  
29
 See 3.1-3.6. 
30
 3.6.2-3.6.3. 
31
 See pp. 202-203 above.  
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More importantly, Caesar openly states when a battle occurs against his own 
directives, demonstrating his intention to make clear when circumstances occur 
through no fault of his own. This is apparent in the defeat of Sabinus and Cotta, in 
which the arguments of Cotta are used to show clearly that the commanders should 
have stayed in camp.
32
 Caesar thereby discharges his responsibility for the massacre 
and clearly attributes it to a decision of Sabinus.
33
 The use of Cotta as a mouthpiece 
for his own opinion contextualises affairs in order to defend Caesar by illustrating the 
commander would not have made such a decision.  
 
The objective of explaining and defending conduct is even evident in the Sabis River 
account, which is described as a victory. Caesar is thorough in demonstrating his own 
foresight in order to defend any problematic aspects of his activity.
34
 In spite of the 
narrative purpose of building tension, he also describes his own preparations to 
illustrate that the lack of preparation was not due to negligence on his part.
35
 In this 
regard he shows that he was naturally cautious in such circumstances: 
 
Caesar equitatu praemisso subsequebatur omnibus copiis. sed ratio ordoque agminis 
aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant. nam quod hostibus 
adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar sex legiones expeditas ducebat; post eas 
totius exercitus impedimenta conlocarat; inde duae legiones quae proxime 
conscriptae erant totum agmen claudebant praesidioque impedimentis erant.
36
 
 
As he states, he followed a standard practice in enemy territory of reorganising the 
marching order, clearly indicating that he was prepared for a potential attack.
37
 This 
statement follows a series of passages that focus on building tension, indicating that 
                                                 
32
 See 5.28.3-5.28.4 where Cotta expresses Caesar‟s wishes that they stay in camp. See below at pp. 
319-339 and at pp. 209-213 above on the representation of Sabinus, in particular pp. 335-339 below 
on how the Quintus Cicero siege shows the correct action. While staying in the camp was never 
specifically stated as the correct course of action, Cicero saved his command by doing so, and 
Sabinus, the poor commander was the one who advocated leaving. 
33
 See 5.52.4-5.52.6 where Caesar condemns the folly of Sabinus. 
34
 Lendon (1999) p. 317 does not account for this in his analysis of the Sabis River account. However 
he does recognise that there is a literary aspect to the account. Brown (1999) p. 332 notes the 
objective. See also Rambaud (1966) p. 165. 
35
 Görler (1980) pp. 24-26 argues that these two contradictory objectives determine the narrative. See 
pp. 66-71 above on tension and suspense in the Sabis River narrative. 
36
 2.19.1-2.19.4. 
37
 See 2.19. Note how this is a rare example of marching order, and therefore appears to be included 
specifically to defend Caesar from the initiation of negligence. 
283 
 
even when Caesar promotes a victory, he is still careful to defend himself against 
intimations of negligent conduct.
38
 The passage describes Caesarʼs precautions, 
mitigating any implication of misconduct that might be raised due to the events 
described. As with the other details examined in this section, the content appears to be 
included to forestall any criticism of the commander.  
 
Inconclusive Victory in Britain  
 
The first inconclusive campaign of the Bellum Gallicum that is described in detail is 
the invasion of Britain, and it affords an opportunity to see how battle and campaign 
work in conjunction to protect Caesar from criticism. This objective is apparent as 
battle and other military information appear to defend the inability to achieve lasting 
results, and support his decision to leave the island with limited success.
39
 This lack of 
a long term result must have presented a problem for Caesar in narrating the account, 
as his presentation of the landing itself, as examined in Chapter Four, drew attention 
to the expedition as a great achievement.
40
 Caesar appears to address the lack of 
overall success by emphasising the unusual problems of the campaign, presenting the 
inconclusive result as due to the formidable circumstances faced. Scholars have noted 
that the historical context of the invasion provided little material gain for Rome, and 
what is notable about the account is that there is no effort to pretend there was any 
long term success.
41
 He does not hide the problem, stating at the end that only two of 
the defeated tribes sent hostages, effectively admitting that the campaign was a failure 
at least as far as subjugating the enemy.
42
 Instead, battle narrative and contextual 
details defend Caesarʼs inability to achieve a conclusive victory, by focussing on the 
unprecedented nature of the difficulties faced, and the vulnerability of the Romans 
while in Britain. Combat concentrates on the unusual nature of the enemy, the novelty 
of their customs and their advantages in battle. The narrative concludes with a battle 
                                                 
38
 As the precaution is essentially a passive activity, Caesar‟s literary objective of making the Nervii 
the aggressor is not undermined. See pp. 192-204 above. 
39
 On problems with the historical campaign see Rambaud (1966) p. 98-100, Richter (1977) pp. 118, 
123. See Goldsworthy (2006) p. 285. See also Stevens (1952) pp. 14-16.  
40
 4.20-4.26. See pp. 245-260 above. 
41
 See his note on the failure of tribes to send hostages 4.38.4-4.38.5. 
42
 See 4.36.2 for Caesar‟s immediate reason being related to the onset of winter, and 4.36.1-4.36.2 for 
the legates sent. See also 4.38.4-4.38.5 where he states only two tribes sent hostages. See 5.1-5.23 for 
the second invasion. See Plutarch‟s assessment Caesar 23. See also Dio 38.52-38.53 who is more 
critical. 
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that recognises a minor victory, but in contrast to other battles this account downplays 
any significance, exonerating Caesar from the stigma of failure by reinforcing the idea 
it was a struggle to achieve any sort of result. Furthermore, through the details 
provided he shows that he exercised sound judgement in his attention to detail. 
Caesarʼs concern to explain his conduct regarding the episode appears integral to the 
military data presented and the reconstruction of combat. 
  
The narrative appears to exonerate Caesar from failure by demonstrating that at the 
time it was not possible to resolve affairs conclusively. In order to show how difficult 
it was to resolve affairs in Britain, a long list of logistical problems is provided, such 
as how tides destroyed his ships, there were no supplies for fixing them, winter was 
approaching and that the army was in danger due to a lack of food.
43
 All these details 
are included throughout the narrative, but he uses the mechanism of examining the 
enemy motivation to reinforce and summarise these points: 
 
Quibus rebus cognitis principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem 
convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis 
deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, 
quae hoc erant etiam angustiora quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones 
transportaverat, optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione facta frumento 
commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut 
reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum 
confidebant. itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos 
clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.
44
 
 
Caesar provides extensive reasons why these tribes decide to fight, but in doing so he 
establishes conditions previously stated regarding the lack of ships, food and the onset 
of winter. He even elaborates on the seasonal danger with the enemyʼs strategy of 
prolonging the fight into winter, illustrating that a description of enemy motivation is 
used to strengthen his proposition that the campaign was particularly arduous, through 
repetition of the issues faced. 
                                                 
43
 For the initial assessment, see 4.29.4. See also generally 4.28 and 4.31 where he is very clear about 
the problems faced. 
44
 4.30.1. See Görler (1976) p. 111 on the narrative shift. 
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Importantly, the issue of motivation appears as an apparently independent verification 
of Caesarʼs own opinion with regard to the circumstances. As the use of words for 
perception such as cognitis, intellegerent, cognoscerent and confidebant illustrate, he 
strongly focuses on their perspective, providing an ostensibly independent assessment 
of his own opinion.
45
 The information is an internal witness verification that 
reinforces the conditions as accepted by all participants to the conflict.
46
 In this case 
the perspective of the enemy and their motivation not only reiterates the challenges 
but appears to independently verify the information, thereby supporting the Roman 
commanderʼs assessment.  
 
This examination of motivation is particular evidence that Caesar is defending his 
conduct of the war, as it is highly selective and designed to only address the campaign 
problems. The repetition of details are apparently good reasons for the enemy to 
renew hostilities, but nevertheless do not mention any other conditions that may have 
motivated them, such as resentment at an invading force or revenge for the defeat at 
the initial landings.
47
 A chance to categorise enemy actions as criminal, and the 
opportunity to condemn their deceit is neglected in the interests of the general 
narrative scheme.
48
 The examination of motivation is purely logistical, as Caesar 
appears only interested in conveying the most problematic aspect of the campaign, 
and only reinforces the conditions of importance to his explanation. 
 
Much of the account seems designed to mitigate Caesarʼs inability to conclusively 
defeat the enemy, and in this regard considerable effort is given to explain the lack of 
cavalry and that this absence is not due to the commanderʼs negligence. He provides 
precise numbers to demonstrate that he was exceptionally diligent regarding his 
cavalry, such as the information that the ships containing these forces were delayed by 
the wind eight miles from the point of embarkation.
49
 While the distance is ultimately 
                                                 
45
 4.30.1-4.30.3. See Martin Jr. (1965) p. 64 on 1.31 and independent assessment. 
46
 Caesar is writing the account so there is no independent assessment, but this is disguised by making 
the statement not a direct reiteration of his logistical state, but as part of the enemy‟s motivation for 
war.  
47
 See 4.23-4.26 and pp. 254-260 above on Caesar‟s representation of the beach landing. 
48
 Contrast the presentation of the Usipetes and Tencteri, which emphasises perfidy. See 4.13 and 
below at pp. 309-313. 
49
 4.22.4-4.22.5. 
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not relevant to the failure of the cavalry to appear, it does serve as an example of the 
commanderʼs attention to their status and location.50 The attention to detail shows that 
he is well aware of the problem, and wishes to communicate the issue precisely so 
that the audience understands his concern.  
 
Furthermore, an extended description of chariot warfare enhances the idea that this 
expedition faced unusual and particularly unique dangers overall, by describing 
general conditions under which the Romans fought. The amount of detail regarding 
the enemy fighting style indicates the importance he attaches to the general effects of 
this novel form of warfare.
51
 As Caesar states: 
 
Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae: primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela 
coniciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque 
perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et 
pedibus proeliantur. Acreage interim paulum ex proelio excedens atque ita cirrus 
colorant, ut, si illi a multitudini hostium premature, expedite ad suos receptor 
habitant. ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant ac 
tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione efficiunt, uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco 
incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et 
in iugo insistere et inde se in currus citissime recipere consuerint.
52
 
 
This is a general description only, as indicated by Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae, 
and the use of si is illustrative of how it describes potential activity.
53
 Also, it is 
unclear who the equitum turmas are supposed to be.
54
 The relationship of this passage 
to the historical situation is therefore ambiguous and the techniques are only broadly 
                                                 
50
 Caesar is also clear that when they finally leave, they do so in clear weather. See 4.28.1-4.28.2. He is 
also precise regarding ships lost at 4.31 and the twelve ships lost in a high tide. Caesar‟s accuracy 
with ship numbers is at odds with his apparently cavalier attitude to other numeric factors, and 
demonstrates his attention to the aspect of logistics that support his self-presentation. See also 4.23.5. 
51
 4.33.1-4.33.3. See 4.34.1 for the effects. John (2002) p. 36 notes the vividness of the passage.  
52
 4.33.1-4.33.3. 
53
 At 5.16 there is another passage on why the enemy are superior with chariots, which is consistent 
with the conditions described here. See also 1.48.4-1.48.7 discussed above at pp. 148-149 and 2.6.1-
2.6.4 discussed at pp. 174-175. Also see 4.2.2-4.2.5 for descriptions of foreign fighting techniques 
utilised to support Caesar‟s objectives in the Usipetes and Tencteri account, discussed below at pp. 
300-301, 308-309.  
54
 The confusion arises as it is unclear whether Caesar is describing combat specifically related to this 
encounter or a generic one, as only general conditions are mentioned. Note the number of times he 
refers to the missing cavalry as he has described how most were missing at 4.23.2, 4.26.5, and 
4.28.1-4.28.3.  
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related to the course of combat. This lack of clarity derives from an objective of only 
describing the problematic tactics adopted by the enemy, to defend the overall 
inconclusive result against such forces.  
 
Caesar only provides the essential details regarding the chariot attack, and his 
preference is for the unusual dangers present in such a situation and the vulnerability 
of the Romans in combat. Some circumstances are described, such as the enemy 
hidden in the woods and the element of surprise this gives them against Romans 
dispersed for foraging.
55
 However, the text devoted to the actual movement of forces 
is very brief.
56
 Instead Caesar mentions the legionʼs discomfort at the novelty of the 
fighting techniques, indicated by the word novitas regarding enemy chariots.
57
 This 
focus on the novel, with little contextual information on the actual battle shows that 
combat is determined by the need to accentuate difficulties peculiar to the 
undertaking.  
 
The description of chariot warfare also appears to defend his inability to conclusively 
defeat the enemy, as it only describes the advantages of this style of fighting. The 
description is primarily of enemy capabilities, in particular the skill of the charioteers, 
such as their manoeuvrability on rough terrain and their ability to stand on the yokes. 
Importantly, the passage focuses on their ability to flee, which is directly relevant to 
the failure to successfully pursue the enemy after successful battles.
58
 In contrast to 
the general advantages ascribed to these forces, Caesar does not detail how effective 
they are in hand-to-hand combat, a particularly important omission as once on foot it 
is unlikely charioteers could mass in sufficient numbers to match the close order of a 
Roman cohort.
59
 The omission of such data suggests he only includes the strength of 
the chariots and their manoeuvrability, at the expense of any analysis that might 
                                                 
55
 4.32.4-4.32.5. 
56
 Only at 4.32.5 does Caesar describe movement and casualties. 
57
 4.34.1. See pp. 247-250 above on the idea of the unusual. 
58
 See Bradley (2009) p. 1077. Bradley argues that the strength of chariots lies in their mobility at a 
strategic level. Not only does Bradley‟s article support the idea that the strength of Britons was in 
their ability engage in indirect warfare, but it also supports the contention of this study that Caesar‟s 
main concerns with his enemies were at a strategic, not tactical level and that this is the main focus of 
the commentaries on Britain. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 57, Goldsworthy (1996) pp. 228-235. 
59
 Even if, as Caesar states, the enemy dismounted to fight, it is unlikely that they could have gathered 
enough men in close proximity to approximate a Roman cohort without creating vulnerabilities either 
to flanking from other cohorts, or to their chariots and drivers. The key to victory would therefore be 
numerical superiority, which Caesar does not refer to as an issue.  
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indicate weakness in their technique.
60
 The description is designed to support the 
proposition that this was a particularly challenging war which was hard to conclude 
due to the mobile nature of the enemy. 
 
The narrative also includes a general impression of vulnerability in the campaign, and 
the chariot battle uses a sequence that reflects an evolving sense of danger: 
 
Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento una pars erat reliqua, 
suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant. tum dispersos 
depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos 
incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.
61
 
 
As the use of nam indicates, Caesar does not adopt a temporally linear account of 
battle, but one that evolves from subjective impression to statements of actual 
conditions. In doing so, he ends with the clear picture of the dire situation in which 
the legion finds itself, using tension and an escalating understanding of events to 
reinforce the atmosphere of danger.
62
 The combat narrative is thus organised to evoke 
the peril of the situation through a gradual revelation that illustrates his limited ability 
to control affairs.  
 
Even the description of contextual information, such as numbers, is used to reinforce 
this impression of vulnerability, and help explain the inability to completely defeat the 
enemy. Caesar states his reasons for fighting a later battle that: 
 
Caesar etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat, fore videbat, ut si essent hostes 
pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos 
Commius Atrebas de quo ante dictum est secum trans portaverat, legiones in acie 
pro castris constituit.
63
 
 
                                                 
60
 See Bell Alex 75.2.1-75.3.1 for how swiftly chariots can be disposed of as a threat, as is evident in 
the statement quae tamen celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. The types of chariots were most 
likely very different; however the use of missiles to repel them should be common to Roman forces. 
61
 4.32.4-4.32.5. 
62
 See Grillo (2011) pp. 243-253 on techniques of narration. Also see the introduction of information 
regarding the Helvetii and the Nervii discussed at pp. 60-70. 
63
 4.35.1-4.35.2. 
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The fact that he resolves to fight is attributed to the presence of the thirty cavalry, as 
he mentions this just prior to this decision. The precise number seems inadequate to 
explain why he would face a force that has proven itself so superior at manoeuvre, 
with so few of cavalry of his own. Nevertheless, the number reminds the audience of 
the paucity of resources available to the Romans, and by inference the advantages that 
pertain to the enemy. This passage shows that even while Caesar provides contextual 
information such as numbers, he does so to convey the lack of resources needed to 
successfully prosecute the campaign. 
 
The description of the final battle in the campaign does not conclude the venture in a 
triumphal manner, but instead supports the identification of the problems and the 
reasons for the overall inconclusive result. Caesar describes the last instance of 
combat in the following manner: 
 
…. commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non 
potuerunt ac terga verterunt. quos tanto spatio secuti, quantum cursu et viribus 
efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque 
aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.
64
  
 
The details are minimal, suggesting Caesar has little interest in describing the 
historical battle except as a reiteration of campaign circumstances.
65
 The significance 
of the victory is downplayed through the avoidance of hand-to-hand combat, 
individual tales of courage, or even numeric accounts of casualties or participants that 
might draw attention to the event or make it distinctive.
66
 What details are provided 
support the idea of a campaign that was particularly challenging to fight, and reiterate 
the ongoing problem a lack of cavalry caused.
67
 The inability to pursue and 
conclusively defeat the opposition is clear in the statement: quos tanto spatio secuti, 
quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, so that the victory is qualified with a 
reiteration of the lack of Roman cavalry.
68
 The limited details support the overall 
presentation of the campaign and why it was difficult to defeat the enemy.  
                                                 
64
 4.35.2-4.35.3. 
65
 See also the Tigurini at 1.12 discussed at pp. 113-116 above. 
66
 This is in contrast to the major battles discussed throughout this study. 
67
 See 4.26.5 where he mentions the inability to pursue the enemy.  
68
 4.35.3. 
290 
 
 
This final account of battle even prioritises self-defence over reconstruction of novel 
or unusual circumstances. The lack of detail in this encounter comes in spite of the 
relatively complex nature of the combat, with enemy chariots, cavalry and an 
unknown number of infantry against primarily a Roman infantry force.
69
 In particular, 
the Romans seem to defeat the chariots; however the manner in which this is achieved 
is omitted.
70
 The lack of elaboration of an unusual situation demonstrates that even 
when the circumstances are novel, and lead to a Roman victory, if the details are not 
supportive of the main aim they are omitted. The particulars of combat in this instance 
are absent; probably as they do not help explain why Caesar could not conclusively 
defeat the enemy.  
 
The extent to which Caesar selectively accounts for battle in Britain is evident when 
contrasted to an event that is described immediately after the withdrawal, where the 
level of detail serves to draw audience attention away from any implication of failure. 
On the return trip, significant information is provided regarding two ships that are 
grounded and attacked by the Morini in Gaul.
71
 Approximate numbers are cited, the 
duration is given and extensive circumstantial details provided.
72
 These include the 
formation of the Romans, the noise of the fighting and that this draws more enemy, all 
incidental details that make the encounter noteworthy, in spite of this being a minor 
confrontation in comparison to the larger forces arrayed in the battles in Britain.
73
 
Nevertheless, the encounter is successful, and following on from the retirement the 
overall affair ends in a more positive manner with details that do not detract from the 
objective of capturing the difficulties in Britain itself. The attention to what is an 
essentially a minor skirmish mitigates any negative interpretation of the British 
venture with an instance of highly successful combat.  
 
                                                 
69
 On complexity see Kraus (2009) p. 165. In this case, Caesar has already described enemy 
manoeuvrability, and does not need to reiterate it with an extended narrative of battle. 
70
 This may also be why he omitted such details in his initial account of the landing, as the enemy 
charioteers were beaten off and therefore not a challenge in that encounter. 
71
 It is similar to the manner in which Caesar uses the courage of Marcus Petronius in the account of 
Gergovia, in order to mitigate the interpretation of defeat. For Gergovia see 7.50.3-7.50.6 and pp. 
120-121 above where his role is examined. 
72
 4.37.1-4.37.4. Gerlinger (2008) pp. 154-157 regards the odds as an example of an unrealistic scene, 
however it is not possible to state this conclusively without better knowledge of how the encounter 
was fought. Gerlinger notes also an association with the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae.  
73
 4.37.1-4.37.4. 
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Caesarʼs account of combat and its attendant circumstances in the first invasion of 
Britain appear to be governed by an overall design to defend his conduct of the 
campaign. It is established through the details that his inability to achieve a lasting 
effect was due to circumstances that were unique to conditions in Britain, including a 
combination of logistical factors and the nature of the enemy. The manner in which 
combat is presented, the choice of details and even the results are all determined by 
the need to portray the expedition in this manner. While presented as a bold and 
unprecedented venture, he shows that it only continued for as long as the prudence of 
the commander deemed necessary. Caesarʼs actions are represented as those of a 
commander who was not only a bold champion of Roman interests, but also one who 
was wise and cautious enough to recognise a situation beyond his control.  
 
The Explanation for Avaricum 
 
The account of Avaricum in Book Seven presents a particularly brutal event, the 
slaughter of an entire town, and explains it in terms of the harsh realities of war and 
the behaviour of the soldiers and enemy.
74
 Ramage states that there are lines of 
inherent argument regarding the justification of the war in Gaul that he calls “clear, 
matter of fact explanation of conditions governing war and the circumstances leading 
up to it”.75 This matter of fact approach to particular aspects of war, in particular 
massacre, is apparent in the account of Avaricum where Caesar shows a distinct 
emphasis on exonerating himself from the slaughter, simply through the progress of 
the siege.
76
 Siege narratives in general have been examined by scholars such as Roth 
and Paul, and there are certain motifs that are common to such passages.
77
 However in 
the case of Caesar, the details appear to have a very specific objective, as they 
                                                 
74
 7.16-7.28. Contrast Bellum Civile 3.80.6 and the assault of Gomphi, a massacre that Caesar takes 
responsibility for. On ideas of justification see Riggsby (2006) pp. 157-189. Goldsworthy (2006) p. 
327 states that Caesar would have said if he had ordered the massacre, which is possible considering 
his candid explanation of killing elsewhere such as at 3.16.4, 4.15.1-4.15.5. 
75
 Ramage (2001) p. 148. Ramage states that philosophical ideas regarding bellum iustum are not 
addressed directly in the Bellum Gallicum as the work is not about theory or philosophy. 
76
 Justification for the massacre is not as overt as in the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri. See 
below pp. 297-319 on justification and punitive measures, and the idea of harm done. See also 2.33 
and pp. 184-192 above on the Aduatuci where the representation of the enemy may help to explain 
why Caesar sold them into slavery. Note that at 7.32.1 he mentions the value of the supplies taken 
from the town to the army.  
77
 See Roth (2006) p. 57 on siege narratives in Livy. On the motif see also Paul (1982) p. 149. Paul 
notes how siege motifs influence Caesar‟s description of Avaricum at 7.28 and are recalled at 
Gergovia 7.47. 
292 
 
establish where responsibility lay, and limit Caesarʼs personal involvement in the 
massacre. This attribution of responsibility is evident in the context of the siege, and 
the structure of combat narratives that show the massacre occurred due to peculiarities 
of the situation, such as the ferocity of the defence, and the anger of the Roman 
soldiers.  
 
Caesar contextualises the events so that the destruction of the town is a natural 
consequence of the war being fought and the character of the opposition. It is 
established in Book Two that his policy is not to grant mercy once the ram has 
touched the wall, and there is no apparent need to explain his conduct according to his 
own standards; however he still appears to include details to attribute the massacre to 
the vagaries of the overall campaign over his own agency.
78
 This is evident in the 
description of a Gallic council, where the status of the city is established as an 
aberration to the general scorched earth policy undertaken by Vercingetorix.
79
 The 
existence of the city stands in opposition to the general will of the enemy, for if their 
leader had his way, it would have been destroyed.
80
 Even Vercingetorix, in the 
aftermath of the siege states that it was folly to try and defend the city, supporting the 
idea that it should have fallen, and that the defeat is part of the implacable nature of 
the conflict and the harsh nature of war.
81
 Similarly enemy activity is described in 
order to explain their role in the eventual result. Caesar describes the Gauls as 
attempting flight, and that they intended to abandon the women and children to the 
Romans.
82
 While this action does not occur, it highlights the male defenders lack of 
concern for their families, and that they forsake their familial responsibilities to look 
after their own interests.
83
 It is clear that the massacre of women and children, while 
performed by the Romans, was already invited by the men of the town who would 
have abandoned them to the mercies of the Romans if able.
84
 The plans of the enemy 
establish a context where the cityʼs natural fate would have been to be destroyed and 
its population left to the mercies of the Roman soldiery.  
                                                 
78
 2.32.1.  
79
 7.14-7.15. 
80
 7.15.6. On Vercingetorix see pp. 260-276 above. The discussion of Vercingetorix‟s scorched earth 
strategy is in detail, and captures the desperation of the campaign. The portrayal of the town in the 
Gallic councils suggests that the defence was not normal or advisable. 
81
 7.29.4-7.29.5. 
82
 7.26.1-7.26.5. 
83
 See 7.26.5 where the plan is abandoned. 
84
 See also Paul (1982) p. 149. 
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Furthermore, the massacre is contextualised so that responsibility lies with the Roman 
soldiers. The men are given a degree of agency in the account, as is evident when 
they demand the signal for battle in a standoff with Vercingetorix.
85
 As established 
early in the siege, the Romans are also motivated by a desire to avenge Cenabum.
86
 
Their agency is evident as it is particularly stated in the final assault that the slaughter 
is their act of vengeance, a repetition that draws attention to their active 
involvement.
87
 Even when Caesar describes his own contribution, the reference the 
dangers the Romans face in prosecuting the assault shows the objectives of the 
soldiers in the assault on the city.
88
 He even refers to the fruits of victory, and the 
corona muralis specifically in a speech to his men, illustrating the extent to which he 
wishes to capture their aims in the assault.
89
 The Roman soldiers are given a level of 
agency that explains the massacre in terms of their own behaviour and motivation 
under the circumstances. 
 
Caesar describes the situation as particularly desperate for the Romans, so that the 
destruction of the city occurs as the result of a hard fought and highly dangerous 
siege.
90
 During the siege, he mentions that Vercingetorix is in close proximity to the 
Romans and in a well-defensible place, ensuring that the siege of the city is 
understood as occurring with pressure on the attackers as well as the defenders.
91
 
Furthermore, spies keep Vercingetorix informed, so that the Gallic leaderʼs 
superiority in terms of intelligence forms the background to activity at Avaricum.
92
 
The pressure that Vercingetorix exerts is clear when he attacks the Romans foragers, 
and this aspect of logistics is stressed several times so that it is apparent the Romans 
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 7.19.4. 
86
 7.17.4-7.17.8. This occurs even though The Carnutes may have already been defeated when 
Cenabum was retaken and the vengeance possibly already enacted. See 7.11. 
87
 7.28.4-7.28.5. Caesar is very clear to state that nobody is spared. See Ramage (2003) p. 346. 
88
 7.28.4. Note Caesar takes responsibility for the plan that outwits the defence at 7.27.1-7.27.3. 
89
 7.27.2-7.27.3. See Nordling (1991) p. 197-198. Nordling notes the similarity to Gomphi in Bellum 
Civile 3.80.6. The rewards seem justified according to the text in the face of such opposition and 
danger. 
90
 Foraging and supply is an important feature of Book Seven, see 7.11, 7.14, 7.32, and for the 
attention to the overall difficulties at Avaricum see 7.17.2-7.17.3, 7.24.1, 7.28.4.  
91
 7.16, 7.18-7.21. 
92
 7.16.2-7.16.3. See also the Sabis River account for the use of intelligence to establish tension 
discussed at pp. 66-71 above. 
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are under considerably difficulties.
93
 Consequently, the circumstances that establish 
the desperation of the situation for the Romans also illustrates that the massacre is one 
in which they are under particular pressure from the harsh conditions of the 
campaign. 
 
The description of motivation is designed to support the idea that circumstances drive 
the sides towards desperate acts that culminate in the massacre. Caesar establishes the 
desperation of the situation for both sides by describing the Gallic perspective, and 
how at one point they see an opportunity to bring the entire war to a conclusion, so 
that pressure is on both sides, and not just the defenders.
94
 As he states: 
 
Cum in omnibus locis consumpta iam reliqua parte noctis pugnaretur semperque 
hostibus spes victoriae redintegraretur, eo magis quod deustos pluteos turrium 
videbant nec facile adire apertos ad auxiliandum animadvertebant, semperque ipsi 
recentes defessis succederent omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis 
positam arbitrarentur...
95
 
 
This is not just a possible victory for the Romans, but for the Gauls as well who see 
an opportunity to end the war. The circumstances establish the level of risk and the 
massacre occurs where the possibility of annihilation of either side is entertained.  
 
More importantly, the narrative establishes the enemy as an aggressor, equal in status 
to the Romans as they perform the bulk of activity, so that the fundamentally 
offensive nature of a siege is reinterpreted.
96
 All enemy actions come first, which are 
followed by Roman activity even where these must have been a massive undertaking 
in the actual siege, such as the construction of a ramp.
97
 In particular, the endurance 
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 7.16.3, 7.17.2-7.17.3. Note that this does not mean the issue of logistics was not pressing in the 
historical context, as the narrative is self-consistent on the issue. However Caesar is giving attention 
to such details to explain the overall atmosphere of hardship that the men laboured under in support 
of his explanation for the massacre. On logistics see also 7.32.1-7.32.2, 7.55.1, 7.71.4-7.71.5, 7.74.1-
7.74.2. 
94
 7.25.1. The enemy place all hope in this but any damage to the ramp is probably more a delaying 
action. 
95
 7.25.1. 
96
 This bears similarity to Aduatuca see pp 188-192 above. Note that this helps Caesar establish the 
culpability of the defenders by contextualising them as aggressors.  
97
 See 7.22 for aggressive sallies. Riggsby (2006) p. 80 notes how the ramp is only given a brief 
description. 
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of the soldiers in bad weather and cold is contrasted with the confidence and strength 
of the enemy.
98
 The Roman activity appears as a reaction, and one of endurance under 
the assault of the enemy, rather than a fundamentally aggressive act of assault and 
siege.
99
 The structural design establishes the siege as part of the aggressive and 
dangerous characteristics of the Gauls, against which the perseverance and endurance 
of the Romans is contrasted. 
 
The passage also includes a description of the walls of the city, and a combat 
anecdote to ascribe to the defenders the implication of aggression. These passages are 
extensive and detailed, and the description of the walls is included not when Caesar 
first arrives at the scene and describes other topographical features, but at the end of 
the passage that contains a list of Gallic measures against the Romans.
100
 As a symbol 
of Gallic aggression and industry it stands in support of the general conditions that the 
Romans have to endure, where the Gauls have a distinct advantage due to their 
position.
101
 Furthermore, the vignette of Gauls desperately attempting to burn Roman 
siege works, and being picked off one by one is designed to capture their 
intractability, and to demonstrate the ultimate necessity of their destruction: 
 
Accidit inspectantibus nobis, quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non 
existimavimus. quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus, qui per manus sebi ac picis 
traditas glaebas in ignem e regione turris proiciebat, scorpione ab latere dextro 
traiectus exanimatusque concidit. hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus 
eodem illo munere fungebatur. eadem ratione ictu scorpionis exanimato alteri 
successit tertius et tertio quartus, nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus 
                                                 
98
 Contrast 7.24 with 7.25.1. The Romans come across as in an essentially defensive role here. Caesar 
makes the situation look disastrous, and only at the end mentions he had placed two legions to 
prepare for the eventuality. 
99
 See Rondholz (2008) pp. 434-435 for the use of this technique in the Bellum Civile.  
100
 7.23. See also the town of the Aduatuci discussed at pp. 185-187 above. Riggsby (2006) p. 79 notes 
the delayed description of the walls. 
101
 7.22.2-7.23.5. Kraus (2010) pp. 46-48 notes the ekphrastic nature of the wall passage and the 
manner this is generalised for Gaul. The extensive detail serves as part of Caesar‟s proposition that 
this is not an enemy that surrenders easily, but who is prepared to fight on. The walls are also an 
imposing structure and Caesar mentions their appearance for their intimidating effect. See also 
Riggsby (2006) p. 80, on the idea of Gallic ingenuity and development.  
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locus quam restincto aggere atque omni ea parte submotis hostibus finis est 
pugnandi factus. Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat...
102
 
 
This is a notable deed, but one that reflects the desperation of both sides rather than 
just the defenders, and the continual attempts to destroy the ramp are illustrative of 
the general stakes of the battle.
103
 The Gauls are sallying aggressively in this passage, 
the fundamentally offensive nature of the action contextualised as part of the many 
things they try to win the battle.
104
 Like the description of the walls, the combat 
anecdote serves to ascribe to the defenders an essentially aggressive posture, which 
mitigates the idea that this is just an offensive action by the Roman army.  
 
Importantly, Caesarʼs most memorable roles are that of observer. In the description of 
the walls, Caesarʼs main role is a narrator of this feature.105 In the Gallic sally, the use 
of inspectantibus nobis relegates Caesarʼs role in this highly memorable passage to 
that of observer, downplaying his contribution in the unfolding action.
106
 Caesarʼs 
main involvement is defensive, either in attempting to call off the siege, reacting to 
Vercingetorix, or in averting a Gallic sally.
107
 By the time he acts aggressively in 
ordering the final attack, it appears like he is simply putting an end to the risks the 
Romans face.
108
 Caesarʼs personal presence limits his own agency in the account, in 
comparison to the other actors described. 
 
In his description of the reasons for the massacre, Caesar depicts escalating details of 
desperation in which the final massacre and destruction of the town arises from the 
conditions and state of each side, including a highly active, aggressive, enemy, so that 
responsibility is inferred naturally from the actions and circumstances under which 
the participants labour. The battle gives centrality to the actions of the defenders and 
                                                 
102
 7.25.1-7.26.1. See Kraus (2010) p. 48. Kraus notes the topos of this passage goes back to Iliad 12. 
Note also that this passage indicates Caesar‟s role as an observer. 
103
 See Rawlings (1998) p. 179. Rawlings notes that this incident appears to undermine Caesar‟s 
attention to the virtus of his own men. However Caesar actually uses it to illustrate the conditions at 
the time. The reason that he states it must not be overlooked is because it shows the determination 
and desperation of the defenders.  
104
 7.26.1. Note also the lack of detail in the attack itself by the Romans at the end in 7.27. Caesar does 
not even mention where or how they surmounted the wall, as the emphasis is on his own observation, 
and the enthusiasm of the men in the face of the frustration of their labours. 
105
 7.23. 
106
 7.25.1. 
107
 7.17.4-7.17.8, 7.18.2-7.19.6, 7.24.5. 
108
 7.27.1-7.27.3. 
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attackers with Caesarʼs role merely that of observer at the most notable points. While 
there is no apparent reason for Caesar to defend his actions based on his own stated 
policy regarding sieges, the construction of the account certainly illustrates a measure 
of isolation of the commander from the fate of the city, and a desire to attribute 
responsibility to others. 
 
Massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri 
 
The battle against the Usipetes and Tencteri develops the explanation for massacre in 
a more comprehensive manner, integrating aspects of the campaign and battle to 
address the necessity of the actions taken by Caesar. The massacre of the Usipetes and 
Tencteri is mentioned in Suetonius and Plutarch, who state that it led to calls by Cato 
to have Caesar handed over to the enemy survivors.
109
 While the dating of the 
episode, and therefore the requirement to address directly Catoʼs demand, is difficult 
to determine the defensiveness of the passage has been observed by Lee.
110 The 
account not only explains Caesar s action against these two tribes, but supports his 
decision to cross the Rhine and deal with the Germani, and analysis of battle in this 
section shows that the tribes are identified as part of a greater threat to Gaul.
111
 The 
battle itself resolves the immediate threat that the Usipetes and Tencteri represent, 
most notably in the treatment of the enemy as a multitude, and in the slaughter of the 
women and children.
112
 The suggestion Caesar would portray the encounter in this 
way is certainly supported by Cicero, who notes the justice of preventative war.
113
 
                                                 
109
 4.1-4.15 See Collins (1972) p. 924. See also Suetonius Div Iul 24.3 for the statement Caesar might 
have been handed over after the episode. See also Plutarch Cat Min 51.1-2, cf Caesar 22 where 
Plutarch gives Tanusius Ceminus as his source. 
110
 On dating see introduction pp. 26-27. It is difficult to draw too close a link between the battle 
narrative and the evidence for Catoʼs demand, but this section shows that Caesar does address his 
breach of a truce by explaining the need to act pre-emptively. See 4.12 on the massacre of auxiliaries. 
Lee (1969) pp. 102-103 argues that the account is manipulated by Caesar and is not simply matter of 
fact. See also Powell (1998) pp. 124-132. For an overview of Gallic auxiliaries and an argument that 
they are portrayed poorly see Gerlinger (2008) pp. 297-303. This thesis by contrast examines 
auxiliaries as they appear in the narrative, to determine their purpose in each episode. 
111
 On the Rhine as a divider see Riggsby (2006) pp. 64-65. 
112
 Powell (1998) p. 129. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 159 and Cicero de Off 1.34-1.35 on pre-emptive 
action. See Rambaud (1966) pp. 120-123. See Nordling (1991) pp. 51-65, who provides an analysis, 
particularly in relation to Rambaud‟s view. On tropes such as woman and children in sieges see Paul 
(1982) p. 149. 
113
 See Cicero de Off 1.80 on the justice of preventative war. See also 3.11 for preventative action. See 
7.3 for Cenabum where Caesar reports how news of a Roman defeat spreads. 
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The account displays an objective of convincing the audience that Caesar was 
required to act against the two tribes in order to forestall a greater threat. 
 
Caesar also includes details to indicate why he attacks while still in negotiations, as 
this is a problematic action he seems to need to explain, possibly again in response to 
Catoʼs demand to have him handed to the enemy.114 The presentation of the enemy 
cavalry is particularly pertinent to this purpose, as a preliminary skirmish is 
constructed to demonstrate why Caesar was required to act pre-emptively, before the 
main body of enemy cavalry could return. As Lee argues, important information such 
as the cavalry skirmish exist in the narrative in order to support Caesarʼs explanation 
of his conduct.
115
 Combat is used to establish the justice of Caesarʼs activity, with 
details included to draw attention to the deceit and injustice of enemy actions.
116
 
Furthermore, while he initially appears to give the enemy the benefit of the doubt, the 
defeat of the auxiliaries marks a change in tone. Within it, the vignette of two brothers 
who die trying to save each other is particularly relevant as it illustrates a dichotomy 
of behaviour between Roman and Germani, and establishes that harm has been done 
to Roman interests.
117
 The presentation of combat in the main encounter then 
addresses the punitive nature of the battle. The cavalry serve as instruments of 
retribution, emphasis is on subjective emotional states over physical movement, and 
numeric assessments are all designed to encourage this interpretation.
118
 The 
preventative and punitive nature of the activity fundamentally influences the 
description of battle in order to justify Caesarʼs conduct of the campaign.  
 
In order to understand the presentation of combat it is necessary to examine how the 
aftermath of the battle is described. Caesarʼs overall assessment suggests that the 
battle is part of a scheme written to prepare the audience for his next episode, the 
                                                 
114
 Ramage (2001) p. 167 examines the negotiations. Lee (1969) p. 100 states the whole affair is 
designed to gain support for Caesar, but mainly analyses the story of the two brothers. Goldsworthy 
(2006) p. 271 says Caesar must defend his actions; however Goldsworthy does not look for 
supporting arguments in the battle itself. See also Powell (1998) pp. 124-132; Gerlinger (2008) pp. 
108-111. Note this section examines the combat scenes, so the treatment of enemy legates, covered 
by the above scholars is not directly addressed. Both the treatment of the legates and Caesar‟s 
description of combat are addressed at the threat that the enemy pose. See pp. 313-319 below. 
115
 Lee (1969) pp. 102-103. 
116
 See Collins (1972) p. 924, on the issue. Also see Suetonius Div Iul 24.3. See also Plutarch Cat Min 
51 1-2. cf. Caesar 22, and Appian Celt 18. See Rambaud (1966) p. 118-123, Gelzer (1968) p. 131. 
fn. 2. 
117
 See Melchior (2004) p. 29 for the change in tone. 
118
 For cavalry see 4.14.5; for subjective states see 4.14.2-4.14.3; for numbers see 4.15.3-4.15.4. 
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crossing of the Rhine.
119
 Powell notes that like the Gomphi massacre, the historical 
massacre of Usipetes and Tencteri might have been part of wider campaign strategy 
and message.
120
 Caesar certainly states this openly after defeating the tribes, and 
mentions that the whole affair makes him cognisant of the fact that he must cross the 
river, both to deal with the Germani as a people, and to punish the last remnants of the 
Usipetes and Tencteri who have escaped to the Sugambri.
121
 Consequently this 
particular battle has a relationship to later activity, and should be viewed as an 
explanation for the later campaign against Germanic peoples.  
 
The link to the crossing of the Rhine is evident as the peoples beyond the river take 
precedence over an examination of those actually faced in combat, and the context in 
which the battle occurs is sacrificed for an examination of the Germani in general. 
This is most clear at the start of the episode, where it is stated that the Usipetes and 
Tencteri cross the Rhine with a large host of men, but rather than describe these 
peoples, Caesar describes the customs of the Suebi, who prompted the migration.
122
 
He chooses to discuss the numeric strength of the Suebi rather than that of the current 
opponent, indicating that odds are totally unrelated to the battle itself.
123
 He even 
discusses the relationship of the Suebi with the Ubii, rather than the Usipetes and 
Tencteri, so that the conditions that lead to the confrontation are only indirectly 
addressed, with the enemy faced in battle merely being portrayed as in a similar 
situation to the Ubii.
124
 This passage on the customs and relations of the Germani 
across the river demonstrates that events are contextualised within a larger 
                                                 
119
 Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum 4.16.1. 
See also 1.37, 1.54 where the defeat of the Germani is also related to the threat from beyond the 
Rhine. See Melchior (2004) p. 42. Note that Riggsby (2006) pp. 25-45 has a recent discussion on 
space and at pp. 47-71 on people. See also Jervis (2001) pp. 61-89 on Caesar‟s mapping of peoples. 
See Chapter Three on the representation of peoples as it applies to specific battle narratives. See also 
Nousek (2006) p. 70 and pp. 86-124 on rivers in general. See also Schadee (2008) pp. 169-170. See 
Wells (2001) p. 117 for the idea that the Rhine is not a cultural boundary during this period, at least 
from an archaeological perspective, and the idea that Caesar is establishing his own dichotomies. 
120
 Powell (1998) p. 129. 
121
 4.16.1-4.16.3. As Ramage (2001) p. 167 notes, the campaign across the Rhine is stated as 
iustissima. See Wells (2001) on Caesar‟s use of the Rhine to define the boundaries of his conquest. 
See also Goldsworthy (2006) p. 309. See also 1.27.4 where the border is stated as the Rhine. 
122
 Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium 4.1.2-4.3.3, 4.1.3-4.1.4. 
On the Suebi see Schadee (2008) p. 168. 
123
 4.1.4-4.1.6. 
124
 4.4.1. Note also how it further addresses the general threat as there is an implicit possibility that 
other tribes might migrate unless the Suebi are dealt with. As Ramage notes, the Suebi feature 
prominently in both major Germani incursions, as he states, there is a “domino” effect from their 
activity. See Ramage (2001) p. 167 fn. 82. 
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framework, in which the broader context takes precedence over the Usipetes and 
Tencteri themselves. 
 
The predominance of a general Germanic threat is evident as any tactical discussion is 
not directly associated with the enemy faced, but is portrayed as part of the broader 
context. The Romans only face the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri in the battle; 
however Caesar describes fighting techniques as part of the description of the 
Suebi:
125
 
 
Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant 
pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque 
deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt. equestribus 
proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equosque eodem remanere 
vestigio adsuefaciunt, ad quos se celeriter cum usus est recipiunt. neque eorum 
moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti. Itaque ad 
quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent.
126
 
 
While the Usipetes and Tencteri utilise this style of combat in one encounter with the 
Romans, the reference to the Germani ensures that their fighting style is placed within 
the context of the larger threat.
127
 The use of the Suebi to provide these details 
demonstrates that tactical data has been contextualised within the broader Germanic 
threat and Caesarʼs actions against them.  
  
The protagonists are identified according to the Germanic menace as well, in order to 
contextualise the actions across the Rhine. Caesar almost always refers to the Usipetes 
and Tencteri as Germani, and while this may be in part to simplify their description, it 
serves to remind the audience of their racial association.
128
 On the battlefield he does 
                                                 
125
 Note there is a contrast between the lateness of ethnic details in the British Invasion, discussed 
above at pp. 247-250, a foreign venture, and how in this case the ethnic details appear at the start of 
the book. Here the effect is to provide a context for understanding the Germanic nature of the threat. 
126
 4.2.2-4.2.5.  
127
 See 4.12.2-4.12.3. Powell (1998) p. 124 analyses the episode and notes the guilt by association with 
the Suebi in the introduction to episode. See Seager (2003) pp. 30-34 on the Germanic threat in 
general as counter civilising. 
128
 They are not actually mentioned by name in the battle, only at 4.1.1, 4.4.1 and after the account at 
4.16.2, 4.18.4. In the encounter with Ariovistus Caesar refers to them as Germani, but there are 
numerous tribes involved and the simplification appears more necessary. See 1.49.1, 1.50.5, 1.51.2, 
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not identify the two tribes separately, much as he did with the Belgae tribes, ensuring 
that the layout is according to the larger ethnic categorisation.
129
 More importantly, in 
his conclusion he actually calls the campaign a Germanic one, indicating that he 
regards the affair as part of something more widespread than only the actions of two 
tribal groups.
130
 His identification of the matter according to the larger association is 
further indication of how the battle is conceptualised to explain his later campaign 
against them.  
 
In particular the campaign is part of a pattern of danger, and details of the episode 
place emphasis on the effects on Gaul. Caesar takes particular care to establish that 
the reason for his campaign is the threat that the Usipetes and Tencteri pose to 
stability in Gaul.
131
 Caesar makes clear reference to the type of stakes involved when 
he states:  
 
His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in 
consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his 
committendum existimavit. 
 
…atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt…132 
 
The conditions are presented as part of a potential uprising, which is in a nascent stage 
when Caesar arrives.
133
 He is specific that he acts to forestall this threat when he 
states: Caesar, ne graviori bello occurreret, maturius quam consuerat ad exercitum 
proficiscitur.
134
 The incursion of the Usipetes and Tencteri is being assessed for its 
effect on Gallic morale and loyalty, and as with the Suebi, groups he is not actually 
                                                                                                                                            
for examples. Note however that Caesar identifies and labels Ariovistus as an individual continually 
throughout that encounter, in contrast to this account, where the emphasis is only on the group 
association. 
129
 See pp. 81-82 on the Belgae battle, for details of how a host is identified over separate tribal groups.  
130
 4.16.1. Caesar‟s stated concerns are in regards to Germani incursions, as this section illustrates. See 
Lee (1969) p. 101. 
131
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 158-189 in particular p. 178 for discussion and p. 159 on prevention as a 
justification for war.  
132
 4.5.1-4.5.3. 
133
 4.5.1-4.6.5. 
134
 4.6.1-4.6.2. 
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facing in combat are drawn into the account.
135
 The battle is therefore part of a 
broader defensive campaign, associated with risks beyond the battle itself. 
 
The episode does show the Usipetes and Tencteri as a military danger in and of 
themselves; however emphasis is still on the strategic threat over any tactical one they 
might pose in battle. This is evident as the description of logistics is directed at the 
landscape of Gaul.
136
 Caesar states that when the enemy are in the lands of the 
Menapii: …omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum 
copiis aluerunt.
137
 The description of logistical features such as shelter and food 
encapsulates the danger that the Germani pose to Gaul, not just to the Roman army, as 
the enemy are dangerous due to their consumption of resources and appropriation of 
property.
138
 In this their behaviour is similar to the Suebi, who depopulate lands in 
their vicinity.
139
 Moreover, Caesar only addresses the enemy in terms of strategic and 
diplomatic terms, stating that the host is tantae praesertim multitudini it cannot be 
resettled easily.
140
 By including such logistical issues, he demonstrates that his 
presentation is designed to focus on the broader threat, rather than the danger that the 
host directly presents to the Roman forces. 
 
Consistent with this focus, the numbers of the Usipetes and Tencteri are not assessed 
in terms of their tactical significance. Caesar mentions on several occasions the vast 
size of the host of the Usipetes and Tencteri, eventually stating that they number 
430,000, a huge number of men women and children that would have been larger than 
the Belgae host described in Book Two.
141
 However the capabilities of such a force 
                                                 
135
 See Lee (1969) p. 101. Lee recognises how the description of Gallic behaviour explains later 
actions. Caesar makes this clear at 4.13.3. See also Jervis (2001) p. 55. 
136
 Caesar eventually refers to logistics in the Belgae campaign as an influential factor, at 2.10.4-
2.10.5.  
137
 4.4.7.  
138
 Note also that it is not explained why they leave the lands of Menapii. Unlike the Helvetii who state 
where they are going, Caesar does not clarify this detail, presumably because the threat he defines is 
their presence in Gaul. 
139
 4.3.1-4.3.3. See also Ramage (2001) p. 167 who comments on the dangers of Germanic migration 
in general. Note the similarity to the actions of the Suebi who devastate the lands around them at 
4.3.2-4.3.3. 
140
 4.8.2.  
141
 4.15.3. Note the number of combatant numbers in both encounters is unclear, as in the Belgae battle 
the numbers mentioned are only those promised. For the Usipetes and Tencteri encounter, Plutarch 
Caesar 22 cites 400,000, but at Cato 51 cites 300,000. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
representation of the multitude is the critical feature of the passage as its combat elements are not 
listed. 
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are not assessed at a tactical level.
142
 He states that the Menapii are terrified of the 
multitude, yet they manage to mount an initial successful defence in which the 
numbers of the Usipetes does not secure victory.
143
 In contrast to an assessment of 
fighting ability or the dangers of the massive body of people, he chooses to direct 
attention to the repercussions of such a number of people on the physical and political 
landscape of Gaul, in order to contextualise his activity in opposing them. 
 
This representation of the multitude and its danger to Gaul has an effect on combat, as 
the narrative does not address the physical circumstances of fighting such a large 
mass of men, women and children. As described the two tribes would have taken up a 
vast area, with a real danger of outflanking the Romans, or overwhelming them with 
numbers, however no details are present regarding these dangers, and there is no 
evidence of such disparity in the size of the forces.
144
 There is also no separation of 
tribes, or engagement by the Romans with separate elements among the defenders.
145
 
Even the size of the Roman forces in the campaign, or on the day of battle, are absent, 
demonstrating a lack of concern with relative numeric factors.
146
 The size of the host 
is only a secondary tactical consideration, which is apparent as it is the enemy cavalry 
that secure victory over the Menapii.
147
 The specific hazards of battling such an 
enormous body of people have been omitted from the account, with the threat only 
identified at a strategic level. 
 
The description of combat is further influenced by a desire to resolve the incursion in 
terms of its long term significance, through a focus on those elements of the host who 
                                                 
142
 1.48.5-1.48.7. See 4.3.1-4.3.3 See also pp. 71-88 above on the presentation of the Belgae as a 
multitude and Caesar‟s elaborate precautions. Note how the word multitudo is a word used frequently 
in the battle against the Belgae, and it had the effect of making Caesar cautious of engaging with the 
enemy, a factor that is not present in this account. See 2.8.1-2.8.3. It is possible that the number of 
Germanic combatants is relatively low compared to the Belgae host, but again, Caesar does not 
clarify the details.  
143
 4.4.3-4.4.7 the presence of the river seems the most likely reason for the successful defence, but 
Caesar does not actually state this. 
144
 4.14. Caesar noted that the camp of the Belgae host, which may actually have been fewer people if 
only the fighting men were present, was eight miles wide. 2.7.4. There is also the distinct possibility 
that Caesar has exaggerated the numbers, an implication suggested by the lack of a physical presence 
to the host in the battle narrative.  
145
 As a comparison, Caesar‟s description of the battle against the Nervii breaks the description down 
to the level of individual legions, and follows the various fortunes across the whole battlefront, 
demonstrating that when he chooses, he examines a battle at a more detailed level. See 2.19-2.27.  
146
 So far Caesar has not mentioned legion strengths anywhere in Book Four. 
147
 4.4.4-4.4.7. As Jervis notes, this also applies to any reputation they might have in combat, as they 
are “the picture of disorganisation and cowardice” in the battle. See Jervis, (2001) p. 81. 
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have associations with the larger threat. In the battle Caesar orders his cavalry to 
attack the women and children; however his description singles out the women and 
boys, rather than all the non-combatants such as the elderly and young girls.
148
 He has 
alluded previously to the dangers of the boys, in his description of the youth of the 
Suebi, who are future combatants, wild and uncontrollable, and all of them potential 
warriors.
149
 Consequently this selectivity in choosing them and the mothers in battle 
demonstrates the neutralisation of the danger posed, both in their ability to expand 
through procreation, and the particularly bellicose youth that will eventually become 
adults.
150
 An aspect of victory in the battle appears to be directly influenced by the 
larger scheme of addressing the racial threat the enemy present. 
 
Moreover the broader dimension of the conflict may have resulted in a simplified 
model of activity being applied to the battle, as the account omits the likely 
complexity regarding the flight of the combatants. The women and children, while not 
the only factor described in the battle, play a critical role in the narrative, as their 
slaughter brings about the flight of the enemy combatants.
151
 The Germanic men act 
immediately as a single entity in hearing and reacting to the slaughter in the 
statement: Germani post tergum clamore audito cum suos interfici viderent, armis 
abiectis signisque militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt...
152
 This simple 
explanation ignores the probability there must have been men among such a large host 
who did not know of the massacre and who continued fighting for a period.
153
 It may 
also omit elite units, who may have fought on due to personal codes of behaviour.
154
 
                                                 
148
 4.14.5. Caesar clearly identifies the women and boys even though the flight was probably a more 
amorphous group than this. Men must have been fleeing and the situation quite chaotic but he 
narrows the description to what is pertinent to his objective.  
149
 4.1.9-4.1.10. 
150
 Note the absence of topos like behaviour, such as pleas for mercy. The anecdote is functional 
regarding the problem faced. His reference to their martial values seems deliberately associated with 
childhood, and resolved through the slaughter of boys in the battle. Also, as Jervis (2001) pp. 67-68 
notes, the Suebi are greatly feared, and devastate regions near them. The implication is that this is a 
tribal custom, and there may be some interrelation between childhood training, and the propensity for 
devastation. 
151
 Caesar also mentions the element of surprise, but while it allows entry into the enemy camp it does 
not resolve the battle. 4.14.1-4.14.4. 
152
 4.15.1-4.15.2. 
153
 As suggested by the huge number of people and the likely size of the camp if Caesar is recording 
generally correct numbers. Note the size of the camp must have been huge, if the size of the camp of 
the Belgae is representative of such numbers, and line of sight not likely to be clear across the whole 
space. 
154
 An example is the behaviour of an elite unit acting independently under their own commander, at 
3.22, and the Nervii at 2.27 who fought on when the rest of their forces were beaten.  
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Nevertheless the host acts as one here and in the ensuing flight, demonstrating that 
activity has been distilled down to its most basic form as part of the context of an 
enemy incursion into Gaul. 
 
The broader context is further evident in the rout of the enemy, as the flight directly 
addresses and resolves the elimination of this threat. The description of the flight to 
the river and the many deaths therein is used to address the initial problem posed by 
them crossing the Rhine in large numbers, and to resolve the account of battle at that 
point where Roman interests began.
155
 As Caesar states: 
 
At reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque – nam cum omnibus suis domo 
excesserant Rhenumque transierant – passim fugere coepit. ad quos consectandos 
Caesar equitatum misit. 
 
…se ex castris eiecerunt et, cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, 
reliqua fuga desperata magno numero interfecto reliqui se in flumen 
praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore lassitudine vi fluminis oppressi perierunt.
156
 
 
The reminder of the initial crossing of the Rhine reinforces the original definition of 
the danger when the enemy entered Gaul. While the flight of individuals is described 
with the adverb passim, the narrative focuses on those who die in the river.
157
 
Considering the size of the host described this unitary approach to the behaviour of 
individuals, while possibly reflecting where the main flight occurred, illustrates that 
the purpose of the account is not a reconstruction of the complexities of combat, but 
addresses the threat to Gaul. The account ends with a reversal of the initial conditions 
under which hostilities arose, the incursion across the Rhine, as the purpose is to 
explain Caesarʼs response with a reminder of the conditions under which the threat 
arose. 
 
                                                 
155
 On the thematic importance of the Rhine see Seager (2003) pp. 30-34. See Gerlinger (2008) p. 280 
on the resolution of the threat. 
156
 4.14.5, 4.15.2-4.15.3. 
157
 4.15.1-4.15.3. See 1.53.1-1.53.3 for a pertinent example as the Germani under Ariovistus all flee in 
one direction, again, to the Rhine. 
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The importance of the river to the context of the narrative means that it only appears 
in the battle for its association with the larger threat to Gaul. The river has proximity 
to the battlefield only once the slaughter occurs, and the geographic relationship of the 
battlefield and river is not actually stated. How far the fugitives fled is unclear, with 
no distance or details of the cavalry pursuit given.
158
 In contrast to this incomplete 
tactical reconstruction, the direct reference to the river focuses attention back on the 
border with the Germanic lands and peoples who are the source of the trouble and 
future action.
159
 Consequently, in spite of a lack of clarity regarding the relationship 
of battle and river, the description of flight extends to this powerful thematic location, 
demonstrating that battlefield topography has been influenced by the explanation for 
the crossing of the Rhine.  
 
Pre-Emptive Action and the Cavalry Threat 
 
In explaining the pre-emptive action against the Usipetes and Tencteri, the danger that 
the enemy cavalry present to the Roman forces is iterated throughout the account and 
has an important effect on the combat described. While the main enemy cavalry force 
is absent foraging during the episode, Caesar himself acts out of fear at their return, 
and accounts for his own activity as a reaction to this.
160
 Furthermore, he provides 
details of their activity against other opponents to reinforce this danger, such as their 
ability to return and surprise the Menapii.
161
 His concern to mention their speed 
suggests that his interest is in their ability to cause trouble through surprise attacks, 
establishing a fear for what might occur if they return against him.
162
 The reiteration 
of the danger that the cavalry pose indicates that highlighting their influence in his 
decision making is important, and why he acts pre-emptively before their return.  
                                                 
158
 The use of the Rhine as an end to the pursuit in two passages suggests the repetition of a theme 
regarding the neutralisation of a threat, as both passages follow the pursuit to this point, even though 
flight would have possibly been in several directions. See Nousek (2006) pp. 86-124 on the uses of 
rivers in the narrative. 
159
 See 4.17.1-4.17.10 for the building of the Rhine Bridge. 
160
 4.9.3. On Germanic cavalry see Gerlinger (2008) p. 318. 
161
 4.4.4-4.4.7. 
162
 The references to the foraging of the cavalry also demonstrates their ability to disrupt the 
environment in Gaul, which may be why Caesar specifies where they were and the fact they had 
crossed the river Mosa to engage in such activity. See 4.9.3, 4.12.1 for the repetition of this point. 
Also note that there is an extended digression on the Mosa, which is regarded by Rice Holmes as an 
emendation. See Rice Holmes, (1911) pp. 135-136 fn. 10. This does not affect the argument of this 
thesis. 
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In particular a cavalry skirmish with the enemy, prior to the main confrontation, 
marks a turning point in the narrative as Caesar states it leads to a change in his 
approach to negotiations.
163
 It therefore might be expected to form part of the 
rationale for this change in approach, which he clarifies after the description of the 
skirmish:  
 
Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones 
accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis, qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum 
intulissent; exspectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatusque 
reverterentur...
164
 
 
According to this passage the major consideration and justification for Caesar 
attacking the enemy is the skirmish, and fear of the return of the enemy cavalry. Any 
combat described therein might be expected to fall within the objective of supporting 
this decision.
165
 The inclusion of the cavalry skirmish aids in understanding later 
activity, and forms part of the justification for his reaction in the overall campaign.  
 
There is a selective analysis of the skirmish that shows how the details provided are 
directed at Caesarʼs reactions to the attack. The skirmish is provided in detail, with 
description of numbers, close combat and even casualties.
166
 However the description 
does not extend to an explanation of why the enemy cavalry attack his men in the first 
place, when by his own admission it was more beneficial for them to await 
reinforcements.
167
 While he has presented Germanic cavalry as confident enough to 
attack superior forces, he does not explain why they would be so devious while 
                                                 
163
 4.12.1-4.12.6. 
164
 4.13.1-4.13.2. 
165
 Powell (1998) p. 126 notes that Caesar does not call the legati by such, and his avoidance of the 
proper term is a contrivance at 4.13.1. He had used the term before. Powell (1998) at p. 127 notes 
that the use of summae dementiae is to forestall critics. 
166
 4.12. See Collins (1972) p. 934. Collins states that Caesar gave much more time to the cavalry 
skirmish than he would normally have given, and even agrees that this suggests it is there for a 
purpose, even though he sees no suppression of the truth in the overall episode. Note that the Roman 
cavalry are fully recovered by the time of the main encounter with the enemy force, suggesting the 
effect on them was not as drastic as Caesar suggests. 
167
 See 4.13.1-4.13.2 where Caesar admits it was better for them to wait. 
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negotiations might put them in a better position.
168
 This selectivity in analysing the 
background to the skirmish is because the encounter is not being analysed for the 
event itself, but to help organise the presentation of activity in the broader scheme.  
 
The strategic threat has a significant effect on the details provided in the skirmish, as 
the numbers are iterated to remind the audience of the possibility of many more 
arriving. As Caesar states:  
 
At hostes ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium 
numerus, cum ipsi non amplius octingentos equites haberent, quod ii, qui 
frumentandi causa erant trans Mosam profecti, nondum redierant…. impetu facto 
celeriter nostros perturbaverunt.
169
 
 
It has already been stated twice in close succession that the main cavalry element is 
absent, and made clear that these extra cavalry pose a serious danger should they 
return.
170
 The inclusion here is therefore unnecessary, but by adding this superfluous 
reference Caesar uses the numeric aspect to remind his audience that there are much 
larger risks and concerns than the event itself.  
 
In particular, Caesar provides the details of combat as a demonstration of the 
effectiveness of the Germani to support his arguments regarding the danger posed by 
the absent cavalry. He earlier stated the confidence and skill of Germanic cavalry with 
the words: atque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire 
audent.
171
 The description of numbers in the skirmish, in which 800 enemy attack 
5,000 cavalry is evidence of this initial contention, as they attack the vastly superior 
Roman forces.
172
 In spite of inferior numbers, they also manage to rout a much larger 
force; so that the details of combat provide a practical example and lesson regarding 
what danger might be expected should the main force return.
173
 There is an 
                                                 
168
 Also note that Caesar does not explain why the enemy Senate would willingly hand themselves 
over en-masse, an action that is simply presented as part of their devious nature. See 4.13.4-4.13.6. 
169
 4.12.1. 
170
 4.9.3, 4.11.4. On repetition of specific words see Williams (1985) p. 224, Riggsby (2006) p. 110. 
See also pp. 63-64 above. For repetition with Baculus see pp. 117-119 above. 
171
 4.2.2-4.2.5. See also 1.15.1-1.15.4 for the effectiveness of the cavalry of the Helvetii. 
172
 4.12.1. 
173
 4.12.2-4.12.3. 
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implication that the enemy are highly effective even in small numbers, and would be 
almost unstoppable in larger numbers.
174
 This detailed instance of combat includes an 
allusion to the effects of cavalry activity on a larger scale, to help justify preventative 
action in the conduct in the campaign. 
 
Germanic Perfidy and Combat 
 
Caesar has another objective that supports his pre-emptive attack, and that is to show 
that he acted against an enemy that could not be trusted and could only be dealt with 
through force. The account of the skirmish marks a turning point in the style of 
narration, and the details of combat are provided to explain why Caesarʼs attitude 
changed. Up until the skirmish his ostensible objectivity is evident as the enemy are 
presented as victims of the Suebi, with a parallel to the friendlier tribe of the Ubii.
175
 
He only uses implication to establish villainy, such as their arrogance in conversation, 
or their trickery against the Menapii.
176
 The use of indirect methods to portray the 
behaviour of the enemy, and their status as victims themselves, illustrates the concern 
to not openly condemn the Usipetes and the Tencteri at the commencement of the 
episode, and that an instance of combat is used to mark a change in narration. 
  
Caesar indicates that prior to the skirmish he took all precautions to ensure a peaceful 
solution, showing that even though he suspected the enemy of duplicity, prior to the 
skirmish he was reasonable and open to a peaceful solution.
177
 This is evident in the 
following passage:  
 
…haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur, ut tridui mora interpositi 
equites eorum, qui abessent, reverterentur, tamen se non longius milibus passuum 
quattuor aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit...
178
 
                                                 
174
 See 4.12.1. Note how no enemy cavalry numbers are given in the main battle. 
175
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 194 on Caesar‟s early treatment of the enemy. At this point Caesar‟s need to 
engage in war does not necessarily indicate a battle is inevitable, evident as he leads his army but 
entertains the notion that he can negotiate with the enemy to leave. See 4.8.3 for his offer to resettle 
the Usipetes and Tencteri. See also 4.7.4 where the Usipetes and Tencteri appeal to Caesar on the 
basis that they are victims. See also Ramage (2001) p. 167 for the issue of character. 
176
 See 4.7.3-4.7.5 for an example of direct speech. Nordling (1991) p. 52 mentions how the speech 
appears hubristic. See 4.4.4-4.4.7 for the trickery. 
177
 Collins (1972) p. 934 suggests Caesar had in mind arresting the legates before the cavalry attack. 
178
 4.11.4-4.11.5. 
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While he suspected a betrayal, and that the enemy were awaiting their cavalry, he 
describes that he made concessions, suggesting he wishes the audience to contemplate 
his attempts at achieving a peaceful outcome.
179
 Consequently the presentation of 
negotiations prior to the skirmish draws attention to his attempts to achieve a peaceful 
resolution. 
 
The presentation changes following the skirmish, and Caesar adopts a harsher 
approach to the issue of enemy duplicity, indicating that he uses the encounter to 
illustrate that the Usipetes and Tencteri cannot be trusted. Whether he always 
intended to actually betray the Usipetes and Tencteri is unclear, and it is difficult to 
determine how far the actual skirmish affected his decision making at the time, 
particularly as he had been open to negotiation after combat in previous encounters.
180
 
What is apparent is that the skirmish has an effect on Caesarʼs language, and his 
description of his attitude towards the Usipetes and Tencteri.
181
 The language changes 
immediately afterwards, with clear words describing deceit, such as dolum, and 
insidias used to describe their behaviour.
182
 His statement that it would be summae 
dementiae to wait for them to increase their forces indicates how extreme he is in 
presenting the situation, and how strong the language has become.
183
 Consequently 
the cavalry skirmish marks a significant turning point in the way the affair is 
presented. The marked change in language helps to convey shock and surprise, 
thereby emphasising the suddenness with which the tribes can turn to betrayal, and 
supporting the choice of pre-emptive action. 
  
The change that occurs is not just related to an act of betrayal by the enemy cavalry, 
but is extended to represent the behaviour of the enemy as a whole.
184
 When Caesar 
states that the leaders turn up to negotiate, he is unequivocal in stating that is done 
                                                 
179
 Lee (1969) p. 102. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 194 who notes how audience rapport is established at 
4.11.4 (c.f. 5.28.1, 7.54.2) as Caesar states he thought the enemy only proposed a truce to recover 
their cavalry, but agreed to only advance for water so that “the thought shows caution even where the 
action doesn‟t”. 
180
 See Nordling (1991) p. 62 and Collins (1972) pp. 924, 934. Caesar sent legates to Ariovistus after a 
skirmish, even though he did not trust him. He also negotiated peace with the Aduatuci after they 
initially defended their town. See 1.47, 2.30-2.32.  
181
 Melchior (2004) p. 29. Caesar shifts from moderate to aggressive language after the cavalry defeat.  
182
 See 4.13.1, 4.13.4. See also Lee (1969) p. 103 who notes the strong language used here.  
183
 4.13.2. 
184
 For group punishment also see the Tigurini at 1.12, the Venetii at 3.16, and the Aduatuci at 2.33. 
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with perfidia et simulatione.
185
 He openly states that they are lying when he uses 
fallendo of their actions, illustrating that the cavalry skirmish allows value judgements 
regarding character to be more strongly advocated.
186
 The account of the cavalry 
skirmish serves a role in providing justification for the harsh treatment of the Usipetes 
and Tencteri, as it contextualises the whole enemy as responsible.  
 
The skirmish not only serves to highlight the danger of the cavalry noted above, but is 
provided to contextualise the main encounter as punitive in nature. This is achieved 
by establishing that harm was done, as illustrated through the use of a numeric 
casualty list.
187
 Caesar rarely states the casualties among his cavalry auxiliaries in 
combat, notable instances of the omission evident in battles against the Helvetii and 
Nervii.
188
 Consequently the description of cavalry casualties, precisely given at 
seventy-four men, is very unusual, particularly as it is so small compared to the total 
number of 5,000 present.
189
 Nevertheless the figure gives a numeric account of the 
harm done, and establishes not only that the enemy attacked first, but also that they 
committed an iniuria by killing a number of individuals.
190
 The existence of a 
casualty report establishes the outrage committed and the harm done, and provides 
evidence for a punitive response.  
 
In particular, Caesar is careful to establish that the harm done was to Roman forces, 
and the details of combat, in particular a combat vignette, prepares for the context of 
restitution and punishment, in which the main battle is presented.
191
 Among the 
casualties are two brothers, whose inclusion establishes a cost to the combat, 
exemplified by the deaths of identifiable Roman protagonists.
192
 As he states: 
                                                 
185
 4.13.4. 
186
 4.13.5. 
187
 See Lee (1969) pp. 100-103 for general support of this argument. Powell (1998) p. 125 notes the 
rarity of precision among Roman casualties. Powell also notes that the story of the brothers is to 
make the audience hostile to the enemy, through the identification of sympathetic individuals.  
188
 See 1.24, 2.26-27 for example.  
189
 4.12.1, 4.12.4.  
190
 Cicero‟s justifications for retaliation de Off 1.34 cited in Riggsby p. 159 includes the idea that harm 
has been done. While it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the legality of Caesar‟s actions, 
which even in antiquity were questioned, his defence of them affects battle narration. Melchior 
(2004) p. 17 notes generally that wounds or death require revenge or serve as pretext for aggressive 
activity.  
191
 For Caesar‟s identification with Rome‟s interests see Hall (1998) p. 12. Melchior (2004) p. 39 notes 
a similar justification in the Ariovistus account at 1.39. 
192
 See Lee (1969) p. 102 who notes the overall persuasive purpose of the combat vignette and story of 
the two brothers. 
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In his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate 
sua regnum obtinuerat, amicus ab senatu nostro appellatus. hic cum fratri intercluso 
ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, 
quoad potuit, fortissime restitit; cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis 
cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato 
equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.
193
 
 
The Senate named Pisoʼs grandfather a friend, so the details provided on him define 
the harm as to Roman allies.
194
 The story of the two brothers is not just a noteworthy 
tale, but gives a Roman dimension to the already individual count of the dead.
195
 The 
choice of vignette demonstrates that the details of combat reinforce the concept that 
the main encounter is a retributive act on behalf of the state.  
 
Moreover the description creates a tone of outrage by establishing a moral dimension 
to the harm done, so that the combat vignette further reinforces the justification for 
retributive action. The manner in which Caesar highlights this vignette establishes the 
familial relationship between the brothers and establishes their deaths as acts of filial 
piety, devotion and courage.
196
 Only one brother is named, the other merely noted as a 
relation.
197
 The actions of the two brothers serve as an exemplar of the familial 
relationship and epitomise Roman values and behaviour, particularly pietas.
198
 The 
combat evokes highly parochial values, in order to establish sympathy for the 
defeated, and set the enemy actions against these values, thereby garnering support for 
the harsh response.  
 
The presentation of the cavalry skirmish is designed to highlight barbaric methods of 
fighting and the ruthlessness of this enemy. Caesar is very clear that the Germani are 
both foreign and brutal, capturing not only their ethnic nature but also their character 
in the statement: rursus his resistentibus sua consuetudine ad pedes desiluerunt 
                                                 
193
 4.12.4-4.12.6. 
194
 4.12.4-4.12.5. 
195
 Caesar does this elsewhere to establish the perfidy of the enemy, such as the description of C. 
Valerius Procillus at 1.47.1-1.47.5 who is described according to his Roman affiliation. 
196
 4.12.4-4.12.6.  
197
 4.12.5-4.12.6. The reference to frater is made twice. 
198
 See also the Nervii, and virtus discussed at pp. 192-204 above. 
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subfossisque equis compluribusque nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt.
199
 
The enemy are behaving according to racial behaviour when Caesar states sua 
consuetudine, establishing it is particular to these people.
200
 The description of men 
alighting to stab the bellies of horses that follows is unusually graphic in the Bellum 
Gallicum, and while it ostensibly describes a method for fighting cavalry, the violence 
of this technique is described precisely when Caesar wishes to distinguish his enemy 
as brutal and foreign.
201
 In this respect the skirmish helps to define the protagonists 
and establishes the context in which the response should be considered.  
 
Caesarʼs Punitive Response 
 
Having established the perfidy of the Usipetes and Tencteri, and the nature of the 
harm done, Caesar also prepares the audience for the battle to be regarded as an act of 
necessary destruction, as he stresses the issue of law through force of arms.
202
 The 
enemy legates state this principle thus: …vel sibi agros attribuant, vel patiantur eos 
tenere quos armis possederint...
203
 The legates state that right comes through force of 
arms when they argue that what they took by force should be granted to them. Even 
Caesar replies to them in these terms, when he rebuts them with the idea that they 
have no right to new lands when they cannot hold onto their own.
204
 Consequently 
action through force of arms is part of the ethos in which the events of this episode 
should be contemplated. 
 
Caesar has the Usipetes and Tencteri themselves state clearly that they live by these 
principles, so that the slaughter of the battle is a fitting solution to their behaviour. As 
he states: ...sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse 
possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint...
205
 They 
indicate that they only respect those who defeat them, as they defer only to past 
                                                 
199
 4.12.2. 
200
 Lee (1969) p. 103. 
201
 Note the treatment of cavalry skirmishes at 1.24.5 and 2.19.7 where the information is only 
summarised, in marked contrast to this particular passage. Collins (1972) p. 934 only states that the 
passage is longer than normal. 
202
 See Gerlinger (2008) pp. 274-282. 
203
 4.7.4-4.7.5. 
204
 4.8.1-4.8.2. 
205
 4.7.5. 
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enemies. They even ask for no quarter, effectively inviting the treatment they 
eventually receive.
206
 Consequently their annihilation in combat is established as part 
of the code of conduct that they are experienced with and accept.  
 
Caesar encapsulates the principle that the massacre is a just imposition of force in his 
summation, which alludes to the idea that his actions are legitimate since they are 
superior to other forms of treatment that the enemy could expect.
207
 He illustrates this 
in his description of the fate of the legates after the battle, when he states:  
 
Caesar iis, quos in castris retinuerat, discedendi potestatem fecit. illi supplicia 
cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle 
dixerunt. his Caesar libertatem concessit.
208
  
 
Rather than face torture at the hands of the Gauls, the legates feel safer staying with 
Caesar even though he has just massacred their people.
209
 As he reveals in his closing 
statement, once punishment and the elimination of the threat have occurred, his is the 
superior brand of justice that even the enemy prefer to local principles.
210
 The 
presentation of their desires in this manner demonstrates that the summation is used to 
establish that his actions are controlled, necessary and possibly even understood by 
the defeated.  
 
Combat within the battle is included to capture these principles of justice and 
necessity at the expense of clarity. This is evident in the treatment of the Roman 
cavalry, whose role is simplified to associate them with the dispensation of the 
punitive measures. The manner the cavalry came to be involved in the battle is 
omitted, and how they came from the rear of the army, where they were placed after 
                                                 
206
 See 4.7.3-4.7.4 for the legates asking for no quarter. Caesar effectively obliges them by wiping out 
their people, suggesting that the battle and conversations prior to it have been structured together so 
that such statements by the enemy are answered in the battle. Consider Ariovistus‟ boasts about 
virtus and Caesar‟s response in battle discussed at pp. 146-161 above. 
207
 See also Lee (1969) p. 103 who notes how Caesar invites the audience to consider why the Usipetes 
and Tencteri prefer his system of justice. 
208
 4.15.4-4.15.5. 
209
 Melchior (2004) p.18 states “Caesar is composing history that will comfort rather than confound”. 
Note that Melchior does not specifically address the Usipetes and Tencteri, and as the complexity of 
this episode illustrates, the objective of battle narrative can be more complex than revenge.  
210
 On iustus in general see Ramage (2003) pp. 347-348. Note the word is not specifically used here. 
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the skirmish, to an instrumental position in battle is not accounted for.
211
 Their only 
mention in the battle is when they are sent against the women and children, briefly 
described as: ad quos consectandos Caesar equitatum misit.
212
 In doing so Caesar 
omits a great deal of activity, such as how the cavalry move around the mass of 
fighting men to attack the non-combatants. Nor does he discuss any dangers they 
might have faced in the actual battle, particularly in view of the effectiveness of the 
Germanic cavalry.
213
 In contrast to all this potential activity that could be described to 
clarify battlefield conditions, Caesar makes them an instrument of destruction as he 
closely associates them with his own order.
214
 The lack of a complete account of 
cavalry activity suggests a thematic purpose, as it enables an interpretation of their 
contribution as the implementation of a required measure at the orders of the Roman 
commander.  
 
The presentation of motivational factors also establishes that the battle is in response 
to enemy perfidy. This is most evident in the presentation of the Romans, as morale in 
combat is governed by the punitive context. Caesar states: milites nostri pristini diei 
perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt.
215
 His soldiers are given one single motivation, 
that of justified anger.
216
 While the mention of the cavalry skirmish may well have 
been used to inspire the army prior to the historical combat, the whole army is 
attributed with one motivation that is synchronous with the thematic purpose.
217
 The 
description of motivation provides an explanation for success, while reinforcing the 
thematic concerns of the passage regarding Caesarʼs need for action. 
 
                                                 
211
 4.13.6. The last mention of the cavalry was when they were placed in rear of the army after the 
skirmish, and Caesar gives no information on his change in attitude towards their reliability. See 
Gerlinger (2008) p. 280. 
212
 4.14.5.  
213
 4.15.1. The cavalry must move around the enemy forces to attack the rear, as the flight began post 
tergum, thus exposing and presumably isolating them. It should be noted that the same cavalry odds 
that applied in the skirmish are applicable here, if the enemy had time to organise their cavalry, 
which is possible considering that a defence was mounted among the wagons.  
214
 He does not explain the motivation of the cavalry, or their recovery from the defeat of the previous 
day. The use of the cavalry in the historical event may have helped restore any morale lost due to the 
skirmish. However Caesar does not mention any such factor as his focus on himself and justice, not 
on the men‟s motivation in seeking revenge, which he has covered at 4.14.3-4.14.4.  
215
 4.14.3-4.14.4. See also Lee (1969) p. 103. 
216
 See also Avaricum 7.28.4-7.28.5. 
217
 Note that the cavalry were auxiliaries, and may even have been only recently recruited as Caesar 
suggests at 4.7.1. How far the legions would have cared or identified with their losses, small as they 
were, in the skirmish is unclear.  
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More importantly, this motivation is used to replace the physical manner in which the 
Romans take the camp, so that the punitive aspect of the event takes precedence over 
the description of the assault itself. Caesar does not mention his actual orders to his 
legates, except the justification for battle and the need for haste, demonstrating how 
he is not concerned to capture in detail any tactics he used or orders he may give on 
the day.
218
 The state of mind of Caesarʼs men comes at the expense of the manner in 
which they advance against the enemy, or enter the encampment.
219
 The passage 
therefore supports the thematic concerns but does so at the expense of the physical 
activity, demonstrating that the imposition of the punitive measure determines the 
nature of the account, and has replaced an explanation of the movement of troops 
against the position. 
 
Caesar takes particular care to establish the status of the enemy as recipients of 
punitive actions, by stressing morale factors that achieve this effect. He explains the 
surprise he enjoys in the battle as due to his speed of action, which captures the 
Germani unprepared.
220
 As he states: …copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra 
defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret. quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu 
significaretur...
221
 The emphasis on surprise enables the defenders to be described in a 
manner that dwells on their dismay and fear, as the use of perturbantur illustrates.
222
 
However Caesar also describes them as perterriti, and states of their fear that cum 
fremitu et concursu significaretur.
223
 The details of their fear may be elaboration not 
just for its significance, but to capture the dismay of the perpetrators just prior to their 
destruction.  
 
The effect of the retributive theme on combat is evident as the presentation of 
Germanic motivation, as with Roman morale, comes at the expense of analysis of 
their physical activity. Caesar presents the suddenness of his attack as almost 
complete, and the impression is that the defenders resist haphazardly among the 
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 4.13.3-4.13.4. 
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 The emphasis is on the psychological effects and states rather than physical progress. 
220
 4.14.1-4.14.2.  
221
 4.14.2-4.14.3. 
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 4.14.2. 
223
 4.14.3.  
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wagons of their camp.
224
 Nevertheless he later describes them as if they were fighting 
in organised units, an idea suggested as they abandon their standards when forced to 
flee.
225
 The level of organisation in the resistance is therefore unclear, as the concern 
is not with the actual nature of the defence, but with the status of the enemy as 
recipients of a punitive measure.  
 
The presentation of the aftermath and the result of battle also show how the content 
has been chosen to present the affair as punitive in nature. Caesar states after the flight 
of the enemy: 
 
Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes perpaucis vulneratis ex tanti belli timore, cum 
hostium numerus capitum quadringentorum triginta milium fuisset, se in castra 
receperunt.
226
 
 
The total absence of Roman casualties is commensurate with an act of punishment, as 
the infliction of damage is entirely one sided, similar to the manner the Tigurini were 
defeated where no Roman casualties were described.
227
 This is an unlikely situation 
considering the numbers of Germani cited, and Caesarʼs own previous explanation of 
the difficulties of fighting among the wagons of the Helvetii, where the defence of the 
camp was particularly fierce.
228
 However the lack of Roman casualties serves to 
emphasise the punitive aspect, as retribution is inflicted in a one sided manner and is 
only nominally resisted.  
 
Furthermore, enemy casualties are given as the total number of people, rather than in 
terms of their fighting strength, further indicating that the casualty report is used to 
                                                 
224
 4.14.2-4.15.5. Note that they only slowly begin to resist, and the statement that they do not know 
whether to fight or flee, while it could be an attempt to capture their thoughts could also indicate the 
action of disparate elements within the camp. 
225
 4.15.1. The statement may indicate that the standards were left behind and the Germani never 
organised around them, or that they abandoned their positions, however Caesar does not specify 
either. 
226
 4.15.3-4.15.4. 
227
 See also Caesar‟s presentation of the Tigurini at 1.12, which is similar in style and purpose, and pp. 
113-116 above. Also note that the enemy only resist briefly. This might be expected of perpetrators 
being punished. Note that the lack of Roman casualties justifies Caesar‟s decision as it shows that he 
was right to surprise attack and thus save Roman lives. See also Riggsby (2006) p. 176. Note also the 
safe return to camp, similar to Octodurus at 3.6.3-3.6.4. 
228
 Gerlinger (2008) p. 108. See the Helvetii battle 1.26.3-1.26.4. While the circumstances are 
different, Caesar does not adequately explain the extraordinary lack of casualties against such a huge 
host in a defensible position. 
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describe the event in terms of punishment. Caesar enacts vengeance against an entire 
people rather than their combatants, and the total number is a demonstration of justice 
as applied in other situations, such as against the Aduatuci and Venetii, where whole 
populations are held to account.
229
 Consequently the description of overall dead 
serves the dual purposes of addressing the initial threat, but is also an example of 
punishment as applied elsewhere in the Bellum Gallicum.
230
 The inclusion of all 
Germanic casualties enunciates the thematic principle of justice being thoroughly 
implemented, rather than assisting in understanding the actual conduct of the battle.  
 
This presentation of the battle as punitive may also explain why Caesar presents the 
slaughter of women and children in such stark and blunt terms. Scholars have reported 
that the description of the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri appears as a matter 
of fact, and the view of Collins is that such a presentation is simply a forthright 
explanation of activity.
231
 As Collins states Caesar “displays unblushingly the very 
aggressiveness he has been charged with attempting to conceal”.232 However it is 
entirely possible that Caesar wishes to show this aggression and slaughter as 
fundamentally a good thing, and the just dispensation of punishment on a deserving 
criminal people.
233
 Caesar himself reveals this emotion when he states regarding the 
capture of the delegates, that his reaction was gavisus.
234
 The record of his pleasure is 
indicative of his presentation of the whole affair, which rather than being matter-of–
fact, is actually intended to be exultant. He is not just being blunt, but is actually 
encouraging a positive interpretation to reflect the elimination of a threat. 
 
                                                 
229
 See 3.16.3-3.16.4 for the Venetii. The Aduatuci are punished after a betrayal at 2.33.7 and the total 
number captured is given. Note also the contrast in the conflict with the Helvetii and Belgae, where 
fighting strength is specifically given. See 1.2.4, 1.29.3. 
230
 Note also that the method of withholding numeric figures until the end of the account suggests a 
revelatory purpose, rather than an explanatory purpose. See 4.15.3. The iteration of the numbers of 
the Usipetes and Tencteri at the very end is a confirmation of the scope of the threat posed by these 
peoples. By withholding this information to the very end Caesar provides the empirical evidence to 
support his activity throughout the account. He addresses the total number of the enemy rather than 
the casualties, since it is the whole people whom he is concerned to describe and whom he illustrates 
were the problem. This is similar to the Helvetii account at 1.29. 
231
 See Lee (1969) p. 100 who cites the scholarship and notes the “apparent frankness” of the narrative 
as seen by others. See also Rice Holmes (1911) p. 140 who refers to the “tremendous frankness of 
this avowal”.  
232
 Collins (1972) p. 929. Note Collins regards Caesar as not needing to show justification. 
233
 Rambaud supports this interpretation of Caesar‟s purpose. Refer to Rambaud (1966) p. 128. 
234
 4.13.6. See Collins (1972) p. 935 who notes the extraordinary use of the word. 
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The context in which the battle occurs, and the content Caesar has chosen, are driven 
by a need to address strategic, preventative and punitive issues. There is evidence to 
suggest he may have been required to defend his actions in this campaign, and the 
narrative certainly shows a desire to justify the treatment of the enemy. Caesar 
chooses aspects of combat that address the necessity of the slaughter over physical 
descriptions of activity or relevant tactical analyses, as his desire is to use the details 
of combat to support his handling of the tribes. Combat details are designed to 
illustrate that this massacre is inherently a good thing, where Caesar and his army are 
given a chance to strike at a particularly untrustworthy enemy, and at the same time 
eliminate a dangerous threat to Roman interests. The details of battle reinforce the 
explanation of events and justify Caesarʼs conduct regarding this particular campaign. 
 
Campaign References in the Second British Invasion 
 
The importance of supporting Caesarʼs conduct of problematic campaigns is not only 
evident within particular episodes, but can extend across a series of campaign 
narratives. Brown calls Book Five a “virtual textbook on generalship” an idea that is 
supported by Caesarʼs representation of the campaigns and battles therein, and 
Brownʼs statement is certainly true to the extent that the narratives appear 
interconnected by the need to show Caesarʼs understanding and mitigation of the 
problems he describes.
235
 This is apparent in the second invasion of Britain which 
utilises military details to address the problems of the previous invasion, and to 
demonstrate his reaction to those concerns.
236
 The cross-referencing is evident not 
only in preparations for the expedition, but in details that contextualise or describe 
combat.
237
 Caesar utilises details of the second invasion to address the first, 
illustrating at a simple level the interrelationship that exists between the various 
campaigns described. 
                                                 
235
 Brown (2004) p. 295. Brownʼs idea is supported by Caesar‟s representation of the campaigns and 
battles therein. This is most evident in the cross referencing noted between the defence of Cicero‟s 
camp at 5.38-5.51, and the massacre of the legion under Sabinus and Cotta at 5.26-5.37. Carrington 
(1939) p. 105 draws the contrast between the Cicero and Sabinus situation 5.41 and 5.26-5.27. 
Gärtner (1975) pp. 113-118 also notes that these episodes are to be read in conjunction. 
236
 5.8-5.23.  
237
 On numbers see separately pp. 123-126 above. Caesar also provides general information, such as 
the details of Britain at 5.12-14, including the use of woad in battle; however these details are not 
referenced or carried through into the battle narratives. On ethnography see also Schadee (2008) pp. 
173-175. 
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A direct reference occurs when Caesar describes that he chose a landing place based 
on knowledge from the previous summer, illustrating that he communicates the 
relationship between his activity in the two campaigns.
238
 In a marked contrast to the 
first expedition, he also makes clear that the distance to Britain from the point of 
origin is thirty miles, but does so to explain his choice of embarkation point, and 
while the actual distance travelled is eventually given, it is does so in order to show 
that the port was the most appropriate.
239
 These details are a general response to the 
first invasion as they address the differences in how he conducted both crossings. 
 
Caesar also demonstrates a concern with the problems he faced in the first invasion in 
his preparations for the second. He states that he ordered ships built that could easily 
be beached, a direct reference to the storms that ruined ships in the previous invasion, 
and possibly a reference to the difficulties of the first landings.
240
 More importantly, 
he makes specific reference to cavalry in precise numbers, a marked contrast to the 
first invasion where no numbers of cavalry were given.
241
 His precision is driven by 
the need to show that he overcame the problems of cavalry in the first invasion, as the 
absence of Roman cavalry was so critical in giving the enemy superiority on the 
battlefield.
242
 Caesar displays a concern to state his foresight and planning, and to 
provide military data where it portrays his reactions to the setbacks of the previous 
campaign. 
 
Caesar further addresses the previous episode as he implicitly answers circumstances 
expected following the first campaign. In describing the landings in the second 
invasion, he states that the enemy retire on sighting his fleet of eight hundred ships, 
                                                 
238
 5.8.4. There is not necessarily any misrepresentation, the text is simply utilising contextual 
information to illustrate his responses.  
239
 5.2.3. Refer pp. 251-253 above, and how such details demonstrate a commander‟s attention to 
detail. 
240
 5.1.1-5.1.4. Note he does not address the storms that plagued the first expedition, and in fact has 
ships designed that are lower and smaller than those used in the Mediterranean, showing the ship 
design was not in response to weather conditions but for ease of landing. 5.1.2. See 4.24.2-4.24.4 for 
the difficulties of the first landings. See also Rice Holmes (1911) p. 170. 
241
 See 4.22.4 where Caesar only mentions that eighteen transports were assigned to the cavalry. No 
numbers of cavalry were actually given. 
242
 See 4.26.5 for an example. See also pp. 283-291 above on the first invasion. See 5.5.3-5.5.4, 5.18.5. 
Also note how Caesar provides details of cavalry numbers left at the beach camp at 5.9.1. This may 
even explain why he mentions the cavalry contribution in battle, even where it is unclear exactly how 
they contributed to victory, such as a river crossing at 5.18 where the cavalry are specifically 
mentioned, even though the infantry appear more important. 
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and the number of ships appears to explain why the enemy do not oppose the landing 
this particular time.
243
 He is even careful to specify how he came by this information, 
so as to verify the accuracy of his assessment regarding enemy motivation. 
Furthermore he elaborates details that draw attention to the sheer size of the fleet, and 
mentions that the total number of ships includes those brought over by private 
individuals, as he is not contextualising the actual strength of his forces but the 
appearance to the enemy.
244
 Such details show that he considers it necessary to 
explain how he avoids the problems of the first landing and the resistance faced 
there.
245
 His use of numbers in this instance is to explain why the enemy do not offer 
battle, and to demonstrate the different conduct of the two invasions.  
 
The Precedence of Gaul  
 
Where the account of the British campaign is most evidently aimed at defending 
Caesar is in the manner that information forestalls criticism regarding the massacre of 
the legion commanded by Titurius Sabinus and Arunculeius Cotta, described later in 
the same book.
246
 He uses the account of the second invasion to help exonerate him 
from responsibility for the defeat, by demonstrating a concern for affairs in Gaul, and 
to show that the invasion was not simple glory hunting. Battle in Britain is used to 
represent Caesar as a particularly cautious and conscientious general who prioritises 
safety and defence over reckless aggression. He even uses this account to demonstrate 
the separation of command responsibility and to make clear not only that subordinates 
are essential for success, but that both success and failure depend on the whole 
military organism. The narrative adheres to a greater pattern regarding Caesarʼs 
personal conduct and how he wishes his leadership to be understood in this book. 
 
Caesar probably faced a particular problem when describing the second invasion, as at 
the time of writing a major revolt that led to the massacre had already occurred, and 
he had to account for something that he may not have been aware of at the time of the 
historical event, and which could ostensibly have indicated a neglect of affairs in 
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 5.8.6. 
244
 5.8.6. 
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 See 4.24-4.26 for the first landing and the enemy resistance. 
246
 5.26-5.37.  
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Gaul.
247
 In the Bellum Gallicum Caesar avoids the intimation of negligence, by 
indicating that he expected further trouble in Gaul, had taken all necessary 
precautions and that the expedition to Britain was necessary and conducted with 
care.
248
 Any idea that Caesar was negligent through ignorance is forestalled as he 
states openly that it was fear of an uprising in Gaul that led him to keep the Gallic 
chieftains with him, thereby establishing that he acted with due caution in response to 
the threat.
249
 The details prior to the invasion therefore establish that the intervention 
in Britain occurs where he was aware of and prepared for potential trouble in Gaul, 
thereby mitigating any intimation that he was unprepared for such events.  
  
Caesarʼs summation of the British campaign demonstrates that he placed affairs in 
Gaul over the invasion itself, as he makes clear he abandons Britain in favour of a 
return. He is very clear in this regard, describing that his return from Britain was in 
response to news of trouble in Gaul: 
 
Caesar, cum constituisset hiemare in continenti propter repentinos Galliae motus, 
neque multum aestatis superesset atque id facile extrahi posse intellegeret, obsides 
imperat, et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet 
constituit; interdicit atque imperat Cassivellauno ne Mandubracio neu Trinovantibus 
noceat.
250
  
 
As is clear in this passage, Caesar weighed up the value in staying in Britain against 
returning to Gaul, with a clear implication through the use of extrahi that there were 
further matters to be resolved.
251
 The fact that he could only order and compel the 
enemy leader Cassivellaunus on peace terms suggests that he was not happy with the 
inconclusive result.
252
 Nevertheless, he states that he had decided to winter in Gaul 
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 See Rambaud (1966) p. 102 on the issue of foresight. 
248
 See 5.5.4, 5.8.1 for overt examples. Prior to the massacre itself, Caesar also demonstrates his 
preparations and diligence; through the manner he describes the delegation of command and the 
extensive details regarding the quarters. See 5.24 for the details. 
249
 5.5.4. See also Caesar‟s descriptions of his customary marching order in hostile territory, which acts 
to mitigate the surprise of the Nervii attack. See pp. 282-283 above.  
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 5.22.4-5.22.5. 
251
 Based on the small scale of the final battle and the lack of details provided, it seems likely that the 
enemy had not been fully defeated in the manner Caesar would have preferred. Also he had not yet 
clearly defeated Cassivellaunus himself according to the account. See 5.22.3-5.22.4.  
252
 The use of words such as interdicit atque imperat is in marked contrast to the lack of ability to 
enforce demands. 
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due to the sudden activity there, demonstrating that in explaining the end result of the 
British campaign, affairs in Gaul took precedence and determined how he dealt with 
the defeated Cassivellaunus.
253
 By indicating his dissatisfaction, he demonstrates that 
Gaul held precedence even where that led to the incomplete resolution of another 
venture.  
 
This sense of urgency to return is also communicated in the account of the crossing 
back to Gaul. Caesar shows this clearly in his extended account of missing ships and 
the multiple trips back that were required when he states: 
 
Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra expectasset, ne anni tempore a navigatione 
excluderetur, quod aequinoctium suberat, necessario angustius milites conlocavit ac 
summa tranquillitate consecuta secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia, prima luce 
terram attigit omnesque incolumes naves perduxit.
254
 
 
As he makes clear, fear of being prevented from returning was strong in his mind at 
this point in the campaign, and he made the crossing by necessity under less than ideal 
circumstances. Caesar shows clearly the concern that he had for making a return and 
communicating how that compelled him to act as he did under the circumstances.  
 
However Caesar is concerned to establish the primacy of Gallic affairs much earlier in 
the book, and structures much of the episode to support the idea that his concern for 
Gaul was ongoing with Britain marginalised.
255
 The reasons for the second expedition 
are not clearly stated, it only being implied that it is because the Britons had not been 
pacified at the end of the first invasion. There is no overt self-aggrandisement that 
might suggest recklessness in his choice to invade a second time either.
256
 Instead in 
his description of preparations for the invasion, on two occasions Caesar abruptly 
interrupts his account to describe his activity against disruptive elements in Gaul, 
these being included as they demonstrate his efforts in suppressing revolt and show 
where his attention was focused. When the Treveri appear to be causing trouble, he 
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 5.22.4-5.22.5. 
254
 5.23.5-5.23.6. 
255
 This is an aspect of consilium as noted by Ramage (2003) p. 338. 
256
 See 4.20.1-4.20.3. Note how the first invasion is presented here with the objective of 
reconnaissance. See 4.38.4-4.38.5 for the lack of hostages sent. 
324 
 
breaks off a description of the ship preparation to describe how he acted to deal with 
them.
257
 The episode with Dumnorix is described in a similar manner, with Caesar 
abruptly breaking off his description of preparations to deal with internal troubles 
involving the recalcitrant leader.
258
 While these are also descriptions of the sequence 
of events, they are included to show his concern with Gaul over any preparations or 
reasons for the invasion.  
 
Caesar is careful to associate any measures taken in these episodes with the invasion 
plans, so that an order of precedence places Gaul first. This is evident in the manner 
that the affair with Dumnorix is introduced. As Caesar states, this Gallic leader was an 
ongoing problem, asking to be left behind and stirring up trouble among the Gauls.
259
 
It is quite clear that as far as Caesar was concerned the man could not be safely left 
behind. However, he states that the inclement weather that held him in port for twenty 
five days gave him the opportunity to deal with the situation, directly associating the 
delay and the measures taken against Dumnorix. 
260
 This is in spite of the probability 
that he would have had to deal with such a situation no matter what the weather 
conditions, to avoid leaving an openly hostile leader in Gaul.
261
 Effectively Caesar 
uses the weather to explain how he had an opportunity to deal with Dumnorix, 
specifically reminding his audience that a pending invasion was on hold and that Gaul 
held precedence in his order of concerns.  
 
Similarly, the response to news regarding the Treveri illustrates Gaul was the priority. 
When Caesar describes a muster of ships, he does not actually mention the numbers 
planned for the British campaign, instead stating that he took four legions and eight 
hundred cavalry against the Treveri:  
 
Huic rei quod satis esse visum est militum reliquit. ipse cum legionibus expeditis 
quattuor et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur, quod hi neque ad 
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 5.2.4. See also Gelzer (1968) p. 132. Gelzer notes the very real need to care for Gaul prior to 
leaving for Britain. 
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 5.6-5.7. Note in particular how he describes at 5.7.6 how he abruptly cut short preparations to deal 
with Dumnorix. 
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concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant Germanosque Transrhenanos sollicitare 
dicebantur.
262
 
 
He merely states that he left enough men with the ships as seemed enough to continue 
the preparations, as the numeric feature is regarding his measures regarding Gaul. 
These receive precise details to draw attention to them, and illustrate where Caesarʼs 
attention was focused.  
 
Furthermore the level of detail given also shows a concern to communicate interest 
with the minutiae of affairs in Gaul. Caesar gives an extended description of his 
activity among the Treveri, recording how each rival leader acted, felt and spoke; the 
attention indicating his concern with the details of the affair.
263
 Similarly the 
Dumnorix episode is described using indirect speech as well, so that it has precedence 
over the musters for Britain.
264
 In particular the use of speech shows a concern with 
reporting the words said in that episode, a marked contrast to the invasion itself where 
almost no spoken records are given.
265
 The attention given to the activity against these 
individuals indicates that Caesar structures the preparation period to indicate his 
concern with, and prioritisation of Gaul over the invasion itself.  
 
The force of these passages involving the Gallic leaders ensures that attention remains 
on Gaul even while Caesar describes his preparations for the invasion. This is 
apparent in comments regarding Indutiomarus and Dumnorix: 
 
Id factum graviter tulit Indutiomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui, et qui iam ante 
inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit. 
 
Ille autem revocatus resistere ac se manu defendere suorumque fidem implorare 
coepit, saepe clamitans liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis.
266
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 5.2.4. 
263
 5.3-5.4. 
264
 The muster of cavalry is described at 5.5, along with the loss of some ships. 
265
 Note also that the words may not be a true record, but show that Caesar is concentrating on giving 
the episode a distinctive and memorable character. The one instance of indirect speech in the British 
invasion is at 5.20.1-5.20.3.  
266
 5.4.4, 5.7.8-5.7.9. 
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The description of Indutiomarus is full of foreboding and foreshadowed trouble, as 
the use of exarsit suggests.
267
 While the words of Dumnorix in the second passage 
might appear sympathetic through his appeals to libertas, they make the passage 
memorable, keeping attention on affairs in Gaul over the preparations.
268
 The 
evocative language used suggests Caesarʼs attention was on Gaul as the passages are 
memorable and noteworthy in comparison to the preparations themselves.  
 
The manner in which Caesar accounts for delegations prior to the invasion is also 
utilised to show his concern for Gaul. As he states immediately after the affair with 
Dumnorix: 
 
His rebus gestis, Labieno in continenti cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus 
duobus relicto, ut portus tueretur et rei frumentariae provideret, quaeque in Gallia 
gererentur cognosceret, consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet, ipse cum 
quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum, quem in continenti relinquebat, ad solis 
occasum naves solvit et leni Africo provectus…269 
 
The chapter starts with the delegation of Labienus, three legions and 2,000 cavalry in 
Gaul, so that the description of the invasion actually comes after such precautions.
270
 
Caesar is also careful to state the level of discretion that Labienus held, so that his 
care to the delegations is clearly enunciated.
271
 Importantly, he states he took the same 
number of cavalry with him as was left behind, so that a numeric aspect of the episode 
reflects his equal concern with both regions. The delegation is included specifically to 
demonstrate a concern for affairs in Gaul and to forestall any criticism that the defeat 
of Sabinus and Cotta occurred due to neglect. 
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 The intensity of the language regarding these incidents is in marked contrast to the invasion 
preparations, which lack the passion that appeals to libertas or the implication of force that exarsit 
evokes. 
268
 On Dumnorix see Barlow (1998) p. 143. On libertas see Seager (2003) p. 23. 
269
 5.8.1-5.8.2. 
270
 Contrast 4.22.5-4.22.6 in the first invasion, where the delegations come after the preparations. 
271
 5.8.1-5.8.2.  
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Command Qualities in the Second Invasion 
 
The invasion itself show aspects of diligence that are common to other parts of the 
work; however the amount of anecdotal information suggests a particular interest in 
mitigating any culpability for the later disaster, through the presentation of Caesarʼs 
qualities as commander. In this regard he illustrates an attention to detail, and concern 
for minutiae in general. This is apparent in other battles where the minutiae serve to 
present his understanding of warfare, most notably in the siege of Alesia discussed in 
Chapter Four.
272
 In the case of the second invasion of Britain, the details appear to 
support Caesarʼs self-representation by establishing that he was not a neglectful 
commander.
273
 He describes the design of ships he ordered built, giving the shape of 
the ships and why this shape was important.
274
 These provide context for 
understanding how he wanted the campaign conducted, such as shallow drafts for 
beaching and loading, and broadness for carrying cargo and animals.
275
 This 
information, even going so far as to include where tackle was ordered from, show his 
attention to detail and the extent of his preparations.
276
 Even the numbers of ships is 
given to illustrate preparedness, as Caesar not only states the numbers constructed but 
the exact number of warships, even though they played no role in the fighting itself.
277
 
The description of preparations is therefore part of establishing his attention to 
minutiae, and while they have significance for the expedition itself, they also have 
importance for Caesarʼs self-presentation as a diligent and attentive commander, who 
does not let even minor details escape his scrutiny. 
 
The concern to illustrate caution and preparation is evident in the attention paid to 
details that highlight these qualities. This is evident in the description of the first 
Roman activity on landing: 
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 See above p. 266. 
273
 For other examples of minutiae see the Venetii ships at 3.13.1-3.13.7 and the walls of Avaricum at 
7.23. The most notable, the bridge over the Rhine described at 4.17-18, is not discussed as does not 
specifically address a battle narrative. 
274
 See overall 5.1.1.  
275
 5.1.2-5.1.3. 
276
 See 5.1.5 for the equipment from Spain. 
277
 5.2.2-5.2.3. Caesar also mentions when actuality does not meet this idea of preparedness, as he 
notes when the ships do not make rendezvous at 5.5.2. 
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Caesar exposito exercitu et loco castris idoneo capto, ubi ex captivis cognovit quo in 
loco hostium copiae consedissent, cohortibus decem ad mare relictis et equitibus 
trecentis, qui praesidio navibus essent, de tertia vigilia ad hostes contendit, eo minus 
veritus navibus, quod in litore molli atque aperto deligatas ad ancoras relinquebat. ei 
praesidio navibusque Q. Atrium praefecit.
278
 
 
Caesar provides extensive details to establish his concern for the safety of the camp 
and ships. He describes the numbers of troops held at the camp, and even names the 
commander in charge. Most importantly, his own prudence is apparent when he states 
that he advanced against the enemy having less fear due to these precautions. This 
instance is not unique, and when he leaves camp later he describes his leaving in a 
similar manner, even going so far as to restate the forces left behind as the same as the 
first time.
279
 The statements and the details provided demonstrate clearly that a feature 
of this campaign is on establishing his overall caution. 
 
In his account of combat Caesar also focuses on activities that demonstrate his 
prudence and concern with defence. His role in one battle is limited to the following 
statement: sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam 
ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui 
volebat.
280
 In this statement Caesar describes his reasons for forbidding the men from 
pursuit, such as the time of day and the ignorance of the countryside. He is also 
particularly careful to mention that a major concern is to prepare defensive 
fortifications, again illustrating his conservative and cautious nature. In this regard, 
Caesar does not need to explain his failure to pursue in such detail, as he engages in a 
pursuit on the next day and thus does not need to explain an apparent omission.
281
 He 
is therefore utilising the circumstances of the British campaign to forestall future 
criticism, by a self-representation that shows a command of affairs motivated 
primarily by caution.  
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 5.9.1-5.9.2. 
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 5.11.7. 
280
 5.9.8. 
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 See 4.26.5 in the first invasion for a contrast, where the cavalry are not available. Note also that the 
failure to pursue on the next day is explained due to the prioritisation of the setbacks regarding the 
ships. See 5.10.1-5.10.2 and 5.11.1 for the pursuit and recall. 
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A description of storm damage also demonstrates that the design is to address his 
prudent reaction to setbacks, in particular those that occurred in his absence. Caution 
is placed first when some ships are destroyed, and Caesar describes how he abandons 
pursuit of the enemy to return to the fleet as follows: eadem fere quae ex nuntiis 
litterisque cognoverat, coram perspicit, sic ut amissis circiter XL navibus reliquae 
tamen refici posse magno negotio viderentur.
282
 He describes his confirmation and 
qualification of what the messengers state, and also his own assessment of affairs at 
the time.
283
 He develops the concept of his attention to minutiae by focussing on his 
own assessment and role in the repairs. The level of detail regarding the repairs, and 
his own prominent role in this activity demonstrates the importance he places on his 
attention to the mitigation of setbacks, even describing that it was he personally who 
assessed the damage and decided that the ships could be repaired.
284
 He even 
describes how he picked out artificers and sent for equipment from the continent.
285
 
The incidental information supplied illustrates his care and attention in such 
circumstances, in particular his mitigation of setbacks, critical to an explanation of his 
overall command. The impression encouraged appears to be that of a diligent and 
careful commander who takes more than reasonable precautions to prevent or mitigate 
the effects of unforeseen disasters, a qualification that prepares the audience to 
understand his lack of culpability for the later defeat of his subordinates in Gaul.  
 
Subordinate Responsibilities 
 
While Caesarʼs self-representation establishes his caution, his presentation of the 
army concentrates on establishing their importance for successful operations, 
broadening the level of responsibility with which to view the later events of the 
book.
286
 He utilises the second invasion to illustrate the importance of all elements in 
the army to victory, and uses the description of combat to establish this principle. 
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 5.11.2. See also 5.10.1-5.10.2 and 5.11.1. 
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 Rice Holmes (1911) pp. 179-180 notes that Caesar may also be trying to excuse himself for not 
having the ships hauled ashore. However the main thrust of that argument is related to his comment 
about how the ships were left at 5.9.6, rather than in the details of repairs. See Carrington (1939) p. 
83. 
284
 See 5.11.2. 
285
 5.11.3-5.11.4. 
286
 See Riggsby (2006) p. 204 and Rosenstein (1990) pp. 172-173 on blame. Note that Caesar is not 
necessarily preparing the text to blame the soldiery; however he is preparing the text for the 
separation of responsibility and the limitations of his own culpability. 
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There is an attention to detail regarding delegated commands that is in marked 
contrast to the first invasion, where subordinates played almost no role in the 
account.
287
 Caesar names all the roles played by his subordinates, specifically naming 
the command of Labienus in Gaul, and the delegation of Quintus Atrius as camp 
commander.
288
 When he receives news from camp, he repeats the name of Quintus, 
demonstrating the role and placement of subordinates; in this case how important this 
subordinate was.
289
 This style persists throughout the episode, Caesar mentioning a 
commander in charge of foraging, and even stating when a tribune was killed in 
battle.
290
 All such details draw attention to the role of his subordinates that help 
exonerate the commander from any later failures by stressing the importance of their 
contribution to success.  
 
Caesar also adopts a highly critical approach to this examination of subordinates, to 
clearly define their shared responsibility for success or failure and to prepare the 
audience for the later criticism of the failed commander Sabinus.
291
 He states at one 
point that the cavalry pursue the enemy too vigorously, his use of cupidius to describe 
their behaviour an implicit condemnation of overzealous behaviour and a reflection of 
his own more cautious attitude.
292
 He similarly mentions that a successful surprise 
attack against entrenching Roman troops occurs due to them being imprudentibus, 
again establishing their need for independent watchfulness and preparation.
293
 The 
critical assessment of such activity shows that he utilises the details of combat to 
highlight the importance of all elements of the army for success. 
 
Praise is utilised to similarly remind the audience of the importance of all elements of 
the army for success. The crossing of the channel to Britain is notable in this regard, 
as it focuses on achievements by the men. Caesar describes that in the crossing the 
                                                 
287
 See 4.22.5-4.22.6. Nousek (2006) p. 181 notes the general absence of subordinate names in the first 
invasion. 
288
 See 5.8.1 for Labienus, 5.9.2 for Quintus Atrius. 
289
 5.10.2-5.10.3. Note the precision regarding the moment at which this occurred.  
290
 5.17.2, 5.15.5. The mention of the tribune Quintus Laberius Durus could also establish a personal 
cost to the unwatchfulness of the troops and a reminder of the need for diligence. Note this is the 
only tribune casualty mentioned by name in the Bellum Gallicum. 
291
 In the massacre, Sabinus, and to a lesser extent Cotta and the men are criticised heavily. See pp. 
209-213 above, and pp. 335-339 below. 
292
 5.15.2-5.15.3. See Gergovia discussed at p. 280 above. 
293
 5.15.3. By contrast, Caesar‟s own intervention, which describes how he sent two of the first cohorts 
against the attack, serves as a reminder of his own prudence in comparison to this lapse 5.15.4-
5.15.5. 
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fleet missed its objective and was forced to row to the landing place.
294
 He then gives 
a description of the contribution of the men as follows: 
 
Qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibusque navigiis 
non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt. accessum 
est ad Britanniam omnibus navibus meridiano fere tempore…295 
 
Outright praise for the contribution of the men is given, demonstrating that Caesar 
places importance on this campaign on recognising positive achievements, in this case 
actions that ensure the fleet arrives intact at the landing place.
296
 He does not use an 
isolated case, stating of the construction of ships: 
 
Eo cum venisset, circumitis omnibus hibernis singulari militum studio in summa 
rerum omnium inopia circiter sescentas eius generis, cuius supra demonstravimus, 
naves et longas duodetriginta invenit instructas neque multum abesse ab eo, quin 
paucis diebus deduci possint. conlaudatis militibus atque iis qui negotio 
praefuerant…297 
 
It is clear in this passage that his expectations were exceeded and he praises not just 
the soldiers, but all involved in organising the work.
298
 In doing so he highlights the 
contribution of his subordinates, including the sub commanders, so that all their 
activity is scrutinised and recognised accordingly. This attention serves to establish 
context for the later massacre, by illustrating that the behaviour of the army as a 
whole is essential for an effective campaign. 
 
Caesar takes particular care to praise the men in combat, demonstrating that battle is 
structured to draw attention to the role of subordinates. As is the case elsewhere in the 
work, the activity of the men supports the general proposition of the text, and in this 
                                                 
294
 5.8.2-5.8.3. 
295
 5.8.4-5.8.6. 
296
 Also note that the rowing may refer back to his own foresight, as Caesar had ordered the transports 
be built for rowing at 5.1. 
297
 5.2.2-5.2.3. 
298
 Note also that the numbers are communicated as part of highlighting the exemplary nature of the 
work. 
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account Caesar uses their actions to establish the importance of all for success.
299
 He 
explains victory in one battle according to the activity of the men, such as the use of a 
testudo to overcome fortifications, which they make themselves without any orders 
from the commander.
300
 He is very careful in this instance to credit the legion with 
success, stating that it is the milites of the Seventh Legion, his naming of the legion 
important, as it has not been specified thus far in the account and thus only included 
for accreditation.
301
 In another example, the description of fighting on the march gives 
credit to the cavalry, a rare example of Caesar focussing on their contribution but 
evidence of how important assigning credit is in this episode.
302
 While the cavalry 
played a major role in the campaign, the statement nostri omnibus partibus superiores 
fuerint appears to be a general observation regarding the superiority of his troops 
rather than the physical capabilities.
303
 The objective is also evident in the description 
of a river crossing where he states:  
 
Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua extarent, ut 
hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent 
ac se fugae mandarent.
304
  
 
This passage focuses on the speed and force of the attack as the reasons for success. 
In doing so Caesar omits direct mention of how stakes the enemy had fortified the 
river with were overcome, as he focuses on the contribution of the troops.
305
 While 
                                                 
299
 When Caesar describes the soldiers in action, it is often in support of the overall objective of the 
passage, such as the revenge motif of the Usipetes and Tencteri encounter discussed at pp. 315-316 
above, the defeat of the Germani reputation in battle discussed at pp. 155-158, or the massacre at 
Avaricum, examined at pp. 293-294. There appears to be a pattern where there is an objective in 
highlighting their contribution. See also the Venetii account and how the men are credited with the 
falx idea during the battle, discussed at pp. 139-144 above. 
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 5.9.7-5.9.8.  
301
 5.9.7.  
302
 5.15.1. 
303
 5.15.1. The cavalry are mentioned several times in the second invasion, due primarily to their 
importance for defeating the enemy when used in close conjunction with infantry. However they do 
seem to be singled out for praise on some of these occasions. See 5.9.4 where the cavalry drive the 
enemy off at a river crossing, without details of how they achieve this, suggesting that the only 
important aspect to note is that it was the cavalry who achieved this. See also 5.17.3 where Caesar 
makes clear the cavalry achieve the victory supported by infantry, and he specifically mentions their 
contribution at 5.18.3 in the swift attack across the river. Contrast the treatment of cavalry elsewhere, 
such as at 1.25.5. In the case of this episode, the cavalry were important for success, and he appears 
to take particular care to mention this. This could also be a reaction to the first invasion failures and 
to show how he learns and adapts. See above pp. 283-291. 
304
 5.18.5. 
305
 5.18.3.  
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physical factors on the battlefield can be implied, the stated reasons for success are 
aspects of quality regarding the troops, which shows that Caesar places emphasis on 
the men and their contribution. 
 
It is not just the progress of battle where Caesar assigns responsibility to the group, 
but he also describes enemy fighting techniques to broaden responsibility. As he 
states of enemy chariots: 
 
Toto hoc in genere pugnae cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, 
intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes 
possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis 
hostem, equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi 
etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros 
removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent. equestris 
autem proelii ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum 
inferebat. accedebat huc ut numquam conferti, sed rari magnisque intervallis 
proeliarentur stationesque dispositas haberent atque alios alii deinceps exciperent 
integrique et recentes defatigatis succederent.
306
  
 
From the outset of this analytical passage describing chariot warfare Caesar makes it 
clear that the problem is a Roman one and not just that of the commander, as the use 
of intellecturum est and sub oculis omnium suggests.
307
 It is all the forces who witness 
the enemy superiority and evasiveness, thereby indicating that the problem is not just 
the commanderʼs but the armyʼs as a whole.308 Caesar uses the instrument of analysis 
to demonstrate that campaign problems are a group responsibility, that they are 
analysed and reacted to by the entire army rather than just the commander.  
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 5.16.1-5.16.4. 
307
 Contrast the lack of spectacle references in the chariot warfare described in the first invasion, 
suggesting that this passage is utilised differently. On spectacle see Feldherr (1998) pp. 4, 10, Kraus 
(2007) p. 375, Quintilian 8.3.66-8.3.70. See also pp. 286-288 for the use of chariot combat in the first 
invasion. 
308
 Contrast the self-promotional objective in the Sabis River account, where Caesar is central to 
identifying and resolving the problem of the faltering legions. See pp. 236-237 above. 
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More importantly, Caesar is entirely silent on his own role in the resolution of this 
conundrum, allowing the menʼs actions to resolve battle rather than assign 
responsibility for a solution to any particular person. As he states: 
 
Postero die procul a castris hostes in collibus constiterunt rarique se ostendere et 
lenius quam pridie nostros equites proelio lacessere coeperunt. sed meridie cum 
Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum C. Trebonio 
legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab 
signis legionibusque non absisterent. nostri acriter in eos impetu facto reppulerunt 
neque finem sequendi fecerunt, quoad subsidio confisi equites, cum post se legiones 
viderent, praecipites hostes egerunt magnoque eorum numero interfecto neque sui 
colligendi neque consistendi aut ex essedis desiliendi facultatem dederunt. ex hac 
fuga protinus, quae undique convenerant, auxilia discesserunt, neque post id tempus 
umquam summis nobiscum copiis hostes contenderunt.
309
 
 
The solution to the superiority of the enemy is evident through the action of the men, 
who act in close concert with each other so that infantry and cavalry are not isolated. 
No officer orders this, neither Caesar nor even Gaius Trebonius who is in charge of 
the forces at the time.
310
 The countermeasure to enemy tactics is credited to the army 
in general, in spite of the almost certainty that someone must have ordered the various 
elements to act in concert.
311
 Just as they witness the problems, so the actions of the 
army solve them, thereby preparing for the responsibility attributed to subordinates in 
the later massacre, by indicating the broad role the army plays in correctly addressing 
the problems of campaign.  
 
There is a consistent approach to this campaign narrative that suggests Caesarʼs 
preparation for the events that are described later in Book Five, in particular the 
massacre of a legion under Sabinus and Cotta. Most important to the presentation is 
his own self-representation, including his caution and concern for and prioritisation of 
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 5.17.1-5.17.5. 
310
 Caesar only orders the foraging, a move that shows his diligence regarding logistics. 
311
 Importantly, the cavalry must have shown considerable restraint not to over pursue yet no 
commander is mentioned. Caesar in particular has mentioned that he had to order the men not to 
pursue in the first encounter at 5.9.8. In this encounter, some preparation to match the enemy tactics 
must have been made, but Caesar assigns no individual or even a group for credit. The army as an 
entire entity is then responsible.  
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matters in Gaul, so that any intimation of negligence or impetuosity is mitigated by 
his attention to affairs. He also pays particular attention to the role of subordinates, 
adopting a critical approach to their contribution that establishes the importance of the 
whole army for success. By broadening the level of responsibility in battle narratives, 
and through his own representation, Caesar ensures that the invasion of Britain 
supports his conduct of the war, by preparing for the disaster itself and the role of 
commander and subordinates therein. 
 
Contrasts of Behaviour in Book Five 
 
Just as the second British invasion prepares the narrative for the massacre, so the 
description of a siege of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp described after the defeat is used to 
isolate the behaviour of the defeated commanders, by showing that the actions of the 
commanders occurred against Caesarʼs express wishes and his expectations of 
subordinates.
312
 The massacre of Sabinus and Cotta was addressed in Chapter Three 
to show the censure of Sabinusʼ actions; however the interrelationship of that battle 
narrative and the campaigns of Book Five extend beyond the massacre itself. While 
Melchior regards the second narrative as an expiation of the defeat, it also serves a 
more complex role in defending Caesar.
313
 The later battle proves that Caesarʼs 
assessment of the massacre is correct, with details of negotiations, and anecdotal 
instances of combat provided as a clear contrast between good and bad behaviour.
314
 
Such cross referencing has been noted and examined by scholars such as Brown.
315
 
However the influence on combat establishes the strength of the connection between 
these battle narratives where defending Caesarʼs conduct is the objective. The 
relationship supports Caesarʼs assessment of the defeat, and defends him from 
criticism by showing the behaviour on display was not condoned. 
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 See pp. 209-213 above. See Brown (2004) for an overview of the relationship.  
313
 See Melchior (2004) p. 55 on the issue of avenging the massacre and its effect on presentation. 
While the defeat is certainly expiated, Caesar‟s objective is more complex as it contrasts the 
behaviour of the participants as well. 
314
 This is not the only purpose of the battle, which is also structured to demonstrate the timeliness of 
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 Brown (2004) p. 292; Rambaud (1966) p. 231; Rasmussen (1963) pp. 27-29; Eden (1962) p. 111; 
Gärtner (1975) pp. 116-117. 
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The clearest reference to Sabinus and Cotta is in the summation of the defence of 
Quintus Ciceroʼs camp, as Caesar openly makes reference to the previous massacre to 
draw contrasts that indicate that the defeated commanders acted contrary to his 
will.
316
 As he states: 
 
...de casu Sabini et Cottae certius ex captivis cognoscit. postero die contione habita 
rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: quod detrimentum culpa et 
temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferundum docet, quod beneficio 
deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina 
laetitia neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.
317
 
 
In relating this detail Caesar demonstrates that he wishes the battle to be seen as 
expiation for the previous event through correct behaviour.
318
 The specific reference 
to culpa et temeritate, contrasted with the virtute of the current defenders, is a clear 
indicator of the interrelationship of the two accounts in the work, and that the pairing 
favours the latter behaviour.
319
 The contrast serves to isolate the actions of the 
defeated commanders from Caesar by separating their conduct from sanctioned 
behaviour, and Caesarʼs overall grasp of military matters. 
 
Furthermore Caesar provides incidental details to support his assessment of the 
massacre, and to exonerate him from the behaviour of the defeated commanders. 
Details such as the reply of Quintus Cicero to the Nervii invite contrasts in character, 
as Quintus acts in precisely the opposite way to Sabinus and Cotta, outright refusing 
to deal with an enemy under arms, the difference an implicit condemnation of the 
earlier behaviour.
320
 Cicero even states Caesarʼs stance bluntly when he replies to 
their offers: ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani 
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 Carrington (1939) p.105; Gärtner (1975) pp. 113-118.  
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 5.52.4-5.52.6. 
318
 He even uses a form of expio with its connotations of purification. See Brown (2004) pp. 294, 307. 
Browns interpretation of centurions‟ contest is that it is to show the expiation of the Sabinus episode.  
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 5.52.6.  
320
 5.41.7-5.41.8 and 5.28.1 Even the speech of the enemy is a parallel of that made by Ambiorix as 
they state the things Ambiorix has stated at 5.41.1-5.41.2. Note how Caesar is not filling in actual 
details and the enemy only mentions Sabinus, not Cotta. The objective is to analyse Cicero‟s actions 
in contrast to Sabinus in the face of enemy negotiations. The long speech given by the enemy given 
is in dramatic contrast to Cicero‟s reply, which is blunt and encapsulates the correct Roman 
behaviour. Such details defend Caesar‟s conduct of the war as they isolate Sabinus from correct 
Roman behaviour and the commander‟s overall understanding of such matters. 
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ullam accipere ab hoste armato condicionem.
321
 Caesar uses the word consuetudino 
populi Romani to make clear how far the defeated commanders acted against Roman 
custom.
322
 The interpretation of the battle as a contrast in behaviours is clearly 
invited, and serves to support the overall contention that the massacre occurred due to 
behaviour that was unsanctioned, thereby removing him from culpability for the 
disaster.  
 
The role of the soldiers also isolates the behaviour of the defeated men from correct 
conduct in battle. In the massacre, Caesar specifically mentions the soldiersʼ concern 
for their personal possessions, stating that they worried over them, and even left ranks 
over their concern for such matters.
323
 He describes the actions of the defeated troops 
as follows during the passage on the massacre: 
 
Praeterea accidit – quod fieri necesse erat – ut vulgo milites ab signis discederent, 
quaeque quisque eorum carissima haberet, ab impedimentis petere atque arripere 
properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur.
324
 
 
Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret, quid 
secum portare posset, quid ex instrumento hibernorum relinquere cogeretur.
325
 
 
The above statements appear in direct contrast to the below passage, which describes 
the behaviour of Quintus Ciceroʼs men in the later battle: 
 
At tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit, ut, cum undique flamma 
torrerentur maximaque telorum multitudine premerentur suaque omnia impedimenta 
atque omnes fortunas conflagrare intellegerent, non modo demigrandi causa de vallo 
decederet nemo, sed paene ne respiceret quidem quisquam ac tum omnes acerrime 
fortissimeque pugnarent.
326
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 5.41.7-5.41.8. No details of the actual meeting are given as the circumstances are not important to 
the message.  
322
 Rosenstein (1990) p. 134 notes the correct Roman response of Cicero. 
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 See 5.31.4-5.31.5 and 5.33.6. 
324
 5.33.6. 
325
 5.31.4-5.31.5. 
326
 5.43.4-5.43.5 See Brown (2004) pp. 299, 302. 
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The difference in conduct by the men in each battle provides support for the idea that 
the earlier massacre occurred due to failures that arose in part from the men involved, 
who acted contrary to praiseworthy behaviour. The attitudes of the men regarding the 
baggage is included to draw specific contrasts that isolate the behaviour of the 
defeated from his general expectations regarding the soldiers.  
 
More importantly, one of the most detailed combat anecdotes of the work is described 
in the Quintus Cicero siege, and contains elements that clearly contrast the behaviour 
of the two sets of defenders. The description of Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo in 
battle demonstrates that co-operation and virtus are important elements in ensuring 
the survival of soldiers under attack, as the two mutually support each other in order 
to return to the camp. They are described as inimicus, yet manage to extricate 
themselves from a difficult situation by acting together.
327
 This is in marked contrast 
to Sabinus, who argued violently with Cotta, and abandoned his compatriot in order to 
surrender.
328
 As Brown notes, the contrast in behaviour is significant, and as the 
anecdote draws close attention to the issue of co-operation Caesarʼs concern seems to 
describe battle with reference to issues of character and behaviour.
329
 The vignette is 
therefore an overt example of exempla being utilised to illustrate correct behaviour 
and thereby implicitly condemn the defeated commanders. 
 
The siege of Quintus Cicero is also used to show that Cicero, unlike the defeated 
commanders, was correct to await his leader. Caesar gives several descriptions of his 
own response to the siege, the attention to detail focusing on his own understanding of 
the need for urgency, and to show that his subordinateʼs faith was well placed.330 He 
is very precise regarding the orders he gave, and the co-ordination of forces in order 
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 5.44.9-5.44.10 succurrit inimicus illi Vorenus et laboranti subvenit. See also Brown (2004) p. 302 
who also notes the behaviour of other soldiers at 5.43.6-5.43.7. At p. 301 Brown also lists the 
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 5.31.1-5.31.2. See Lendon (2005) pp. 217-218. The event may be true, but there is a literary 
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 See Brown (2004) p. 301. Kraus (2005) pp. 246-247 analyses 5.44. Eden (1962) p. 111 states 
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another.  
330
 See 5.46-5.48 for the details. 
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to reach the beleaguered camp.
331
 He is particular to mention times and distances, and 
even incidental details such as the re-use of a messenger.
332
 He even describes his 
own contribution to a message and the details of how it was attached it to a javelin, 
such is his concern for detail and the idea of faith well-placed.
333
 All these aspects of 
Caesarʼs response are designed to capture the importance to him of rescuing the camp, 
to prove that Cicero was correct to hold and await the arrival of his commander. The 
details illustrate how comprehensively the narration of the siege is directed at the 
earlier passage, in order to exonerate Caesar from the disaster described.  
 
The battle narratives examined in this chapter illustrate that the need to explain 
Caesarʼs conduct or the results of a campaign affect the military information 
conveyed. While there is a general care to communicate his diligence as commander, 
Caesarʼs conduct of affairs is particularly addressed in campaigns that are problematic 
in terms of their result. The first invasion of Britain is a notable example, as its 
representation of combat explains why he was forced to retire without a conclusive 
victory. The siege and assault on Avaricum is also used to contextualise the result and 
to primarily explain the massacre as brought about by the enemy and the Roman 
soldiers. Caesar is also clear to address his own decisions, and uses the details of 
battle to justify his conduct in the account of the Usipetes and Tencteri, where the 
Germanic threat and the representation of battle as a punitive response explain why he 
acted pre-emptively to eradicate these peoples and take further action across the 
Rhine. Self-defence can also span several campaigns, and the second invasion of 
Britain, the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta, and the defence of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp 
all have an implicit relationship, as they work in conjunction to exonerate him 
personally from the massacre. The battles are particularly illustrative of this need to 
explain and defend, and as with other persuasive objectives, shape the course of battle 
and its context in the Bellum Gallicum. 
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 5.46-5.48. Details include the sending of envoys to camp commanders, and he even describes 
himself as diectus at the news Labienus is held up. 
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 5.46.1, 5.47.1, 5.48.3-5.48.9. 
333
 As illustrated at pp. 242-243 above such details also serve to emphasise his arrival, even though 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Battle Narrative not Battle Report 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the place of battle narrative in the Bellum Gallicum, and 
the fundamentally persuasive role of the military details. Several theories of reporting 
battle have been advanced by military historians such as Lendon and Kagan, and these 
rely on the implicit idea that a major role of the narrative is to explain the result of the 
historical battle.
1
 However Caesarʼs accounts do not always align with a full and 
accurate reconstruction of battle itself, and an important aspect of this study has been 
to show that while the battle narratives contain a wealth of information about the 
encounters fought, this does not simply occur due to a reconstructive motive, as the 
criteria for battle narrative are more involved than clarification of the historical event 
or a record of victory. As was illustrated in Chapter One Caesar can actually display 
an almost cavalier attitude to the reconstruction of the historical confrontation, being 
highly selective in his choice of information to include.
2
 In this sense, there is also a 
lack of reporting standards to judge his objectives as a purely military reporter, with 
the absence of immediate precedents or a stated goal regarding battle.
3
 In the Bellum 
Gallicum some battles are extremely short even where the scope of the original event 
must have been immense, as is evident in the very first battle described, the defence 
of the Rhone, illustrating the extent of simplification that can occur.
4
 A detailed 
examination of the battles and their context also shows just how inconsistent Caesar is 
regarding military reporting, particularly the details that provide context for battle, 
such as the strength and nature of the forces, their dispositions, or movement on the 
battlefield.
5
 Elements appear and then disappear on the battlefield without 
explanation, even where they must have played an important role in the historical 
confrontation. As Chapter One illustrated, Caesar is not just interested in explanation 
of the historical event.  
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 This thesis qualifies the arguments of Lendon (1999) p. 277 and Kagan (2006) pp 108, 201-201. 
Kagan argues against Lendon, but still states that Caesar‟s accounts are primarily determined by the 
motive of reconstructing the original event and the important features of the confrontation. 
2
 See Wiseman (1979) p. 30-31 for use of the term “cavalierˮ in regards to rhetoricians. 
3
 See Riggsby (2006) pp. 133, 202. 
4
 1.8. 
5
 See pp. 45-59 above. 
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Caesarʼs apparent disinterest in a comprehensive reconstruction of historical 
confrontations is a deliberate choice driven by his relationship with his audience, in 
particular his desire to influence their reception of the events described. Whether in 
issues of command, or details such as the placement, presence and activity of forces 
on the battlefield, or even the minutiae of combat such as anecdotal information, 
elements of battle often appear in order to evoke a desired reaction.
6
 This is apparent 
in the stylistic purpose for which information can appear, such as in the Bibracte 
narrative and the Sabis River account.
7
 Both of these use information to foreshadow 
danger and build tension, particularly in the reiteration and elaboration of threats.
8
 
Furthermore, in the Belgic confrontation, stylistic choice dominates the narrative, as 
the creation of the topos of the multitude is a prime determinant of content, and is 
designed to emphasise the odds against the Roman commander.
9
 This is a literary 
interpretation, illustrating that the narrative is fundamentally driven by the effect on 
the audience. The extent to which a passage can be influenced by the style adopted is 
evident in the Octodurus narrative. Free from the need to promote his own actions, 
Caesar constructs the entire battle narrative in order to capture the impressions of the 
characters and engage his audience in the unfolding drama of the confrontation.
10
 
Rather than simply recreate the course of events in the text, the perception of the 
participants is captured in order to create a vivid and engaging account. The military 
information revealed in the passage is not just included to reconstruct the historical 
confrontation, but is primarily addressed at the impression it has on the audience. 
Caesarʼs description of battle, in spite of an apparent simplicity, incorporates the 
details of combat and other contextual information with the effect on the audience as a 
predominant concern.  
 
                                                 
6
 Gerlinger (2008) identifies some of these in the examination of realism in battle. 
7
 1.24-1.26, 2.17-2.28. 
8
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9
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The Persuasive Role of Battle  
 
Battle narrative is utilised for more than just engaging with the audience, and this 
study has illustrated the fundamentally persuasive role that these passages have 
throughout the text. Through a focus on case studies it has been shown that methods 
and objectives may change, but Caesar uses the content of battle narrative to influence 
and persuade his audience to understand the events and characters according to his 
interpretation.
11
 Battle narratives are far from just a clarification of the historical 
events, and are not simply defined by military criteria such as a concern with 
explaining the result.
12
 As demonstrated, the relationship between battle, the 
campaign, and the promotion of Caesar is inseparable, and each narrative is 
constructed according to discrete and highly specific criteria. Whether it is in the 
representation of groups, individuals, or more importantly Caesar himself, battle 
narrative is more persuasively forceful than a record a victory or defeat. The 
information by which battle is understood, and the minutiae of combat itself, serve a 
critical role in influencing the audience to accept Caesarʼs understanding of the events 
described.
13
 
 
Chapters Two to Five examined different aspects of the persuasive element, such as 
the interpretation of an episode or characters, or the use of battle in the promotion of 
Caesar personally. Each chapter demonstrated that battle narratives use information to 
create or support an understanding of the campaign in which they appear, such as the 
battle against Ariovistus, where the issue of virtus, and which side is stronger is 
addressed in the content of the described confrontation.
14
 This is not an isolated 
example, and all major, and most of the minor battles are driven by a fundamental 
desire to influence the audience to accept Caesarʼs perspective regarding the events 
                                                 
11
 See Barthes (1970) p. 153 on meaning. 
12
 For example Brown (2004) has an excellent example of battle narrative in use, in his analysis of the 
relationship between the defence of Quintus Cicero‟s camp at 5.38-5.51 and the massacre of the 
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related. In some cases the objective is clear, such as the short account of the Tigurini, 
where the brief description of combat supports the clear concept that this is the 
enactment of both public and personal justice.
15
 A longer account, such as the 
massacre of Sabinus and Cotta in Book Five also has a stated interpretation that 
informs the massacre itself, and continues to inform the later description of the 
defence of Quintus Ciceroʼs camp.16 Where there is no stated interpretation for the 
battle to support, Caesar nevertheless uses the details to create very specific 
impressions. This can be achieved through a brief account such as the massacre or the 
Usipetes and Tencteri, where the combat reiterates and resolves the dangers of these 
peoples, or the extended narratives of the Sabis River and Alesia, where self-
promotion is a fundamental aspect of the narrative structure that underpins these 
accounts.
17
 
 
The persuasive methods available to Caesar are numerous. In his description of the 
fighting in Britain, numbers are used to illustrate the ongoing threat that a particular 
enemy poses, and then a catalogue of tribes is used at the end of the account to 
illustrate the extent of their final defeat.
18
 A more subtle use of numbers is the 
casualty report of the Nervii in Book Two, which establishes not only the extent of 
their courage, but by inference the greatness of Caesar in overcoming them.
19
 Caesar 
also makes use of rhetorical exempla to support his understanding of an event. In the 
battle of Gergovia, exempla such as Marcus Petronius and Lucius Fabius, and 
anecdotes such as the Nitobrigian king and the women on the walls are all used to 
assign responsibility for the defeat to the army and to illustrate how the men lost 
control.
20
 This method is seen throughout the work, most notably in the use of 
Baculus to represent the status of a legion and the need for Caesarʼs intervention, or 
the Tenth Legion as an exemplum of contempt for the reputation of the Germani.
21
 
Empirical data, and the minutiae of combat, in particular close combat, all function to 
influence the audience and support Caesarʼs interpretation of the events described, 
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 See pp. 209-213 and pp. 335-339. 
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supporting the concept that the construction of these passages is based on persuasion 
of the audience.  
 
The battles often have a close textual tie to their relevant campaign narrative, and act 
in concert with the general text to create or support Caesarʼs interpretation of the 
episode. This is highly evident in the two battles examined in Chapter Two. The 
description of the naval battle against the Venetii, with its description of the falx as a 
countermeasure to Venetian naval superiority, addresses the challenge of resolving 
this campaign against a mobile and elusive opponent.
22
 Caesarʼs concern to explain 
the difficulties he faced throughout the campaign is reflected in a battle narrative that 
addresses and then resolves the overall problematic nature of fighting these 
adversaries. Similarly a textual relationship governs the battle against Ariovistus and 
the Germani, as the role of the passage is to directly address and rebut the idea of 
Germanic prowess, raised both by the character Ariovistus, and by Caesarʼs character 
in the near mutiny at Vesontio.
23
 This objective informs the construction of the battle, 
as is apparent in comparative references to virtus in the array of forces. Combat serves 
to demonstrate the superiority of the Romans in this quality, with a powerful 
description of courage by individual milites hurling themselves on the shields of the 
enemy that is a direct refutation of Ariovistusʼ boasts.24 This highly vivid passage 
illustrates the role that battle plays in addressing and resolving the message regarding 
the Germanic reputation, and, as with other accounts examined in this chapter, the 
relationship with the overall episode guides construction of the narrative. The nature 
of the implementation may vary, but details of battle are used in conjunction with the 
overall passage to create or encourage an impression of the episode for the audience.  
 
This is common throughout the work and the manner in which battle and the 
campaign narrative are interrelated demonstrates the persuasive dimension of these 
passages. The battle against the Belgic confederation in Book Two utilises the 
catalogue of enemy forces and the course of combat in conjunction to encourage the 
impression of a vast and disorganised entity, and to illustrate the disruptive nature of 
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 3.7-3.16. 
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 See 1.31-1.53. 
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 1.52.3-1.52.6. 
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the horde.
25
 Campaign and battle also function in conjunction in the account of the 
Nervii, where the reputation of the enemy is built up through the preceding passages 
in order to create a worthy enemy for Caesar to defeat in the battle.
26
 This relationship 
is essential to an understanding of battle and is evident from the case studies that 
examine each battle in its campaign context. 
 
More importantly, there is a relationship across the problematic campaigns of Book 
Four and Five that demonstrates the extent to which the content of battle has been 
selected to address Caesarʼs aims. The description of the massacre of Sabinus and 
Cotta has a substantial effect on campaigns described throughout the course of Book 
Five. The second British invasion therefore not only addresses the first expedition, but 
it is utilised to show a concern for Gaul, and to establish concepts of responsibility in 
order to establish Caesarʼs lack of culpability in the defeat.27 The influence of the 
massacre is also apparent in the subsequent defence of Ciceroʼs camp, where Caesar 
draws contrasts in behaviour to dissociate his own ideas of command from the 
conduct of the defeated officers.
28
 The complexity of the relationship between 
episodes, and the manner in which a single major concern links together several 
campaign and battle narratives illustrates the comprehensive usage of the material of 
battle narrative, in this case to defend Caesar against possible criticism for the defeat. 
 
Battle narrative also supports or creates impressions regarding characters other than 
Caesar, and this can be as simple as an introduction in the case of the Helvetii, where 
the Bibracte narrative in Book One is used to define Gallic warfare for the audience.
29
 
The vivid depiction of Helvetian courage, tenacity and intractability establishes 
behaviour by which to understand the enemy and the nature of warfare against them. 
Content is often selected to illustrate characteristics of the enemy, whether that is the 
barbaric auguries of the Germani, or the allusion to the warlike nature of the Britons 
in the description of their fortifications.
30
 Even battlefield topography can be 
incorporated into an interpretative framework for the characters, as is evident in the 
siege of Aduatuca where physical features of the battle such as walls, and piles of 
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surrendered arms, reflect the enemyʼs perception of superiority and the level of their 
duplicity.
31
 Caesar selects his battlefield information for its relevance to his 
understanding of the enemy and how he wishes them to be interpreted, and the details 
are determined by the supportive role that they serve.  
 
It is not just the representation of groups that has a fundamental effect on battle, and 
Chapter Three included an examination of information that is included to address 
issues of individual character. In particular, Caesar utilises some of the shorter 
narratives to praise subordinates such as Crassus and Labienus, whose contribution to 
victory forms the focus of campaigns when they are separated from their 
commander.
32
 By contrast, one particular account, the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta, 
includes information to specifically show the flawed command characteristics of 
Sabinus.
33
 This is the case throughout the work, such as the manner in which battle is 
used to dispel the boasts of Ariovistus, or to marginalise Vercingetorix and reduce 
him to a figure of defeat.
34
 The presentation of this major character indicates that 
content is included as part of the representation of participants, and as with the other 
case studies illustrates that battle has a critical role in establishing a desired reception 
for these groups or individuals.  
 
Caesar the Character and Battle 
 
Most of the efforts to influence the audience relate to the most important character of 
the Bellum Gallicum, Caesar himself, and the critical factor in any consideration of 
battle narrative is the manner in which a passage promotes him, either as author or as 
the most prevalent figure of the work. Self-promotion is entirely unsurprising in this 
work; however the extent that this motive determines the presentation of military 
information is critical for an understanding of the battles of the Bellum Gallicum. At a 
simple level, Caesar engages with his audience through the creation of a compelling 
narrative, as is apparent in the dramatic defence of Octodurus, a passage that 
illustrates the importance to Caesar of a positive literary reception to the work as it 
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adopts the perspective of the participants rather than his own perception of the 
event.
35
 Similarly, whether through a simple tale of shipwreck survivors in Book 
Four, or through the long and gripping tale of near defeat at the hands of the Nervii, 
Caesarʼs relationship with his audience and his apparent desire to create a favourable 
impression is a key determinant of battle.
36
 Self-promotion is particularly evident in 
the battle of the Sabis River, where the narrative is structured towards a crisis point 
centred on his person, even though important elements for victory occur elsewhere on 
the battlefield.
37
 Self-aggrandisement through the representation of Caesar the 
character is also evident in the topos of the Belgic horde, a literary interpretation of 
the battle that is not simply a reiteration of numbers, but draws attention to the scope 
of Caesarʼs victory.38 Even where he is not present, such as the siege of Quintus 
Cicero, Caesar draws attention to his importance through the structure of the narrative 
that establishes his role as rescuer.
39
 The construction of battle is consistently 
determined by the need to persuade the audience to view Caesar positively, both as 
author and character.  
 
Battle also creates a favourable impression of Caesar as a great commander, through 
narratives that associate him with positive themes, ideas and characteristics. Battle 
does much more at a literary level to promote Caesar than to record the victories, as 
he positions his character on the battlefield to associate himself with thematic criteria, 
as seen in the battle against Ariovistus and the Germani, or to ensure his physical 
presence is associated with the thematic resolution of a campaign, as in the naval 
battle against the Venetii.
40
 These battles have an essentially persuasive role in 
establishing the importance of Caesar; they associate him with the positive resolution 
of themes and enhance his importance as commander through association with key 
concepts in the confrontations described.  
 
Where Caesar does not draw explicit attention to his presence, his objective in 
promoting command capabilities is nevertheless an important determinant for the 
construction of battle. Caesar utilises battle as a demonstration of particular qualities, 
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and the siege of Aduatuca makes constant references to his clementia.
41
 Command 
qualities similarly have a strong presence in the first invasion of Britain, where the 
preparations, and the landings themselves, are designed to demonstrate his abilities as 
commander, and to associate his actions with the advancement of Roman interests.
42
 
His physical presence is limited in this account, but the construction of the battle 
adheres to the broad purpose of self-aggrandisement as it focuses on how obstacles 
are overcome through his responses to the challenges of the landing. The concern for 
his quality as commander is also evident in Book Seven, where the pairing of Caesar 
and Vercingetorix, and other contrasts in command, is highly influential in the 
descriptions of the campaigns fought.
43
 Most importantly, the final confrontation at 
Alesia is a demonstration of his superiority to Vercingetorix and the other Gallic 
commanders.
44
 However, command qualities can be put on display in a subtle manner 
using battle, and in the confrontation with Ariovistus, the complex interrelationship of 
negotiations, mutiny and finally battle all serve to ultimately prove Caesarʼs 
understanding of the enemy is correct.
45
 As a display of qualities, battle supports the 
representation of Caesar as a great commander more thoroughly than as a record of 
victory, as it illustrates his command qualities through the details supplied.  
 
Battle also serves to protect the reputation of Caesar as great commander, through the 
construction of passages that minimise any negative interpretation of problematic 
battles or campaigns. Caesarʼs apparent frankness in his description of the difficulties 
faced is superficial, rather the details of battle are used implicitly to support or defend 
his conduct. The description of the first invasion of Britain specifically includes the 
details of chariot combat to support his explanation for why he retired from the island 
and to highlight the unusual difficulties faced.
46
 Battle narrative also serves to 
implicitly explain the course of events and dissociate Caesar from responsibility, as is 
evident in the siege of Avaricum, where the representation of the participants is 
critical to the explanation for the massacre.
47
 The ferocity of the defence and the 
determination of the Romans are used to explain the slaughter as a natural result of 
                                                 
41
 2.29-2.33. 
42
 4.20-4.26. 
43
 See 7.1-7.15, 7.16-7.28, 7.66-7.68. 
44
 7.69-7.89. 
45
 See pp. 146-161. 
46
 See 4.33. 
47
 7.16-7.28. 
349 
 
the circumstances. In a more direct instance of justification, the massacre of the 
Usipetes and Tencteri is part of a campaign structure where the necessity of 
eliminating this untrustworthy and dangerous threat to Gaul is established, then 
resolved through combat.
48
 Within these battles and campaigns, the concerns of self-
defence have a significant effect on the presentation of conflicts that pose particular 
problems for the commander and narrator of the work. Caesar displays considerable 
flexibility in his use of battle narrative; however there is a consistent self-conscious 
concern with his reputation as commander and the favourable interpretation of the 
conflicts described.  
 
The Nature and Place of Caesarʼs Battle Narratives  
 
The role of battle throughout the Bellum Gallicum is essentially to provide supporting 
arguments for Caesar‟s interpretation of each episode, through a process of selection 
and emphasis of particular military details. To return to the example used in the 
introduction, the battle against the Usipetes and Tencteri, this account is a 
representative example of Caesarʼs technique and intent.49 It seems likely that Caesar 
faced some criticism at Rome for his handling of the affair, in particular the breaking 
of a truce and the capture of legates, and the battle certainly appears as part of an 
explanatory passage regarding his conduct of the campaign.
50
 In the account Caesar 
addresses the threat that the Usipetes and Tencteri posed to Gaul in order to show the 
necessity of his actions. He introduces the threat in the introductory passages before 
the battle, using background information to establish the scope of the danger that the 
enemy presented. The battle narrative itself supports this concept, and reminds the 
audience of this threat in the description of the cavalry attack against the women and 
young boys, specifically mentioning those who were a threat through their ability to 
procreate or due to their future potential. Numbers are cited in the battle in order to 
empirically assess the scope of the danger, and the narrative follows the ensuing rout 
to the Rhine in order to demonstrate the resolution of the strategic issue.
51
 
Furthermore, a cavalry skirmish is included to evoke ideas of deceit and the danger of 
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the enemy cavalry, and to emphasise the punitive aspect of the massacre.
52
 This 
matter of Germanic betrayal is then addressed through the description of Roman 
morale and the justified aggression of the soldiers, who storm the camp out of anger at 
the perfidy of the enemy.
53
 This particular battle narrative includes information 
designed to justify Caesarʼs behaviour in breaking a truce and pre-emptively attacking 
the enemy. Such use of battle as part of a literary scheme or pattern is consistent 
across the accounts of the Bellum Gallicum. In line with the other case studies, this 
passage provides an understanding of the nature and purpose of battle narratives, as 
each has a powerful argumentative role in the creation of an impression, or the 
support of Caesarʼs interpretation of an episode. 
 
This fundamentally persuasive role of battle narrative has implications when 
considering Caesarʼs place in the historical corpus. It is clear that his battle narratives 
are not just extended description of victories, to be read like the military manual of an 
author like Frontinus, whether for instruction or pleasure.
54
 Rather, Caesar has the 
objective of attributing meaning to the events described; a style he shares with 
historians such as Livy who attributes meaning to battles such as the defeat at 
Trasimene, where he blames Flaminius.
55
 However unlike some of his historical 
counterparts, Caesar seems less inclined to attempt clarification of the source event 
that he describes, as is evident in his highly selective inclusion of numbers.
56
 Whereas 
Livy or Polybius at least attempt to provide clarification of the sides to a 
confrontation, Caesar largely includes numbers for their persuasive effectiveness, 
such as the precise cavalry casualties suffered in the cavalry skirmish against the 
Usipetes and Tencteri.
57
 Whether it is a simple message of justice and necessity, as is 
the case in the battle against the Usipetes and Tencteri, or the extensive explanation of 
the difficult campaign against the Venetii, battles include content primarily to support 
and reinforce his understanding in a highly focussed manner.
58
 Caesar is also 
motivated by the need to celebrate his achievements, and uses the material of battle to 
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promote the victories, illustrate his command qualities and forestall criticism. The 
interpretative framework therefore appears to be constructed with the same desire for 
celebration that Cicero sought for his own consulship.
59
 The battles of the Bellum 
Gallicum contain elements of the historical, but are highly selective in both contextual 
material and the details of combat, both of which are placed in service to direct self-
promotion. 
 
The highly directed arguments and contentions of the battle narratives in the Bellum 
Gallicum make possible some tentative observations about the relationship between 
battle, literary techniques and rhetoric contained therein. Caesar recognises causally 
important features of the battlefield, such as the return of Labienus in the Sabis River 
account, however these elements do not form the framework of his narrative 
structure.
60
 Instead, battle is part of an argument in support of an episode, whether 
that is implicit or openly stated. The case studies of this thesis have revealed the 
relationships that exist within each episode and the methods by which Caesar 
persuades his intended audience. His methods include techniques such as 
foreshadowing, secondary narrators, asyndeton and focalisation; features that are 
common across many accounts and that indicate he makes use of a variety of 
conventions.
61
 Caesar consistently applies these literary techniques throughout battle 
narrative, for example using the subjective perception of the defenders in the 
Aduatuci account to highlight the arrogance of the enemy, or relegating Vercingetorix 
to the role of observer at the end of Alesia to establish his helplessness in defeat.
62
 It 
may be beneficial to engage in further study of these techniques across the work, with 
particular consideration of Caesarʼs use of anecdote and exemplum, which seem close 
to the use of such figures in rhetoric, and synthesise this analysis with studies of the 
speeches. In particular, the use of the anecdotal figure of Baculus suggests that the 
rhetorical techniques on display are not just evident in speeches, and that the studies 
of scholars such as Nordling can also be applied to the course of battle descriptions.
63
 
Caesar appears to draw on various methodologies for his battles, illustrating the 
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flexibility of his technique and the combination of different forms of persuasion. This 
thesis notes the possibility for a more robust understanding of Caesar and his style of 
argumentation, through further analysis of the methods used in the passages of the 
Bellum Gallicum. 
 
Another important conclusion to be drawn from the use of battle narrative is the 
highly episodic nature of the Bellum Gallicum. Caesar does not appear to have a 
stated goal for battle at the start of the work, and simply defines the theatre of 
operations. This lack of a stated scheme is apparent as, with the exception of Book 
Five, where there is an extensive interrelationship between the campaign accounts, 
most battles are directed at an understanding of the individual confrontation narrated, 
or at the campaign in which the battle appears. The essential feature of Caesarʼs 
battles is that they seem to address short term textual objectives, such as the 
representation of enemies like Ariovistus and Vercingetorix.
64
 As the account of the 
battle against Ariovistus illustrates, the content of the battle addresses the boasts of 
the enemy leader in the initial negotiations, and supports Caesarʼs opinion as stated in 
the Vesontio passage, demonstrating the close relationship of passages throughout the 
second half of Book One. Even complex battle narratives are primarily episodic, such 
as the Sabis River battle that builds the account around the virtus of the enemy, and 
that places Caesarʼs personal entry into battle against this enemy in a central 
position.
65
 This does not preclude an overarching or unifying theme for the whole 
work, but it does appear that Caesarʼs objectives for battle narrative are highly 
localised in the text.
66
 There is a close textual relationship between each battle and its 
attendant campaign, with highly visible objectives that are peculiar to each passage. 
 
The episodic relationship between battle narratives and their campaigns has 
implications for the composition of the work. The absence of external evidence to 
conclusively date the Bellum Gallicum has left unresolved the question of when and 
how the work was composed.
67
 The analysis provided in this thesis indicates that 
there is potential to better understand the manner of composition through an 
examination of battle and its relationship to the surrounding text. In particular, the 
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complex relationship of the various campaigns of Book Five, in which responsibility 
for the massacre is defined in the second invasion of Britain, and then reinforced in 
the siege of Quintus Cicero, suggests a literary pattern that emphasises the book over 
the work as a whole.
68
 This book shows a strong literary structure that suggests it may 
have been written to stand alone, the level of literary independence suggesting a 
periodic composition to the work.
69
 While not conclusive, the structure of Book Five 
may have important implications for scholarship on composition, as it displays a 
coherent argument structure that is limited to the content of the book and the activity 
of that particular year.  
 
Most importantly, this thesis provides improved qualifications to Caesarʼs concept of 
Roman warfare, an area of research that has thus far relied heavily on a literal 
interpretation of the text.
70
 While military scholars have recognised the artifice of 
speeches, battle has sometimes been afforded an exceptional position as largely 
immune to the self-promotional dimension of the work.
71
 In particular scholars such 
as Lendon and Kagan have attempted to explain Caesarʼs battles as driven by his 
understanding of warfare in the historical events described, but this thesis shows that 
these narratives serve a far more persuasive function. For example in the Sabis River 
narrative, two legions disappear from the narrative because Caesar concentrates on his 
own contribution and a tribute to his brave enemy, an omission Lendon attributes to 
the narratorʼs focus on the causal significance of virtus.72 While Lendon is correct to 
note that virtus is causally important, as Caesar shows in other battles, it is not the 
reason that this battle narrative appears as it does.
73
 This thesis demonstrates that a 
reconstructive view of battle may misconstrue the reasons the content exists, and lead 
to erroneous assumptions about Caesarʼs understanding of warfare. An acceptance 
that battle is carefully constructed for self-aggrandisement means that the reasons 
content appears can be correctly identified. This in turn creates opportunities for 
building a clearer picture of this commanderʼs understanding of warfare. 
                                                 
68
 See pp. 319-339. 
69
 Note also that if the exemplum Baculus‟ early appearances could be shown to foreshadow his later 
roles, this alternatively might indicate unitary composition. See 2.25.1, 3.5.2-3.5.3 and 6.38.1 for his 
appearances. 
70
 Wheeler (1998) and (2001) has noted the problems with the current use of sources such as Caesar. 
71
 See above pp. 22-25. 
72
 See above p. 202. 
73
 See above pp. 43, 56, 192. 
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It is this persuasive objective that can actually provide some highly valuable insights 
into Roman warfare. The most obvious result of this thesis is an understanding of 
what Caesar regards as the desirable characteristics of a commander, and how such a 
commander functions in both victory and defeat. This is illustrated in the account of 
the landings in Britain, where it is more important to show how he overcomes the 
challenge, than to portray himself physically leading the landing.
74
 Similarly, Caesarʼs 
representation of the massacre of Sabinus and Cotta illustrates that he has to show 
particular diligence in order to avoid censure for the defeat of the subordinates.
75
 
Overall, Caesarʼs attempts to convince his audience of his competence as commander 
lend a level of veracity to the military concepts contained within, as he appears to 
draw on preconceptions of command against which to rate his own performance.
76
 
While a level of caution is still required, Caesarʼs attempts to persuade his audience 
towards his interpretation of each passage are in themselves valuable in understanding 
what he considers are the important characteristics of a commander.  
 
In particular, this literary study of battle has already yielded results in an analysis of 
Caesarʼs expectations regarding centurions.77 A forthcoming article by this author is 
based on the study of exempla in the Bellum Gallicum, as it has been possible to 
define limits on centurion behaviour based on the literary context in which they 
appear. By first considering the motives behind the account, and the behavioural 
norms against which the centurions are assessed, it is possible to determine under 
what circumstances they were expected to enter personal combat or hold back and 
control the milites. This has implications not only for how centurions performed in 
combat, but on the behaviour of the cohorts overall. A detailed knowledge of 
persuasive role of battle narrative in the Bellum Gallicum enables a more exact 
understanding of Caesarʼs knowledge of warfare, through a balance of his authorial 
objectives against his military experience.
78
 Once the desire for a literal interpretation 
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 See pp. 254-260. 
75
 See pp. 319-339. 
76
 See for example the invasion of Britain pp. 251-253 above. 
77
 This is addressed in a forthcoming article, D. Nolan, Caesarʼs Exempla and the Role of Centurions 
in Battle. The author is indebted Dr Jeremy Armstrong of Auckland University in this regard, for the 
opportunity to contribute to his book.  
78
 This is the subject of a further examination regarding the siege of Quintus Cicero at 6.36-6.41 in 
Book Six. See Gerlinger (2008) p. 227. As Richter (1977) p. 164 notes regarding the use of Caesar 
“Sonach ist der Quellenwert des BG zwar in mancher Hinsicht begrenzt, jedoch innerhalb der 
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of battle has been dispensed with, there is scope for a much deeper understanding of 
Roman warfare as described by this highly successful commander.  
 
In Summation 
 
As a window into Caesarʼs reasoning while composing the Bellum Gallicum, an 
analysis of battle narrative yields valuable results regarding his concerns as he 
constructed each section of the work. By analysing the elements of combat provided, 
including structural and stylistic considerations, within the context of the immediate 
text, the persuasive role of battle narrative is apparent, and a detailed understanding of 
Caesar‟s objectives is possible. The overall role that battle plays is evident in the 
persistence of textual relationships that are addressed at specific objectives throughout 
the work, as he reflected on his military achievements and used them for self-
promotion through textual representation. It is not just through the military victories 
themselves that Caesar gained his formidable military and political reputation. 
Through the conflicts described in the Bellum Gallicum he was able to create 
meanings of his choice, and he used these narratives based on the wars in Gaul to 
advance his political career in Rome, and to help build a reputation as commander 
that persists to this day. 
                                                                                                                                            
gegebenen Grenzen von einem Gewicht, das es nach wie vor als das erstrangige Zeugnis für die 
dargestellten Geschehnisse und ihr politisches Milieu qualifiziert.” 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF BATTLES CITED 
 
 
Battle/Campaign Ref Main Citations 
Campaign against the Helvetii 1.4-1.29 pp. 49-50, 57-59, 170-177 
Defence of the Rhone 1.8 pp. 47-48, 215-216 
Defeat of the Ceutrones, Graioceli, Caturiges 1.10 p. 48 fn. 51 
Defeat of the Tigurini 1.12 pp. 55-56, 113-116 
Cavalry battle with the Helvetii 1.15 pp. 62 fn. 142, 178 fn. 98, 308 fn. 171. 
Defeat of the Helvetii 1.24-1.29 pp. 48-49, 57-59, 170-177, 215-215 
Campaign against Ariovistus and the Germani 1.31-1.53 pp. 50-51, 63-64, 146-161, 220-222 
Germanic attack on a camp 1.50 pp. 167-168, 184 
Defeat of Ariovistus and the Germani 1.51-53 pp. 50-51, 63-64, 146-161, 220-222 
Confrontation with the Belgae 2.1-2.12 pp. 51-53, 56-57, 64, 71-88, 177-184, 194-
198, 216 
Defeat of Belgic states 2.13-2.15 pp. 51-52, 195 
Defeat of the Nervii at the Sabis River 2.15-2.29 pp. 14, 45, 51, 66-71, 117, 166, 192-204, 222-
238, 282-283 
Siege of Aduatuca 2.29-2.33 pp. 54, 184-192, 243-245 
Defence of Octodurus 3.1-3.6 pp. 54, 88-111, 117-118, 163-164, 170, 280-
281 
Campaign against the Venetii 3.7-3.16 pp. 126-145, 221-222 
Sabinus and the Venelli 3.17-3.19 pp. 208 fn. 263, p. 209 fn. 268. 
Crassus in Aquitania 3.20-27 pp. 205-206 
Campaign against the Morini and Menapii 3.28 No battle fought 
Campaign against the Usipetes and Tencteri 4.1-4.16 pp. 8, 55, 297-319, 349-350 
First Rhine Crossing 4.17-4.19 No battle fought 
First campaign in Britain 4.20-4.37 pp. 245-260, 254-260, 279-280 
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Beach landing in Britain 4.20-4.26 pp. 254-260 
Chariot combat in Britain (first invasion) 4.32-4.34. pp. 65, 286-288 
Final battle in first invasion 4.35-4.36. pp. 288-290 
Morini attack on Roman cohorts 4.37 p. 290 
Second Invasion of Britain and preparations 5.1-5.23 pp. 125-126, 319-335 
Roman assault on river and wooded 
fortifications in Britain 
5.9-5.10 p. 328 
Chariot combat in Britain (second invasion) 5.15-17 pp. 331-335 
Roman assault across fortified river in Britain 5.18 pp. 331-332 
Roman assault on natural fortifications, a 
sortie and last battle in Britain 
5.21-5.22 pp. 166-167 
Defeat of Titurius Sabinus and Arunculeius 
Cotta 
5.26-5.37 pp. 52-53, 209-213, 335-339 
Defence of Quintus Cicero camp 5.38-5.51 pp. 239-243, 335-339 
Labienus defeats Indutiomarus 5.56-5.58 pp. 169, 207-208 
Campaign against Nervii, Senones, Carnutes, 
Menapii 
6.2-6.6 No battle fought 
Labienus defeats the Treveri 6.7-6.8 pp. 207-208 
Second Rhine crossing 6.9-6.10, 6.29 No battle fought 
Ambiorix escapes Basilus 6.30-6.31 pp. 205-206 fn. 244. 
Campaign against the Eburones 6.32-6.36 Minor skirmishes 
Quintus Cicero defence of Aduatuca 6.36-6.42 pp. 164-165, 209 fn. 268-269 
Sack of Cenabum 7.3 No battle fought 
Campaign against Vercingetorix 7.4-7.15 pp. 260-264 
Siege of Vellaunodunum, Cenabum and 
Noviodunum 
7.11-7.12 p. 263, fn. 263 
Siege of Avaricum 7.16-7.28 pp. 165-166, 262-263, 291-297 
Battle of Gergovia 7.36-7.52 pp. 116-123, 280 
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Slaughter of Romans at Noviodunum 7.55 No battle fought 
Labienus against Camulogenus 7.57-7.62 p. 207 fn. 259 
Cavalry battle prior to Alesia 7.66-7.68 pp. 268-269 
Siege of Alesia 7.69-7.89 pp. 264-276 
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